NIGERIA: THE 1979 ELECTION CHALLENGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00985R000200250004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Naiional ) ei'1~1.~
Foreign
Assessment
Nigeria:
The 1979 Election Challenge
An Intelligence Assessment
Confidential
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National Confidential
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Nigeria:
The 1979 Election Challenge (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 30 May 1979.
The author of this report is1I Africa
Division, Office of Political Analysis.
Comments e
directed to
This report has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations. (u)
Confidential
PA 79-10241
June 1979
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Nigeria: Federal States, Tribal Groups, and Islam
PORTO- LAGOS
NOVO
Gulf of Guinea
Equatorial
Guinea
Former northern region boundary
State boundary
PRINCIPAL TRIBES
Kanuri
Middle Belt Other
0 200
Kilometers
bon
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Nigeria :
The 1979 Election Challenge (U)
Key Judgments Nigeria has arrived at the last phase of its transition to civilian rule
planned for next October, but still must pass the test of national elections
this summer. Although many uncertainties remain, we are guardedly
optimistic that the changeover will occur.
? Several factors favor the restoration of civilian rule, particularly the
determination of General Obasanjo's government to avoid stormy elec-
tions and to see Nigeria through whatever problems develop between now
and October.
? The election period could well have difficult moments, however, and
there clearly is a risk that the transition may yet be disrupted.
? Since political violence is an endemic problem in Nigerian politics, a
heated electoral contest might degenerate into widespread communal
strife along ethnic and regional lines and cause the regime to cancel its
civil rule plan.
? The elections could polarize the Army and spur a coup attempt should
ethnic bitterness, communal violence, or administrative chaos pass a
certain unacceptable point.
? Shehu Shagari, presidential candidate of the northern Muslim-oriented
National Party, is the most likely victor, unless radical realignments occur
in the course of Nigeria's multistage elections.
? A prospective civilian government-whatever its leadership-is likely to
be more conservative, preoccupied with domestic affairs and stability, and
less active internationally.
The above material is classified Confidential.
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Nigeria:
The 1979 Election Challenge (U)
After 13 years of military rule, civilian government is
scheduled to be restored in Nigeria on 1 October under a
program begun in 1975. So far the plan has been carried
out step by step by General Obasanjo's regime in spite
of numerous hurdles. Even at this late stage, however,
it cannot be automatically assumed that the transition
will succeed. The country's greatest challenge will
be to proceed through a series of civilian elections
scheduled to begin in July and end by mid-August.'
The elections are fraught with many uncertainties
and potential risks, particularly the possibility that the
transition to civilian rule would be aborted if the elec-
toral process slides into uncontrollable political violence
or breaks down in administrative chaos. (C)
Federal and state legislative bodies must be elected and
in place to act as an electoral college should gubernato-
rial and presidential runoff elections prove necessary.2
The three legislative elections in July will pose the
first real test of strength for Nigeria's five competing
political parties since the formal ban on political activity
was removed last September. The results probably will
lead to political realignments that could significantly
affect the outcome of the August presidential election.
Most political parties are concentrating their efforts on
the first few races in the belief that the party showing
early strength will be perceived by voters as the eventual
t Nigeria's new constitution requires elections at the federal level
of a US-style presideht and vice president, a 450-member Federal
House of Representatives, and a 95-member Federal Senate.
Each of the country's 19 states elects a governor, deputy gover-
nor, and a unicameral House of Assembly. Nigeria's approxi-
mately 47.4 million registered voters will go to the polls at
weekly intervals according to the following schedule: Federal
Senate on 7 July, Federal House of Representatives on 14 July,
and state Houses of Assembly on 21 July; state governors and
deputy governors on 28 July and, if required, gubernatorial
runoff elections on 4 August; and federal president and vice
president on 11 August, with a runoff election on 18 August, if
necessary. (C)
2For a first round victory, presidential aspirants face a stiff
constitutional requirement-intended to force political parties to
be national in character and to put together broad ethnic coali-
tions-that they receive a majority of votes nationwide and
one-fourth of the votes in 13 of 19 states. Failing that, the
choice between the two top contenders is decided by majority
vote in all the federal and state legislatures. This provision is
national victor. The early front-runner-providing there
clearly is one-is counting on a bandwagon reaction as
that party heads into the all-important presidential
contest. (C)
Electoral Building Blocs
The Nigerian electorate is divided into six fairly distinct
groupings based on traditional ethnic and regional
affinities and the pattern of civilian politics during the
1960-65 parliamentary regime.
