TERRITORIAL ISSUES IN THE SOVIET-SINO DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOI OIW
SUMMARY
't'erritorial issues idong the 1'ItC-USS11 border reflect the, overall
Sino-Soviet dispute and have been tisc(1 by both sides to vent it. Border
talks---initiated in 19GI, then broken off, and resumed in 19(39--have
faile(1 to product It settlement, it failure that results as much from
Peking's inflexible conditions for negotiation as from llte issues arn(l
territory actually in dispute. If it, boun(ary settlement is finally con-
clnde(l, no sizable territorial exchanges are expecte(1. Although all
major territorial issues have already been publicized, less important
sovereignty problems could arise amid demarcation or re(lenucrcation
of the lengthy border iaight prove troublesome.
Territorial problems include, first, those arising from undefined
river boundaries in the castvrn border sector, where no agreement
exists on the allocation of several hutuire(i islands. A second category
of problems, applicable principally to the Pamir area, concerns the
validity of certain boundary treaties. Other problems, of unknown
complexity and seriousness, involve the (lemareation of land boun-
daries or their rcdcmarcation where the original survey may be in
question or lioimdi(ry markers have disappeared.
Nott:: This pa[Wr was prodt.ted by Ilie (Nfity of Ccogtaphic ..od Cartographic Research
and coordinated within the Directorde for Intelligroce and with the Ccographer. Department
of State. Comments or quest inns may I m- directed to Code 143, Extension 3057,
or Extension 3583. 25X1 A9a
25X1A9a
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NOFOUN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
l"c')nont(c. Drvrlopment
(;urrent Ncgotlating i'osiUans
Sprcilie Territorial i'ml li ms
Undefined liiverhiv Ilott darles
llortler IUvers mid '('heir Islands
(:hint:tnya island Arva
Other Disputed Islands
Iloundary Agrrrtnctits at issue
Pamir:
Man-dton?li Area
Paw
Land Boundaries Requiring Demarcation or Redenutrcation .. .. .... 8
Western Sector .. . 8
Lake Khanka to 'l'umen River 12
Prospects 12
1. Lower Ussuri River Valley
Page
2
2. Chinntaya Island Area
fold-rua following
J. I'a-c:h'a Island
6 . i;pcnd ix
. 0
4. Upper Argun River
5. Dzungarian Cate
0. Druzhha Army Barracks
10
7. Ili (liver
11
Page
China-USSR Border Area ............ ................ . . ... . ... facing 1
China-USSR Border: Eastern Sector ...................... fold-out following
Appendix
China-USSR Border: Western Sector ...................... fold-out following
Appendix
iii
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NOI"ORN
China-USSR Border Are,,
Sen of
~-, r~SOaff(,
'J(oroa)
r' Ycllow r j
Sea in
Run
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NOFO1IN
Territorial Issues in The Sino-Soviet Dispute
Nearly all of the 6,700-1-,iloneter Sino-Soviet
boundary is base(] on 19th century treaties negoti-
ated at it time when an expanding tsar1s Russia
cane in contact with the distant outposts of it
weakening Manchu Chinn. Russia thereby acquired
sizable territories--estimated by Peking to total 11/z
million square kilonetcrs--that since the 17th and
18t!i centuries had been under at least nominal
Chinese control. The border region was unpopu-
lated or sparsely inhabited by naniadic groups
neither Russian nor Chinese.
Most of !;je 3,700-kilometer eastern part of the
Sino-Sovict border is formed by the Amur and
Ussuri Rivers. Except for a small segment at the
extreme western end, the boundary was established
by the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860).
China claims that these treaties resulted in the loss
of 1 million square kilometers of territory that had
been acquired by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (Nip-
chu) in 1689. This treaty, which ended the initial
Russian penetration and colonization of the Amur
region, defined a boundary-as best as can be
deciphered from the vague and imprecise descrip-
tion-that incorporated nearly all of the Amur
Basin within China. During the intervening 170
years of Chinese ownership, however, the vast
forest lands of the Amur-Ussuri territories were vir-
tually unsettled and undeveloped by China and re-
mained almost exclusively the domain of scattered
Tungusic tribes.
