CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001700110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY DIA review(s) completed.
CURRENT
N-W f 2)/ /
COPY NO. 50
OCI NO. 1790/58
22 May 1958
State Department review completed
OQGUnnr_+?
NO CHANCE IN CLASS
0 OECIASS'"r-
CIASS. CHANGED TO
t4EXT REVIEW DATE:
HR 10
AUT
REViEWER?.
pATE'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY`
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
RETURN TO W HIVES a R
S CENTER
JOB ~~Qr? Box
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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N"We
FIDENTIAL
CON
similar rank in France
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
P'flimlin's Position
Premier Pflimlin is under
mounting pressure from the mili-
tary and. extremists in both
Algeria and France, and the pos-
sibility of General de Gaulle
returning to power has markedly
increased. While the National
Assembly has given the govern-
ment overwhelming support to
date, Pf limlin appears barely
able to keep the army problem
from coming to a head. Inde-
pendent'"leader Pinay's offer to
act as a go-between to negotiate
the return of De Gaulle reduces
the chances of a "national union"
solution if Pflimlin falls.
The Pflimlin government,
while.professing its determina-
tion to.carry on, has admitted
it has practically no informa- --
tion as to developments in Al-
giers, and is extremely worried
over reports that rebellious
field-grade officers are in con-
tact with fellow officers of
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ere appears to be some ques-
tion regarding the role of the
new French army chief, General
Lorillot, because of his earlier
close association with the osten-
sible civilian chief of the
Algerian junta, Jacques Soustelle.
It appears more and more
unlikely that the Pflimlin gov-
ernment can resist the concerted
pressures from the military for
long. Posters appeared in Paris
on 21 May announcing the forma-
tion of a "national committee
of public safety," and the com-
mittee stated on 22 May it would
"remain calm and disciplined a
few days longer, but no more."
De Gaulle encouraged army
elements in Algiers when, in his
press conference, he both com-
mended''their action and attacked
the "regime'of the parties" in
Paris. Following his state-
ments, the "war of nerves" against
Pflimlin was intensified. The 25X1
army in France is reluctant to
split with its generals in Al-
geria
Pflimlin has refrained
from condemning the Algerian
"coup" and has tried to buy at
least some army support by re-
storing cuts in the military
budget and by increasing the
length of service for draftees.
The Communists and Social-
ists, separately, continue to
issue warnings that they will
oppose any attempts to topple
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
the Fourth Republic and are
gearing their organizations for
underground resistance in the
event De Gaulle returns to pow-
er. The American Embassy, how-
ever, has doubts about how?
strong or.how sustained leftist
efforts to block his return
would be in the face of the rank
and file's apathy thus far.
American Consul General
Lyon in Algiers believes the
recent Algerian developments
are "irreversible" and that the
French Army and rightist civil-
ians there are determined not
to accept the authority of the
Pflimlin government. Should
the premier continue to hold
out, extremists among these
elements may eventually resort
to still more radical tactics
in an effort to bring about the
desired change of regime in
France.
Precise power relationships
within Algeria are still unclear.
De facto military and civil cab-
inets have been appointed with-
out reference to Paris, and an
all-Algeria committee of public
safety is being formed. Gen-
eral Salan, France's top com-
mander in the area, who still
provides a tenuous link with
Paris, will probably continue
to be recognized as supreme
titular authority, at least by
all the military, until a clear
test between Paris and. Algiers
deve lops,.. He appears to be un-
der increasing pressure, how-
ever, both from the clique of
paratroop officers who original-
ly masterminded last week's ac-
tion and the extralegal Algiers
public safety committee which
is headed by General Massu but
apparently dominated by local
civilian extremists. Lyon be-
lieves these elements are wield-25X1
ing the real authority at pres-
ent, and this view,
seems borne out by a an s re- 25X1
mark to a cheering crowd on 21
May that "we shall march together
up the Champs Elysees."
The position of Jacques
Soustelle, former' "tough" gov-
ernor general of Algeria who
arrived in Algiers on 17 May,
remains somewhat ambiguous. At
present he is the principal ob-
ject of adulation from the
streets and apparently the main
spokesman for the civilian ele-
ments in the new leadership.