? The Hausa-Fulani Muslim North, including the states of
Sokoto, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, and Bomo and part of
the Niger state, has 38 percent of the electorate. Nige-
ria's first civilian government was dominated by the
more populous north, but the region today is far more
politically diverse and less united than it was in the early
1960s.
? The Yoruba West, including the states of Oyo, Ondo,
Ogun, and Lagos and part of the Kwara state, has 22
percent of the electorate. The Yoruba traditionally have
been Nigeria's most politically factionalized people.
? The Ibo East (ex-Biafra), with 13 percent of the vote,
is made up of Imo and Anambra states. Politically
cohesive in the past, the Ibo are now split into several
factions.
? The Middle Belt, which includes minority tribesmen of
the states of Plateau, Benue, and Gongola and parts of
the Kwara and Niger states, has 14 percent of the total
vote. This is a politically divided, ethnically and reli-
giously mixed buffer zone between the Muslim north
and predominantly Christian south.
being challenged in a court case that argues for a second popular
election before a possible electoral college finale. The constitu-
tion specifically states that a runoff contest is to be between the
presidential candidate who gained the largest vote nationwide
and the one with the next highest number of votes in the
greatest number of states. Gubernatorial runoffs will be held in
respective state Houses of Assembly should no candidate obtain
a majority of votes statewide and one-fourth of the votes in
two-thirds of all local government areas of the state. (C)
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Table 1
Nigerian Legislative Elections
Number of
Number of Legislative Seats
Registered Voters
Federal
Senate
Federal House of
Representatives
State Houses
of Assembly
Anambra
Bauchi
Bendel
Benue
Cross River
2,442,227
Gongola
2,284,500
3,465,198
Kaduna
3,420,839
33
99
Kano
5
46
138
42
Lagos
Niger
Ogun
Sokoto
Total
' Nigeria's new constitution provides for 450 seats for the federal
House of Representatives, which includes one for the yet-to-be-
organized territory where the federal capital will eventually be
relocated. (u)
? The Non-Ibo East, which includes the minority tribes
of Cross Rivers and Rivers states, contains 8 percent of
the electorate.
?Bendel State, a borderland of minority tribes between
the major Yoruba and Ibo peoples, has about 5 percent
of the vote. (C)
These components provide the electoral blocs from
which the main political parties must assemble wide
enough coalitions to elect their presidential slates under
existing constitutional rules. Within this context, the
traditional triangle of electoral competition has re-
emerged in which parties representing Nigeria's three
main ethnic groups-Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo-are
battling for inroads in one another's regional strongholds
and in minority tribe borderlands. (C)
Rural areas, where most Nigerians live, are expected to
vote largely along ethnic and regional lines and to follow
the direction of traditional local leaders or old-line
politicians. The behavior of the presumably more
sophisticated and politically aware urban voter is less
predictable. This group may be swayed more by populist
stands of the parties and inclined to vote across ethnic
lines and to split tickets. The urban vote alone, however,
probably would not be enough to swing the presidential
election in favor of any one candidate. (C)
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Parties, Leaders, and Prospects
Five political parties have been registered to compete in
the 1979 elections (see table 2). All are in varying
degrees regionally based, led by old-line politicians, and
for the most part descendants of parties that existed in
the early 1960s. As a result, political campaigning has
generally followed traditional lines of ethnic and re-
gional competition. Party parochialism is not as extreme,
however, as during the first republic. (C)
? The major northern Muslim-oriented National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) is clearly the front-runner going into the
elections. It represents the north's conservative tradi-
tional establishment and is a factional alliance of north-
ern political barons. Their compromise choice as presi-
dential candidate is Shehu Shagari, a 55-year-old Muslim
Fulani and a man of ability and moderation. The NPN is
widely perceived as the party with the strongest national
base but the one whose standard bearer projects the
weakest leadership image. It expects to do well in
various areas of the Middle Belt and the south.
