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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
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Secret
No. 0419/75
January 28, 1975
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Sudan: Cabinet Change Strengthens
Numayri's Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mozambique: Status Report . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Angola: Sign of a Split Among Liberation
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
India-Iraq: Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit . . . 5
Jan 28, 1975
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Cabinet Change Strengthens Numayri's Position
The US embassy in Khartoum reports that the
major reorganization of the Sudanese ca biriet last
weekend strengthened the position of President
Numayri.
Although several of the ten dismissed ministers
were dropped because of inept performance, Numayri's
move was primarily intended to break the power of a
group of independent-minded senior cabinet members.
The removal of the finance and foreign ministers,
for example, stemmed from Numayri's ire over their
opposition to a presidential-backed development
project. The influential finance minister had also
recently been the target of corruption charges.
The governmental reorganization may also have
been an attempt by Numayri to quiet popular grumbling
over economic problems such as the rising prices of
energy and other imports. Most of the government's
development projects will require several years
before they begin producing visible results. By
bringing in new faces to direct economic policies,
Numayri may hope to create an impression of acting
forcefully to deal with Sudan's 1..roblems.
The cabinet shuffle appears to be a victory for
the hierarchy of the government-controlled Sudanese
Socialist Union, the country's only party, several
of whose leaders have been made ministers. The party
leaders have long been seeking to broaden their power
base and increase party influence.
The US embassy believes that the governmental
changes will probably have little effect on Khartoum's
foreign policy and that Sudan will continue to be
receptive to private foreign investment. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A (143-7895)
Jan 28, 1975 1
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Mozambique
Status Report
After four months in office, Mozambique's
transitional government is moving smoothly toward
independence, scheduled on June 25. The Portu-
guese-appointed high commissioner and the prime
minister appointed by the black nationalists'
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique appear to
be cooperating closely. Along with other offi-
cials of the new government, however, they are
maintaining a low profile.
In recent weeks, much of the government's
time has been taken up with economic matters. A
Portuguese economic delegation arrived on January
19 to discuss a number of economic issues includ-
ing the establishment of a central bank of Mozam-
bique and the future development of the Cabora
Bassa hydroelectric project. The talks are likely
to continue for some time. The United Nations has
stationed a development representative in Lourenco
Marques, and a UN economic survey team will visit
Mozambique next month.
difficulties in collecting meaningful and reliable
statistics that can be submitted to potential aid
donors.
economic specialists both
in Lisbon and Lourenco Marques are encountering
Public order has not been seriously disturbed
since the short-lived outbreak of civil violence
last October that was sparked by a clash between
Portuguese commandos and troops of the Front.
Portuguese forces are being withdrawn according to
schedule and will be gone by June. Approximately
20,000 troops from the metropole were stationed
there when the transitional government took over.
(Continued)
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the
government is also having difficulties tin ng
qualified persons, either black or white, to
replace white technicians and businessmen who have
fled the territory since the transitional govern-
ment came to power. The number of whites who have
fled may now exceed 20,000. The government hopes
that many whites will return if the security
situation remains calm. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-4380)
Jan 28, 1975 3
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Angola
Sign of a SpZit Among Liberation Groups
According to the US consul general in Luanda,
the first public indication of a split in the front
recently established by Angola's three liberation
groups has surfaced. Last Friday, only a week
berore the scheduled installation of Angola's
transitional government, the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the
liberation groups, issued a press release accusing
unidentified "left-wing" opportunists of attempting
to promote "anarchy and disobedience" in information,
labor, and education. The obvious target of the
attack is the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola, the only leftist organization in the
territory.
The National Union is undoubtedly worried
about the strong political support enjoyed by the
Popular Movement, primarily among urban workers.
Although the National Union holds the labor portfolio
in the transitional government, it will have a tough
fight trying to undercut the Popular Movement's
influence over Angola's labor force. The National
Union is also concerned over the allocation to the
Popular Movement of the information ministry, a
position that will give it considerable opportunity
to publicize its Marxist ideas and impede the propa-
ganda efforts of the other ~,;wo groups. The National union
holds the portfolio for education, but this is bound
to be another area of intense competition. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-4380)
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India-Iraq
Prime Min;_ster Gandhir during her visit to
Iraq earlier this month, succeeded in getting
Baghdad to drop its demand for cash payment for
2.8 million tons of Iraqi oil India is committed
to import this year. The Indians reportedly
stressed that from New Delhi's standpoint oil is
the basis for its cooperation with Iraq. They
said that without concessionary terms, India might
buy elsewhere and may even withdraw Indian military
advisers and technicians from Iraq.
Iraqi Baath party leaders and government
officials, reportedly on the basis of this presenta-
tion, finally agreed to give India the same terms
as in 1974. These terms, which saved India $110
million, call for a small down payment at delivery
followed by a five-year grace period and repayment
over the next five years at 2.5 percent annual
interest. The two sides also agreed to expand
trade and to develop plans for more Indian technical
assistance and training programs for Iraqis.
Both India and Iraq appear interested in con-
tinuing their longstanding cooperative relationship,
but the lack of specific commitments beyond the oil
deal and the bland communique suggest there are only
limited prospects for closer economic ties. More-
over, last year India bought only 17 percent of its
oil imports from Iraq, and New Delhi continues to
buy the bulk of its oil imports from Iran and Saudi
Arabia. (SECRET)
(143-6062)
Jan 28, 1975
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