ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST COMBAT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE B-3 FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100030006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 17, 1999
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2006i~1jq~,; RDP78T02095R000100030006-9
Organization and Strength. of the Communist Combat
and Administrative Service Units Subordinate to the B-3 Front
1. A communist finance document captured by TJS forces on
May 6 in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, lists all combat and
administrative service units subordinate to the B-3 Front and
gives their strengths as of April 1970. These units are carried
in the order of battle as all North Vietnamese.*
2. The document lists a total of more than 21,000 personnel.
However, some sick and wounded in the hospitals listed in the
table are included in the total. If deleted, the actual number
is closer to 20,000 men. Of the 20,000, approximately 11,000
are combat forces and nearly 9,000 are administrative service
personnel. Our estimates as for March 1970 reflected a total
Communist strength of about 9,000 men, of which 6,600 are combat
and nearly 2,500 are administrative service personnel. A unit
by unit comparison between the documents and our listings is
attached.
3. The major difference in the number of combat forces
results from the higher unit strengths listed in the document;
nearly all the combat units listed previously had been identified.
For administrative services, however, the differences result
from both higher unit strengths as well as a larger structure than
wh~.t we have been estimating.
4. Although we may have simply understated unit strengths,
it is also possible that these strengths may be the result of
recently received NVA replacements. Amore important problem
with the strength figures, however, may be found in the fact
that unit strengths listed in finance documents often are consider-
able higher than actual unit strengths because they are used for
planning purposes for such things as food and clotYiing. Other
*VC combat and administrative service units which operate
in the B-3 Front area are not directly subordinate to the Front
but to the province headquarters of Gia Lai, Kontum, and Dac Lac.
The Front, however, indirectly maintains operational control over
these VC units through the respective province headquarters.
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 Approved For Release 2006IA-RDP78T02095R000100030006-9
captured documents and prisoner reports, however, indicate higher,
as well as lower, strengths, suggesting that the writer may have
used both actual as well as authorized strengths, depending on
which was more readily available.
5. The document lists both a 40A and 40B Artillery Regiment
with a combined strength of 1,790 men. We carry a 40th Regiment
with 3 battalions and a strength of only 850 men. '.Pwo headquarters
elements of the 40th and at least three new battalions of the unit
have recently been identified. In addition, another document,
dated May 1970, reveals that the 40th Regiment cons:Lsts of as
many as eight battalions with a total strength of 1,964 men.
However, these two additional battalions possibly are units which
we already carry that simply have been resubordinatc~d to the 40th
Regiment for tactical purposes.
6. The document also suggests that our present organizational
listings of the 24th Regiment may be incorrect. Prc~sently, we
carry the 24th Regiment with two subordinate battalions, the 4th
and the 6th. The 5th Battalion which was formerly ;subordinate to
the 24th Regiment is carried as an independently detached battalion.
The document lists the strength of the 24th Regiment as well as
a separate listing of the strengths of the 5th and 6th Battalions.
This separate listing suggests that the 6th Battalion also may
have been separated from the 24th Regiment and, like the 5th,
may now be operating independently. According to oar present
listing, this would leave the 24th Regiment with on:Ly one battalion.
However, additional documents suggest that the 24th may have
acquired at least one new battalion, the 7th. This would mean
the 24th Regiment now has at least two battalions in addition to
the 5th and 6th. The net result is the probable addition of at
least one new combat battalion to the B-3 Front.
7. In addition, the document indicates that we probably
have understated some unit strengths and not picked up a considerable
number of logistical, training, and medical personnel of the B-3
Front. We do not carry a 27th NVA Engineering battalion, Binh
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 Approved For Release 2006/11106 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000100030006-9
SEC T
Tram Bon (one of four Binh Trams subordinate to the F'ront),
or several training schools. In addition, while we were aware
of the existence of the three other Binh Trams, we have not
carried any strength for them because of the lack of information
on the nature and extent of their functions. The document lists
these three Binh Trams with an aggregate strength of about 2,500
men. Another recent captured document cites the aggregate strength
-~}I QEr
of these~Binh Trams at about 2,000 men, which tends to confirm
the aggregate size of these units. Other differences between
the document and our estimates are found in the strengths carried
for transportation and medical elements of the B-3 Front. Our
strengths of the transportation units are much lower than those
listed in the document, although we actually carry two more
battalions than listed (the two others we carry are believed.
to be aka's for the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions). Our
estimates of the strength of the medical elements also appear
somewhat low. However, there is some question about the apparently
high strengths indicated for some medical units listed, particularly
the V211 and Vl Hospitals. These units are not believed to
include sick and wounded as the document clearly lists the strength
of these personnel separately.
