TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/06/ 5 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000200020 ling Paper
31 May 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Showers
SUBJECT Concept Papers on Aspects of Management Information
Mechanisms
1. Attached are four papers prepared by las think 25X1
pieces to help us develop perspectives and a frame of reference for the
various kinds of information that might be desirable to include in a
DCI/IC data reservoir. The papers are intended as straw men, and may
help to focus discussion on various aspects of our total DCI/IC data
needs. As presently written, the papers do not represent proposals for
action.
2. Some s cts of these papers reflect discussions with 25X1
and others. Those talks were stimulated by General
Taylor's request that the Data Support Group develo a lan.to take over
the operation of the CCPC Facilities Inventory and 25X1
request for our suggestions on a cross-reference mec anism
3. The paper, dated 12 May 72 and entitled "Management Information
Mechanisms", refers in passing to "effectiveness measures." Our purpose
in briefly mentioning this 'subject is merely to acknowledge that it is
important in an overall, total concept, but not to suggest specific
actions on this problem at this time. I would defer to for
25X1
any further discussion of this aspect.
Ii-, You have requested multiple copies of these papers for distribution
to your committee considering DCI/IC data needs and the future configuration
of a CIRIS-like mechanism or some alternative thereto. The following docu-
ments are attached; I suggest they be read in the order listed below:
a. "DCI/IC Information Needs Synthesized ..." (undated)
b. "Management Information Mechanisms," dtd 12 May 72
c. "Intelligence Organizational' Inventory," dtd 10 May 72
d. "Cross-Reference System," dtd 10 May 72. (TS/COMINT)
e. Memo dtd 31 May 72 entitled "Fixes to Papers on Information 25X1
Systems". This merely acknowledges a number of comments from 25X1
hat are not reflected in the preceding papers.
Chief, IC DSG
Enclosures (5)
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31 May 1972
SUBJECT: Fixes To Papers on Information Systems
suggested the following fixes to my three papers on
information systems (Cross-Reference System, Intelligence Organizational
Inventory, Management Information Mechanisms). I agree with him, and will
include them in the next iteration.
a. Codewords and nicknames should be reflected in the system for five
years after their cancellation to facilitate retrieval from older documents.
b. Location should include coordinates (geographic or UTM?).
c. Capital investment should include the value of removable assets.
He also suggested some non-substantive semantical changes that will
improve the papers.
25X1
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DCI/1C I1-3 RMATION NEEDS SYNTHESIZED FROM RECENT PAPERS, AND QUESTIONS
CONCERNING TMI
RESOURCE INFORMATION NEEDS:
1. Resource data on a functional, eg orraphie and subject target basis,
relatable to organizational entities.
What level of aggregation does PRG desire?
What level organization?
What relationships are of interest?
2. FYDP data displayed by sensor and platform.
What level of aggregation does PEG desire?
Does this differ in some way from present CIRIS capability?
3. Collection and processing costs by sensor and platform.
Is this an essential necessary to derive 2, above?
What level of aggregation does PEG desire?
4. Full allocation of support costs.
What does PEG mean by "full allocation"? .~ J
How should support costs be allocated?
5. Production costs.
What are the categories into which production is to be divided?
V r o~ .
How does PEG want +roduction costs displayed?
6. Changes in budget and programming trends.
To what do PEG and PRG want changes to relate? hat is the validity of programming changes past Program Year 1? [!l
7. "Official" resource data, by organization,, rep2rting entice CIRIs),
pro, rara element, mission, function, sensors activity and appropriation
category.
What organizational level does CCG want?
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How are decreases to be displayed?
How are out-of-cycle data calls to be handled?
Out-of-cycle resource update based on significant decrements.
What is a significant decrement?
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION NEEDS:
,/,'H'ow should the relationships be expressed? Ca)
e,/Aow is "activity" defined?
Identification of all units engaged in intelligence work in terms
relatable to dollars and manpower.
-,""What is a unit?
Which data elements are to be relatable to resources.?
(y:Relationship of intelligence work activities to organizational entities.
LTs the universe complete without ct intelligence assets?
