SPECIAL REPORT LIN PIAO NEW NUMBER-TWO MAN IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400090002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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2~ September 1966,
Copy No. 7 15
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
LIST PAO,, NE
W NUMBER-TWO MAN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
E= TRA,L IN-LLIGEN E AGENCY
DIREtTcRATE o6,= *IITELIENCE'
State Dept. review
completed
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GROUP .1 Exctuded'from ctutt r atic
downgrading' and" declassifi cation
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LI N PI AO, NEW NUMBER-TWO MAN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
After months of turmoil within the Chinese Com-
munist leadership, Defense Minister Lin Piao emerged
in August as Mao Tse-tung's first deputy in the party.
In this role he displaced Liu Shao-chi, long a domi-
nant figure in the regular party apparatus. Lin Piao
is the only leader now described in the Peking press
as Mao's "close comrade in arms." An aura of per-
sonality second only to Mao's has been built up
around his name, and he is evidently being groomed
as Mao's successor.
Lin has risen in spite of a long record of ill-
ness and absence from public view. His chief as-
sets have been his power in the army, Mao's high re-
gard for him, and Mao's apparently growing mistrust
of other leaders. Lin's military background once
seemed to be a major bar to political advancement in
a state which stresses party control over the army.
This factor has become less important now that the
authority of the party machinery has been downgraded
with the demotion or dismissal of many of its leaders.
Lin Piao and the army have been in the center
of the drive against the party apparatus. His
precise role in this sweeping campaign, however,
remains unclear. He may have been merely an in-
strument of Mao, may have worked with others, or
may himself have been the prime mover behind the
purge. Whether he has developed a strong enough
personal power base to survive after Mao goes is
uncertain. At the moment there is little question
that he is the dominant leader in the regime af-
ter Mao. If Mao's control has slipped badly, as
seems conceivable, Lin may already be the dominant
leader.
Background
Lin Piao is considered one
of China's most brilliant mili-
tary commanders. An honors grad-
uate of the Whampoa Military
Academy, he had by the time he
was 28 won recognition as a
theoretician on warfare and was
acknowledged the foremost mili-
tary strategist in the Chinese
Communist armed forces. He
participated in the Nanchang Up-
rising on 1 August 1927 which
marked the birth of the Chinese
Workers and Peasants' Red Army,
and in 1934 he led the vanguard
Communist troops from central
China to Shensi on the Long March.
At the 1937 battle of Ping-hsing
Pass in Shansi, he defeated the
crack Itagaki Division and won
the first major Communist victory
against the Japanese. His critique
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Born in Huang-kang, Hupeh
(Chou En-lai was director of the Political Department)
Member of the Standing Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs-Committee
of the Ci'.P Politburo
Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the
CCP
Vice Premier of the State Council
Minister of Defense
Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council
Marshal of the Chinese People's Republic
1926 Joined the Chinese Communist Party
1927 Participated in 1 August Nanchang Uprising which marked the birth
1934-35 Led vanguard troops on the Long March
1945-49 Commander of the 4th Field Army
1949 Appointed Chairman of the Central-South Military and Administrative
1954 Elected Vice Premier of the State Council, Vic Chairman of the
of China (one of 10)
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of that battle was used as a text
for instruction.
In 1942 and 1943 Lin took
part, with Chou En-lai, in the
Chungking negotiations between
the Nationalists and the Commu-
nists. After the defeat of Japan,
with civil war impending, he was
assigned the crucial mission of
consolidating Manchuria as a
base for the conquest of the
whole of China.
When the Communists came to
power in 1949 he was a national
hero, but poor health seemingly
kept him from playing a fully ac-
tive role in the Peking regime.
He has been absent from public
life for several protracted pe-
riods since 1937 and there have
been official announcements on a
number of occasions that he was
ill.
He was seriously wounded in
1937 and received treatment in
the Soviet Union, and on four
separate occasions between 1950
and 1954 organizations subordi-
nate to him sent him "comfort
messages"--indicating that he was
then incapacitated. In 1960 a
Chinese press statement described
him as "very weak."
Lin was
out of public view from 1950 to
1956. He made one appearance
in 1957, but then numerous ones
during the next four years. He
may have overdone it, because
his public activity dropped off
sharply after early 1962 until
the summer of 19 66 .
Lin
~iassood at t e centers of party
and military power for over a
decade. He was elected to the
politburo, the party's top policy-
making body, in 1955, and to the
politburo's standing committee,
the inner circle of Mao's closest
advisers, in 1958. The next year
he was appointed minister of na-
tional defense, replacing the
disgraced Peng Te-huai, and was
put in charge of the party's
Military Affairs Committee (MAC),
the supreme military authority.
