REQUIREMENTS FOR SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY FOR ABOUT THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002500050038-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 4, 1964
• Content Type: REQ

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CORONA/i
NRO Review
Completed.
COMOR-D-13/23
Requirements for Satellite Photography
for about the Next Five Years
1. Recent USIB actions on this subject are as follows:
USIB-D-41.13/2 (COMOR-D-13/17) of 31 July 1964 approved
COMOR recommendations that development work proceed urgently toward
achievement of a single capability for search and surveillance with a
continuous stereoscopic ground coverage equivalent to KH-4 and a reso-
lution equivalent to KH-7; and a capability which will permit inter-
pretation of details on the order of one foot or less on a side even
with a swath width half that of KH-7. In addition COMOR made certain
recommendations regarding priority which USIB did not approve,
b. Vulnerability
USIB-D-41.14/167 (COMOR-D-13/20) of 14 August 1964 reminded
the NRO of the urgent need for the protection of U.S. satellite recon-
naissance vehicles against Soviet anti-satellite capabilities,
C. Crisis Satellites
USIB-D-41.15/42 (COMOR-D-48/91) of 14 September 1964
requested the NRO to maintain a crisis standby capability with the KH-7
as had been done with the KH-4 and remanded to COMOR its paper on this
subject with instructions to broaden its considerations of crisis col-
lection vehicles to include manned systems and possible quick-reaction
satellites.
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COMOR-D-13/23
2. This paper contains no recommendations on the number of photo-
graphicsatellites required for crisis situations in view of other work
underway in response to the USIB directive mentioned in l.c. above. Our
remaining requirements for about the next five years are stated in the
paragraphs below.
General Search and Surveillance
3. We believe that high quality overhead photography with a swath
width of at least 200 miles and a ground.resolution.'of three to'fitre:'.feet is
needed to meet requirements for general search and surveillance of the
USSR, China, the European satellites, and other selected areas of the
world. Such photography would provide substantially more information.
bearing on important intelligence problems than can now be obtained by
the KH-4 system, For example, 3-foot resolution would greatly improve
our capability to: (a) monitor future offensive missile development and
deployment (e.g., small ICBMs), (b) locate mobile defensive missile
systems, (c) locate and identify ABM installations and determine the
interrelationshipsamong their facilities, (d) locate and identify sub-
marines by class, (e) identify small nuclear energy production facilities
and detect changes in known facilities, and (f) capitalize on targets of
opportunity. Furthermore the quality of base-line coverage useful in,re-
tracing the development of newly-identified facilities,and}in:lpro.ducing.;order-
of-battle and indications intelligence would be increased to a marked
degree.) A swath width of at least 200 miles'is required in light of the
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extensive land masses to be covered, the large size of many target
complexes, and the need for simultaneous coverage of targets falling
into a single intelligence category (e.g., heavy bombers at several
airfields).
4. We recognize, however, that the fulfillment of our intelligence
requirements for broad area search and follow-up surveillance over the
next two or three years will be limited by the resolution of the KH-4
system. To provide guidance for operating the KH-4 in that time
span, we summarize below our requirements for useable photography
derived from the KH-4 system:
a. Quarterly coverage of about 50 percent of the targets
in the USSR and China in each of the highest priority categories (e.g.,
50 percent of the ICBM complexes). Currently there is a total of
roughly 100 such targets. Regular quarterly coverage of a few of,these
high priority targets is required (e.g., Lop Nor and Tyura Tam).
b. Semi-annual coverage of a substantial portion (say 75 percent)
of the built-up areas of the USSR and China.
c. Annual coverage of substantially all (say 90 percent)
of the USSR, China and the European satellites.
d. Limited coverage of other areas of the world, as required
from time to time, primarily as a by-product of the missions conducted in
response to the foregoing needs.