Identify the universe of intelligence assets.
p/ What are intelligence assets?
.What comprises "identification"?
_ ___--_
12. Describe intelligence assets in teriAs of--..
a. Basic (unchanging) data: name, location, command relationships,
authority creating, mission, support received and provided.
b. Subject to change: targets, g bili2E, major equipment
TOA, authorized strength. ?--
Are these data elements all that are needed?
How does PEG define capabilities; should they be in a different system?
What specific kinds of data are needed to satisfy each of the data elements?
?~ 13. Sensor and platform types, their cost, their manpower, and their
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What are costs?
Should these be elements of a capabilities system?
Heir are sensors and platforms to be described?.
What does PEG mean by conspicuous?
14. Conspicuous facilities.
What are facilities?
What is meant by "conspicuous"?
15. Cedes;orda, nicknames, and their definitions.
What are the security implications of including the definit:.Y.: codewords?
is there an existing, central listing of codewords and nicknames for
Is there a need to include acronyms?
I VIA
Does PEG also want limittionsand, if so, what kinds?
How are capabilities to be described--designed., actual, potentials in general
or against specific targets and geography?
What is to be the source of capabilities data?
the intelligence community?
CMOILITIES INFORMATION NEEDS:
16. A c bilities, inventory.
Capabilities of what?
OBJECTIVES AIM REQUIREMENTS INFOIMATION NEEDS:
17. Linkages e*ro:a geographic and subject target priorities.
What does PRG mean by "linkages"?
Can priorities be separated from both geographic and subject targets?
How can priorities usefully be displayed?
18. Subject target and geographic area breakouts compatible with
DCID 1/2 Supplement objectives.
What kind of breakouts does PRG have in mind?
Can this be achieved with existing overlaps among objectives?
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Is a stable target universe prerequisite to satisfying this need?
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19. :?5 , :CID 1/2
Sup-le: ent.
Dc::;? PG want only the document, or automation of its matricos?
Binds of output would be desired from automation of the matrices?
20. -?tteiiated requirements for Pro, ;ram Years 1 and 2.
in trhat manner are requirements to be expressed?
With what validity can requirements be projected 2 to 3 years hence?
Should requirements fmr cureent and budget years be included?
Would it be better to divide requirements into "current", "near germ",
and "mid-term" categories?
Should requirements be related to objectives and priorities, and if
o, how?
21. Relationships between requirements and resources.
What kind of relationships are envisioned?
To what level of detail are requirements to be stated?
Is that level of detail compatible with the level to which resource
data is now displayed, and if not, what adjustments to CIRIS
are needed?
22. Relationships between assets and requirements.
How does PEG define assets?
'That relationships are of interest?
To what level of detail are requirements to be stated, and is the
definition of assets compatible with that level?
23. DCI's goals for the Intelligence Community.
In what forms are these goals stated?
To what extent can conceptual goals be included?
13 this need met by DCID 1/2 Supplement?
24+. CID 1/2 Supplement priorities.
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Cat intelligence priorities be meaningfully stated separate from
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either objectives or geographic areas?
To what ought priorities be related?
EFFECTIVENESS INFOFMATION NEEDS:
25. Y(-nr-to-ye.r trends in production activity.
How does PRG define "production activity"?
Is the level of activity to be measured, or is effectiveness to
be evaluated?
Which trends are to be followed?
What are the standards against which production activity is to be
evaluated, or thriteria against which it is to be measured?
26. The relative value of facilities and their inherent capabilities.
How does PEG define facilities?
If PEG desires relative value, what are the criteria for worth?
If relative effectiveness is desired, what are the norms and
standards against which "facilities" are to be evaluated?
To what extent is value based on effectiveness?
Can the effectiveness of "facilities" of different disciplines be
compared, as HUMINT with COMINT with IMAGERY?
Can relative effectiveness indices be developed for systems application?
Is effectiveness a matter for continuing judgmental decision and,
hence, not capable of being systematized?
27. Jru-d ments on how well assets satisfy requirements.
How does PEG define assets and requirements?
What are the criteria for satisfaction of requirements?
