CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ISSUES OF THE 80S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200010083-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: October 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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SIGNAL
ON FAG _9l~P October 1980
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Marine Corps Reconnaissance,
Surveillance and Target Acquisition in
the 80s
U J U NDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS, the requirement
to "find and fix" the enemy's movers, shooters
and emitters is a challenge to any organization's recon-
naissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)
capability. Looking forward. to the 1980s, this chal-
lenge to the Marine Corps is even more imposing.
While rapid deployment in response to worldwide
contingencies has long been a demonstrated capability
of the Marine Corps., the advent of the Maritime Pre-
positioning Ships (MPS) concept introduces new com-
plications for the Marine Corps in the 1980s. In addi-
tion to maintaining our traditional role of forceable en-
try in amphibious operations, we must be prepared to
move rapidly by air;, marry up with our forward de-
ployed equipment prepositioned aboard specially con-
figured commercial ships in the objective area and then
carry out any one of a myriad of operational missions
assigned.
This complex activity must be executed in a manner
which ensures that the Marine commander has contin-
uous and responsive: intelligence support throughout
the entire process, from the airlift phase to the poten-
tial "movement to contact" phase. Yet, the very na-
ture of MPS deployment suggests that the commander
will frequently be separated from his normal in-
telligence and RSTA assets. During such periods, the
commander must rely on theater or national in-
telligence assets to keep abreast of a potentially vola-
tile and changing situation. This, in turn, places heavy
reliance on his accompanying communications, both
while airborne and upon reaching the objective area.
Upon arrival in the area, he may find Marine forces
deployed with Navy? Army and Air Force units, each
having unique organic RSTA assets. Service system
interoperability now becomes a factor as assets such
as Air Force RF-4C's, Navy EP-3C's and Army
SOTAS systems commence operations and provide
products of high potential value.
The Marine Corps must be prepared to employ its
RSTA assets in threat environments ranging from high
Clyde R. Dean
Brigadier General, USMC
Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters USMC
intensity against modern, sophisticated opposition, to
low intensity against insurgents, terrorists or similar
groups with varying degrees of combat capability. The
weapon systems and emitters we must "find and fix"
may be Communist-produced or may be of United
States or Allied origin.
As the state-of-the-art technology is incorporated in-
to the weapon systems of the 80s, the need for real-
time and near-real-time systems to detect and engage
the opposition becomes essential. We look forward to
a Marine Corps tactical intelligence system in the mid-
80s which comprises automated SIGINT collection,
processing and dissemination, including airborne col-
lection and direction finding capabilities; enhanced ca-
pabilities in ground sensors, including a capability for
remote emplacement; and the fully-fielded Marine Air-
Ground Intelligence System with its capability to in-
tegrate products of theater and national systems to
provide timely, responsive intelligence support to Ma-
rine commanders.
The challenge of the 80s is clear: a tactical RSTA
system which will provide tailored and timely in-
telligence; the flexibility to operate under varying and
demanding conditions; interoperable with other Serv-
ice theater and national systems; as mobile as the unit
it supports; capable of rapid deployment; and support-
ed by communications which will ensure that the prod-
ucts get to the commander in time for decisive actions.
The Marine Corps acknowledges the contributions
of the AFCEA community toward meeting this chal-
lenge, and lcu ks forward to.your continued assistance.
O~~S~i~~13
(1 1
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Emergence of New or Enlarged
Intelligence Requirements
A S WE MOVE INTO THE DECADE Of the 1980s, it is
certain that the intelligence community will be
called upon increasingly to provide vital support to our
national security decision-making processes. In this
regard, I am reminded of a perceptive statement made
by a senior intelligence official in 1977 in specific refer-
ence to the changing intelligence environment. This of-
v'ficial noted that two things stand out most clearly:
"? There are more things about which we need in-
telligence data.
? There is the prospect that intelligence may be
harder to obtain."
Our intelligence efforts have historically been heavi-
ly oriented toward the military aspects of world events
and remain largely so today. But while military consid-
erations remain vitally important, our need for eco-
nomic and political intelligence has an increasing im-
pact on our national security as well. This is a central
feature of the contemporary environment: the emer-
gence of new or enlarged intelligence requirements
which are in addition to, rather than instead of, more
traditional categories of intelligence.
Looking at some recent events, it seems to me that
an extremely useful outcome of the SALT II debate
within the Congress was a generally increased aware-
ness of the capabilities of intelligence to contribute to
our national security not only in respect to SALT but
also across the entire range of our security interests.