One exception was a small Manchu-inhabited
area, the "64 villages," located south of Blagovc-
shchensk on the left bank of the Amur. This area
was specifically allocated to China by the Treaty
of Aigun, but at the turn of the century a wave
of anti-Chinese feeling in Russia resulted in the
death of many of the Manchus and the forced
removal of others across the Amur. Although oc-
casionally mentioned by China in the past, it is not
clear whether the Chinese have actively pressed the
issue.
The mountainous 3,000-kilometer western section
of the Sino-Sovict border divides the Chinese-
ruled eastern fringe of traditionally ishunic Turke-
stan from the gigantic Soviet-controlled portion,
which extends westward to the Caspian Sea. This
boundary also, except for the southern segment,
was defined by the Treaty of Peking. It was later
demarcated in accordance with the Tnrbagatay
Treaty (1864) and apparently also the Treaty of
Uliassuhai (1870) and modified by the Treaty of
Ili (or St. Pet ,rsburg) in 1881. The southernmost
segment, in the high Pamirs, was determined with-
out Chinese participation by it British-Russian
agreement in 1895, designed primarily to establish
a buffer zone between British India and Russia.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Most of the economic development and sett]
ment in the frontier region is on the Soviet side-
a fact that does much to explain the futility of
Peking's demands for a Soviet military withdrawal
from the disputed territories. Along the eastern
section, contrasts are particularly sharp and Soviet
security interests most acute (Photo 1). On the
Soviet side the Trans-Siberian Railroad closely
parallels the border, connecting the cities of Blago-
veshchensk (via a spur line), Khabarovsk, and
Vladivostok with each other and with the western
USSR; agriculture is important around these and
other cities and along the middle 1,mtir between
the Bureya and Zeya Rivers and to the Khanka-
Ussuri lowlands; and regionally significant indus-
trial plants are located in the major urban centers.
In contrast, the Chinese side of the frontier remains
little developed and sparsely populated. Most of
the small Chinese frontier towns and villages a:rc
directly connected only by the border rivers them-
selves; although most roads are oriented toward
the Chinese interior, improvements in roads along
the frontier have been made since the late 1960's.
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'I'lte contrasts between the two sides of the
boundary are less sharp in the western section.
Settlements and agricultural areas arc scattered
along both sides north of the Tien Sham; several
of die more important ones lie in cast-west stream
valleys that cross the border, No sizable cities or
major agricultural areas tare located immediately
adjacent to the boundary, and no major transpor-
tation routes parallel the border. Farther soitth, in
the 'Tien Shan and other high mountain ranges,
there is little permanent settlement or economic
activity.
The USSR rejects the Chinese demand that ntili-
tnry forces be withdrawn from all nreas Peking
claims to be in dispute. Moscow feels that it pull-
back from these areas would lend credence to the
legitimacy of the Chinese position and prede-
termine the outcome of the negotiations. Soviet
officials have softened their original adamant stand
against relinquishing any territory to the Chinese
and now offer to return some islands in the Atnur
and Ussuri to Chinn. There is no hint, however,
of any willingness to compromise on either the
Chimnaya Island area or the Pamirs.