As Mao's principal military
adviser since 1959, Lin has been
a faithful exponent of Mao's
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political-military theories of
"self-reliance," "man over weap-
ons," and "people's war." Little
is known of his own military
philosophy. He assumed his top
military posts at a time of ma-
jor conflict between Mao and some
of the army leaders, presumably
to facilitate strengthening of
party domination over the armed
forces. Under Lin's aegis the
role of the General Political De-
partment, the party's arm within
the military, was greatly en-
larged and political indoctrina-
tion was pressed throughout the
services.
Lin Piao's name achieved in-
creasing prominence outside the
military after a drive was
started in 1964 to have the whole
country adopt the army's politi-
cal indoctrination methods.
Everybody was told to study Lin's
instructions on "putting politics
in command" and studying Mao.
In September 1965 Lin authored
a major article setting forth
Mao's views on global strategy
and "people's war.'." Toward the
end of the year Lin was being
cited as an authority on intel-
lectual and cultural policy.
Throughout this period Lin
Piao himself remained a shadowy
figure, seemingly serving as an
instrument of Mao and lending the
prestige of his name to reinforce
Mao's authority.
Lin Piao's Recent Rise
It was not until May 1966
that Lin emerged as a serious
threat to other leaders. At that
time the Liberation Army Journal
--pointedly identified in May as
Lin's journal--spearheaded the
attacks against high party offi?"
cials who were being brought down
in disgrace. Theiusually authori-
tative central committee journals
People's Daily and Red Flag fol-
lowed the army journal's lead
in that period. in early May,
Lin showed up for the first time
in 12 months, making an appear-
ance with Mao, party general sec-
retary Teng Hsiao=ping, and Pre-
mier Chou-En-ldi., The order of
precedence at that appearance was
Mao, Teng, Chou, end Lin, indicat-
ing that although; Lin was
closer to the top power struc-
ture than before, he did not yet
stand ahead of too party and gov-
ernment leaders.
Lin's standii!iq improved af-
ter the early May` appearance. Dur-
ing May and June he and Mao were
virtually the onl7 leaders cited
in the party press as authorities
on important curr6nt developments.
However, the time was not
yet ripe for a mote against rank-
ing party leaders: such as Liu Shao-
chi. During July, both the People's
Daily and the army journal found
occasions to indi ate that Liu
was still a domin4nt party leader
as well as chief df state.
A showdown apparently took
place at the llth. !central commit-
tee plenum held from 1 to 12 Au-
gust. Subsequentlevents indicate
that the main decision taken at
the plenum was to 'demote Liu
out of the inner circle of power
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and to designate Lin Piao as Mao's
first deputy and heir apparent.
To achieve this, bargains involv-
ing Lin, Chou En-lai, and Teng
Hsiao-ping were probably made.
Chou retained his number-three
position, one he has held for
many years, and Teng, while drop-
ping to sixth place, was allowed
to remain in the standing commit-
tee as head of a weakened sec-
retariat.
Since the plenum Lin has
been consistently represented as
holding a pre-eminent position
over Mao's other lieutenants. He
is now the only person described
as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms,"
an accolade formerly given to Liu,
Chou, and Teng as well. Press
accounts of the three mammoth
rallies held in August and Sep-
tember to display the new leader-
ship lineup described Lin as
standing "shoulder to shoulder"
with Mao and speaking in Mao's
name.
Several senior military of-
ficers have been added to the po-
litburo. Although no formal an-
nouncement has been made, the new
politburo lineup implied by pub-
lished lists of leaders attending
the Peking rallies indicates that
three senior military officers--
all members of Lin's Military Af-
fairs Committee--have been brought
in. The only military men on the
previous politburo, besides Lin,
were the ineffectual Ho Lung and
Liu Po-cheng. Six of the 21 mem-
bers of the politburo now are mil-
itary men.
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Lin Piao's Views
Less is known about Lin Piao
than about any other Chinese
leader. There is no large body
of public writing attributed to
him and such few works as are
available--the article on "Peo-
ple's War" published in Septem-
ber 1965 for example--are not
much help in assessing his atti-
tudes. As might be expected they
applaud and echo Maoist doctrine
at every point, and thus do little
more than reflect Lin's willing-
ness to perform the kind of pub-
lic kowtow that has been neces-
sary for survival and advancement
under Mao.
Lin's contacts with foreign-
ers have been limited. The most
detailed available accounts we
have of such encounters date from
the 1930s and, although they pro-
vide clues about his character at
that time, they throw little light
on his present views. He has never
been abroad, except for medical
treatment in the Soviet Union, and
therefore there is no evidence to
be derived from recent impressions
gained by Western observers.
The scanty and fragmentary
information available does, how-
ever, permit a number of tentative
conclusions about Lin's outlook
which suggest the general approach
he might take toward major ques-
tions of policy. These are based
in the main on what is known about
Lin before he rose to a position
of authority at the center of power
during the mid-1950s and must
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therefore be treated with caution.