In addition to the obvious need to maintain our in-
telligence focus on coverage having long-range strate-
gic importance, I believe it is clear that our need for
political/economic/military intelligence on other func-
tional and geographic areas will continue to grow. Re-
Improving Our Analytical and
Dissemination Capabilities
T HE 1980s WILL BE a dynamic and challenging peri-
od for people in the intelligence business.
Throughout the decade, the potential for international
instability and turmoil will be very high. In this diffi-
cult setting, the intelligence community must continue
to identify and, indeed, anticipate the changes in the
foreign political, military and economic environment.
One of the greatest challenges faced by intelligence
professionals may well be the development of im-
proved ways of analyzing and disseminating in-
telligence information. Developing, procuring and em-
ploying the most cost-effective and mission-effective
collection systems will, of course, continue to be vital
tasks. Our technical capability to collect intelligence
should keep pace with needs though, and collection in
the 1980s will likely be characterized by the generation
of a large variety and heavy volume of timely, but
"raw," data, especially in times of crisis. To ensure
Bobby R. Inman
Vice Admiral, USN
Director
National Security Agency
cent events in Iran and Afghanistan underscore this
need. I believe that we must have a sizeable increased
investment in both intelligence collection and analytic
resources during the next decade if we are to serve the
nation's vital interests and take maximum advantage
of the opportunities available to us to produce in-
telligence of great value to this country.
It is my personal conviction that a prudent invest-
ment now in our overall intelligence posture will pay
back huge dividends as we move further into the
1980s. The challenge facing those of us in the In-
telligence Community is to plan wisely and be able to
articulate our programs well in order to build the nec-
essary levels of understanding and support in the deci-
sion-making levels of both the Executive Branch and
the Congress. The debate must be focused on what we
as a nation need in the way of first class intelligence,
not on what we can do without. An integral part of this
process will necessarily involve a more detailed educa-
tion of the public (to the maximum extent possible
within sensible classification bounds) of the vital role
of intelligence in relation to the national security of the
United States.
John B. Marks
Major General, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence,
Headquarters USAF
the data is used effectively, our analytical and dissemi-
nation capabilities must be equal to the technical po-
tential of collection systems. This will require progress
in several areas.
First, to separate and correlate the key bits of infor-
mation in a large volume of data, better analytical tools
will be, required. Many of the approaches to answering
this problem undoubtedly can be found in the data au-
tomation field. Computer-assisted analysis capabilities
will be essential.
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Secondly, improved communications will be critical
to our efforts to ensure effective dissemination of the
intelligence. In the tactical warfare setting, especially,
one can anticipate a need for near "real-time" commu-
nications. Here even the luxury of "a matter of min-
utes" may not be available to the tactical commander.
Decisions may have to be made in seconds. To do this,
the commander must have the best and latest in-
telligence available. Moreover, it must be presented or
displayed in a manner that facilitates rapid decision
making. To ensure that this is achieved, we must pay
continued attention to improvement of both our infor-
mation handling and communications capabilities.
Here again, data automation will play a significant
role. The contributions of America's dynamic elec-
tronics industry will be central to our efforts.
Finally, for Air Force intelligence, and the others in
this business, there is one particular area in which we
The Soviet Naval Threat
1. T HE CLOSE OF THE 1970s is more than a convenient
benchmark for the Soviet Navy; it is in fact a sig-
nificant milestone which marks the end of a full gener-
ation of dramatic Soviet naval progress and accom-
plishment. It has brought within grasp a Russian aspi-
ration nearly three centuries old; an open ocean Navy
capable of actually influencing world events. The signs
are clear and unmistakable: there has been a major
shift in the basic mission of the Soviet Navy, and as a
result, the Soviet leadership in the 1980s will have at
their disposal political and military options never be-
fore available.
Already established as the greatest Russian naval
builder since Peter the Great, Admiral of the Fleet of
the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov at age 70 still has a
few more years to consolidate and expand what he has
termed the "balanced fleet." Balanced to Gorshkov
means being capable of achieving any or all of the
broad range of traditional Naval missions:
? destruction of enemy naval forces, especially U.S.
submarines and aircraft carrier task forces-sea
denial;
? protection of Soviet areas for Soviet economic
and military use-sea control;
? strategic nuclear strike and deterrence;
? support of ground forces, primarily in areas con-
tiguous to the Soviet Union;
? cutting of enemy sea lanes;
? support of Soviet foreign policy in all areas of the
world;
? projecting power ashore.
During this period of rapid Soviet naval develop-
ment, top priority was obviously given first to match-
ing the United States nuclear submarine missile force.