Can Judgments be systematized?
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12 May 1972
SUBJECT . Management Information Mechanisms.
1. Papers prepared by DCI/IC components indicate a need for detailed'
data descriptive of the intelligence community, its participants, and its
work. This memorandum presents a concept for an information network covering
five distinct but related aspects of the intelligence world. A conceptual
exploration of the treatment of descriptive information appears useful now,
whether or not the implementation of specific systems is feasible at this time.
There is a need to establish outer boundaries, to indicate possibilities that
should be made specific, and to consider relationships that might otherwise be
overlooked. This conceptual framework should help us develop parameters for
what we can and should do now, and what we consciously forego for the present.
2. The concept. herein for an information network encompasses (a) an
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intelligence organizational inventorye (b) an objectives and requirements
data base,-(e) effectiveness measures, and, (f) a cross-reference system.
Some pertinent assumptions to be tested are at enclosure 1.
a. The intelligence organizational inventory would identify the
various organizational entities which comprise the national intelligence
community, their relationships to each other, and the intelligence work
which they undertake. It would replace both the CCPC Overseas Facilities
Inventory and the CIRIS Reporting Entity Identification data. DSG has
prepared a separate paper outlining data element assumptions for such
an inventory.
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b. .,An objectives and requirements inventory would relate DCID
112 and JCS intelligence objectives and the intelligence collection
and production requirements derived from them to the operations,_.programs,
projects and activities of intelligence organizations working toward
their satisfaction. It would identify quantitatively the effort expended
(not the. qualitative results achieved) against those requirements by
priority, facilitating resource decisions based on the contribution of
specific intelligence assets toward goal achievement.
c. A catalogue of intelligence capabilities would provide data on
the designed, actual and potential performance capabilities of intelligence
units and systems by geographic area and against specific targets. It
would describe the variables that limit system capabilities and degrade
unit performance. It would facilitate cross-program collection planning.
d. The resources data base would be based on CIRIS, which displays
dollar and manpower resources in relation to intelligence entities, system
types, functions and the targeting of objectives. It would expand CIRIS
to include the accounting data that is needed to close the feeback loop;
f;o make visible the actual application of resources so that the cosi.; of
the various intelligence operations, programs, projects and activities
could be related to their yield.
e. Effectiveness measures would provide information on the actual
performance of intelligence organizations and systems. This would identify
the sensor-platform mixes that were empirically determined to be most
effective against specific geographic areas and targets within these
areas. (The lack of definitive norms and standards against which
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It may not be possible to place relative values on both the potential and
intelligence assets can be measured is a serious limitation for any
evaluation measurement effort. The development of such norms and
standards should be a high-priority DCI/IC task.)
f. The cross-reference system is the subject of a separate
memorandum to Mr. Hitchcock, Chief IC/PEG.
3. Conceptually, it must be recognized that there are phenomena which
tend to defeat the development of an ideal network of systems. It may not be
possible to distribute resources with precision among collectors with multi-
target/multi-area capabilities, or against serendipitous collection "take".
actual capabilities of some collection systems, or to determine probability
indices for collection success against some target categories. It may be
infeasible to assign value to redundant confirmation, to differentiate
precisely between substance and trivia, to quantify values for timeliness,
` relative values for precise and gross data. Some intelligence
L,Or_t__1.,.._1,,._o provide
operations and activities may be too sensitive to permit their description
in a computerized information system. It should, however, be possible to
develop, within the limitations of what is reasonably attainable, a data base
capable of rapidly providing the essential information that is needed to meet
DCI/IC day-to-day requirements.