Nigerian Political Parties
National Candidates and
? The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), led by veteran
Yoruba politician Obafemi Awolowo, is a resurrection
of his Yoruba-based party of the early 1960s. Although
well organized, the UPN has little sutmnort outside the
? The Nigerian People's Party (NPP) is based in the Ibo
east with some support among minority tribes in the
Middle Belt and south. Its presidential candidate is
Nnamdi Azikiwe, a 75-year-old Ibo who was Nigeria's
ceremonial president under the first parliamentary
regime. Azikiwe has more prestige than his party, since
the Ibo still are tainted by their attempted secession as
Biafrans in 1967.
? The Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) is a personal
vehicle for the presidential ambition of Waziri Ibrahim, a
53-year-old Muslim Kanuri from the northeast. One of
Nigeria's wealthiest businessmen who allegedly has some
following in the military, Ibrahim has a nontribal style
Orientation
Tribal Affiliation
Major Parties
President: Shehu Shagari (Fulani) Northern Muslim-oriented and dominated by major
Vice President: Alex Ekueme (Ibo) Hausa-Fulani ethnic group; has some support among
major southern tribes and minority tribes of Nigeria's
Middle Belt; generally conservative, rightwing cast.
Nigerian People's Party
President: Obafemi Awolowo (Yoruba) Based primarily on major southern Yoruba ethnic
Vice President: Phillip Umeadi (Ibo) group with little support elsewhere; strong populist
stance.
President: Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo)
Vice President: not yet chosen
Based heavily on major southern Ibo ethnic group,
eastern minority tribes, and Middle Belt support;
moderate centrist group.
Minor Parties
Great Nigerian People's Party President: Waziri Ibrahim (Kanuri) Dissident northern Muslim faction with a small
Vice President: Benjamin Nzeribe (Ibo) scattering of Middle Belt and southern support;
moderate centrist grouping.
People's Redemption Party President: Aminu Kano (Fulani) Alliance of antitraditional northerners and progres-
Vice President: Samuel Ikoku (Ibo) sive southern Ibos; reformist and xenophobic outlook.
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Shehu Shagari-1 975
Waziri Ibrahim-pre-1 965
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of politic
The is strongest in Borno and 'NPP
the electoral college gives an advantage to a northern
candidate-if regional unity operates-since the north has
the largest bloc of legislative seats. (C)
0 0 o s a s the north and has a small following in
the Middle Belt and the east.
? The People's Redemption Party (PRP), composed
of northerners adamantly opposed to the traditional
elite, is dominated by Aminu Kano, a 59-year-old
Muslim Fulani who led a similar grouping in the early
1960s. It is based mainly in northern Kano and Kaduna
states and is especially prone to violence. The PRP sees
its role as a spoiler in northern politics and allegedly
receives Libyan support. (C)
The presidential contest is clouded by uncertainty
and controversy over whether or not NPP candidate
Azikiwe and PRP leader Kano will be disqualified
under the election law for failure to provide proof of
payment of past income taxes. The two were put on
notice last April that they would be barred, but the
regime-concerned that their disqualification could spark
rioting-may yet find a way out by letting at least the
more important Azikiwe run. Azikiwe and Kano cannot
be formally disqualified until one month before the 11
August presidential election, and both are waging a legal
battle to stay in the race. NPP and PRP followers pri-
vately attribute the disqualification move to collusion
between the front-running National Party and influential
northern members of the ruling military council who
hope to retain senior military posts under civilian rule.