CURRENT NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
Since its enunciation in 1969, the unchanging
basic negotiating position of Peking calls for the
following:
- As it precondition to an overall settlement, it
preliminary agreement of mutual non-agres-
Sion;
- As a second precondition, withdrawal of
armed forces from all disputed areas along
the present de facto Sino-Sovict border-in
effect, requiring withdrawal only by the USSR
because it occupies virtually all of the dis-
puted territory other than the uninhabited
river islands;
-Confirmntion by the USSR that treaties re-
lating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary tire
"unequal" and were imposed on China by
"tsarist Russian imperialism"-although re-
cently less stress apparently has been placed
on this point;
-Chinese willingness, nonetheless, to accept
these treaties as the basis for an overall settle-
ment of the Sino-Soviet boundary-an ap-
parently deliberate display of Chinese reason-
ableness;
- Return, subject to mutually agreed adjust-
ments, of territories now occupied or under
the control of either party in violation of these
treaties-i.e., return by the USSR to China;
- Conclusion of a m:'re equitable Sino-Soviet
treaty to replace the "unequal" treaties, and
survey and demarcation of the boundary.
SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS
UNDEFINED RIVLRINL IIOUNDARIF"S
Border Rivers and Their Islands
The most pressing territorial issue is the disposi-
tion of about 7(10 islands in the, border rivers, none
of which were allocated by the 19th century
treaties. The initial 1964 Soviet negotiating posi-
tion was that all of the Aniur-Ussuri islands be-
longed to the USSR, but Moscow has gradually
moderated its stand and offered to return some
400 islands to Chinese control. Although no evi-
dence is in hand, the new position was probably
reached after examining the islands' relationship
to the deepest part of the train navigable channel,
the thnlweg-a widely recognized method of river
boundary dclimitation.
Generally, international boundaries along navig-
able rivers follow the thalweg, and the ownership
of islands is determined accordingly. Should sud-
den changes occur in the alignment of the main
channel, prevailing practice in international law
is to leave the boundary where originally estab-
lished even though water subsequently may cease
to flow in that channel. In contrast, the boundary
may be altered by gradual changes in the course
of a border river-unless otherwise agreed by
treaty.
Most of the Amur-Ussuri islands are small and
low-lying, many are marshy or swampy, and some
are little more than mud or sand banks. Some of
the islands are inundated following spring breakup
of river ice and after mid-slimmer rains, but rela-
tively lush tree growth on many islands indicates
that flooding is not prolonged. Although stream-
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bed changes call occur quickly during; flooding,
the sire and physical charactcrisii:?s of the islands
appear to change little. Inder.d, the evidence is
overwhelming; that Glaring the last 40 years the
navigable cluunnels have remained relatively stable.
A comparison of Japanese navigation maps of the
Amur-surveyed in the 1930's--with recent maps
and photography indicates that no major realign.
mcnts have occured. 't'here has been some shoaling
and do-epeniug and minor alterations fit the size
and locution of niud and sand hanks, but these
changes have not significantly altered the align-
ment of tile thalweg.
Very few of the river islands are permanently
inhabited, with the notable exception of Chhnnaya;
they serve its sources of hay and firewood and
me visited front time to time by fishermen. Island
settlements would in filet have no economic ad-
vantage over those on the river banks. An island
settlement could be established for political reasons,
but it would be both vulnerable to attack and
difficult to supply. Even most of the border posts
are located on the banks of the boundary rivers
where logistical support can be more readily mnain-
tained. While island occupation might strengthen
the claim of the occupying side, in the current
atmosphere it would be a highly provocative net.
Chimnaya Island Area
Along the border rivers, the most contentions
segment is the Chinmayn Island area, at the con-
fluence of the Anutr and Ussuri Rivers. This area
has been the major territorial issue between Mos-
cow and Peking since border talks began in 1161.
The poorly drained triangular area, about 50 1 ilo-
meters long and less than 12 kilometers wide, is
comprised of two large islands, Chimnaya and
Tarabarovskiy (together named I Iei-hsia-tzu by
the Chinese), and several smaller islands ( Photo 2,
foldout following Appendix). Along the southwest
side is the 35-kilometer Kazakcvichcva (Fu-yiian )
Channel. The USSR considers this waterway, which
connects the two rivers, to be the border.