4. Although the DCI/IC is not expected to be involved in resource issues
concerning the so-called tactical intelligence units and activities, they
should be considered in any concept for a-national intelligence information
network. (As used in this paper, tactical intelligence assets exclude combat
units, such as an armored cavalry troop, and intelligence staff components of
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headquarters below the numbered army, fleet or air force.) We are aware
of JCS and Service reluctance to expose tactical assets to scrutiny, even
within the Department of Defense. We believe, however, that visibility of
the relationships between "tactical" and national assets is necessary for
t1 IC Staff to carry out its responsibility for sound recommendations for
the allocation of resources to national programs. The following examples, 25X1
from opposite ends of the tactical intelligence continuum, are illustrative:
5. In our view, DCI/IC follow-on work on mechanisms for management
information, development, in order of priority, should be: an intelligence
organizational inventory, a cross-reference system, and an objectives and ?
requirements inventory. These three, along with a continuation of a CIRIS-
like resources targeting system, are largely factual. They can and should
go ahead together as they are interrelated.
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6. Norms and standards against which to evaluate intelligence units and
systems and effectiveness measures are interrelated. Both require a large
amount of exploratory work, analysis and testing. This is a task where all
DCI/IC components may have inputs and where the IC Systems Analysis people
shave a major role. It will require several years of continuous effort.
7. Accounting data for PPB feedback necessarily involves prior fiscal
years. The DoD information is available at the FYDP level of operation
(i.e., Program Elements but not individual units and components) from ASD(C).
To identify unit and component resources, it would be necessary to tap
Service and agency comptrollers. Relating this information to the substantive
yield, gain or value of intelligence can provide historical insights and
trends and may be helpful as one reference for current planning. However,
this type of use assumes existence of standards and value measurement criteria.
Until the work on those matters has progressed considerably, this accounting
data has a low priority.
8. The availability of data to feed the information network is a
policy matter requiring agreement among DCI/IC, INR, ASD(I), and the CDIP
program managers. This paper represents an initial effort to set the stage
for agreement among the DCI/IC components as to IC Staff information needs.
After we have reached agreement, it will be necessary for D/DCI/IC to nego-
tiate for. the inputs.
9. We would appreciate your comments. 25X1
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ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING DCI/IC INFORMATION NEEDS
1. The development and implementation of the information network
described herein will wally be supported by the intelligence community.
''. Support for this network notwithstanding, individual program
managers will continue to jealously guard their perceived prerogatives and
seek to reduce the exposure of their programs to scrutiny that could result
f Of
in program cuts. 4
Al "-'b
3. Data on intelligence entities, plans, operations, programs, projects
and activities will be required in sufficient detail to:
a. Establish relationships among intelligence organizations;
ollection, processing, production and support functions; command and
tasking channels; and customers serviced.
b. Provide background for program reviews.
c. Provide for the production of a quick-reference "fact book"
containing basic data on entities of IC Staff interest.
1. The DCI/IC will require data concerning actica,/intelligence units
and activities, at least to the extent that the DCI can:
a. Meet Congressional expectations that the DCI be aware of the
totality of US intelligence;
b. Make judgments concerning the allocation of resources to those
national intelligence entities on which the tactical intelligence effort
impacts.
c. Conduct national intelligence operational planning, which
requires an awareness of the tactical intelligence effort in relation
to national intelligence targets.
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For the foreseeable future, the JCS and-the Services will resist
inclusion of resource data o{r _tacticai i ntelligence units in a community
data base because of concern:
a. That tactical unit resources could be diverted from support of
the operating forces;
b. That intelligence funding could be centralized at a level
that diminishes U&S command operating control over the resources for
their integral tactical intelligence capabilities;
c. That if made visible, tactical intelligence resources could
be subject to national intelligence tradeoff decisions.
6. Because tctical.intelligence units and activities are external to
the CDIP'and are reviewed as integral elements of the Defense programs under
which they are funded, and because decisions concerning them cannot properly
be separated from decisions.concerning the capabilities of the combatant
forces which they support, the IC Staff will not be required to make recommen-
dations concerning the resources to be allocated to them.
7. Although the IC Staff will not need program/budget resource data
foractical intelligence units and activities, it will have a continuing
need to be aware of the manner in which their work impacts on the resource
requirements of national entities.
8. Codeword and nickname meanings and their relationships to intelligence
entities and programs will be made available, and IC personnel will be cleared
for access to them.
9. Authority will be granted to maintain codewords and their definitions
in a secure, computerized data base.