The passage of time and the bur-
dens of responsibility inevitably
affect and sometimes profoundly
alter a man's character. There
is no way of knowing with any cer-
tainty how events of the last
decade have influenced Lin's out-
look.
One thing that is reasonably
certain, however, is that he re-
ceived his fundamentally revolu-
tionary orientation as a young
man. He was born just before the
collapse of the Manchu dynasty in
1911 and grew up in the ensuing
period of political ferment during
which demands for social change and
newly assertive nationalism grew
into powerful forces shaping the
thought of China's youth.
Lin, the second son of a
petty landholder who was also the
proprietor of a small factory in
the Yangtze valley province of
Hupeh, was sent to a middle school
at Wuhan--one of China's first in-
dustrial centers--in 1921. While
at school Lin joined a group known
as the "Social Welfare Society"
directed by a man who later be-
came a prominent propagandist for
the Chinese Communist Party. Dur-
ing his four years in Wuhan, Lin's
thought probably acquired a basic
Marxist twist.
To this was added an impor-
tant overlay of modern chauvinism
when Lin was caught up in the May
30th Movement of 1925 which dwarfed
all previous antiforeign demonstra-
tions. This social convulsion was
touched off when police in the In-
ternational Concession in Shanghai
fired on a group of demonstrators
protesting against foreign control.
Strikes, b_oycotts;, and militant
"anti-imperialist' demonstrations
--led by student Agitators--erupted
all over China and continued for
many months. There: is no precise
information concerning Lin Piao's
role in these events but it is
clear that he was much influenced
by them.
Driven by the thrust of twin
forces--the thirst for social
change and the desire to erase
the humiliation of foreign domina-
tion--Lin Piao chase a military
career to realize ;his ambitions
and entered the Whampoa Academy
late in 1925. This school, with
Chiang Kai-shek as commandant and
Chou En-lai as director of the po-
litical department,, produced the
officers who commanded China's
armies in the years to come.
While at Whampoas. Lin learned
his lessons well. In 1926 he re-
nounced his membership in the
Kuomintang, Joined the Communist
Party, and graduated to command a
platoon in Chiang's "northern ex-
pedition" against the warlords.
When the Kuomintan and the Com-
munists split in 1127 Lin Piao
joined. the Communi.5t forces led
by Chu Te. From that point he
rose rapidly--commending a regi-
ment at 20, a division two years
later, and the First Red Army
Group at the age of, 24.
From then until 1955 when he
was elected to the Politburo Lin's
role was primarily that of a troop
commander, a professional soldier
occupied with the problems of
training armies and directing them
in the field. In this he became
a legendary figure., No leader in
a Communist army can be apolitical,
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and indeed success in guerrilla
warfare--at which Lin proved him-
self a master--demands great skill
in the arts of propaganda and po-
litical manipulation. Lin used
these arts while head of the anti-
Japanese military and political
university in the early 1940s.
Lin's pride, however, is clearly
in his achievements as a strategist
and tactician.
outline of a man different in im-
portant respects from the ideo-
logues who have been directing Pe-
king's course. Lin appears as an
old revolutionary, one clearly
still adept in manipulating the
symbolic language of Marxism and
threading the labyrinth of party
politics. Although he has repeat-
edly identified himself with Mao's
propositions, it is doubtful that
he is entirely in tune with the
kind of nonsense current in China
during recent years which insists
that study of Mao's thought is
more important than field exer-
cises in forging a military ma-
chine--or in coping with any
similar practical problem.
His attitude toward the out-
side world is probably suspicious
and hostile. US officials who
dealt with him in the period just
after World War II found him an
evasive and misleading bargainer
and there is nothing in his record
since then to indicate any change
in his approach to the West. Lin
probably subscribes wholeheartedly
to Mao's proposition that the US
should be despised "strategically"
and over the long run it is likely
that he takes even more seriously
the second part of the "paper ti-
ger" thesis which enjoins cautious
respect in tactical situations
existing today.
Lin's Future
The composite picture that
emerges from all of this lacks
sharp definition but suggests the
In each of his major state-
ments made in August and September
Lin Piao declared that the main
task ahead was to bring down ad-
ditional powerful party figures.
This indicates both that he feels
he has some distance to go before
fully consolidating his position
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and that he has considerable con-
fidence in his strength. He has
many things going for him--Mao's
trust, the backing of the army,
the apparent cooperation of Chou
En-lai and the government appara-
tus, and the acquiescence of some
leaders in the party apparatus.
In the present fluid situa-
tion, however, Lin's position must
be considered uncertain. His
physical vigor is in question.
Mao's health and control may be
slipping. Whether Lin is strong
enough to survive without Mao's
backing, should he die suddenly,
is also in que~t.ion. Mao, who
has recently turned against many
old comrades, could even turn
against Lin neat. In short, the
situation is expected to remain un-
stable until-Mao finally goes and
Lin--or some other contender--full
consolidates his position,
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