(C)
If the National Party defeats its assorted rivals in the
north and does well elsewhere in the legislative elections,
the party could possibly win a first round presidential
election. Should the National Party falter badly in early
contests, the political lineup could change radically and
result in a "stop-Awolowo" coalition since the Unity
Party is perceived as the second strongest party. An
Awolowo victory seems improbable because of the
depth of anti-Yoruba feeling in the north and Ibo east.
Awolowo and his supporters, nevertheless, harbor
unrealistic expectations of electoral breakthroughs and
seem destined for severe disappointment. (C)
A presidential runoff election is likely to be between a
northern candidate (Shehu Shagari or Waziri Ibrahim)
and Awolowo, or possibly the third-ranking NPP candi-
date Azikiwe, if he is not disqualified. The makeup of
If Azikiwe and Kano are disqualified, the principal
beneficiary would be GNPP leader Waziri Ibrahim. He
would be likely to pick up the support of Aminu Kano's
PRP followers and possibly important votes from the
NPP, which was led by Waziri Ibrahim before it split into
two parties last fall. It is even possible that Waziri
Ibrahim and Shehu S:hagari could face each other in a
presidential runoff. (C)
Campaign Issues
Personalities and domestic issues, rather than foreign
affairs, figure most prominently in the Nigerian election
campaign. There is nothing in the makeup of the leading
presidential candidates or their party platforms to
suggest that Nigeria would embark on radical change
under civilian leadership. Each political party espouses
broad populist goals and has promised a sweeping array
of welfare benefits. The main parties seem to accept the
continuation of a mixed economy and to be relatively
nondoctrinaire in their economic views. There is general
agreement on the broad outlines of Nigeria's present
nonaligned foreign policy, and all parties have made pro
forma statements of support for the liberation struggle
in southern Africa. (C)
Political Violence
Since political violence is an endemic problem in Nige-
rian politics, a heated electoral contest could degenerate
into communal strife along ethnic and regional lines and
possibly result in a breakdown of public order that the
security forces could not contain. The depth of under-
lying tension is difficult to gauge, but sectional strains
will inevitably increase as elections occur. Political
violence has gradually increased in recent months.
The rawest political contests are in the traditional
trouble spots-the Yoruba west, the Middle Belt, Kano
state in the north, and Bendel state in the south. (C)
The likelihood of violence will depend to a large extent
on how the presidential disqualification issue shapes up
in early July and on the government's ability to contain
recent student unrest in the north, which has taken on
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antisouthern and anti-Christian overtones directed
particularly at the Yoruba. Much depends on the success
of leadership by politicians and local traditional leaders
in avoiding exacerbating tensions within the country. (C)
The situation would deteriorate rapidly in the extreme
event that one of the presidential candidates were
assassinated or refused to accept the pr
anti inri+ari hie fnilnmare +n ,,nh o, +inn
I Vio-
lence instigated by followers of the People's Redemption
Party most likely would be largely confined to Kano
state and would not in itself be enough to disrupt the
overall electoral process. (C)
Partial Election Boycott
Even if serious political violence is averted, the presiden-
tial election might be boycotted in some areas of the
country should their preferred presidential candidates be
disqualified. (The last national election, in 1964, was
boycotted by the Ibo east and other scattered areas.)
Such a development would give a prospective civilian
government an inauspicious start and leave it open to
charges of not representing the popular will.
Administrative Bungling
The government's logistic preparations for elections
have been marked by inefficiency and ineptitude.