CORONA/1
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CORONA/F__-] COMOR-D-13/23
5. On the basis of past experience and taking account of weather,
we believe that the foregoing requirements can be met by ten successful
CORONA J missions each year, i.e., 20 film packages. We also believe
that these missions should be spaced fairly evenly throughout the year
and that the zombie mode should be perfected and used. There should also
be a reserve of equipment sufficient to provide for about three additional
successful CORONA J missions to meet particularly pressing intelligence
needs of an ad hoc nature, should such needs arise,
6. At the earliest practicable time,the general search and sur-
veillance function should be taken over by the improved system discussed
in paragraph 3 above. We cannot at this time predict the number of
successful missions required to provide general search and surveillance
coverage with a 3-5 foot resolution, 200 mile swath system. We consider
it likely, however, that we will require at least the same coverage with
the same periodicity as described in paragraph 4.
Detailed Surveillance
7. Based on an analysis of several major weapon systems and nuclear
materials installations, photography with a ground resolution of about 3
feet is adequate to determine existence and identity and to pick up
changes in targets over time. In most cases, it is also adequate to
provide the data for estimates of capability. However, greater resolution
(on the order of one foot) would in many cases provide additional
CORONA ~
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COti,ONA/ COMOR-D-13/23
information which would make more positive the technical evaluation
of an object. For example, photography of this resolution would assist
us in determining important characteristics of offensive missile systems,
including specific details and dimensions of missiles and sites. It
would probably permit similar kinds of determinations regarding ABM
systems and provide firmer knowledge on Soviet submarines. It would
also contribute to our knowledge of Soviet military aircraft and certain
ground force equipment. Thus, there is a requirement for resolution
on the order of one foot.
8. If we were seeking only single isolated targets and the
probability of acquiring such targets were high, a narrow swath (say
5 miles) with one-foot resolution would be acceptable, provided that
the system described in paragraph 3 was also available. But, the
targets on which we desire high resolution photography are frequently
grouped at installations of fairly large size (e.g., Tyura Tam and
Sary Shagan) and the locations of some are not precisely known (e.g.,
submarines within a naval operating base). Therefore, launch economy
apd requirements of intelligence analysis dictate that the swath width
be as great as possible, preferably several times greater than that of
the KH-7 system.
9. /Paragraph 9. deals with the number of detail surveillance missions
required for minimum coverage of highest priority targets. It is still
under discussion within CIA./
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COMOR-D-13/23
10. The frequency requirements for an advanced system with about
one foot resolution cannot be specified at this time and would depend
upon the swath width and other operational characteristics.
Other Capabilities
11. There are a number of additional capabilities discussed below,
which we believe should also be achieved over the next five years or so.
We are aware that programs are under consideration or development to
meet some of them.
a. Operational Flexibility
Greater flexibility in the operation of satellite systems
would increase their usefulness in many situations. For example, an
on-orbit programming capability is needed in new systems to permit
coverage of targets not programmed at launch. Efforts to reduce response
times, both from launch decision to launch time and from launch to product
delivery, should be included. Since the community interest in areas outside
the Sino-Soviet land mass will continue to increase, it follows that there
is a need for greater flexibility in orbit selection. Orbit and program
change times should be reduced if possible to permit introduction of
changes shortly prior to launch time when required. Efforts should be
continued to develop the zombie mode in multi-packaged systems to
conserve boosters, and to permit retargeting on the basis of the previous
package results. Film capacity shbuld not be a limiting factor in new
systems as it is in KH-4 at present,
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b. Near-Real-Time Readout (Data Link)
There is a need to develop a near-real-time readout
capability to meet requirements for indications surveillance in crisis
situations. Such a capability would also be applicable to bomb damage
assessment.
c. Infra-red
There is a requirement for high resolution infra-red
photography to monitor the operational status of nuclear reactors,
gaseous diffusion plants, and other production facilities.
d, Multi-sensor, All-Weather
A capability is required to obtain simultaneous or
selective coverage by various types of sensors, on an all-weather,
24-hour basis, with near-real-time readout.
e. Geodesy and Cartography
A capability is needed to provide photogrammetric quality
photography of the world's land mass to permit more accurate positioning
of targets and the automatic stereocompilation of standard topographic
maps.
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