Soviet occupation of stratcgicr,lly located Chim-
naya Island reportedly took place in the early
1930's in response to .rowing tensions with Japan,
then in occupation of Northeast China, and ap-
parently has been continuous since then. Ile island
is the site of as Small shipyard-probably n sub-
sidiary of one of the larger ones in Khabarovsk-
for repair of river and small coastal vessels; It
could also be used to build small craft, A perma-
nent settle"Ient adjoins the shipyard, and It few
small agricultural settlements are found elsewhere
on both i;hintnaya and 'i'araharovskiy islands.
Thre'e border outpost! front the (:hinese "naln-
land" along the Kazakevicheva Clutnnel,
A railroad line is being; constructed across
Chimnaya island as it shortcut from the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to the southeni, end of the
Khabarovsk urban area. This expensive project,
over marshy ground, is clear and current evidence
of the Soviet rejection of Chinese claims, Rails
were laid across the ice from Khabarovsk to
Chimnaya during the. winter of 1972-73, three
dredges were nu.ved to the island, and it founda-
tion for two large I'OI, tanks was prepared. Sub-
scclnently, construction began on it railroad em-
bankment on :himna ya, using; materials dredged
from nearby channels, the POh tanks were
erected, and additional construction support ecluip-
nunt was moved to the island. Across the Amur
River to the north, it railbed was prepared leading
from an existing spur of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road to the bank of the river; at Khabarovsk it
causeway aligned with another spur of the same
railroad all(] witl1 the embankment on Chirnnayn
was built out into the Ussuri.
Since the summer of 1974, the embanknnent on
Chirnnayn has been extended, with one segment
now directly aligned with the railbcd on the north
bank of the Amur. More equipment mill facilities
have been moved to the island, and additional con-
struction activity-the purpose of some of which
is not clear-has been initiated. Recent upgrading
of military defenses further indicates Soviet inten-
tions to retain these islands.
Use of the thalweg principle to define the
boundary would allocate the Chimnaya Island area
to China, but the overriding factor in the dispute
regardless of the legal merits-is the strategic lo-
cation of the islands in relation to Khabarovsk.
Non-Soviet control of the island complex would
be a threat to the security of the city and the Amur
River crossing of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This
vital supply line will remain vulnerable even after
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completion of the secon(1 'I'rnus?Siberluuu 111klhro;ul-
tlt"" Ilnykul-Amur NIg!istol' ( BAN1)-it deca(Iv. or
more hence, since no alleruntivc roll r(mle exists or
is planned hetwecu Klutba ?ovsk nil VIndivostok,
Sensor l shoaling; of the Kar.nkcvichevu (;hmid
Occurs during, low enter stages Ihul nornullly ex-
tend from late June until lilt(- July and ng;ain front
about the bcg;inuing of Seplem1wr until frecienp
in early November. 'I'bis shoaling, hws not posed
any signiHennl ccon(m-ic loss for (he (;hh-esc bv.-
cause little (,largo has ever beet) skipped between
the Amur and Ussuri Rivers (tiring, (it(, ntvigmtion
sensotl, which extends frool about the first of May
until lilt(, October. i?a(h year the Chinese annum(,.
their intentions to sail, (hiring tI-e low wntcr pc-
rio(ls, around the east end of (;l-innatytt dv iig
what Chinn reg;;irds its the irttertationnl boundary.
Soviet authorities counter by (ainling; that lltc
Amur and Ussuri in this area Orr USSI1 inland
w;(ters, and that tl,e Kaxakrvic?hrva (;luunul forms
the international houndnry. Since 1973, the USSR
has offered to assist in deepening; the cluunuvl--a
ploy the (;hinese predictably ignore bec?uuse le-
ceptancc would imply rrc?og;nition of the c?hvtuel
as the de facto houndnry. Whatt-ver Ili(, relative
merits of the Soviet end (;hinese positions, (,ot)-
tinuatiun of the status (pto wppears necessary to
protect Soviet sec?urily interests at Khabarovsk.