However, he has either not been
offered, or has so far declined
to accept, any official position
locally and the real extent of
his influence and ambitions is
not clear. While formally ac-
cepting Salan's over-all author-
ity and frequently appearing
with him in public, Soustelle
is reported to have clashed with
Salan privately and appears to
work more closely with the Al-
giers committee than with Salan.
Soustelle may yet assume more
open authority, especially if
the extremists, who apparently
have continuing doubts about
Salan, decide to remove the
general.
Moslem Attitude
Most of the 1,200,000 Euro-
peans in Algeria seem to approve
the recent developments, and
-there have been numerous public
manifestations of support for
the "new Algeria" by consider-
able numbers of Algerian Moslems.
These, however, appear to be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
largely artificial affairs
staged by psychological warfare
units of the French Army and,
in some cases, by local employ-
ers. Lyon
who witnessed a recent demon-
stration involving nearly 10,-
000 Moslems report it was mani-
festly overorganized and that
the Moslems who participated
were mostly "simple peasant
types herded about like sheep"
by army personnel with portable
electric megaphones.
by French military leaders in
Algiers that the Moslem rebels
have virtually ceased fighting
were apparently made with little
regard for reality in order to
satisfy a propaganda line. They
have been officially contra-
dicted by the minister of infor-
mation in Paris.
it appears most unlikely
that many of the Moslem leaders,
who ultimately determine the
position of the largely apa-
thetic masses, are being im-
pressed by the "unity and broth-
erhood" line now being propa-.
gated by the new local leaders.
Meanwhile, the Moslem na-
tionalist rebels of the Algerian
National Liberation Front (FLN)
have shown no interest in Salan':s
recent amnesty offer. An.'FLN
spokesman broadcasting over
Cairo radio has excoriated the
"Massu-Soustelle criminal gang,"
and a top FLN military leader
stated in. Tunis on 18 May that
the rebels have no intention of
putting down their arms until
France agrees to the principle
of independence. Recent claims
Morocco, and especially
Tunisia, are extremely anxious
over the activities in Algeria,
which have heightened latent
fears that the French Army might
attempt to reoccupy those coun-
tries. There is, however, no
evidence that the French, who
have long regarded Bourguiba
as the "number-one enemy" be-
cause he supports Algerian in-
dependence, are preparing any
early military operations out-
side Algeria. The reported grow-
ing restlessness of French troops
in Tunisia is likely to lead to
serious incidents in Tunisia
and set the stage for the inter-
nationalization of the French-
Algerian problem.
Nevertheless, the freewheel-
ing activities of the French
commandant at the Remada base
in remote southern Tunisia, who
on 17-18 May dispatched troops
to surround two Tunisian road-
blocks within 25 miles of his
base, have created a new problem
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
in French-Tunisian relations.
As they threatened, Tunisian
units on 22 May fired on four
French jet aircraft when they
took off from the Gafsa air base
some 175 miles northeast of
Remada, and French troops re-
turned their fire. Bourguiba
now can be expected to press
again for the immediate supply
of American arms and ammunition
forces.
to equip his small security
The Lebanese Government
has decided to appeal to the UN
Security Council against UAR in-
tervention, despite friendly
warnings that its case must be
a strong one. The decision,
which provoked the defense min-
ister to resign, is probably
the result of realization that
suppression of the violence in
the country is impos-
sible as long as the
UAR is supplying and
introducing new
groups of dissidents
into the situation.
The most recent
example of a revival
of dissident activity
is the "capture" of
Balabakk city hall on
20-21 May by an armed
band composed of
fedayeen terrorists
from Syria and local
dissident tribesmen.
This putsch was or-
ganized in northeast-
ern Lebanon, and
about the same time
another band of about
1,000 dissidents is
reported to have be-
gun a march westward,
possibly toward the town of
Tripoli, where strong points
are still held by antigovern-
ment forces.
To encourage these and
other operations, Damascus and
Cairo radios have become more
outspoken and direct in their
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\ Balabnkk
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
support. Damascus radio on 21
May broadcast an appeal from
a Syrian Druze leader to his
fellow Druze in Lebanon, call-
ing on them to support the an-
tigovernment cause. Cairo radio
on the same date broadcast,
while technically quoting, a
dissident appeal to Lebanese
army officers to join the dis-
sidents and do their "duty" by
overthrowing President Chamoun.
Cairo radio is particularly
effective in its situation re-
port broadcasts.
