TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: November 17, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

 Aooroved For Release 2003110122: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9'
jIIUdW HIT Mr It if
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . i
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Derides President's Troop Withdrawal Announcement . . . . . . 1
Lnw-KP.sr P kJnQ Ramt--inn, DPniarat APrPaide t1=. AnnnunrpmanY _ L-
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
POLAND-USSR
Top Leaders Stress Unanimity on Eve of PZFR Congress . . . . .
37
TOPICS IN BRIEF
Arbatov on President's USSR Visit . . . . . . . . . . .
39
CCP-Spanish CP Meeting . . . . . . . . . . .
39
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
Moscow (2691 items)
Peking (1604 items)
October Revolution
(30%)
25%
Domestic Issues
(21%)
24%
Anniversary
Indochina
(8%)
21%
(Leaders'
(8%)
10%]
[Cambodian National
(--)
14%]
Speeches
Polish-Soviet Talks
(--)
6%
Day
[FUNK-RGNUC Delega-
(--)
5%
in Moscow
China
(2%)
4%
tion in Hanoi
Albanian Party Anniver-
(8%)
13%
Indochina
(2%)
4%
sary & Congress
Brezhnev in France
(9%)
3%
Asia-Africa Table Tennis (17%)
13%
Chilean CP-CPSU
(--)
2%
Matches in PRC
Talks in Moscow
PRC Delegation in UN
(20%)
8%
World Youth Day
(--)
2%
PRC-Lebanon Diplomatic
(--)
4%
Indian-Soviet
(--)
2%
Relations
Friendship Month
Pakistan Foreign
(1%)
4%
Minister in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and eventri given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
'7 NOVEN.rER 1971
I 11D0CH I NA
President Nixon's 12 November press conference announcement that
45,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn in the next two months was
promptly deprecated in Hanoi radio and press comment as a move
to assuage public opinion while continuing the war. Like the
President's 7 April announcement that 100,000 more troops would
be withdrawn by December, this one occasioned no high-level DRV
official statement; prior to April, all the President's major
statements on Vietnamization and troop withdrawal since November
1569 had elicited official statements. DRV Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a speech at a reception for a Cambodian
FUNK delegation on the 16th, did take brief note of the
President's press conference, saying routinely that it again
showed U.S. intent to maintain U.S. forces in South Vietnam and
to continue support for the Thieu administration.
In Peking's initial reaction to President Nixon's press conference,
an NCNA report on the 15th echoed Hanoi's interpretation of the
troop withdrawal announcement as a move to allay public opposition
while persisting in the war in Indochina. If the President were
serious about withdrawing troops, according to NCNA, he would
accept the PRG's seven-point peace proposal. PRC delegate ..o
the UNGA Chiao Kuan-hua, in his maid --n speech on the 15th, also
expressed support for the PRG's seven points, adding that a U.S.
troop withdrawal to allow the three Indochinese countries to
solve their own problems is "the key to the relaxation of tension
in the Far East."
Moscow's limited reaction to the President's troop withdrawal
announcement complained that he failed to set a date for complete
withdrawal. Soviet media selectively reported his remarks to show
that the United States intends to continue seeking a military
solution.
Hanoi's concern over inroads by the allied pacification effort in
South Vietnam is reflected in a series of unusually candid articles
in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Wile
reiterating Hanoi's stock for east that the pacification program
will fail, the articles also take note of allied claims of success
and acknowledge difficulties created by the program.
HANOI DERIDES PRESIDENT'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT
Hanoi media reacted promptly and predictably to the President's
unscheduled 12 November press conference at which he announced
Approved For Release 2003/1e(.i$ IP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
projected U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam during the
next two months. The initial comment came on the 13th in a
Hanoi radio commentary, followed on the 14th by a statement
from the DRV spokesman in Paris and comment in the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. On the 15th Hanoi radio broadcast a
Commentator article in the party daily NHAN DKN, a standard
vehicle for comment on the President's pronouncements. The
only available Front comment was an LPA commentary of the 14th,
broadcast by Hanoi. as well as Liberation Radio.
The Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th set the line when it
said that the President had to continue to withdraw a portion
of U.S. troops to placate public opinion but that his real
policy was evident from his failure to set a date for total
withdrawal, his remarks indicating that he would maintain
forces in South Vietnam "indefinitely," and his "threat" to
step up air action if U.S. troops are endangered. The radio
commentary, like the LPA comment, acknowledged that 45,000
troops are to be withdrawn during the next two months.
Other Hanoi propaganda failed to mention the figure, although
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN did observe that the President "acted as if
the rate of U.S. troop withdrawal was greatly increasing."
The Hanoi radio commentary described the three factors which
the President said would determine further withdrawals--the
level of enemy activity, progress in Vietnamization, and
progress in the release of POW's--as a "prete-:t" for continuing
the war.* It argued that the President's conditions cannot
be met because the South Vietnamese will continue to fight
as long as the United States maintains troops there and
supports the "puppet" Thieu regime, because any progress in
Vietnamization is an "illusion," and because the way to obtain
the release of prisoners is to respond to the 1 July PRG peace
proposal and set a deadline for a total withdrawal. The same
resolve to continue the struggle is reflected in other
propaganda, and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said the fact that the
* The propaganda of course obscured the President's remarks
on the level of infiltration from North Vietnam in connection
with "enemy" action. And only the NHAN DAN Commentator article
cryptically acknowledged that the President spoke of progress
toward a cease-fire as well as on the POW issue in outlining
the third factor that would determine future withdrawals.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
President has had to maintain a "large number" of troops in
South Vietnam and "step up" air raids gives the lie to
Secretary Laird's recent statement that Vietnamization will
be successful.
Propagandists of course obscure the fact that the President
said U.S. air strikes would have to be intensified if there
was stepped-up infiltration of DRV troops into Laos and
through Cambodia into South Vietnam. But Foreign Minister
Trinh in his 16 November speech at the reception for the FUNK.
delegation, after claiming that the President's press
conference remarks showed U.S. intent to maintain troops in
South Vietnam, went on to say: "The U.S. imperialists, far
from ending their war of aggression in Cambodia and Laos,
are intensifying it with a threat of stepped-up bombing for
the massacre of the three Indochinese peoples."
The President's statement that the combat role of U.S. troops
in offensive action has already ended was ridiculed in some
propaganda. The DRV spokesman bluntly said that the
President "lied" in this regard, and NHAN DAN's Commentator
called the statement a""hoax." While Commentator was not as
vitriolic toward the President as Hanoi propaganda has been
on occasion in the past, I.e injected the personally abusive
remark that "Nixon's ugly face was laid bare" when he refused
to announce a deadline for total withdrawal, as demanded by
public opinion. Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited
critical reactions to the President's announcement by
senators, including Mansfield and Javits. And NHAN DAN's
Commentator said that the President's "stubborn" attitude will
give impetus to the U.S. antiwar movement and prompt the
Senate to increase its pressure fcr a deadline for a total
troop withdrawal.
NEGOTIATIONS NHAN DAN's Commentator ridiculed the
President's remark on continuing negotiations
at Paris--"a very old maneuver to deceive public opinion."
This cannot deceive the "progressives" in the United States
and throughout the world, Commentator said, adding that the
President "must be held fully responsible" for the stalemate
at Paris. The Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th reported
that the President said he does not see any "prospect or
breakthrough" in the Paris negotiations. But it distorted
hi6 remarks when it said: "But he went on to say that he
would carry out diplomatic activities through other channels."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
The commentary called this "a dirty trick designed to sidetrack
public opinion and evade replying to the PRG's seven-point
proposal." (The President's remarks were in fact made in the
context of the POW issue. After saying "we have not given up
on the negotiating front," he added: "I would not like to
leave the impression that we see the possibility of some
striking breakthrough in negotiations in the near future. But
we are pursuing negotiations in Paris and through whatever
other channels we think are appropriate.")
ELABORATION OF In castigating the President for refusing to
PRG PROPOSAL respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal,
some of the propaganda has echoed DRV Foreign
Minister Trinh's recent elaboration of the eemands in point one
on U.S. withdrawal. Thus, the Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th
specified that putting an end to aggression and withdrawing
troops included the cessation of "all activities of U.S. air
and naval forces in South Vietnam." The DRV Paris spokesman's
statement echoed this along with the other additional demand
that the United States must stop military aid to the Saigon
"puppet administration." Trinh had spelled out these two
additional demands in a 24 October speech at a banquet for the
visiting DPP.K delegation, and they were incorporated in the
29 October joint DPRK-DRV communique on the visit.*
LOW-KEYED PEKING REACTION DENIGRATES PRESIDENTS ANNOUNCEMENT
P.'king's reaction to President Nixon's 12 November press conference
has been in a low key and sparing of abuse while glossing over
key issues. In the only direct comment thus far, an NCNA report
carried in Chinese on the 15th and in English the next day**
interpreted the President's announcement on further troop
* These elaborations are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 November
1971, pages 11-13. At the 4 November Paris session PRG delegate
Nguyen Van Tien also inserted the demand for an end to
activities of air and naval forces in reviewing the PRG proposal,
but this was not reflected in the VNA account of the session.