Settlement of the sovereignty (lucstion for nearly
all of the other irdauds cat likely be based on the
timhveg; formula, but the USSR will never agreo
to its application in the Chinuuaya ishind area.
Other I)i.sputed Islands
The sovereignty of other Annur-Ussuri islands,
including the well known (:hen-pao (i);-tn; i ckiy )
and 1't)-ch'a (Photo 3), has I-cen disputed. Ad-
herence to the thalweg principle would allocate
to China all disputed islands whose locations have
been dutv.tn t ed. Sensitivity to direct observation
from several islands lying opposite USSR settle-
ments probably accounts for Soviet claims to these
particular islands. Ili most erases, however, there
appears to be no specific security interest respon-
sible for the Soviet position.
Another boundary segment that may cause a
problem is the upper Argun above Priargunsk;
it has been si-own differently on Soviet and Chinese
amps. 'I'll(, upper Argon flows in ounurrotus bridled
cltuuuPls lltr(ntg;h it it it Isy flood plain its nuuch us
10 kilotuctct?s wide ( I'll(:'() 4), 0't-rrully, fit(' Soviet
limps show the bottn(h1, tdoug, the east(?rnmost
(,hunt)( will the (:lines(, r(-aps partrmy it nloaK
the westct?c-tnost, 1)nring, pcriud.v of hi};h wilier
the chaillwls unty shift within the flood plain; weir
parison of recent tnwlis with Japan se maps com-
piled b- fit(' early 10,10ys indicates that sailer channels
have shifted. '1'echnirnl problems coil]( easily arise
when ac bill boundary demarcot :n Is tnt(lcrtwk(n
because of the plysicwl chan%(irr of tilt- river will
tit(. difficulty in ag re(ing, oil its limit) rharanel, but
this boundary s(g;ntenl seems unlikely to 1-coma'
it major Issue.
No conflicting, chtitns Ii%v( been publicly voiced
by either party i1ong; fie lower Argun liiver, oil
Lake Khwnka, or ;dung, the Song;achw lliver, which
e?cntnects lake Khankn w;t.h the Ussuri. Alloca-
tion of islnuls in these rivers has never been
ag lecd, IIuv(ver, mid there is it possibility of tills
issue being, raisc(1 rI some future (late.
ROt1N1)AIIY A(a11E.1,1111:N'1'S AT ISSUE.
I'(lmirs
The Chinese el;titn of sums' 41,01Y) sclnarv kilo-
meters in the 1'nntirs' ^pparrntly is based nullity
on lSth c?entor' Manchu military operations, in
1895 the boundwry in the i . nirs wws clc?tc?rnined,
without direct Chinese pdtticipatioo, by a British-
11ussian ng;recnent designed primarily to define
'the border between British India and Rttaia. Some
sources refer to wt) acceptance of the Pamir ho;nd?
ary as it (c? f;rc?to line in an 1894 Sino-Tlussimi ex-
ch.-Inge of notes, but this c?orrespoudeocr has never
been found. Although Chinese na::ps depict the
dv facto boundary in this sector, it is labeled "In-
d(finite"-tl-c only sco r of the entire border so
(lesignated.
No subsequent Chinese government has accepted
the Pamir boundary, and protests were voiced im-
mediately after the 1895 agrecnu?nt was signed.
From time to time Chinese maps have shown vary-
?A "parnir" literally is a high, trtvlrss, glaciated s?alley
lillri with glacial debris end rimmed by higher snow-
(?rownt(1 ri(igcs. The Pamirs are made tap of a null'ber of
such valleys and ridges.
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ing but 'sizable areas in the I'iunirs its plat of China.
The Chinese are probably less concerned with the
border alignment itself than with its origin, which
they consider defective because no Chinese officials
participated In It.