The UAR portrays the strug-
gle in Lebanon as exclusively
one between Chamoun, his West-
ern-enthralled lackeys, and the
"people.
The dissident leaders in
Lebanon are of course playing
the same theme and insisting
they will not lay.down arms or
call off their general strike
until Chamoun resigns. They
are being partially encouraged
in'their intransigence by the
maneuvers of army commander
General,Fuad Shihab, whose ob-
jective, in so far as it can be
discerned, seems to be twofold.
Meanwhile, there are signif-
icant economic pressures for an
end to violence building up in
the important Lebanese business
community. While Beirut port
is reviving from the almost com-
plete close-down last week and
while more shops in the city
are open for at least part of
the day--they close after ' bombs
explode--the merchants have lost
very large sums already and
stand to lose considerably more
while the transshipment business
is at a standstill, It re-
mains to be seen which side
this kind of pressure will favor,
although almost any kind of
compromise at this point would
probably appear as a defeat for
Chamoun.
The events in Lebanon con-
tinue to arouse great concern ,
among other states in the area,
some of which appear to feel
that they may be next if Lebanon
falls to Nasir's pressures.
One of the reasons given
by Jordanian authorities for
Samir Rifai's appointment as
Jordanian prime minister when
he was scheduled for an Arab Un-
ion government post is the need 25X1
for a firm hand in Jordan durin
this period.
e Israelis are watch-25
n e elopments closely; Tel
Aviv has kept public official
comment to a minimum,
25X1
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Government operations to
crush the North Celebes dissi-
.dent movement are proceeding
swiftly. Djakarta announced on
20 May the recapture of Morotai
Island, and government troops
reportedly have landed at
Djailolo _On Halmahera Island.
The dissidents claim, however,
they recaptured Gorontalo in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
North Celebes on 20 May; the
government had reported taking
it the previous day. Other gov-
ernment operations are said to
be planned soon against the
northern coast of Celebes and
against the Poso area, with the
dissident capital of Menado as
the ultimate objective, During
the dissident air strike against
Ambon on 18 May, one B-26 was
shot down,
In the wake of government
successes, dissident military
commander Lt, Col. Sumual on
21 May announced he was prepared
to negotiate for a "reasonable"
settlement, Djakarta immedi-
ately refused the offer. Gov-
ernment officials repeatedly
have stated that negotiations
with the dissidents will not be
considered.
President Sukarno delivered
a speech on 20 May, National Re-
awakening Day, which was more
favorable to the United States
than any he has given since the
beginning of the provinces' re-
volt. Emphasizing that Indo-
nesia had achieved its identity,
Sukarno quoted Abraham Lincoln
as stating that "no nation is
good enough to govern another,"
and said this applied to the
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Dutch, the USSR, and the United' 25X1
States in.relatioa to Indonesia.
The Indonesian army intel-
ligence chief, Lt. Col. Sukendro
--undoubtedly speaking for Chief
of Staff General Nasutior--told
the American army attache last
week that moderate Indonesian
leaders intend to make changes
in the cabinet and undertake ac-
tion against the Communists.
He said, however, that these
actions must be delayed until
after the defeat of the North
Celebes dissidents.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
BLOC LEADERS MEET
The present meeting of bloc
officials in Moscow has brought
together an unprecedented com-
bination of party, government,
economic, and trade leaders. It
was foreshadowed last April by
Khrushchev during his Hungarian
tour when he called for a meet-
ing of Eastern European and So-
viet leaders to discuss bloc
economic cooperation, industrial
specialization, and particularly
economic cooperation among in-
dividual satellites. These eco-
nomic problems may indeed be
thorny enough to merit this con-
centrated attention, but it
seems -inevitab :e that the dis-
cussions will. spill over into
political and military problems
as well. In addition, TASS has
announced that a meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Pact is scheduled
to begin on 24 May*
Conspicuous by their ab-
sence are the Yugoslavs, and the
underlying theme of the meeting
could well be the need for the
socialist camp to exhibit mono-
lithic bloc unity-economic,
military, and political--in the
face of 'titoist revisionist ob-
stinacy and Western colonial
aggrandizement, Khrushchev now
may be able to accomplish this
aim, even though he achieved
only limited success in a sim-
ilar effort last November on
the party level aloner The
fact that TASS has announced
that such a r:meetisg is in
progress. suggests that a for-
mal communiqud on the results
is in the offing and that no
serious difficulties are fore-
seen.