** The President's 7 April TV speech announcing troop
withdrawals was similarly reported first by NCNA in Chinese
on the 10th and in English on the following day. There was no
Peking comment on a more authoritative level.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
withdrawals as a move to allay public opposition while seeking
to "persist in and prolong the war of aggression in Indochina."
While acknowledging that 45,000 more troops wculd be withdrawn
in December and January, NCNA noted the President's statement
that the United States would maintain a residual force in
South Vietnam and would continue to use air power until the
Saigon regime has developed the capability to handle the
situation. The report also noted the President's remark
that the United States might have to step up air strikes,
but NCNA did not, of course, report that he indicated this
would be in response to increased infiltration from North
Vietnam. Similarly, NCNA failed to note the President's
conditions affecting further troop withdrawals--the level of
enemy activity and infiltration rates, progress in the
Vietnamization program, and progress in obtaining the release
of prisoners and a cease-fire in all of Southeast Asia.
The NCNA report shied away from the question of negotiations
and predictably ignored the President's remarks on his
forthcoming visits to Peking and Moscow. In a bow to the PRG's
seven-point proposal, which Peking editorially endorsed three
days after the plan was introduced on 1 July, NCNA said "it
would be a matter not of 45,000 men but of accepting the
seven-point proposal" if the President "seriously wants to
withdraw troops," But NCNA ignored the President's remarks
linking troop withdrawals and negotiations as well as his
suggestion that a negotiated settlement would mean withdrawal
of American forces stationed "in other places in Southeast
Asia or in the Asia theater that are directly related to the
support of our forces in Vietnam."
While seemingly taking care not to encroach on Hanoi's
prerogatives, the NCNA reaction to the President's press
conference also reflected Peking's concern not to mar the
atmosphere for his impending visit. NCNA derided the President's
opening statement as having "sanctimoniously" promised an
announcement of substantially increased troop withdrawal. It
also charged that "'peace' in his mouth is merely a synonym for
continued aggression" and that "U.S. imperialism" seeks to hang
on in South Vietnam in order to turn it into a military base
for "aggression against Indochina and the whole of Asia."
Nonetheless, NCNA's reaction was relatively mild. By contrast,
NCNA's report on his 7 April address called it "a downright
fraud" and contemptuously concluded: "To hell with Nixon's
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
'troop withdrawal' hoax!" NCNA at that time referred to the
President as the representative of "the arch criminals"
composing "the U.S. monopoly ruling circles"; it also claimed
in April that the President was "more frantic and adventurist"
than his predecessors and that his address foreshadowed
"a more rabid adventure" than the Cambodian and Laotian
campaigns.
As in the reaction to the 7 April address, Peking has again taken
note of "strong" opposition from public opinion to the President's
announcement. NCNA cited the Western press as reporting that
"some" senators expressed disappointment over the announcement
and that the announcement may be a ruse for the coming elections.
Also as it did in April, NCNA has reported Vietnamese comment
on the President's announcement, summarizing NHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on the 16th. Characteristically,
Peking has left it to Hanoi to press points currently being
blunted in Peking's own comment. Thus NCNA quoted a NHAN DAN
Commentator article as saying the President's press corference
once again demonstrated his "colonialist, aggressive stand
and his bellicose, obdurate attitude." NHAN DAN was also
cited for the view that the President's reference to a
negotiated settlement is a "customary trick" and that his
refusal to respond to the PRG's seven-point plan shows his
unchanged intention to seek a military victory.
ROUTINE MOSCOW REACTION DEPLORES PRESIDENTS STATEMENT
The first Soviet reaction to the President's press conference
came early on 13 November in the usual prompt TASS report,
which acknowledged that he said 45,000 more troops would be
withdrawn In December and January but complained that he made
furt"er withdrawals conditional on progress in Vietnamization
and in the training of the Saigon army.* TASS failed to
Or The 14 November domestic service commentator's roundtable
discussion contains, for the first time, internal evidence that
this Sunday feature is recorded earlier in the week. In the
program as aired at 0900 GMT on the 14th, a participant noted
that the President was to make an announcement on Vietnam on
the 15th, with no reference to the press conference g:Vven two
days before. A repeat broadcast of the roundtable, at 1500
GMT, converted this passage into a complaint that the President
said "nothing new" at the press conference, his "first
preelection statement."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
acknowledge the other conditions--the level of enemy activity,
progress in obtaining the release of prisoners, and
progress toward a cease-fire in all of Southeast Asia.
TASS complained that the President said he considers it
necessary to maintain "residual" forces indef initely in
order to "keep the present Saigon regime in power," but it
did not mention his comments on prisoners or a negotiated
settlement in this context. Instead, TASS routinely scored
the President for allegedly making no proposals for a
political settlement and for again ignoring the PRG's
seven-point proposal.
The TASS report also noted that the President stressed that
the United States would "not only continue the air raids
but also intensify them," without, of course, acknowledging
that he said the bombings would have to be stepped up if
infiltration from North Vietnam into the South were increased.
A foreign-language commentary by Shakov, broadcast on the
13th and 14th, similarly noted without elaboration that the
President said the raids would be intensified "if necessary."
The Shakov commentary said that preparations to extend U.S.
intervention in Southeast Asia account for the "negative
attitude" of the U.S. delegation at the Paris talks.
Without referring explicitly to the President's remarks in
this regard, the commentator said "Washington politicians"
have chosen this time to declare "repeatedly" that the
United States "sees no prospect in the immediate future of
any substantial progress at the Paris talks."
A foreign-language commentary by Soltan on the 15th referred
to the recent antiwar demonstrations in the United States
and said the White House decided to make a "pacifying
statement" in order to create the Impression that the
Administration is "allegedly sincerely trying to reach a
negotiated settlement in Vietnam." Routinely criticizing
the United States for ignoring the PRG's seven points and
for trying to retain a "military stronghold" in Indochina,
Soltan complained that the President set no date for complete
troop withdrawal. And a domestic service commentary on the
15th charged that the President intends to retain residual
forces "indefinitely" to support the Saigon regime.
A PRAVDA article by Vishnevskiy, briefly summarized by TASS
on 17 November, said that the announcement on the withdrawal
of another contingent of 45,000 troops "by no means signifies
Approved For Release 2003/101F ig5T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
the reduction of combat operations." It asserted Lbat "Pentagon
hawks" are calling for intensified bombings of the DRV and that
the Administration publicly "admitted" its intention to keep a
residual force in Vietnam indefinitely.
Like Peking, Moscow predictably ignored the President's remarks
on his forthcoming visits to China and the USSR.
INDOCHINESE UNITY REAFFIRMED DURING CAMBODIAN VISIT TO DRV
A delegation of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and government (RGNU)
paid a "friendship visit" to Hanoi from 10 to 17 November at
the invitation of the DRV Government and the Vietnamese
Fatherland Front to reaffirm Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity
and presumably to coordinate their anti-U.S. plans. The
delegation, led by Ieng Sary, "special envoy of the interior
part" of the RGNU, included a number of FUNK Politburo members
and RGNU ministers.
The delegation was greeted with considerable fanfare in Hanoi;
its impending arrival was announced in a communique issued by
the DRV Foreign Ministry on the 10th, and the visit was
hailed in editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on
the same day. The group was seen off in Peking by Li Hsien-nien
and was met at the airport in Hanoi by Foreign Minister Nguyen
Day Trinh. The Cambodians had talks with a DRV Government
delegation headed by Trinh and also attended by Pham Van Dong,
and they were received by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, and Dong.
These meetings were described as having taken place in an
atmosphere of "militant solidarity" and "fraternal friendship."
Ieng Sary has been playing a prominent coordinating role, both
between the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian forces in the field and
those based in Peking and now between the Cambodians and the
Vietnamese. He had gone to Peking in August "directly from
the front lines" in Cambodia, and his arrival there was used
as a demonstration of the unity of the Khmer "patriots" at
home and abroad and as an occasion for a show of Asian unity
embracing Peking and its allies.* His image as a representative
of unity among the Khmers was further served by his role in
"seminars" in Peking involving FUNK members and RGNU heads of
* Ieng Sary's arrival in Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of
1 September, pages 8-10.
Approved For Release 200fg/HNNRDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
diplomatic missions. RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, in a speech reported
by the FUNK radio on 5 November, praised Ie:.g Sary for having
played "the most important role in achieving unity of views and
stands, conscience and policy, and in strengthening the unity of
Cambodians at home and abroad" by means of the seminars.
UNITY Tt-EMES Ieng Sary's visit to Hanoi was also used to
promote themes of unity. The visit was
accompanied by copious testimony to Vietnamese-Cambodian
solidarity and mutual expressions of gratitude for assistance
and support. Speakers on both sides repeatedly reaffirmed their
loyalty to the joint statement of the Indochinese People's
Summit Conference and the determination of the Indochinese
peoples to continue to fight together in unity until victory.
According to the joint communique signed on the 16th, the two
sides discussed the anti-U.S. struggle and Cambodian-Vietn.uiiese
relations, revealing "identical views on all problems discussed."
