Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070002-9
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BOI 027R000300070002-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NIO1W
NFAC-8193-80
22 December 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none; for your information only.
2. El Salvador
The junta government has survived its latest crisis (resulting
from the murders first of the political-front leadership of the extreme
left and second of the American missionaries). But prospects seem poor
for short-term stability, and even poorer for gaining the domestic and
international support needed for political and economic reconstruction.
Under PDC and US pressure, the leadership of the military and security
forces probably see it in their interest to take some steps to curb
atrocities. The strengthening of hardline attitudes throughout the
officer corps (that is, a determination to crush the extreme left) and
the continued freedom of action on the part of the extreme right--
civilians and some officers, noncoms, and enlisted men--mean that the
pursuit of indiscriminate warfare against the left will persist. This
will continue to strain the PDC-military alliance and likely produce
still another political crisis over the coming months.
Meanwhile, the recent increased receipt of arms will probably
embolden the extreme left and add to the violence and polarization.
Intensified economic pressures will also contribute. As a result, the
junta will not attract badly needed international support--and in fact
is likely to become more isolated.
Approved-For Release 2047/05/47-:CIA=RDP83BO1027R000300070002-9
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3. Nicaragua
In response to increased economic and political pressures,
the Sandinistas are likely to continue the recent trend toward more
ham-handed dictatorial rule. This probably will lead to an increase
in paramilitary opposition, but no serious short-term challenge to the
regime's control. Whatever anti-regime plotting was taking place in
the armed forces earlier in the year has probably been placed on the
back burner by the Sandinistas' provocation/penetration of the Salazar
"plot". And with the armed and security services behind the regime,
through loyalty or because of intimidation, the government will be
able to control, although not root out, the insurgents and dissidents.
The Sandinistas will probably seek increased Cuban and Soviet assistance
to bolster their regime. This and increased repression could slow the
flow of Western assistance and eventually add to the domestic pressures
against the regime.
4. Costa Rica
Economic and political pressures ng, at a time when
titular leadership is in the hands of the increasingly 25X1
unpopular President Carazo. The country's resilient political insti-
tutions and resourceful political elite should see Costa Rica through
the next election (1982). Nonetheless, tensions will continue to rise,
in part because of the increased activities of rightist and leftist
groups from other Central American trouble spots.
-Approved For Release- 2007/05/TT:,- CI-A-RDP8.3-BO 1027 R000300070002-9
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/EA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGSR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/OPA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - N I 0/ LA
Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027ROO0300070002-9