In the last 10 years, the Soviets have built on the order
of 55 nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and al-
though the rate of construction has leveled off, we ex-
pect the Soviets to continue building even larger ballis-
tic missile submarines, with long range, more accurate
missiles.
absolutely must make progress. Intelligence work in
the 1980s will require personnel with highly developed
technical and analytical skills. However, the demand
for such skills in the private industrial sector, espe-
cially in the field of communications and electronics,
has outstripped the existing supply of these highly
trained personnel. The ability of the military to com-
pete with industry for-these people, and retain. the ones
we have, has never been great. Therefore, the real
challenge for military intelligence will be to build a
structure that permits us to attract, appropriately train
and then retain in our business the people who will, as
always, be our most valuable resource in the 1980s.
The challenge for industry and, indeed, the nation as a
whole, will be to help us train and create a pool of
technically and analytically qualified people in order to
meet the needs of both industry and the military com-
munity in the decade of the 80s and beyond.
Sumner Shapiro
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Naval
Intelligence
Even while building this nuclear deterrent force, the
Soviets have succeeded in developing a formidable
and increasingly capable number of general purpose
submarines. The Soviets added about eight sub-
marines in 1979, a majority of which were nuclear at-
tack types, bringing the total of general purpose nucle-
ar submarines to almost 100.
At the same time, they were carrying out their am-
bitious submarine building programs, they have also
carried out an equally ambitious naval surface ship
construction program. In the final analysis, this could
be of even greater significance, since it could well in-'
dicate the ultimate course that Soviet naval seapower
will take in the 1980s and beyond. Over the past 10
years, the Soviets have built an average of 12 principal
surface combatants each year. They have in progress
series production of four impressive new classes of
cruisers, one of which is nuclear powered. Adm.
Gorshkov, a surface sailor earlier in his career, has
convinced the rest of the Soviet leadership that future
wars will not necessarily be settled solely by massive
nuclear exchanges. The Soviet Union must prepare,
he has said, for conventional wars, and an open-ocean
navy is necessary for that.
Finally, the Soviets have expanded their naval pow-
er into new areas: amphibious warfare, at-sea replen-
ishment and now sea-borne aviation. Although not
conclusive, the accumulated evidence to date points to
the development of a larger conventional take off and
landing aircraft carrier by the end of this decade. If
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indeed the Soviets continue the progression we have
seen to date, the new carrier will probably also be nu-
clear powered.
What is most impressive about the Soviet Navy
today, however, and of longer range significance, is
the capital investment the Soviets have made in their
shipbuilding industry-both surface and submarine
construction and repair. yards. Five shipyards are
building submarines, eight are building surface war-
ships and several others produce minor warships and
auxiliaries. The yards now available to the Soviets are
capable of easily sustaining construction rates far in
excess of the rates we have seen during the past dec-
ade, and. they have obviously been developed with a
view to satisfying wartime requirements for repair fa-
cilities.:
The sum of these efforts is impressive. A generation
ago a defensive coastal force, outclassed by several
other navies, the Soviet Navy in 1980 is second only to
the United States, and this trend of increasing capabili-
ties continues into the foreseeable future.
1980 is the last year of the current Soviet five-year
plan. For the world to see, the Soviets will probably
have failed to reach many goals, especially in their do-
Army ISTA of the 80s
70 SCENT TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE initiatives in the
X'Varea of Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Ac-
quisition (ISTA) have contributed significantly to the
modernization and effectiveness of the Army's fighting
forces- The development and fielding of new equip-
ment is an important facet of this program. Equally
important is the management of the total structure of
tactical intelligence, which includes personnel, their
training and new organizations as well as the best
equipment that our technology can develop.
The nucleus of intelligence support to tactical com-
manders is the Combat Electronic Warfare In-
telligence (CEWI) unit assigned to Corps and Divi-
sions. A CEWI Battalion assigned to each Division
and a CEWI Group per Corps are currently being in-
tegrated into the Army force structure. These units
will control all the intelligence sensors directly respon-
sive to the Division or Corps G2; provide the organiza-
tional framework for collection management plus tar-
get and intelligence development; manage Electronic
Warfare assets; and assist the G3 in EW and Opera-
tions Security planning. The CEWI concept has
proved very successful in the efficient multidiscipline
management of ISTA/EW equipment and has greatly
increased the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence
products.. Concern with tactical intelligence does not
stop at Corps level. Echelons Above Corps (EAC)
play a key role in providing tactical commanders in-
telligence on enemy forces that could affect their areas
of operations. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Secu-
rity Command (INSCOM) provides the ISTA support
required at EAC and INSCOM units are tied closely
,with CEWI elements at Corps and Division. Under the
mestic economy. But also for the world to see is a na-
val building effort which, by any measure, has been a
success.