(Similar references to unanimity of views appeared in the joint
communiques on Podgornyy's early-October visit to Hanoi and
the 24-30 October visit of the DPRK's Pak Song-chol; in all
three cases, surrounding comment suggested that this characteriza-
tion was included at the visitors' behest. DRV spokesmen during
the course of the visits avoided referring to unanimity of views
even as the visitors so characterized the talks.)
At a farewell banquet on the 16th, Ieng Sary expressed
satisfaction that an "identity of views" had been reached on all
questions discussed. "Our two parties have identical conceptions
and stands regarding the conduct of the revolutionary war of
national liberation and regarding the offensives launched
against the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs," he said,
adding that "our delegation has particularly noted the unanimity
of view of our two parties on the conception of militant and
fraternal friendship and fighting solidarity." But Nguyen Duy
Trinh, in his brief speech at the banquet, did not offer any
assessment of the discussions during the visit.
NIXON VISIT There were indications that President Nixon's
TO PRC projected visit to the PRC--regarding which
Hanoi expressed disquiet in polemics last
summer--was also a subject of discussion. In a banquet speech
on the 10th, Trinh made what could be interpreted as an
allusion to the visit when he condemned the U.S. Administration
for "making propaganda blasts about their hypocritical 'peace
plans' and resorting to many perfidious maneuvers to try to
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
divide the Indochinese peoples and weaken the anti-imperialist
forces and the world people's movement in support of the peoples
of Indochina." An allusion to the President's visit had
appeared in a 10 November AKT. commentary on Cambodian-Vietnamese
solidarity, not specifically pegged to the Ieng Sary visit but
obviously timed for it and mentioning it in passing. Asser;;ing
that President Nixon has been using "numerous deceitful tricks
clamoring about 'cessation' of war, 'serious negotiations,'
and 'search for peace for future generations,"' the commentator
complained that "everywhere he shows his 'white flag' to pass
for a 'messenger of peace."' AKI charged that the President
wants to mislead U.S. and international opinion "in the hope
of having his presidential mandate renewed in the next election."
The image of the U.S. waving a white flag--which Kim Il-song
had used in his 6 August speech endorsing Peking's invitation
to the President--appeared in a speech by Ieng Sary at a
Peking meeting marking Cambodian National Day on 9 November,
the day before his departure for Hanoi. Without directly
mentioning the President's forthcoming 'isit, Ieng Sary warned
that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled tc come to China
with a white flag" it continues its "vicious intrigues" cf
denying the rights of weak and small countries and is resorting
to "new trickery" to deceive public opinion. This passage--
containing the first public reference to the President'r: visit
to have been made in Peking, apart from announcements on the
Kissinger missions--might be read as an expression of concern,
shared with the Vietnamese communists, over what effects the
presidential visit may have on the anti-U.S. cause in Indochina.
SOVIET ROLE Presumably in deference to their hosts'
sensitivities, the Cambodians avoided pointed
allusions to the USSR's failure to extent recognition to the
RGNU. The AKI commentary on the 10th, however, aired the
Cambodians' resentment toward the Soviets by pointing out that
recognition of the RGNU "is the dividing line between genuine
and fake" revoluticnaries and between "those who actually
oppose oppression and those who just profess to do so."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
CUNr1UNISTS CALL CAPTURE OF CAMBODIAN TOWN "STRATEGIC VICTORY"
The capture of the Cambodian town of Rumlong was officially
hailed in a 13 November communique from the Route 6 command of
the Cambodian National People's Liberation Armed Forces
(CNPLAF). As carried by Sihanouk's news agency (AKI) on the
16th, the communique announced that on the night of
12-13 November, after three weeks of attacks, the CNPLAF
and people "unleashed a decisive attack against the last
enemy positions" at Rumlorig and "recorded a smashing victory
by annihilating the 46th puppet brigade and liberating
Rumlong." It claimed that more than 1,000 government troops
were killed or wounded in the fighting at Rumlong, that
"hundreds of others" surrendered, and that "a large quantity"
of arms and war materiel was seized.
This "strategic victory," according to the communique, marks
the defeat of the Cambodian Government's Chenla 2 operation
to clear Route 6 and "signals the defeat of the Nixon doctrine
in Cambodia." Claiming that "numerous" government positions
are being encircled and attacked, the communique called upon
the armed forces on Route 6 to "exploit their victories" and
"strike harder."
Hanoi's acclaim for "the brilliant victories" on Route 6 was
expressed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a speech
on the evening of the 16th at a reception given by the head
of the viclting Cambodian delegation, Ieng Sary. Trinh
singled out for praise the "resounding exploits" at Rumlong.
On the 17th the Rumlong victory was welcomed in editorials
in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The NHAN DAN
editorial termed the capture of Rumlong a "ne,:v and outstanding
contribution . . . to the common victory of the Indochinese
peoples" and said it proved that the CNPLAF is capable of
"attacking and completely destroying an important troop
concentration in a large operational area" despite the
"greatest efforts" by the Lon Nol forces with "direct support"
from U.S. and Saigon forces. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN acclaimed
the engagement at Rumlong as a "big battle of annihilation
and a brilliant feat of arms."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
DRV ARMY PAPER DISCUSSES STRUGGLE AGAINST PACIFICATION
The series of articles on pacification published in QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN, also broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam,
presents an unusually candid discussion of the allied
pacification program. The first article in the series,
monitored on 11 November, was said to have appeared in the
paper on that day. (Although the VNA press review mentioned
an article on pacification in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 10th,
no broadcast of this article was monitored.) Subsequent
articles in the series were broadcast on 12, 14, and
15 November.
The article broadcast on the 11th takes note of allied claims
of success in pacification when it discusses indicators--
such as improvements in road security--used by the allies
to demonstrate pacification progress. It ridicules the
practice of measuring success by the frequency of attacks on
lines of communications, declaring that such attacks
represent only one of "hundreds of guerrilla combat methods."
It is not possible, the paper argues, to assess "an entire
guerrilla warfare movement" or "revolutionary activity in
villages and hamlets" by measuring the results of a single
combat method.
The article concedes that "in some areas the U.S.-puppets
have edged outward triflingly," but it insists that this
does not prove the success of pacification. Such "temporary"
problems, it says, are due to the fact that "the regional
people are not sufficiently vigilant and fail to cleverly
combine various struggle methods." It goes on to repeat
the routine claim that the balance of forces favors the
communists and that the "total collapse" of the allied
pacification program "is only a matter of time."
The article broadcast on the 12th describes various
pacification plans, stressing the increased priority
placed on the pacification effort by the Nixon Administration.
It warns that the fight against pacification "can never be
belittled or neglected, and we cannot be optimistic or
belittle the enemy schemes."
The final article, spelling out methods to oppose
pacification, advises, among other things, that efforts be
concentrated on "annihilation" of "ringleader hooligans"
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
and on the destruction of military posts. Calling for the
destruction of strategic hamlets so as to enlarge 'liberated
areas" and achieve "liaison" and "mutual support" between
bases, the article also maintains that "only by launching
concerted, large-scale offensive waves under a unified plan
will the southern armed forces and people be able to achieve
high combat efficiency, deal the enemy vigorous blows, and
demolish military subsectors."
NORTH VIETNAMESE SPOKESMAN ROUTINELY PROTESTS U.S. BOMBINGS
Alleged U.S. air attacks from 9 to 11 November in the demilitarized
zone and Quang Binh Province are the subject of a routine DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 13th. The statement
charges that U.S. planes, including B-52's, attacked Huong Lap
village while U.S. artillery from ships and south of the
demilitarized zone shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Giang--all of which
it says are in the demilitarized zone "on DRV territory." The
statement says U.S. planes "raided" a number of places in
western Quang Binh during the same period. The last previous
foreign ministry spokesman's protest, on 8 November, had
atypically prompted a flurry of comment.*
None of the recent strikes is mentioned specifically in a
15 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which says that each
time the United States suffers a setback it embarks on a
"new militaty adventure." The paper calls upon the people's
local armed forces throughout the North-?-"especially in the
fourth military region, in the coastal areas and along
important communications lines"--to further "heighten their
vigilance with a determination to crush all war adventures of
the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, whenever and by
whatever means they may come."
HANOI OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR CHRISTMAS MAIL TO POWS
The procedures governing the mailing of Christmas packages and
cards to U.S. prisoners-of-war in the DRV were announced by
Hanoi on 11 November, two days later than last year. VNA's
announcement says that the provisions which applied during the
* See the 10 November TRENDS, pages 17-19.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
0
holidays last year will be carried out again. It stipulates that
parcels, to weigh five kilograms "'instead of the usual three,"
are to "be sent by post via Moscow in accordance with the
procedures already laid down." It warns that parcels sent in
any other way will not be accepted. Cards may be sent to
Hanoi by post or in care of the Committee of Liaison With
Families of Servicemen In Vietnam, New York.*
* Last year's instructions are discussed in the 12 November 1970
TRENDS, page 15.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
SINO -SOVIET RELATIONS
NEW PRC CORDER NEGOTIATOR ATTENDS SOVIET EMBASSY CONCERT
In a curious development, Moscow on 13 November reported--to
the Chinese radio audience only--that Ambassador Tolstikov on
the previous day had hosted a concert at the Soviet embassy
attended by a legion of PRC offi ials, including the n'w
Chinese chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks.
