A REVIEW OF GUATEMALAN ARMS PURCHASES AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002700060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1977
• Content Type: IM

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
A REVIEW OF GUATEMALAN ARMS PURCHASES AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. Guatemalan President Laugerud recently ordered
the mobilization of reserve forces and informed the US he is
prepared to go to war over Belize if upcoming talks with the
UK fail and the colony is granted independence. This in-
teragency memorandum describes Guatemala's recently concluded
and planned weapons purchases, compares Guatemalan capabilities
to those of British forces in Belize, and examines the im-
plications of this force improvement.
I. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT FORCE LEVELS
2. Since 1969 Guatemala has bought a wide variety
of military equipment Major 25X1
acquisitions in the p nc e:
]STOL transport aircraft
armored cars
5.56-mm assault rifles
;;~=rounds of ammunition
elic ers
C-47 transport airgraft
patrol boatsi
* This memorandum was drafted byl CIA's
Office of Strategic Research unaer e auspices o the
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.
It was coordinated at the working ZeveZ with DIA in the
Department of Defense, INR in the Department of State
and NSA.
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Guatemalan Capabilities
3. The equipment Guatemala has recently purchased
considerably improves that country's overall military capa-
bilities.' Guatemala has a small number of I larmored
vehicle
personnel carriers, as well as a marginally effective force
4. The Guatemalan air force can contribute to ground
forces capabilities. The air force has 11 25X1
ground-attack aircraft and two combat-capable T-33 trainers,
I I both types of plane offer a close air
Moreover, Guatemalan forces can rely
on Itransport aircraft for para-
drops. s many as 13 helicopters could be made available
for airmobile operations.
5. The Guatemalan navy is primarily a coastal de-
fense force consisting chiefly of 13 patrol boats and one
landing craft which could offer marginal support in an am-
phibious landing operation in Belize. The boats would be no
match for a British frigate and could be utilized only in
the absence of a frigate.
6. Guatemalan forces enjoy a significant numerical
superiority over British forces in Belize. The Guatemalans
have a total of 13,355 men in their armed forces. F -
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8. The numerically superior Guatemalan forces dis-
play several weaknesses that limit their ability to conduct
sustained military operations against Belize. High on the
list of shortcomings are logistical constraints.
I Even if
the Guatemalans procure additional weapons, long training
periods will be needed for their troops to learn to man and
maintain the equipment.
9. Moreover, shortcomings in command and control
would also become apparent. Planners in Guatemala City would
be hard pressed because of poor lines of communication to
control effectively their forces operating in Belize at least
200 kilometers away. The rugged terrain in southern Belize
would inhibit overland resupply operations.
10. The Guatemalans are planning additional weap-
ons purchases and have apparently approached several dif-
ferent foreign suppliers:
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12. Judging from previous and planned arms deals,
we believe that Guatemalan military leaders have been content
to buy relatively simple equipment rather than sophisticated
weapons their forces could not effectively employ.
13. Guatemala's recent modernization efforts have
probably been undertaken with a Belize campaign in mind. On
June 17 the Guatemalan Defense Minister, General Otto Spiegeler,
publicly stated that the country's armed forces have been pre-
paring for the last seven years to recover what they consider
Guatemalan national territory. Guatemala initiated some of
the above-mentioned arms deals in the mid-1970s when tensions
were running high over the status of Belize. Should anxiety
over Belize continue, financial considerations would prob-
ably not deter military leaders from arms procurement.
14. In addition to the Belize issue, several other
reasons probably account for the ongoing Guatemalan force
improvement.
--The need to replace outdated equipment.
--Guatemala's wish not to be overshadowed militarily
by any other Central American country. Recent
weapons acquisitions by Honduras and El Salvador
(stemming from their border dispute) have erased
the former Guatemalan superiority and placed all
three of these countries at approximate parity.
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--A long-standing insurgency problem that continues
to preoccupy Guatemalan leaders. Many of the
arms they are seeking, such as helicopters and
small arms, are well suited for internal security
roles.
15. Since counterinsurgency as well as a Belize cam-
paign are both tasks for the ground forces, Guatemalan ground
units would be the primary beneficiaries of the new weapons.
The purchases of armored cars transports as well
as the possible acquisition of vast amounts of ammunition
all combine to increase the capabilities of the ground forces.
16. Guatemala is diversifying its sources of mili-
tary hardware to avoid dependence on one single country.
This strategy has been increasingly evident for several
years and the cancellation of US military aid programs in
March 1977 added new impetus to the drive. While evidently
ready to receive weapons before that
time, Guatemala will not accepti __j as
long as there are preconditions concerning human rights.
Moreover, Guatemalan planners complain of long delays in
shipments
17. Nor would purchases of Soviet weapons be wel-
come in Guatemala City. Given Guatemala's past orientation
to and the anti-Soviet feelings of its conservative
military officer corps, any agreement for Soviet weaponry
is not likely--even on the favorable financial terms the
Soviets have arranged with other recipients. While some
Guatemalan leaders have raised the possibility of purchasing
Soviet weapons, we view this generally as an emotional,
vindictive reaction to US policy on military assistance.
18. In view of dim prospects for arms from either
the US or the Soviet Union, Guatemala is turning increasingly
toward Israel and Western European nations--particularly
France, Belgium, and West Germany. We expect this trend to
continue.
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