The Pamirs seem an unlikely area to be coveted;
the region Includes the highest mountains in the
USSR, with elevations over 7,(X)0 teeters. Most of
the Pamirs arc uninhabited except for small con-
centrations of people who practice irrigated farm-
ing in the broader stream valleys. The coal sad
other mineral deposits have gone unexploited bc-
cause of their inaccessability. The extensive Pamir
snowficlds provide abundant water to irrigate the
cotton growing areas of Soviet Central Asia to the
west, and ambitious Soviet plans call for construc-
tion of large hydroelectric power plants utilizing
the water in the swift flowing rivers.
Man-chou-1i Area
The border segment between the Argun River
and the China-USSR Mongolia tripoint might prove
troublesome-although there is no direct evidence
that this has been a contentious issue. Soviet maps
show the boundary as much as 21 kilometers south
of the alignment depicted by the Chinese, leaving
about 900 square kilometers of territory between
the two lines. This tract is strategically significant
because it lies across the major approach from
the USSR into Northeast China. The Soviet version
apparently has served as the do facto boundary
ever since the Tsitsihnr Agreement was signed by
a moribund Manchu government in 1911. This
agreement is c,F questionable legality, however, be-
cause it was never ratified by any Chinese gov-
ernment; the Chinese continue, therefore, to por-
tray the boundary cartographically on the basis of
the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727).
LAND BOUNDARIES REQUIRING
DEMARCATION OR REDEMARCATION
Western Sector
The 3,000-kilometer western part of the border,
with the exception of the Pamir region, was de-
fined in the second half of the 19th centuiry by
two sets of treaties between the Russian and Chi-
nese Governments. Although the Chinese claim
to have lost about 440,000 square kilometers of
territory its a result of the Treaty of Px,1 Inif (1800),
they have, no realistic expectations of recovering
it, (According to '''eking, the boundary should have
been drawn to connect the westernn(n;t mobile
pickets established by Manchu China to regulate
use of pastures by nomadic Kazakhs in Central
Asia. Soviet authorities, in turn, chuhn that the
1860 boundary is correct since it follows the line
of permanent Chinese outposts, which were lo-
cated considerably cast of the maximum Chinese
clan.) The 1881 Treaty of Ili transferred an addi-
tional 70,000 square kilometers from the, Lake
Zaysai , Ili, and other anent, to Russia.
Aside from the Pamir tract, no other disputed
area is known to exist along the western border-
despite its length and the disappearance of 19th
century boundary markers. The boundary appears
to be well known to local inhabitants in the rela-
tively few areas where the frontier is permanently
settled and major route cross the boundary. How-
er- several border incidents have occurred in
the past, and it is possible that additional disputes
could arise once negotiations reach the stage of
establishing a precise alignment.
The physical character of the border and the
ethnic composition of the frontier area could create
additional problems in reaching n final boundary
agreement. North of the Pamirs a number of natural
corridors, primarily rive: valleys, cross the bound-
ary. The most important is the Dzungarian Gate,
connecting Kazakhstan and Sinkiang Province
(Photos 5 and 6). Other important corridors are
the valleys of the Tekes, Ili (Photo 7), Emel', and
Chernyy (Black) IrtyAi Rivers. It was through the
Dzungarian Gate that Moscow and Peking planned
to link their Turkestan railroad systems. Although
the Russians completed track-laying in 1958 to
the border town of Druzhba ("friendship" in Rus-
sian, but actually an armed camp), the Chinese
halted construction at Wu-lu-mu-ch'i (Urumchi )
in the early 1960's as the Sino-Soviet dispute
deepened.
The border has never been a barrier to the
various ethnic groups inhabiting the grasslands
and valleys of the USSR-China frontier. Kazakhs,
Uighurs, and Kirgiz live on both sides; other Cen-
tral Asian ethnic groups have a vast majority in
one or the other country. Slavs, primarily Russia.-
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.,LCtt
and I ikraintam., have moved Into urban arsaq m ;tr
III(- ftontler, Stutilatly, hugs, numbers of Ilan
(a-inize have tnii,rutctl Into Sinl ianj eluting (If('
pna Iwo dreads':; iniuty Inter been silt led III rural
arras to work oo land reeliunittimi projects, it few
of which iuv located oche Ihr bottler.