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25X1
ILLEGIB
SUBJECT
2. The concept herein for an information network encompasses (a) an
intelligence organizational inventory, (b) an objectives and requirements
Management Information Mechanisms.
1. Papers prepared by DCI/IC components indicate a need for detailed
data descriptive of the intelligence community, its participants, and its
work. This memorandum presents a concept for an information network covering
five distinct but related aspects of the intelligence world. A conceptual
exploration of the treatment of descriptive information appears useful now,
whether or not the implementation of specific systems is feasible at this time.
There is a need to establish outer boundaries, to indicate possibilities that
should be made specific,.and to consider relationships that might otherwise be
overlooked. This conceptual framework should help us develop parameters for
what we can and should do now, and what we consciously forego for the present.
inventory, (c) a catalogue of intelligence capabilities, (d) a
data base,(e) effectiveness measures, and, (f) a cross-reference system.
Some pert: nent assumptions to be tested are at enclosure 1.
a. The intelligence organizational inventory would identify the
various organizational entities which comprise the national intelligence
community, their relationships to each other, and the intelligence work
which they undertake. It would replace both the CCPC.Overseas Facilities
Inventory and the CIRIS Reporting Entity Identification data. DSG has_
prepared a separate paper outlining data element assumptions for such
an inventory.
ILLEGIB
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b. .,An objectives and requirements inventory would relate DCID
1/2 and JCS intelligence objectives and the intelligence collection
and production requirements derived from them to the operations,_.program,5,
projects, and activities of intelligence organizations working toward
their satisfaction. It would identify quantitatively the effort expended
(not the qualitative results achieved) again.st'those requirements by
priority, facilitating resource decisions based on tin contribution of
specific intelligence assets toward goal achievement.
c. A catalogue of intelligence capabilities.would provide data on
the designed, actual and potential performance a6pabilities of intelligence
units and systems by geographic area and against specific targets. It
would describe the variables that limit system capabilities and degrade
unit performance. It wou3ld facilitate cross-program collection planning.
d, The resources data base would be based on CIRIS, which displays
dollar and manpower resources in relation to intelligence entities, system
types, functions and the targeting of objectives. It would expand CIRIS
to include the accounting data that is needed to close the feekack loop;
to make visible the actual application of resources so that the cost of
the various intelligence operations, programs, projects and activities
could be related to their yield.
e. Effectiveness measures would provide information on the actual
performance of intelligence organizations and systems. This would identify
the sensor-platform mixes that were empirically determined to be most
effective against specific geographic areas and targets within these
areas. (The lack of definitive norms and standards against which
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intelligence assets can be measured is a serious limitation for any
evaluat .on_measurement.effort.;The development. of such norms and
standards should be a high-priority DCI/IC task.)
f. The cross-reference system is the subject of a separate
Chief IC/PEG.
3. Conceptually, it must be recognized that there are phenomena which
tend to defeat the development of an ideal network of systems. It may not be
possible to distribute resources with precision among collectors with multi-
target/multi-area capabilities, or against::serendipitous-collection"t`take".
It may not be possible to place relative values on both the potential and
actual capabilities of some collection systems, or to determine probability
indices for collection success against some target categories. It may be
infeasible to assign value to redundant confirmation, to differentiate
precisely between substance and trivia, to quantify values for timeliness,
or to provide relative values for precise and gross data. Some intelligence
operations and activities may be too sensitive to permit their description
in a computerized information system. It should, however, be possible to
develop, within the limitations of what is reasonably attainable, a data base
capable of rapidly providing the essential information that is needed to meet
DCI/IC day-to-day requirements.
4+. Although the DCI/IC is not expected to be involved in resource issues
concerning the so-called tactical intelligence units and activities, they
should be considered in any concept for a'national intelligence information
network. (As used in this paper, tactical intelligence assets exclude combat
units, such as an armored cavalry troop, and intelligence staff components of
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headquarters below the numbered army, fleet or air force.) We are aware
of JCS and Service reluctance to expose tactical assets to scrutiny, even
within the Department of Defense. We believe, however, that visibility of
the relationships between "tactical" and national. assets is necessary for
t}eeIC Staff to carry out its responsibility for sound recommendations for
the allocation of resources to national programs. The following examples, 25X1
from opposite ends of the tactical intelligence continuum, are illustrative:
5. In our view, DCI/IC follow-on work on mechanisms for management
information, development, in order of priority, should be: an intelligence
organizational inventory, a cross-reference system, and an objectives and
requirements inventory. These three, along with a continuation of a CIRIS-
like resources targeting system, are largely factual. They can and should
go ahead together as they are interrelated.