This represents the only confirmation thus far in either
Soviet or Chinese media of the appointment of Han Nien-lung,
a vice foreign minister in charge of Far Eastern affairs, to
replace Chiao Kuan-hua, the original Chinese negoti-: lr at
the border talks and now head of the PRC delegation dt the
UN Gea ral Assembly session. Chief Soviet negotiator Ilichev
and his deputy were also present at the concert. Peking has
not mentioned the event.
The Soviet report made the exceptional. gesture of referring to
the Chinese officials as "comrades," a fraternal title that
fell out of favor in Sino-Soviet relations as party ties were
broken under the impact of the cultural revolution.* The
concert, at which two Soviet artists performed, was also notable
for being a half step toward resumption of cultural exchange,
another victim of the deterioration of relations during the
cultural revolution. Though the concert was sponsored by the
Soviet ambassador rather than being held at Chinese invitation,
the large turnout of Chinese officials marked another in the
series of moves by the two sides toward observance of the
diplomatic amenities and improvement of their working relations.
The Soviet gesture may have been intended to redress in some
measure the effect of Moscow's attack on the Chinese in marking
the October Revolution anniversary a few days earlier. While
Peking used the occasion to send a conciliatory signal to the
Soviets,** Politburo member Grishin, in his keynote address on
6 November, sharply denounced the Chinese for their "splitting,
anti-Soviet line," an attack prompting a walkout by Chinese
* A notable exception was Brezhnev's reference to "Comrade Chou
En-lai" in the CPSU chief's important speech on 27 October 1969
endorsing the Sino-Soviet border talks, which had begun a week
earlier.
** See the TRENDS of 10 November, pages 15-16.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
diplomats. The Soviets have expressed concern over the effects
on their interests of Peking's flexible diplomatic moves,
particularly its invitation to President Nixon. But while
seeking to impose discipline on the Soviet wing of the communist
movement in order to meet Peking's challenge, Moscow has been
willing to persevere in the protracted border talks, now into
their third year without a change from the Peking venue.
According to a 7 November article by a leading proxy spokesman
for the Soviets, the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG's Varnai, the Chinese
have rejected new high-level talks with the Soviet leadership.
That the Chinese wish to keep the talks going at the level of
deputy foreign ministers seems reflected in the appointment of
Han Nien-lung to replace Chiao Kuan-hua.
MOSCOii4 CAUTIOUSLY DISCUSSES CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet central press has reacted cautiously to speculation
that Lin Piao has been purged, limiting itself to publishing a
TASS report citing the Paris AFP on the subject. The AFP
dispai.ch on the 12th, noting signs L'at Lin has been ousted
and citing a recent RED FLAG article attacking "sectarianism,"
concluded that the Chinese military were being "stripped of
important political rights" and r;.dt civilians are in the
ascendancy. The TASS version of the report was carried without
comment in PRAVDA and the other Moscow dailies on the 13th.
In an effort to put current PRC developments into perspective
for the domestic audience, Radio Moscow's weekly commentators'
roundtable pr-'gram on the 14th broached the subject after
discoursing defensively on the triangular aspects of President
Nixon's projected trips to Peking and Moscow. Citing "Western"
news sources, the panelists recounted reports of "the reshuffle
in the Chinese leadership" involv4ng the disappearance of Lin,
his wife, and a number of military leaders. One commentator
seemed at pains to point out that the changes would not alter
Peking's anti-Sovietism or its policy of rapprochement with
the United States: "Judging from the continuing Chinese
propaganda, the anti-Soviet course and the simultaneous
revision of Chinese policy toward the United States are
continuing, as is the development of Maoist concepts leading
to further weakening of the front of the anti-imperialist
struggle."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 197'_
Soviet agitational broadcasts to China have sought to fan
party-military tensions, as in one of the special programs for
the PLA, on 13 November, which said the army is being used as
a pawn in the Maoist leadership's "political game." Calling
attention to the disappearance of the Chinese defense minister
and of other high-ranking military officers, the commentator
explained that Mao ib resorting to a purge of the military "to
increase his influence on every aspect of the country's political
and economic life and to limit the role of the FLA." The broad-
cast went on to warn that "this is only the beginning" and to
forecast that "as in the past, hundreds and thousands of high-
ranking and middle-ranking commanders will be r.epiaced or
persecuted."
Moscow has avoided airing speculation about the crash of the
PRC jet in the Mongolian People's Republic on the night of
12-13 September. TASS on 30 September had carried the Mongolian
MONTSAME agency's report on the crash, and on 1 October TASS
dismissed as "fantasy" a Tokyo report that Liu Shao-chi had
defected to the USSR. Soviet media have not picked up rumors
circulating in the WL,Aern press that the crashed jet was
carrying Lin Piao or other Chinese military leaders.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
CHINA
RED FLAG ARTICLES ATTACK "SWINDLERS." CALL FOR UNITY
Lin Piao's name has gone unmentioned by Chinese media for the sixth
consecutive week. Meanwhile press articles continue to indicate
that. unnamed high-level "political swindlers" have tried to split
the party. An article by the writing group of the Liaoning CCP
Committee, published it, the 12th issue of RED FLAG and reprinted
on 13 November in all Peking dailies, added new fuel to the
campaign with the charge that anonymous enemies at one point
distorted Mao's five requirements for party members as outlined
in the party constitution, "lowering the requirements." In 1967,
Lin had issued "three criteria" for training, selecting, and
promoting, which are similar to Mao's party requirements.
Lin's three criteria seem quite uncontroversial, having as their
main message the need to follow Mao, keep in touch with the masses,
and maintain revolutionary vigor. They do, however, seem to fit
the article's attack on those who "pass off fish eyes as pearls"
by "wantonly altering the five requirements set forth by Chairman
Mao."
The precise issues in question are illuminated very little by
the RED FLAG article, although the trappings of a major purge
are obvious enough. The article notes that a bourgeois
political style "among some persons has resulted in their
political degeneration," which has led in turn co "serious
errors in orientation and line." "Just as" in the cultural
revolution, "swindlers" have opposed the revolutionary integrity
of the proletariat. Although the party constitution does not
say so, the article claims that the five requirements were
advanced as a specific reminder "to be vigilant against
individual careerists and schemers like Khrushchev and to
guard against such baC ;,_,sons usurping the leadership of
the party and state at all levels." Since the army under
Lin apparently controlled the apparatus at all levels, the
reference seems most applicable to him.
The RED FLAG article seems to take special aim at those
"leftists" who, during the cultural revolution, failed to
adhere closely enough to the zigs and zags of Maoist policy.
"One who adheres to an erroneous line can commit even greater
errors if he displays greater enthusiasm," the article observes.
"Leftist" targets are indicated again via a critique of certain
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
incorrect "standards for communist party members and revolutionary
cadres" which made no mention of Marxism-Leninism--a rather common
flaw during those periods of the cultural revolution when Mao
alone was the declared fount of all knowledge. (The new winter-
spring schedules for the Peking domestic radio, effective
15 November, drop certain programs entitled "selected readings"
or "study" :E Mao's works in favor of programs entitled "s,;udy
Marxist-Leninist works ori;i Chairman Mao's works.")
COMMENT The 12th issue of RED FLAG also contains a commentary
ON SONGS on the two songs now being widely popularized through-
out China, the "Internationale" and "Three Main Rules
of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention." The latter song,
based on rules long associated with Lin as well as their author
Mao, was last popularized during the early stage of the Red Guard
movement in the fall of 1966. The major theme of the song, as
stressed by the commentary, is the need for unity. The song is
presented as an injunction to the army, party and people to
"observe discipline, implement policy and unity" under Mao's
line.
The rules and points as presented in the commentary are revised
to make them somewhat more applicable to the modern context.
The first rule, "obey orders," receives special attention, and
the other two rules are combined into a general plea for
"building the nation with diligence and thrift." Of the
eight points, the commentary singles out only two for special
attention; the first, "speak politely," is now interpreted as
an injunction to respect the masses and guard against arrogance,
themes that broadcasts indicate have special relevance for
some PLA cadres at local levels. The fifth point for attention,
"don't hit or swear at people," is now interpreted as an
injunction "not to issue orders arbitrarily" and to strengthen
ideological education among the masses.
The popularization of the "Internationale" is apparently also
related to the leadership situation. The commentary echoes
earlier articles in quoting from the song the phrase "never
has there been a savior"--an implicit rebuke to Lin, who
during the cultural revolution constantly hailed Mao as the
genius responsible for the Chinese revolution.