on the economic side, the
USSR heretofore has relied on
voluntary approaches to inte-
gration 'by members of the bloc
Council for Mutual Economic Aid
(CEMA)? However, nationalistic
desires for economic independ-
ence and resistance to the
elimination of inefficient in-
dustries which developed dur-
ing the Stalinist postwar
period have limited the promo-
tion of specialization, which
would not only step up produc-
tion but also increase bloc
interdependence. The Soviet
Union now may be proposing
that CEMA decisions be made
binding on all members. It
is probably also eager to
counter the growing economic
unity of Western Europe.
Working-level CEMA confer-
ences have already engaged in
developing ~ coordinated eco-
nomic plans to run through
1965, the terminal date of the
yet-to-be-announced Soviet
Seven-Year Plan,
On the political side, the
participants will probably de-
cide on a united policy against
Yugoslavia, including strong
economic sanctions, a decision
that may be difficult for
Gomulka to adcept.
In discussing ways to bol-
ster bloc unity, the conferees
might come up with some sort
of new bloc organization de-
signed to coordinate political
and economic efforts. The
Asiatic Communist countries,
which have delegates of some-
what lesser rank in attendance,
will probably participate to
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SEC. ET ... .
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
some degree in whatever pro-
gram develops from the cur-
rent meetings.
Any decision to re-estab-
lish a Cominform type of re-
lationship in the bloc, however,
would probably have to surmount
the objections of Gomulka, who
would see in.such an arrange-
ment an implicit threat to his
principles of noninterference
and autonomy.
In the international arena,
the Warsaw Pact political meet-
ing to follow will probably
come up with the bloc's answer
to the West German decision to
arm with nuclear weapons. The 25X1
USSR has been threatening un-
specified countermeasures to
this for some time.
(Prepared jointly with ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
.22 May. 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
USSR WARNS WEST ON INDONESIA AND LEBANON
On 14 May Moscow and Pei-
ping simultaneously denounced
"American intervention" in In-
donesia and accused the West
of "direct incitement to over-
throw the legitimate Indonesian
Government.". On 18 May the
USSR attacked Western "inter-
vention" in Lebanon as "another
case of interference in inter
nal Arab affairs." The USSR
ignored its contradictory posi-
tion of supporting the estab-
lished regime in Indonesia and
the revolutionaries in Lebanon,
implying that the West was at-
tempting in both these coun-
tries to. establish colonial re-
gimes.
Both statements are pri-
marily political broadsides in-
tended to indict the West, and
specifically the United States,
before world public opinion on
the charge of military inter-
vention and colonial aggression.
The statements are essentially
political moves designed to in-
hibit Western action, and they
cater to nationalist frustra-
tions in Asia. However, they
do not indicate that the USSR
is willing to follow through
with direct military action.
As in the Jordan and Syrian
crises last year, the USSR spoke
over the heads. of Asian and
African leaders to the other
great powers in defense of its
professed principle of great-
power "noninterference" in re-
gional disputes,. Both state-
ments seem to be unsolicited
testimonials in support of In-
donesia and of the UAR, which
has an active interest in
bringing down the Lebanese Gov-
ernment. They reflect Moscow's
view that?the UnitedirStates has
replaced Western European colo-
nial powers as the chief enemy
in Asia and Africa.
Both Warnings were unoffi-
dial and ambiguous. They were
spotted with stereatipped !!warn-
ings" of Soviet concern and un-
elaborated hints of possible
further action without actually
committing the USSR; they were
phrased so that the West might
amplify and interpret them as
threats. The statements, re-
leased through TASS, are about
the weakest in Moscow's cate-
gories of crisis threats. If
Moscow desires to act further
in either of these disputes,
several stronger methods of at-
tack are open to it, such as a
PASS release of an authorized
Foreign Ministry statement,_a
statement from the Foreign Min-
istry itself, personal letters
from Khrushchev to Western
political leaders, the informal
threat that the USSR "would
not stand. in the way of citizen
volunteers," formal demarches,
and action against the West
in the United Nations.
Communist propaganda media
have not raised directly the
possibilit3r of bloc "volunteers"
entering the present crises.