8. Despite all the problems with the specific strengths
of individual units, this document and a number of other supporting
documents provides the Intelligence Communist with a much clearer
picture of the structure of Communist combat and administrative
service forces in the Front and indicates that our previous estimates
of its aggregate strength were considerably understated. In
addition, other documents indicate the probable existence of
several units of the Front not listed in the basic document or
in our estimate, including a transportation battalion and a food
production regiment. Considering all factors we_believe that the
aggregate strength listed in the document represents a good
estimate of the total personnel of the Front.
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 Approved For Release 2006/11106 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000100030006-9
~~
Comparative Listing of VC/NVA Combat Forces
Subordinate to B-3 Front
,Doc
(Apr 70 )
24th NVA Inf Regt
1,308
28th NVA Inf Regt
1,769
40A NVA Arty Regt )
1,790
40B NVA Arty Regt )
66th NVA Inf Regt
1, 790
95B NVA Inf Regt
1,182
K20 NVA Sap Bn
304
(Possible AKA for the
120th Sap Bn)
K28 NVA Recon Bn
263
K37 Sap Bn
259
5th NVA Inf Bn
383
(Detached from 2.~th Regt)
6th NVA Inf Bn
539
(Bossibly detached from
24th Regt)
80th NVA Sap Recon Bn
354
K631 NVA Arty Bn
491
K394 NVA Arty Bn
593
_ Estimate
_ ~ (Mar 70 )
750
1,200
850 (Car.ry 1 regt, 3 bns;
however, unit recently
appears to have picked
up at least '3 new bns)
1,000
750
200
150
300
250
(250) (Carry as part of
24th Regt)
450
300
400
Total 11,025 6,600
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~~~T
Comparative Listing of VC/NVA Administrative ;Service
Personnel Subordinate to B-3 Front
Doc (Apr '70 )
Hq. & Staff, B-3
(includes Hq. B-3;
MI Unit; Poli, &
Rear Svc Staffs)
K25 NVA Engr Bn
K26 NVA Signal Bn
K2 7 NVA Engr Bn
Military-Political
Tng S ch oo l
3 other Tng schools
Central Hospital
K22 Hospital
K23 Hospital
V211 Hospital
DT3 Med Unit
DT4 Med Unit gg
GT
_Estimate
(Mar 70)
Carried as part of
the strength of the
Front's Hq & Staff
Not carried
Not carried
Not carried
Not carried. May be
AKA for 3rd Medical Bn
Carried as part of the
strength of the Hq &
Staff of Kontum Province
Not carried ) Carry a
province
dispensary
as part of
the streng
of the 6ia
Lai Prov
Not carried ) Hq. ~ Staf
 Approved For Release 2006i111~~DP78T02095R000100030006-9
V2 Hospital
Hospital 84
3rd Med Bn
D2 Trans Bn
D5 Trans Bn
D6 Trans Bn
Estimate
Doc (Apr 70 ) (Mar 70 )
Not listed. May
be AKA for the
K22 Hospital
Not listed. May
be AKA for the
Central Hospital
Not carried. May be
AKA f:or one of
following bns ,
Not carried. May be
AKA f:or one of
following bns.
D3 Trans Bn
D4 Trans Bn
17th Trans Bn
509th Trans Bn
X6 Unidentified Unit
Not listed 125
Not listed 125
Not listed 125
Not listed 125
222
Not carri
ed
Binh Tram Bac
1,062 )
Existence
known but no
Binh Tram Trung
846 )
specific
assigned
strength
to the indi-
Binh Tram Nam
631 )
vidual BT's because of
lack of information
Binh Tram Bon
Sma11-~.Misc Units
466
4.ti~
Not carried
rT,.~ ,..,vv_ ~a
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 Approved For Release 2006i11106i -~DP78T02095R000100030006-9
*Docuemnt gives the total as 21,067. The difference is
due to the counting of sick and wounded personnel in the hospitals
which have been omitted from the listing above.
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