1980 is the end of a generation of Soviet naval
achievements. It is likewise the beginning of a new
naval age, both for the Soviet Union and the United
States, as the two navies grow more evenly-matched
in an open-ocean competition that could alter the
course of history.
In summary, the thought I would like to leave with
you is that there are clear and unmistakable signs that
the Soviet Navy is changing its orientation and its mis-
sion. Defense of the homeland is still paramount in So-
viet strategic planning, and the Soviet Navy figures
prominently in such plans. However, the balanced
fleet which Adm. Gorshkov conceived and built has
far greater capabilities than are required for a purely
defensive role. The Soviet leadership obviously recog-
nized the increased range of political and military op-
tions that such a navy affords them. They have proved
this, both by the way they employ their Navy in sup-
port of Soviet national interests today, and by the
mammoth capital investment and resource com-
mitment they are making in their Navy's future.
Edmund R. Thompson
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence,
Headquarters, USA
conditions of modern warfare, particularly that envi-
sioned in a European conflict, the contributions of IN-
SCOM units are critical to tactical commanders. The
size, speed and mobility of Soviet forces demand that
we acquire information from multiple sources on sec-
ond echelon units long before they can affect the battle
along the line of contact. We must be able to disrupt,
wear down or destroy these forces as far away as possi-
ble, beyond the range of the ISTA sensors available to
the Divisions or Corps. EAC elements can provide this
intelligence needed for deep targeting through a multi-
disciplined collection effort and analysis of resultant
information .utilizing Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) techniques.
ISTA/EW hardware has improved significantly over.
recent years and advancements in technology promise
even greater improvements in the decade of the 80s.
The challenge is to develop sensors that will provide
location data' on enemy units with sufficient accuracy
to permit immediate targeting (i.e., within 50 meters)
and have automated executive systems that can re-
ceive this sensor input, process it and send the data to
supporting fire units (artillery or tac air) in seconds.
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ment but a dedicated, positive approach to this prob-
lem throughout the Army will reduce the time lag.
In summary, we are entering an exciting period of
ISTA development within the Army intelligence com-
munity. Tactical commanders deserve the best in-
telligence and the most accurate and responsive target-
ing system that modern technology can provide. Suc-
cess against the Soviets or any other potential
adversary demands our collective best effort in meet-
ing this challenge!
Further, the sensor systems must be enemy independ-
ent, that is they must have the ability to collect in-
telligence despite the enemy's efforts to conceal his
operations. Technology is currently available to ac-
complish this challenge. ISTA sensors are now being
fielded or are in development, and the system to tie it
all together, the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS),
is expected to be fielded in the mid-1980s. Our devel-
opment efforts continue to be hampered by an exces-
sive period between conception and fielding of equip-
The Challenges Confronting U.S.
Military Intelligence
T HE HEALTH OF THE U.S. military intelligence
structure has never been better. Its work force is
more professional than at any previous time. Comput-
ers, communications and other technical aids provide
unprecedented capabilities to move and to analyze in-
formation. The traditional jobs-military capabilities,
order of battle, technical characteristics of equipment
and so forth-are being done well. We are continuing
to improve.
How then, can one reasonably speak of critical is-
sues for the 1980s? Simply because doing the tradition-
al things well is certainly not enough, and the current
rate of performance improvement may not be rapid
enough. Military intelligence must change with, or
ahead of, the times. It must recognize and accomodate
new needs while continuing to improve its service to
long established needs.
That comment undoubtedly has a familiar ring. The
fact that organizations and organisms perish or pros-
per as they adapt to change is widely understood. Yet,
I doubt that SIGNAL readers have had occasion to re-
late this principle to the challenges confronting U.S
military intelligence. A few examples of such challeng-
es may help.
For military intelligence, technological change
poses at least four major challenges. The first is keep-
ing up with the truly explosive growth of militarily sig-
nificant technologies in the traditional industrialized
countries. The second is maintaining currency on the
rapid transfer of technology to areas now developing
rapidly. The third is adequately tracking indigenous
technological growth in those developing countries.
The fourth is correlating technological advance. with
military capabilities. We know technology is very im-
portant to military capabilities, but we do not know
how to express military capability as a function of
technology when many other variables are present.
. The spread and increase of technology is paralleled
by the spread and increase of military capabilities.
Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Many of the formerly "underdeveloped" countries
have developed into regional military powers. Some of
these powers will undoubtedly be able to enhance
existing capabilities by purchasing modern equipment
and by further growth of indigenous industrial and
technological capabilities. Some will be able to devel-
op nuclear, chemical or biological capabilities. Some
will be able to purchase or produce rather sophisti-
cated electronic warfare gear. The sheer workload of
remaining adequately abreast of this rapid technical
and military capabilities growth will be a major chal-
lenge.