According to press reports, a
"high government source" in Dja-
karta has said that Communist
China, Czechoslovakia, and Po-
land have all offered volun-
teees to fight. in Indonesia.
The source warned there would
be nQ' alternative but to accept
them if Chinese Nationalist
.troops should land in East Indo-
nesia.. The bloc might again
threaten to use Communist volun-
teers, p\Imarily to develop op-
position to American actions
among the smaller powers and
the Afro-Asian neutrals by ex-
ploiting fear that the conflict
would spread.
The USSR, belaboring West-
ern activity as a "threat to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
peace," appears to be laying
the groundwork for some UN ac-
tion on Indonesia and to a less-
er extent Lebanon. The harder
language of the Indonesian
statement probably reflects
Moscow's conviction that a bet-
ter case can be made there.
Soviet UN action on Lebanon
would be inhibited because the
present government is pro-West.
Moscow is at best ambiguously
on the side of "the people" and
uncomfortably vulnerable to the
countercharge that it is abet-
ting interference in internal
Lebanese affairs. Consequently,
Moscow's argument on Lebanon is
built on the more general terms
that irresponsible American ac-
tion there' threatens the re-
gional peace of the Near and
Middle East.
The USSR probably be-
lieves the : force of. its at-
tacks will evoke more out-
spoken support of Asian and
African neutrals, Both in
Indonesia- and Lebanon, the
USSR stands to gain by its
stand against Western "in-
terventionism." To the de-
gree that intervention be-
comes a reality, Moscow will
fully exploit the presence
of foreign soldiers to exacer-
bate nationalist frustrations.
If the West refrains, Mos-
cow can claim, as it did
in the Syrian and Egyptian
episodes, that its warnings
once again proved to be
an effective deterrent to
Western "aaaression" in Asia.
NASIR'S VISIT TO THE USSR
The results of Nasir's 18-
day visit to the USSR indicate
that all Soviet-UAR policy dif-
ferences were not resolved and
that the trip may have been
something less than an unquali-
fied success. Khrushchev, in
lauding Nasir and the UAR at
the Kremlin farewell ceremonies,
claimed that complete agreement
existed on all questions 'of
"mutual interest." The final
communique, which ranged over
a wide variety of international
topics, was vague, however, on
the subject of Israel, and a
comparison of speeches made by
Nasir and by Soviet leaders
suggests ,.some disagreement
on other political issues as
well. Nasir avoided seconding
sharp Soviet attacks on the
West and, except for bitter at-
tacks on Israel's "imperialist
role" in the Middle East,.kept
to subjects of Arab interest
and to innocuous statements on
friendship.
The "iced-carpet" treatment
given Nasir and the spate of
friendship speeches reinforced
the public impression that the
USSR firmly endorses Nasir's
bid for leadership of the Arab
world. Khrushchev reportedly
told Nasir that the USSR wanted
nothing from Egypt but to make
Egypt strong, while the West
looks on Egypt as a former
servant and will never accept
it as an "equal," Information
so far, however, suggests that
Nasir remains suspicious of
both the USSR and the West and
probably places little re-
liance on Soviet promises of
general support, although he
probably will continue to ex-
ploit such promises to extract
concessions from the West. Nasir
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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told Ambassador Hare that the
talks with the Russians had gone
"more or less" as expected.
Moscow apparently was
displeased by signs of the UAR's
growing economic rapprochement
with the West and reportedly
was "visibly angered" by con-
clusion of the UAR - West Ger-
man economic agreement, news
of which arrived while talks
were going on in Moscow.
Nasir was partially ? suc --
cessful in his efforts to re-
duce the burden of debts con-
tracted with the USSR by Egypt
and- Syria.
(Concurred 'in by ORR
Pied date.
to visit the UAR at an unspeci-
The joint communique is-
sued at the conclusion of the
visit reaffirmed the identity
of Soviet-UAR views on a wide
range of subjects and stated
that Khrushchev and Voroshilov
had accepted Nasir's invitation
GOMULKA'S EAST EUROPEAN TOUR
Any Soviet hopes that
Gomulka's trip to Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania would suc-
ceed in boosting bloc unity
were probably only partially
fulfilled, and much that trans-
pired may lead to future fric-
tion between the USSR and Po-
land. Although Gomulka hewed
to the established line on
policy toward the West, prole-
tarian internationalism, and
the basic principles of build-
ing socialism, he pointedly re-
frained from recognizing the
leading role of the Soviet
party, remained publicly silent
on the Yugoslav issue, defended
the "Polish road to socialism,"
and condemned dogmatism with
only slightly less vigor than
revisionism.