PROVINCIAL In their turn, the provincial radios increasingly
BROADCASTS reflect elements of discord between army and party
personnel. The Hunan provincial radio on 5 November,
for example, after reviewing the various historical attempts to
undermine party unity, confidently predicted the inevitable doom
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
of all "political swindlers" who plot to "sabotage unity and
attempt to split the party." Leveling direct criticism at PLA
members of local party committees, the broadcast warned that
"it is certainly not right to issue compulsory orders, and
still less is warlordism permitted," Leading bodies were
instructed to adopt methods of "persuasion and education" and
to cast aside the "attitude of comrandism and methods of
compulsion.."
The Hunan commentator also forcefully argued the need to
counter the .nfluence of "politi-al swindlers like Liu Shao-chi"
who pretend to be "humble little commoners" (a reference to
Chen Po-ta), and of those who "frantically preach the idealist
theory of genius" in order to "lead us astray." But the
developing bill of indictement against Lin--for his erroneous
view of the role of human genius and resultant "excessive"
adulation of Mao--was spelled out more directly in a Szechwan
broadcast on 5 November. After asking its audience to "please
listen carefully," the Chengtu radio followed RED FLAG'S
lead in quoting from the song "Internationale"--"never has
there been a savicr, nor will we ever rely on godfl and
emperors"--to buttress its condemnation of "political
swindlers" who have claimed to be gifted with genius but in
fact "did not know how to work, til the land, or fight a war."
Claiming that those "schemers and careerists" who pretended to
be heroes have been "crushed to pieces by the advancing wheel
of history," the broadcast firmly declared, "Let the absurd
theory that 'heroes create history' go to hell!"
Current party-army tensions were also discussed in a Shensi
broadcast on 8 November which reported on the activities of
a local PLA unit to increase the soldiers' perception of the
harm done by previous attempts to split the party and army.
Members of the unit turned to Mao's works to deepen their
understanding of the "antiparty behavior of C}-ang Kuo-tao in
splitting the red army" and concluded that since the question
of "to unite or to split" separates "genuine and sham Marxism-
Leninism" the goal of "party unity should be as dear to us as
our own lives." They also recalled the c--imes of "political
swindlers like Wang Ming and Liu Shao-chi' who plotted to
"split the party while constantly waving the signboard of
Marxism-Leninism and putting forward a set of reactionary
theories to deceive the masses." Those cadres who had been
"fooled thereby" were instructed to intensify their study of
Mao's works "and unite closely around the party Central
Committee headed by Chairman Mao."
Approved For Release 200014UUgNTGI RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
The specific need for greater civilian control over local PLA
members engaged in the "three supports and two militaries,"
administrative tasks entrusted to the PLA during the cultural
revolu'Llon, was argued in a 6 November Changsha broadcast.
Leading PLA cadres in local party organizations were instructed
tQ urderstand fully that "the higher their aut!- -?ity, the more
should they be modest and prudent and the more effort should
they make to st-.en-then their concept of the party" and obey
the "unified leadership" of local CCP committees. The broadcast
asserted '_h at military personnel, "no matter how high their
positions are," must all place "themselves inside the CCP
committees, not outside and above the CCP committees."
A similar broadcast on 8 November by the Kwangsi provincial
radio noted that the members of the Nanning garrison CCP
committee are sharpening their understanding of "the importance
of rifles being commanded by the party." Apparently, however,
there are still a few who resist this concept; the broadcast
called for greater vigilance within all garrison departments
to guard against those who "oppose the red flag with one of
their own" and seek to "usurp our party and state."
SHANSI PARTY-GOVERNMENT CHIEF LOSES POST AS # CO+1ANDER
In a move that may portend a coming trend, one provincial
leader has given up his post as commander of the military
district while continuing to serve as party and government
chief of the province. A 13 November Taiyuan broadcast,
reporting on a local PTA rally for a martyr, identified Tsao
Chung-nan as the commander of the Shansi Military District
(MD), a post that had been previously held by Hsieh Chen-hua,
first secretary of the Shansi Provincial Party Committee and
chairman of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee.
Both Hsieh and Tsao have had military responsibilities within
Shansi since 1967. Tsao became a vice-chairman on the
provincial revolutionary committee last November and was
named a secretary on the new provincial party committee
announced last April. Hsieh's vice-chairmanship on the
revolutionary committee dates back to 1967: In May 1970 he
was identified as commander of the Shansi MD and in September
this year as chairman of the revolutionary committee.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
This shift in MD leadership may have occurred, unannounced,
sometime ago. Although Hsieh has appeared regularly in recent
months, including a 6 November appearance at a provincial
conference on publishing work, he has not been identified as
commander of the Shansi MD since C,;*ober 1970. Since the
formation of the provincial party cc~ aittee last April, he
has been listed only as first secrets y of the provincial party
committee and chairman of the revolutionary committee.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW SUPPORTS CAIRO CALL FOR UNGA DEBATE ON MIDDLE EAST
Soviet propaganda on the Middle East, sustained at a low level
this fall, responds in low key to Cairo's request, reported
in the 13 November AL-AHRAM, for an UNGA debate on the Middle
East at the end of November. Moscow does not deal with speci-
fics of Egypt's plan of action, with a domestic service commen-
tary by LITERARY GAZETTE observer Kurov on the 13th merely
noting that Egypt is striving for a UN decision on fulfilling
Resolution 242. (As outlined by AL-AHRAM, Egypt will seek a
resolution calling or. Israel to give a positive reply to
Jarring clarifying its commitments toward implementation of
Resolution 242, and, if Israel rejects such a solution, will
ask the General Assembly to take several steps, including
imposition of sanctions against Israel.)
Other Soviet press and radio commeaL praises the decision as
exemplifying Egypt's desire for a political settlement. An
Arabic-language talk and an English-language commentary on
Radio Peace and Progress on the 14th reaffirm the Soviet
position, stated by Podgornyy during Egyptian President
as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, of continued efforts
for a political settlement while assisting Egypt and other
Arab countries in strengthening their "defense capacity.."
The Peace and Progress commentary provides the first avail-
able Soviet reference to what the broadcast calls Washington'ss
decision "not to renew deliveries" of Phantom planes to
Israel "at the moment." It calls his "another of Washington's
maneuvers" timed to coincide with the UNGA debate in an effort
to forestall expected criticism of U.S. policy. The radio's
remark was presumably prompted by--but does not allude to--
Secretary Rogers' U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT interview, in the
issue dated 22 November, in which he said that up to now the
military balance has not shifted, that a review is "in train" in
light of the recent Soviet-Egyptian communique, and that Presi-
dent Nixon has made it clear he will be sure that the military
balance is continued. Rogers added that the USSR in the last
four or five months "operated with some restraint as far as
shipments are concerned."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FB'[S 'TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
AS-SADAT The Kurov domestic service commentary on the 13th
SPEECH cited as-Sadat as saying, in his 11 November speech
at the inaugural session of the People's Assembly,
that the Miudle East question concerns withdrawal of Israeli
troops and restoration of Palestinian rights, not the opening
of the canal, and that Egypt will never agree to the substitu-
tion of an agreement on opening the canal for an overall settle-
ment of the crisis. Kurov dismissed the idea, reported by Israeli
and U.S. media on the 11tA, that Israel is prepared to let Egypt
begin clearing the canal, without withdrawing Israeli troops from
the east bank of the canal. Such asgertions, Kurov said, would
lead one to believe that the entire Middle East crisis was just a
matter of navigation through the canal. And in a 15 November
PRAVDA article, Glukhov noted that as-Sadat's "peace initiative"
regarding the canal is viewed as a first step on the road toward a
general settlement.
Glukhov cited as-Sadat's new condition--an affirmative Israeli
reply to Ambassador Jarring's 8 February 1971 memorandum--as a
preliminary condition "for discussing the question of opening
the Suez Canal." The Egyptian president had called it an
"indispensable condition that must precede any other step" and
had said that without an affirmative anewer from Israel "there
will be no room for any debates or discussions." While as-Sadat
did not specifically link his condition with discussions on the
canal issue, AL-AHRAM made this connection in a 13 November arti-
cle.
Moscow's first known acknowleigment of as-Sadat's declaration
that 1971 will be "a decisive year"--first made in remarks to
troops on the Suez front in early June and subsequently repeated--
appeared in the TASS report of his Assembly speech on the 11th.
TASS said he "reiterated" that 1971 must become the year of the
solution of the Middle East crisis. The "decisive year" formula-
tion is also pointed up in - PRAVDA article by Demchenko on the
16th: Demchenko charged "imperialist propaganda" with trying
to distort Egypt's real position as well as the meaning of
as-Sadat's "statement that 1971 should become the decisive year."*
Judging from the TASS report, Demchenko, without explanation,
said that an end has been put to these propaganda "concoctions"
by Cairo's new initiative in proposing an UNGA debate.