Widespread administrative breakdowns by the federal
electoral commission would significantly increase
the risk of disruptions and claims of vote-rigging-two
persistent features of Nigerian elections. Election prob-
lems could be complicated by the questionable accuracy
of the national voter roll and by the possible disqualifi-
cation for income tax irregularities of many of the
9,000-odd candidates the political parties have fielded
for various offices.3 In addition, the election dates
coincide with the rainy season and the Muslim obser-
vance of Ramadan, which threaten to reduce' voter
turnout in rural areas and the north generally. The
handling and tabulation of ballots for five closely spaced
elections will be further impeded both by the sheer size
of the electorate and by the country's inadequate
transport and communications facilities. (C)
3Under election rules, a political candidate cannot be formally
disqualified until one month before the scheduled date of the
election he is contesting. (C)
Voter Confusion
There is some risk that the voting public may have
difficulty coping with five separate elections and the
large number of candidates involved. A majority of
Nigeria's predominantly youthful society is illiterate and
has never voted before. (C)
Military Polarization
The electoral contest could polarize the military estab-
lishment should ethnic bitterness, communal violence, or
administrative chaos pass a certain unacceptable point.
At present, the ruling military council is united in its
desire to hand over power and is vigilant against possible
dissent in the lower ranks. Middle-grade and junior
officers-many of whom are thought to be lukewarm
about civilian rule-seem inclined to let civilian govern-
ment come to pass and to wait for it to break down
before seizing power. One concern is that the disqualifi-
cation of NPP presidential candidate Azikiwe might spur
unrest in the Army, where Middle Belt tribes-which
heavily back this party-are well represented. (C)
On balance, we are guardedly optimistic that Nigeria will
pass the test of elections and that the transition to
civilian rule will take place more or less on schedule. The
election period may well have stormy episodes, however,
and there clearly is a risk that the plan may yet be
aborted. (C)
Whether or not civilian rule is restored depends almost
entirely on the avoidance of widespread electoral vio-
lence. If there is serious strife, the Obasanjo regime
would probably cancel its civilian rule plan as much to
forestall a possible coup by middle-grade and junior
officers as to restore stability. It is also possible that the
1 October turnover date to civilian rule could be delayed
somewhat should it prove necessary to stretch out the
election schedule or should vote-counting be delayed by
administrative inefficiency. (C)
A number of positive factors argue for a successful
transition :
? The general absence to date in the long preelection
campaign of serious outbreaks of political disorder.
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Confidential
? The regime's determination to proceed with a transfer
of power and its confidence in its ability to handle
trouble.
? The resolve of the federal electoral commission to
conduct an honest election for which the results will be
acceptable to the people.
? The constitutional requirement for building a nation-
wide party coalition, which should help moderate
intemperate political behavior.
? The likelihood that no party will lose out entirely in
the elections since each probably will take control of
some state governments and have some representation in
the federal legislature.
? The apparent desire of most Nigerians to return to
civilian rule.
? The moderating behavior thus far of the country's
traditional leaders, who have worked to defuse volatile
situations, and of the press, which has generally re-
frained from overdramatizing incidents of political
violence. (C)
How the national elections are conducted and the
kind of leadership that emerges should provide a good
indication of how long a new civilian regime may last. It
is not clear if the presidential election can be won
without recourse to a legislative runoff. Even should
there be a first round victor, it seems unlikely that he
could get much more than 40 percent of the national
vote, given the ethnic and constitutional setting in which
Nigerian politicians must operate. This suggests that,
regardless of how Nigeria's future president is chosen, his
national mandate would be rather thin, and this could
affect his ability to govern. A brokered legislative runoff
following a heated first election could intensify the
ethnic bitterness that a new leader would have to face.'
(C)
Many informed Nigerians believe a prospective civilian
government will be far more preoccupied with domestic
problems and internal stability than international affairs,
particularly during its first year. They expect that
foreign policy under civilian rule will be less activist,
more conservative, and generally inclined toward closer
economic cooperation with the West. The closeness
of future Nigerian relations with Western countries,
however, will initially be heavily influenced by Western
moves to recognize the new Rhodesian Government and
to lift sanctions, and by the severity of the response to
Western actions by the present Nigerian military regime
before it hands over power. (C)
4A second national election-as has been proposed-would
give a greater aura of legitimacy to a presidential victor than
would an electoral college verdict. It is possible, however, that
the security situation in the country following the first presiden-
tial election would be unsettled enough to preclude another
popular vote. (C)
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Confidential
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