Gomulka's own views were
the ones most often expressed
in the various joint communi-
ques, while he avoided formal-
izing views he does not share
with the satellite leaders in-
volved. Furthermore, the words
"general agreement" were used
to sum up the discussion of
ideological matters rather than
the more traditional expression
"identity of views." Thus,
Gomulka still remains a noncon-
formist influence in the Soviet
bloc.
Gomulka's views were evi-
dent in the Bulgarian and, to
a lesser extent, the Rumanian
communiques. The communique
signed in Budapest, as well as
his speeches in Hungary, indi-
cated that broader agreement
had been reached there. An Ap-
parent effort was made to give
Polish party support to Kadar
and the centrist elements in
the Hungarian party.. In con-
trast to the other two visits,
there were no open meetings in
Budapest for the Polish leader,
probably in fear of too strong
a public acclaim for the leader
of a nation identified with
defiance of the Kremlin. Ap-
parently as a Polish concession
to Kadar's sensitivity`::on this
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i%ww
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 May 1958
issue, only the Hungarian com-
munique failed to make a refer-
ence to "sovereignty, independ-
ience , and nont terference in
internal affairs."
Kadar claimed that most
disagreements between the two
countries--particularly the
disagreement over the Hungarian
revolution--had been eliminated,
He played " on 'o . 4s ,?tyx aiAts-
omy.; line by insisting that
each party could best determine
the actions necessary to solve
its own internal problems.
Gomulka for his part acquiesced
in the view that, in the last
analysis, counterrevolution
had to be put down with the
brotherly aid of the USSR, but
he added that he deplored the
"profoundly tragic" fact that
many Hungarians who thought
they were fighting for "'demee-
I7 P found themselves fight-
ing against it.
In all three capitals, the
host leaders stressed the
leadership of the USSR in the
Communist world, but Gomulka
did no more than recognize the
USSR as the first and most pow.
erful socialist state. This
distinction, which was clearly
evident in the press coverage,
will probably contribute con-
siderably to Gomulka's reputa-
tion among the more liberal
political elements in Eastern
Europe. The dispute between the
USSR and Yugoslavia was not pub-
licly mentioned, prraasbtiy; Oecaus e
Gomu,lka+.,wwauted- to-, avoid deep in-
i~oltvean net n. a diipute. hellther
side of. . which h e fully endorses:
During the course of the
three days Gomulka spent in each
country, demonstrations Of bloc
unity predominated, joint eco-
nomic commissions were created,
increased trade was agreed on,
and the whole Soviet peace cam-
paign was promoted.
HUNGARY AND THE, SOVIETYUGOSLAV DISPUTE
In the face of the deteri-
oration of soviet-Yugoslav re-
lations, Hungary's party leader
Kadar is seeking to comply with
Moscow directives to suppress
all dangerous manifestations
of liberalism in his country
but continues to reassert his
intention to adhere to methods
of persuasion, notably in agri-
cultural collectivization. He
nevertheless appears to have
lost some ground to his extreme
"hard-line" critics within the
Hungarian party, who may be us-
ing the condemnation of Tito's
policies by Moscow. and Peipi*g
as grounds for attacks on Kadar.
While the very presence of
Gomulka in Hungary should have
strengthened Kadar'within the
Hungarian party, there is evi-
dence that the visit, coming
as it did during the hardening
of the bloc line toward Yugo-
slavia, was a source d some
embarrassment to him. Although
he has long been angling for
Polish support, Kadar was re-
luctant to identify himself
closely with the Polish leader;;,
perhaps because any indication
of fraternization would play
into the hands of his Stalinist
opponents. The visit in the
long run, however, may serve
to shore up the moderate fac-
tion in the Hungarian party
which advocates policies
closely resembling those of
Gomulka.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
22 May 1958
Kadar's situation is made
more difficult as a result of
the' deterioration of Soviet-
Yuggs].av relations, since Hun-
gary of all the bloc countries
experienced the most drastic
consequenOOs of the 1948 break.
Although Kadar has not deviated
from the Moscow-approved pdsi-
tion on Soviet leadership Of
the "camp"