* AL-AHRAM editor Haykal, in his 5 November article, explained
that decisiveness did not mean "reaching the ultimate result,"
whether through peace or war, but only "making a decision."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONK' f I)LN'I' I AI:, UB;CS 'I ' 'RENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
ROLE OF Moscow has not yet publicly addressed itself to the
BIG POWERS matter of PRC participation in big power consulta-
tions on the Middle East. In the days immediately
after the 25 October UNGA vote on PRC seating in the United Nations,
Moscow had continued to press for renewed efforts by the "Big
Four" in promoting a settlement. Propagandists had been pursuing
this line since Gromyko's complaint in his 28 September UNGA
address that Israel and "its patrons" had paralyzed Jarring's
mission and stalled the four-power consultations. However, a
possible allusion to a Chinese role appears in a 4 November
PRAVDA article by Demchenko: He assailed U.S. initiatives and
mediation attempts undertaken without consulting "other member
states" of the Security Council. TASS' 31 October account of a
press conference statement by Elysee spokesman Baudoin on the
Brezhnev-Pompidou talks had failed to include his "wait-and-see"
reply to a question about the effect of Peking's entry into the
Security Council on the four-power discussions.
Recent elite references to the Big Four talks have included
Brezhnev's remark in Paris, at a 27 October dinner for Pompidou,
that the four powers have a duty to facilitate a peaceful settle-
mcnt. The French-Soviet communique called it necessary to give
Jarring an opportunity to resume consultations and added that
the USSR and France would use all available possibilities,
including the quadripartite consultations, to explore ways for
a Middle East settlement. The 26 October communique on Kosygin's
visit to Canada said the sides agreed on the need to support
the efforts of the four powers and Ambassador Jarring.
Moscow again spelled out its grievances against the U.S. position
in the talks in a 28 October article by PRAVDA's New York
correspondent Kolesnichenko, who in two previous articles this
year--in February and August--had detailed, and attacked,
Washington's "negative stand" in the talks.
PRC ENVOY IN UNGA REAFFIRMS PEKING SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS
In his maiden speech at the 15 November UNGA session, Peking's
delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua sustained the PRC focus on
the Palestinian element in the Middle East problem, mentioning
the Palestinians six times in one paragraph. But while expressing
the belief that the Palestinians "and other Arab peoples" will
recover the lost Aran territories and restore Palestinian "national
rights," he seemed to be keeping the diplomatic options open on
the question of a settlement by failing to advocate armed struggle.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONUII)ENTLAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
He defined the Middle East question as aggression by "Israeli
Zionism" with the "support and connivance of the superpowers,"
and took another swipe at the United States and the USSR in
concluding that no one has the right "to engage in. political
deals" behind the Arabs' backs, "bartering away their right to
existence and their national interests."
Chiao made no mention of the various efforts within or outside
the United Nations to promote a settlement, and there has been
no indication from Peking media of Chinese views on the problem
since the 25 October UNGA vote on I'ZC seating. Cairo sources,
however, have evinced interest in tha PRC position: AL-AHRAM
revealed on the 10th, according to tEe MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA), that "important contacts" had taken place recently
between Cairo and Peking to learn China's opinion and the line
it would take in the United Nations. And the paper reported
on the 13th that Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad is expected to
visit Peking in January at the invitation of the Chinese Govern-
ment.
MENA on the 10th said that the Chinese delegation to the United
Nations, in a statement made during a stopover at Cairo airport,
expressed China's firm support for as-Sadat's "attitude and
efforts to achieve a just peace," and pointed out that the
Middle East crisis would be a top item on the delegation's
agenda at the United Nations. The following day, MENA reported
that PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, in a statement published
in AL-JUMHURIYAH that day, affirmed the need for Israeli with-
drawal from the Arab territories and i+aple-nentation of the
November 1967 Security Council resolution. MENA quoted Li as
saying that nonimplementation of Resolution 242 and "failure
of the talks"--nature unspecified---would create a complicated
situation in the area.
RELATIONS According to MENA, Li expressed astonishment that
WITH ISRAEL Israel voted in favor of the Albanian draft resolu-
tion on China; he denied rumors, MENA said, about
the existence of PRC-Israeli trade relations and declared Peking's
determination not to develop relations with Israel in any field,
whether economic, political, or cultural.
However, Chou En-tai in his ASAHI SHIMBUN interview, as reported
in the ASAHI EVENING NEWS on 8 November, ruled out diplomatic
relations with Israel but left the door open with regard to
frieude' 'g "with the Jewish people." Noting that among the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONI''IDEN'C1AL P11 U4 'I1RENI)8
1.7 NOVEMBEfl 1.971,
countries which voted for the Albanian resolution there are some,
such as Israel, with which Peking cannot have official governmental
relations, he explained that Israel started an aggressive war and
this problem has not yet been resolved. Thus while Israel voted
for China, there nevertheless coild not be diplomatic relations--
which he called a "major problem."
Peking had earlier reacted to "fabrications" in some Israeli
and Western, newspapers regarding Israeli-PRC contacts "on 'the
establishment of diplomatic relations."' A PEOPLE'S DAILY
article on 13 August attacked TASS for "spreading these lies,"
in turn accusing the Soviet agency of trying to divert
attention from the "sinister activities which social-imperialism
itself is engaged in, including its collusion with Israel."*
MOSCOW KILLS, RESURRECTS REPORT ON GOLDA MEIR IN WASHINGTON
A series of recent reports by Moscow media alleging that Israeli
Prime Minister Golds' Meir was visiting Washington seems to indi-
cate the bureaucratic difficulties involved in killing an
erroneous story once it gets into Moscow', propaganda pipeline.
On 4 November, the day Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began
her Washington visit, a New York datelined TASS report said
that Mrs. Meir had arrived in Washington and was expected to
have meetings with President Nixon and other U.S. officials. The
item was transmitted in TASS' Russian-language service at
0647 GMT. TASS English transmitted the item at 0806 GMT and
repeated it about an hour later, meanwhile having reported Mrs.
Gandhi's visit.
Some eight hours later, at 1559 GMT, TASS English finally trans-
mitted a service message killing the item on Mrs. Meir. But
three hours after that Moscow's Arabic-language service had still
failed to get the word: A brief commentary in the 1900 GMT pro-
gram on Israel's demand for more Phantom planes began with the
statement that Golds Meir had arrived in Washington to meet with
American officials.
Curiously, the story surfaced again a week later, when Moscow's
domestic service at 2230 GMT on the 11th carried a commentary
by LITERARY GAZETTE observer Kurov on the Israeli budget debate.
* See the 11 August FBIS TRENDS for a discussion of Soviet
propaganda speculation on reports of Israeli-PRC contacts.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFLI)ENT1AL Filly 'T'RENDS
1.7 NOVEMBER 1971
Charging that war hysteria was being whipped up in Israel, Kurov
said that Israeli, Air Force commander Hod had gone to the United
States to demand i,ew arms shipments and that "Golda Meir flew to
Washington for the same reason."
Meanwhile, in Israel., Mrs. Moir was reported by Jerusalem radio
as meeting with the four visiting African presidents on 3 and
5 November and acireesing public functions i., Israel on the
9th and 10th.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
ARMS CONTROL
SEMENOV REPLEDGES USSR TO SERIOUS EFFORT AT VIENNA SALT
Negligible Soviet propaganda attention to the opening of the
sixth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in
Vienna on 15 November has been confined to reportage on the
arrival statements and activities of the U.S. and Soviet
negotiators. By contrast, on the eve of the opening of the
previous round in Helsinki on 8 July, a lengthy article by
V. Viktorov in PRAVDA had recapitulated Soviet propaganda
attacks on U.S. opponents of an agreement on arms limitation,
at the same time noting that the 20 May U.S.-Soviet announce-
ment said the two countries had agreed to concentrate their
efforts this year on an accord limiting the deployment of
antimissile defense systems and to work toward "certain
measures" limiting strategic offensive arms.*
Chief Soviet delegate Semenov in his arrival remarks on the
14th, reported by TASS, repledged the USSR to serious
negotiations, noting that the Soviet Government had
instructed his delegation to "conduct the talks in a
constructive manner." Recalling that the course of the
upcoming talks was specified in the 20 May U.S.-Soviet
agreement, he said there is now "a real opportunity for
obtaining positiv,_ results." In the pattern of his arrival
remarks in Helsinki on 7 July, Semenov did not spell out
the issues to be discussed. He said only that the agreements
reached at the last round--on improving the means of
preventing accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons
and on improving the Washington Moscow hotline--are proof
that positive results can be achieved when there is "mutual
good will."
The same TASS report on the 14th said that Ambassador Smith,
in a statement for the press, had expressed hope for
"a successful completion of the talks in.the near future."
A TASS report of President Nixon's 12 November press
conference noted briefly that the President, in answer tc
a question, said "he believed in the possibility of
* The Viktorov article is discussed in the TRENDS of
8 July 1971, pages 24-26.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
progress toward the achievement of an agreement before the end
of the year." TASS did not go on to cite his observation that
an agreement must limit both defensive and offensive Weaponry.