Turning to non-technical matters, military capabili-
ties rest upon supporting political, social, economic
and cultural institutions. It has often been observed
that military establishments are expressions of the.
supporting infrastructure. Our understanding of that
infrastructure in many areas is inadequate now, and
the supporting institutions are undergoing rapid
change. Our ability to understand the infrastructure
will be a major factor in our understanding of military
capabilities' and regional balances. Raising that under-
standing to the desired level will be a major challenge.
This brief commentary can only suggest some of the
major challenges ahead. What is certain is that the
challenges are large, that they extend across many dis-
ciplines, both "hard" and "soft," and that the,need
for excellent minds, excellently trained, will be greater
than ever.'
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The Long Term Health of the
Intelligence Community
HREE YEARS AGO, President Carter signed Execu-
I tive Order 12036 establishing a new system to
manage and oversee American intelligence. Since that
new beginning, the Intelligence Community has been
tested by world events and influenced, not only by
those same events, but by changing national priorities,
demand for greater public accountability and the need
to continue to produce a high quality intelligence prod-
uct.
Since then, our best substantive performance has
been in areas where we have traditionally excelled.
Support for SALT II, for example, demonstrated the
Community's broad and diverse collection capabilities
as well as perceptive and unbiased analysis. Timely
and accurate assessments of events in Vietnam and
Afghanistan drew creatively on a variety of ambiguous
indicators to provide clear.warning.
There have been important procedural and organiza-
tional accomplishments during this same period which
will affect the long term health of the Intelligence Com-
munity. For the first time in our 33-year history, a
closely reasoned, truly integrated National Foreign In-
telligence Program budget now provides the means for
judging competing intelligence programs against na-
tional needs. Vastly improved relations between the
CIA and the FBI have engendered this country's
strongest counterintelligence program in over a dec-
ade. A renewed and expanded dialogue with the aca-
demic and business communities is invigorating our
analytic effort.
However, challenges remain. Just functioning ef-
fectively in a world which during the 1970s learned
more about intelligence operations than was ever
known is a serious challenge.
Recognizing and assessing small but potentially sig-
nificant degrees of political and social change has be-
come increasingly important and can severely test the
most discriminating observer. Analysts must try to
draw conclusions from a gallimaufry of factors ranging
from religious and ethnic to socio-economic, genera-
tional and institutional. The problem of collecting this
kind of raw intelligence demands not only a heightened
sensitivity to subtle clues, but often new techniques,
both human and technological.
The Community is further challenged today by the
greatly expanded range of issues with which in-
telligence, must. deal. Not only must we continue to
study Soviet military capabilities,. but more and more
attention must focus on other areas which have the po-
tential to disrupt international stability. The growing
commerce in narcotics, the spread of terrorism, popu-
lation growth, famine, disease and the accessability of
goods and raw materials are but a few.
Stansfield Turner
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
While the Intelligence Community's plate is full and
the task may seem overwhelming, I have every con-
fidence that we will be able to continue providing the
best quality of intelligence to the policy maker. But to
do that, every intelligence organization, along with the
business community, which has for so many years bril-
liantly provided us with the technological means to do
our work, must play an important part.
The functions of individual intelligence services
were reasonably distinguishable at one time. Today
they are much less so. Despite E.O. 12036, the struc-
ture of the Intelligence Community and its sometimes
divergent interests understandably still tend to encour-
age competition for functions and resources. Com-
petition in the analysis we do is healthy and to be
sought. Competition in system development or collec-
tion wastes resources and risks limiting our capabili-
ties unnecessarily. Within the Community, we must
work to prevent the destructive fractionalizing of the
intelligence budget, or the building of new structures
to circumvent it, which will only result in increased
costs without commensurate return.
American business can help by recognizing that
while we all would hope to remain on the frontiers of
technological innovation, that is not always financially
possible. The Intelligence Community, the United
States and the interests of business are better served
when marginal gains at great cost are identified for
what they are and funds as well as creative effort are
directed toward areas where there is greater con-
fidence in and need for the gains to be achieved.
None of these problems can be solved overnight,
nor goals reached by a single effort. But as T. S. Eliot
said, "History is now." What we do today to capital-
ize on the formidable capabilities we have and to solve
the problems we can identify will strengthen our con-
tribution to a history we can all be proud of. It will
require open -minds, an uncommon willingness to sub-
ordinate parochial interests to measures which are
more in the longterm good of the country and frequent
checking to ensure we are all looking through the right
end of the telescope. None of that is easy, but we will
not succeed without it.