MAJOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 1, 1973
• Content Type: PAPER

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1. There is a sharp imbalance between collection and production.
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2. Production resources and funding must be increased.
3. The rules of production and collection compartmentation need review.
4. There are inadequate numbers of analysts.
5. The time of the limited number of analysts is being misused.
6. A significant number of analysts lack adequate training to conduct
sophisticated analysis.
7. Too much time is spent on conducting political analysis -- too little
on military intelligence analysis per se.
8. Cross-training of production analysts in collection disciplines (and
vice versa)is inadequate.
9. Management of the time and productivity of analysts is inadequate.
10. Quality and experience levels of middle managers (through 0-6, GS-15)
is not conducive to quality production.
11. Upper levels of management are not providing sufficient direction
and control over their production operations.
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
PA
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MAJOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS
I. Collection vs. Production
a. The capability of the collection and processing systems outstrip
the ability of the production community to analyze and produce finished
intelligence.
b. This imbalance is so great that there should be a thorough
review of production and collection funding with a view to markedly
increasing the former even if it means decreasing the budget of the
latter.
c. Collectors can help resolve the imbalance problem if they are
willing to depart from some of the more time-honored and rigid views of
compartmentation of collection and production functions. Some examples:
(1) NSA should produce finished intelligence providing
their judgments as to the significance of intelligence derived
exclusively from their sources.
(2) NPIC should provide finished intelligence products
illustrating the significance of intelligence derived exclusively
from their sources.
(3) Clandestine'HUMINT reporting should highlight the
message they are trying to transmit by (a) providing the
production analyst with better identification of both source
and information reliability and (b) provide integrated analysis
of the most significant HUMINT reports.
II. Production Problems
a. There are inadequate numbers of analysts.
Collection and processing capabilities outstrip the ability
of production assets to analyze and produce finished intelligence.
b. The time of the limited number of analysts is being misused.
(1) Extremely disproportionate time and talent expended on
daily, ten minute CJCS briefing.
(2) Time of professionals improperly used in preparing
creation sheets to feed the automated files (up to three hours
a day for professionals assigned to Arlington Hall).
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(3) Most talented current intelligence analysts used
to fulfill the requirements for "dog and pony shows" and
not upon the less glamorous and painstaking analytical studies.
c. A significant number of analysts lack adequate training to
conduct sophisticated analysis:
Inability to analyze complex problems such as:
(a) how to assess the combat effectiveness of
foreign military forces when HUMINT sources are
limited.
(b) is it possible to establish through SIGINT/
PHOTINT an indicator list which would permit me to
discern the differences between Arab and Israeli
exercises and intentions to initiate hostilities?
(c) how can we analyze the Arabs' capability
to employ the sophisticated weapons systems provided
by the Soviets?
d. Too much time is spent on conducting political analysis -- too
little on military intelligence analysis Per se.
(1) If military intelligence analysts had substantially
ignored the political scene and concentrated upon the military
indicators, there would have been a much greater likelihood
that the community would have been forced to make a reappraisal
of conventional Arab-Israeli wisdom.
(2) Little effort is spent by DIA tasking INR and CIA
to provide them with the types of intelligence which by
charter these agencies are charged with producing.
e. Cross-training of production analysts in collection disciplines
(and-vice versa) is inadequate.
(1) Too much of a "them" (the dull collection types)
and "us" (the smart production types) attitude.
(2) Cross-training should include a full tour of
duty in a collection discipline.
f. Management of the time and productivity of analysts is inadequate.
(1) Management often seems to be almost entirely lacking
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(2) All production requests are honored regardless of
source of request or need to know
g. Quality and experience levels of middle managers (through 0-6,
GS-15) is not conducive to quality production.
(1) Too many managers are in the "passed-over" and
"twilight tour" category.
(2) Many lack sufficient military operational
experience so that they can meaningfully direct and
lead the work of their production analysts.
h. Upper levels of management are remiss in providing sufficient
direction and control over their ,production o erations articulari in
the following matters:
(1) failure to create adequate mechanisms to
challenge whatever is the conventional wisdom on any
subject at any moment i.n time.
(2) failure to control and validate production
priorities.
(3) failure to demand the conduct of independent
military intelligence analysis, separate and distinct
from political analysis.
(4) failure to require the use of advanced
analytical methodologies in intelligence production.
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