Moscow continues routinely to attack U.S. opponents of
strategic arms limitation, with a lengthy article in the
November issue of the journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZI?IDUNARODNAYA
OTNOSHENIYA by A. Kalyadin, for example, complaining about
"influential forces" in the United States which are striving
"to retain as much freedom as possible for the military-industrial
^omplex in building up military might." Signed to the press on
21 October, the artf.cle said that the participants in the
"polemic" around SALT are divided into three groups--those who
see a need to curb the growth of armaments through international
agreements or through the policy of mutual example and who
grant the possibility of some reduction in the existing level
of world armaments; those who advocate limiting certain types
of arms in favor of accelerating the development of others;
and the "extremists" who are "sharply hostile to SALT, condemn
the existing international agreements in this sphere, and
oppose any attempts to prevent the buildup of military might
and the improvement of the instruments of war." The last
group, the author asserted, id made up of businessmen who
have grown rich on military contracts, "rightist" politicians,
certain senators and congressmen, research corporations,
centers for strategic studies, and activists from ultraright
organizations like the John Birch Society.
CHIAO MENTIONS LIQUIDATING BLOCS IN UN POLICY STATEMENT
Chiao Kuan-hua, delivering the maiden PRC speech before the
UN General Assembly on 15 November, in the main recited
familiar Chinese i.Lrmulations on disarmament issues. In
one notable passage, however, Chiao took the occasion to
hail what he described as the demand of the peoples of the
world for the dissolution of military blocs, the withdrawal
of foreign troops, and the dismantling of foreign military
bases. While Chinese spokesmen over the years have
frequently called for troop withdrawal and liquidation of
foreign bases, they have only rarely mentioned the third
element of the trinity, the liquidation of military blocs.
That demand was last broached in the 9 June communique
following Ceausescu's visit to the PRC--evidently
reflecting a Chinese effort to identify yet another point
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
of convergence with the Romanians, who have long called for
the liquidation of blocs.* The last known high-level
Chinese reference to the subject before that had been in
November 1963, when the Chinese delegate at a World Peace
Council meeting in Warsaw outlined a prograir _o prevent
world war; among other steps, he called for the liquidation
of forelen military bases, withdrawal of foreign troops, and
dissolution of "aggressive" military blocs.
In the UN speech, carried in full by NCNA on the 16th, Chiao
disavowed any Peking intent to be a "superpower," at the
same time assailing the "one or two superpowers" which would
"manipulate and monopolize" the United Nations and are
engaged in arms expansion while talking about disarmament.
Without mentioning the Soviet proposal of last June for a
conference of the five-nuclear powers, but in language
reminiscent of the 30 July PRC statement rejecting that
proposal, Chiao asserted that China "will never participate
in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the
nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries."
The nuclear disarmament sought by the superpowers, he said,
is "entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons."
Defending the PRC's development of nuclear weapons, which he
said are still in the experimental stage, Chiao insisted
that the PRC's weapons are solely for purposes of defense,
for breaking the nuclear monopoly, and for ultimately
eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear war. He repeated
the long-standing Chinese proposal for a world summit
conference to discuss nuclear disarmament and, as the first
step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear
weapons. Reaffirming that the PRC will never be the first
to use nuclear weapons, Chiao went on to challe,-- the
United States and the USSR--as in the 30 July PE,; statement--
to commit themselves not to be the first to use the weapons.
* Sino-Romanian affinities in the diplomatic arena seemed
reflected in a 13 November NCNA report on visits by Chiao to
the Albanian, Romanian, and Algerian delegations to thank
them for their efforts in behalf of PRC representation. It
would be natural for the Albanians and Algerians--principal
cosponsors of the pro-PRC resolution--to be singled out in
this way, but the inclusion of the Romanians appears to be a
special gesture in their favor. After his visit to Peking,
C ausescu picked up the Chinese theme of common interests
uniting the "small and medium-size countries."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
GERMANY
AXEN IN FINLAND: GDR MEDIA IGNORE DETAILS OF FINNISH PROPOSAL
GDR media's coverage of SED Politburo member Hermann Axen's
7-12 November visit to Finland, at the invitation of the
Finnish Communist Party (SKP), has portrayed it not only as
a parity-to-party contact but also as a public step forward
in the development of state relations between the GDR and
Finland. Reporting on Axon's activities and meetings throughout
the six-day visit, including talks with President Kekkonen,
Prime Minister Aura, and Foreign Minister Mattila, East
Berlin's ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND have noted that problems
of European security and the development of GDR-Finnish
relations were discussed. However, in keeping with past
avoidance of any discussion of the details of the 10 September
Finnish Government proposal to establish full diplomatic
relations with both German states, East Berlin has refrained
frum reporting the substance of Axon's public remarks on the
subject in Finland.
That the aim of the trip went beyond the mere holding of talks
with a fraternal party was made clear in Axen's statement upon
arrival back in East Berlin on the 12th. The SED Central
Committee, he said, had assigned him two tasks: to strengthen
relations with the SKP, and "to contribute, through talks
with the leading political figures of the Republic of Finland,
to fully normalizing relations between Finland and the GDR."
Axen concluded that his talks with the Finnish leaders had
promoted the latter goal, looking toward eventual full
diplomatic relations. The joint communique on the visit,
however, sought to play down the official state aspects of
the visit by noting only that Axon was received by Kekkonen,
with no mention of his meeting with the Finnish premier and
foreign minister, and by omitting any reference to the Finnish
Government proposal.
It is in a second document issued at the conclusion of the
visit--a joint declaration entitled "For the Security of the
Peoples of Europe," signed in the name of the SED and SKP
central committees--that the SKP "welcomes the GDR's readiness
to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of a state treaty
on the settlement of relations between the GDR and the
Finnish republic, including the establishment of diplomatic
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
relations." The SKP then restates its view, made previously
in statements issued by its central committee in September and
October, that "Finland must on no account make the establishment
of diplomatic relations with the GDR dependent on the attitude
of the FRG."*
In publicizing the text of this document, East Berlin media
carried their first acknowledgment that the Finnish proposal
to establish relation- with the GDR is contingent on simultaneous
approval by Bonn for the establishment of FRG diplomatic relations
with Finland. But where Helsinki radio reported Axen as stating
at a press conference in Finland on the 12th that the GDR
understood the principle of equality contained in the Finnish
proposal, according to which talks should be held simultaneously
with the two German states," ADN reported only that he called
for the opening of bilateral negotiations between the GDR and
Finland. Helsinki's report said he added that while the GDR
has given "an affirmative reply" to the Finnish offer, the
"complete sovereignty of the sides" must be borne in mind.
Although Axen in Finland publicly broached the Finnish proposal
for negotiations on settlement of damagca caused by German
troops in Finland in 1944-45, GDR media's brief accounts of
his speeches ignored this aspect and it is unmentioned in the
joint declaration. On the 9th, according to Helsinki media,
Axen remarked that it would be difficult to appraise the grounds
for Finland's claim to compensation for war damages and asserted
that the important thing was to move ahead with negotiations on
normalizing relations.
* Moscow media have not been heard to report the joint
declaration, although TASS briefly summarized the joint
communique, including passages in which the two parties
jointly condemned the "anti-Soviet chauvinistic policy of
the Mao Tse-tung group."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
- 34 -
FRG- CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE ANTICIPATES PROGRESS IN NEXT ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS
In a speech one week before the fourth round of FRG-Czechoslovak
talks, slated to be held in Bonn on 18 and 19 November, Czechoslovak
party Presidium member Vasil Bilak foresaw "substantial" progress
toward the talks' objective of bringing about negotiations to
normalize relations. In the speech, delivered at an election
meeting on the 11th and carried in Bratislava media, Bilak may
also have publicly foreshadowed a muting of Czechoslovakia's
unyielding approach on the pivotal issue of the Munich agreement
in the next round of the talks.
Pointing out that the successful development of bilateral economic
relations could serve as the model for normalization of relations
in the political sphere, Bilak reiterated the basic Czechoslovak
stand calling for West German recognition of the invalidity of
the Munich agreement ab initio in order to give necessary impetus
to the development of political ties. "Sooner or lcter," he said,
"the responsible circles in the FRG must realize that whatever was
committed by Fascist Germany against our people was a crime and
must be fundamentally condemned from its very beginning." But he
went on to indicate what may possibly be the basis for a face-saving
gambit looking toward an accommodation on the issue: He argued
that "no extenuating circumstance or any justification exists or
can exist even for the temporary validity of the Munich diktat;
no Czechoslovak government can ever recognize even the temporary
validity of the Munich agreement. This was . . . a crime, and
as a crime it cannot be acknowledged as an act of law." The
customary Prague presentation of this point has stipulated
unequivocally that the FRG must join with Czechoslovakia in
recognizing the agreement as invalid ab initio. The implication
if Bilak's more circuito'-.s presentation may be that Prague would
cattle for a formula that would encompass the Czechoslovak
Gov:rnment's unqualified position on the nonvalidity of the
accord while permitting Bonn to declare the agreement invalid
in such a way as to exempt or gloss over the period from
September 1938 to March 1939, when Hitler's troops occupied
Bohemia and Moravia.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
Czechoslovakia's inclination toward some kind of compromise
that would enable the talks to move forward has seemed implicit
in its comment since the third round of the talks on 27-28 September
in Prague. There has been a marked emphasis on Prague's interest
in doing its part to reduce tensions in Europe in line with the
CPSU's "peace program," and the normalization of relations with the
FRG has been cited in this context. Notably, at a Prague rally
on 5 November marking the October Revolution anniversary, Premier
Strougal prefaced remarks on Prague-Bonn relations with the
statement that Czechoslovakia "is ready to contribute its share"
to the Soviet peace program and went on to say, with respect to
relations with Bonn, that "we are taking the necessary initiatives
with the conviction that thereby peace and security in Europe will
also be strengthened." On the 11th TASS noted that Czechoslovak
First Deputy Foreign Minister Krajcir had met that day with
Gromyko in Moscow to discuss "questions of mutual concern."