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6. Norms and standards against which to evaluate int.elligence.units and
systems and effectiveness measures are interrelated. Both require a large
amount of exploratory work, analysis and testing. This is a task where all
DCI/IC components may have inputs and where the IC Systems Analysis people
have a major role. It will require several years of continuous effort.
7. Accounting data for PPB feedback necessarily involves prior fiscal
years.. The DoD information is available at the FYDP level of operation
(i.e., Program Elements but not individual units and components) from ASD(C).
To identify unit and component resources, it would be necessary to tap
Service and agency comptrollers. Relating this information to the substantive
yield, gain or value of intelligence can provide historical insights and
trends and may be helpful as one reference for current planning. However,
this type of use assumes existence of standards and value measurement criteria.
Until the work on those matters has progressed considerably, this accounting
data has a low priority.
8. The availability of data to feed the information network is a
policy matter requiring agreement among DCI/IC, INR, ASD(I), and the CDIP
program managers. This paper represents an initial effort to set the stage
for agreement among the DCI/IC components as to IC Staff information needs.
After we have reached agreement, it will be necessary for D/DCI/IC to nego-
tiate for the inputs.
9. We would appreciate your comments.
25X1
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ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING DCI/IC INFORMATION NEEDS
1. The development, and implementation of the information network
Mea c 4- ,
described herein will e be:supported,by:the intelligence.communt.ty.
2. Support for this network notwithstanding, individual program
managers will continue to jealously:-guard--iheirpperceiv@dyprerogatives-.:arid
seek to reduce the exposure of their programs to scrutiny that could result
in program cuts.
3. Data on intelligence entities, plans, operations, programs, projects
and activities will be required in sufficient detail to:
a. Establish relationships among intelligence organizations;
ollection, processing, production and support functions; command and
sking channels; and customers serviced.
b. Provide background for program reviews.
c. Provide for the production of a quick-reference "fact book"
data on entities of IC Staff interest.
4. The DCI/IC will require data concerning tactical intelligence units
and activities, at least to the extent that the DCI can:
a. Meet Congressional expectations that the DCI be aware of the
totality of US intelligence;
b. Make ud
j gments concerning the allocation of resources to those
national intelligence entities on which the tactical intelligence effort
impacts.
c. Conduct national intelligence operational planning, which
requires an awareness of the tactical intelligence effort in relation
to national intelligence targets.
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1
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5. For the foreseeable future, the JCS and the Services will resist
inclusion of resource data on tactical intelligence units in a community
data base because of concern:
a. That tactical unit resources could be diverted from support of
the operating forces;.
b. That intelligence funding could be centralized at a level
that diminishes U&S command operating control over the resources for
their integral tactical intelligence capabilities;
c. That if made visible, tactical intelligence resources could
be subject to national intelligence tradeoff decisions.
6. Because tactical intelligence units and activities are external to
the 63IP'and are reviewed as integral elements of the Defense programs under
which they are funded, and because decisions concerning them cannot properly
be separated from decisions concerning the capabilities of the combatant
forces which they support, the IC Staff will not be required, to make recommen-
dations concerning the resources to be allocated to them.
7. Although the IC Staff will not need program/budget resource data
for tactical intelligence units and activities, it will have a continuing
need to be aware of the manner in which their work impacts on the resource
requirements of national entities.
8. Codeword and nickname meanings and their relationships to intelligence
entities and programs will be made available, and IC personnel will be cleared
for access to them.
9. Authority will be granted to maintain codewords and their definitions
in a secure, computerized data base.
SECRET-WORKING PAPER
Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000200020016-4