MEETING WITH(Sanitized) AND CHUCK BRIGGS, 16 APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00134R000100050036-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: April 17, 1963
• Content Type: MFR

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Approved 10 Release
SUBJECT: Meeting with
'61A-RDP67-0 R000100050036-5
17 April 1963
and Chuck Briggs, 16 April
1. Ray Cline has approved in principle the establishment of
an all-source center in OCR. Indexed and locatable through this
center will be COMMINT, ELINT, NPIC, DD/P sensitive source material
and other intel of a highly sensitive and limited clearance nature.
There will be certain compartmentation within the center itself.
The center will have to be physically located behind a barrier
and access to it carefully controlled based on the actual clearances
shown on an individual's building pass. This, of course, means a
large job of determining need for access for individuals in each
component plus the physical job by security of briefing and clearing
such individuals and then marking the appropriate clearances on new
badges.
2. Physically, the center will be built around Special Register
as a nucleus,but some building remodeling will have to be done to
accommodate it and it will probably be split between the first and
second floors. .feels that somehow or other greater access
must be given to some of this material by analysts who, up to now,
have never been permitted to know of the existence of large
quantities of material having direct bearing on subjects on
which they are worki
is confident that unwitting analysts are still writing requirements
and asking unwitting collectors to obtain intelligence on subjects
which are covered extensively through technical collection methods
but the information thus obtained has not been made available to the
analysts.
3. I (points out that developments in technical collection
methods in recent years have tremendously increased the amount of
valuable intelligence obtained. Further imminent break-throughs
in the technical collection field hopefully will produce additional
vast quantities of highly sensitive and important intelligence.
It is therefore imperative that the most forward-looking methods
possible shall be developed for the rapid processing, storage and
retrieval of this information. In order to make proper use of the
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information now available and to be obtained in the future, it seems
essential that additional analysts will have to be cleared for access
to information obtained from highly sensitive technical and human
sources.
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4-. If an all-source center can be established, including a
central requirements and collection guidance grow which is capable
of rapid and accurate retrieval of information, can foresee
the day when analysts can do away with a large portion of their own
files and rely on the center. He can foresee the time when analysts
can be told to drop certain areas of study and attention because we
know all that is necessary to know about the subject. Likewise,
collectors can be told not to bother to collect information on
certain subjects because technical coverage is more than adequate.
Requirements and targets can thus be narrowed and refined, individuals'
productivity can be directed toward specific "gap" areas rather than
spread over broad, general, analytical studies. Although physical
space and personnel staffing may present some problems, 0 feels
that space requirements may well be met by doing away with extensive
personal files maintained by large numbers of analysts and that
anticipated increased productivity of personnel should hold
increases to a minimum.
5. In response to my question, said that Art Lundahl,
Director of NPIC, had no objection to the indexing and storage of
NPIC materials in the all-source center as long as it was done
under the appropriate security safeguards.
6. I then asked if DIA knew of our plans for an all-source
center or if he knew of any DIA plans for such a center. He stated
that as far as he knew DIA was not aware of our plans, nor was he
cognizant of any DIA plans along these lines. He added, however,
that in view of Department of Defense intelligence, targeting:and
other defense responsibilities, he had no doubt that they
might well establish such a 'center to meet their own requirements.
I raised the question of the extensive duplication by DIA of CIA's
production components as evidenced by the DIA Organization and
Functions Manual, the manner in which DIA now rejects the great
bulk of CIA's intelligence requirements on the basis of its DIEM
and related issuances, and asked how he thought duplication by DIA
of our all-source center might be avoided. 0 did not feel it
could be avoided until such time as CIA could furnish information
to DIA on request as rapidly as DIA could obtain the information
from its own files. On this point Dis hopeful that there
will shortly be operational and available a fascimile system equipped
with a secure scrambler device which would be enormously useful,
though somewhat limited, in serving this purpose. The machine would
for instance make it possible for the DCI to show a cable or document
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on his desk simultaneously to the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State in their own offices while the three of them
discussed it on a secure telephone link.
7. Towards the close of our conversation, I commented that it
seemed to me that the DCI, as leader of the: intelligence community,
would sooner or later have to actively involve himself in the
25X1 rapidly growing extensive duplication of CIA production work toward
which DIA seems heading. I lagreed but pointed out that Secretary
McNamara and General Carroll are certainly going to take all steps
they deem necessary to meet the intelligence requirements placed
upon them by virtue of their military and defense responsibilities.
He also observed that, notwithstanding the President's letter to
the DCI establishing him as the community leader, he felt the DCI
had recently weakened and watered down somewhat his position as
community leader in submitting the Cuban report to the President's
Board as his own rather than as a report from the entire intelligence
community.
CAL
Distribution:
orig - IG, then subject file
1 - FMC chrono
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