Krajcir's one-day trip to Moscow had not been announced in advance.
Bilak in his speech on the 11th seemed to be seeking to assure
West Germany that if the hurdle of agreement on the "fundamental"
Munich agreement issue could be overcome, the talks could move
ahead without difficulty. "All the other existing problems are
of a secondary nature," he said, in apparent allusion to Bonn's
concern over possible Czechoslovak reparations demands as well as
the myriad of legal issues surrounding the Sudeten German
citizenship question. A Radio Moscow commentary in German by
"Soviet historian" Aleksandr Gal%.in on 28 September, at the time
of the third round of the Prague-Bonn talks, had directly
discounted FRG concern on these counts: Taking issue with
the argument advanced in Bonin that the FRG must co-Lsider
"possible legal consequences if the Munich agreement is
declared invalid ab initio," Galkin pointed out that "the
legal responsibility for the damage inflicted on the Czechoslovak
Republic during the occupation has long since been apportioned
by international accords on war criminals and b?; Czechoslovak
laws which provide punishment for collaboration."*
The notion that the FRG need have no concern about the "legal
consequences" had also seemed implicit in Prague's modification
of its long-standing formula that Bonn must recognize the Munich
See the TRENDS of 6 October 1971, pages 37-39.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
accord as invalid ab initio with "all the consequences arising
therefrom." The quoted concluding phrase was dropped in the
communique on the 2 August Soviet bloc summit meeting in the
Crimea, and subsequent Czechoslovak elite statements have
repeated the formula without it.
In his Presidium report to the CPCZ Central Committee plenum
on 21 October, remarking that economic relations with Bonn
were being pursued "without any serious disturbing moments,"
Bilak noted that political relations were "developing on
another level" and went on to call for FRG recognition of the
Munich agreement as invalid ab initio. The communique on the
11-12 November visit of a GDR party-government delegation led
by Honecker to Czechoslovakia registered the GDR1s support for
the "Just" Czechoslovak demand regarding the Munich agreement.
Winding up his remarks on relations with the FRG in his
11 November election speech, Bilak expressed the conviction
that "steps will be taken on the part of the FRG Government"
at the forthcoming bilateral session "which will substantially
advance the present talks."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
POLAND-USSR
TOP LEADERS STRESS UNANIMITY ON EVE OF PZPR CONGRESS
Without prior announcement, Soviet and Polish media on
10 November reported the arrival that day in Moscow of Poland's
Gierek and Jaroszewicz for "friendly" talks with their Soviet
opposite members, Brezhnev and Kosygin. Held some four weeks
before the 6 December opening of the Sixth Congress of the
Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the meeting was duly
publicized in PRAVDA and TRYBUNA LUDU on the 11th with a
report--not designated a communique--on talks which "confirmed
a complete unity of views" in an atmosphere of "cordiality,
friendship, and fraternity." The 1 November communique on
Brezhnev's talks with Honecker in the GDR had included no
reference to unity of views, although the Soviet and GDR
leaders spoke of unanimity in their speeches that day.
Radio Moscow on the 12th, reporting that a PZPR Politburo
meeting had "fully endorsed the results of the visit,"
noted an emphasis in Polish media both on "the complete
coincidence of views . . . on all matters discussed"
between the Polish and Soviet leaders and on "the truly
inestimable importan:re" of Soviet bloc unity in light of
"the cardinal shift toward international detente."
This was Gie :k's third reported visit to the USSR this
year: With Premier Jaroszewicz, he made his first visit
abroad as PZPR first secretary to Moscow in early January,
when unity of views was also reported, and he took part in
the rump meeting of Soviet bloc party leaders in the Crimea
on 2 August.
The 11 November report on the Moscow talks mentioned "a
comradely exchange of opinions" on bilateral relations
and "urgent" international topics--economic integration
under CEMA, preparations for a European security conference,
and "unity of action" of the socialist countries, the world
communist movement, and "all anti-imperialist forces."
Undoubtedly also discussed, but unmentioned in the report,
was the internal matter of the impending Warsaw congress,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDEN11AL FBIS '1'RI NDS
1.7 NOVI,?MBER 1.971
which Brezhnev may he expected to attend.* Advance propaganda
indicates that the conclave will be attended by an unprecedentedly
large proportion of younger delegates drawn from the urban
proletariat who will he expecting further evidence of the change
in style in the conduct of party affairs promised by the Gierek
regime, The new style is manifest, for example, in the use
of the term "guidelines" to describe the congress directives
which Gierek presented for adoption at the 4 September plenum
of the PZPR. Gierek stressed at the ilenum that the document
was not "final" but was merely to serve as the basis for
precongress discussion by the workers and party bodies. Soviet
media, in reporting the congress document, adhered to the
orthodox term "directives."
A Warsaw domestic service report on the 15th of a precongress
party meeting in the Gdansk coastal area, where the riots
broke out last December, exemplifies the Polish party leadership's
concern to get across the idea that it has made good on its
promises to the workers. Gdansk Voivodship PZPR committee first
secretary Karkoszka is reported to have insisted at the meeting
that "the party has consolidated its bonds with the workers of
the coastal area." At the same time, he reminded the coastal
workers of their "promise contained in the word 'pomozemy'
[we will help] made during the meeting of comrades Gierek and
Jaroszewicz with shipbuilders last January."
In contrast to the regional first secretary's claim of
successful "consolidation," a congress delegate from the Lenin
Shipyard was quoted by the Gdansk domestic service, also on the
15th, to the effect that the work of "regaining the workers'
confidence in the party organization" was "not yet finished"
and that "many comrades" were "somehow unable to grasp the essence
of the seventh and eighth plenums" of the PZPR in December 1970
and February 1971, respectively. The delegate added a double-edged
remark that "in our everyday work we assume that the sixth party
congress will definitely and finally close the December events of
last year."
* Brezhnev has attended virtually all the party congresses of
Moscow's East European allies, including the Fifth PZPR Congress
in November 1968, since taking over as CPSU leader in October
1964. A notable exception was the Romanian party congress in
August 1969.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1.7 NOVEMBER 1971
TOPICS IN BRIEF
ARBATOV ON PRESIDENT'S USSR VISIT
U.S. affairs specialist G.A. Arbatov's article in the November
issue of the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, the
most authoritative comment to date to be pegged to the
President's forthcoming Moscow visit, was signed to the press
on 12 October--the day the announcement on the visit was
released. In the pattern of the 15 October Nekrasov article
in PRAVDA and other comment, Arbatov's article defended the
agreement on the visit as "another practical result" of
So?riet efforts to implement the foreign policy program of the
24th CPSU Congress, "a program fully in keeping" with
principles of peaceful coexistence.
With these prefatory remarks, Arbatov proceeded to recapitulate
stock Soviet lines on U.S. Sbviet relations. He deplored the
existence of "influential" opponents of detente in the United
States, and he outlined broad "problems whose solution would
be in the interests" of both countries without damaging tl.e
"legitimate interests" of others. He identified these
problems as prevp tion of a world thermonuclear war, the
quest for a more ;table foundation for strengthening world
peace and security, limitation of the arms race, and the
broadening of trade and economic, scientific, and technical
cooperation. At the same time, Arbarov cautioned against
expecting too much from the visit in light of the "complexity"
of the relationship between the world's leading military
powers.
CCP-SPANISH CP MEETING
In a notable show of flexibility in interparty relations paral-
leling Peking's broadening diplomatic moves, the Chinese have
disclosed the visit of a Spanish CP delegation headed by its
general secretary, Santiago Carrillo. According to NCNA on
17 November, the delegation left "for Europe" the previous day
after visiting Peking, Yenan, Canton, and Shanghai at the invi-
tation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With
Foreign Countries. The Spanish CP's clandestine Radio Indepen-
dent Spain, quoting the party organ !'.'.UNDO OBRERO, had reported
on 28 October that the delegation was in China.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9
CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971
Though the delegation was not invited by a party body, NCNA
reported that it was received and entertained by Keng Piao,
a central committee member and head of the CCP's international.
liaison department. NCNA made clear that the two parties hold
divergent views, noting that Keng had "a frank conversation"
with the delegation in which the two sides "expressed their
respective stands and views." It is nonetheless a significant
sign of the times that Peking would publicize contacts with a
West European party other than the ideologically subservient
"Marxist-Leninist" parties. A key to Peking's willingness is
the well-known independence of Moscow demonstrated by the wing
of the split Spanish CP led by Santiago Carrillo.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010041-9