'fine presence of if single ethnic lroitp idott); both
sides of Its Sino.Sovitt border is it sotuc?r of boroler
iucidetitc. 'i'he most notable example wits its exo-
dus of ?10.(HX) Kitzaklis nod tlighurs from Sinkiang
in 1002. 'I'hts incidtvil developed its it result of the
temporary liberalization by the (;Masse of their
emigration regulations and the consequent esca-
lntion (,f efforts by minority peoples in great
numbers to cross over into the Soviet Union, When
the Chluese officials changed their minds they
brutally suppressed those who still insisted on
emigrating to the USSR. Since then tighter con-
trols slid improved economic conditions in Sin-
kiang have reduced transborder movement, 'I'hc
USSR continues to i eani anti-Chinese broadcasts
to Sinkiang Uighurs; the brov,dcasts appear to be
only another facet of the overall dispute, however,
rather than it serious attempt to foment it genuine
separatist movement.
The 550-kilometer boundary between Lake
Khanka and the North Korea-USSR-China tripoint
at the Tumen tiivv-r was twice demarcated in the
late 19th century. The precision with which the
boundary is depicted on recent Soviet maps con-
trasts with the relatively generalized delineation
on Chinese maps. This may simply reflect it need
for redemarcation of the border in this generally
hilly and lightly populated sector where, in many
areas, the boundary follows no easily recognizable
terrain features. Undoubtedly many of the 37
markers erected in 1886 have deteriorated, become
overgrown, or have been destroyed. No territorial
disagreement between China and the USSR has
been documented along this sector of the border,
but previous border clashes between Soviet and
Japanese troops in the 1930's and alleged Soviet-
hisligalrvl Iritnsbotder Incidents in 11)01) suggest
sits unrdr;tr demarcation t,f the boundary, in reer fit
yea is vegetisttstu bus been cleari?d along several
ss'gtnents of t1!4' boundary, thtts making It sissy It)
Idrrttliy; i:1 olhrv, netts, however, Ihr boundary is
Isss ldentlfiahlr whets vrgelIII loll hits been allowed
to regrow or has iir?ver been cleared,
PROSPECTS
U111il relations between the two countries Int-
lrc-ve, it resolution of the bonier dispute Is unlikely,
Although border talks continue to be held Inter-
niitlsntly, no credible evidence Is available to sug-
gest that Peking and Moscow arc now close to
concluding it settlement.
'I'll(, greatest problem area is still Cldnuutya.
Even though the (aiinese case for sovereignty over
the island tract appears to be supported by both
the treaties and the geographic factors, strong
Soviet security interests are involved. Although
the Pamir segment is also Important, China's claim
appears less legitimate., It scans unlikely that the
Chinese will press it as vociferously-not only
because it Is improbable that the USSR will with-
draw from such a large tract but also because con-
tinued demands would expose Chinese unreason-
ableness and thus be politic, lly infeasible. None
of the other disputed tracts al,pears to pose as
great it problem: in many cases the major task
involved is demarcation or redemarcation of the
boundary; many small islands in the frontier rivers,
though, would change hands following a border
delimitation. In sum, the total territorial exchange
in any future border settlement is likely to be ex-
tremely small.
The initiative for reaching a border settlement
appears to rest with the Chinese, who, despite their
self-proclaimed desire to reach an agreement, rig-
idly adhere to their 1969 negotiating stance, which
is still totally unacceptable to the USSR. Continuing
polemical exchanges and the intransigence of the
Chinese suggest that future border talks, at least
until major leadership changes occur in the PRC, will
continue to be protracted and at times acrimonious.
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APPENDIX
'Territory and
Applknble Trrnllrr
UNDI;IINP:D RIVEHINE BOUNDARY
(:himnaya Isbinll Area
Nrllhrr trenly allocnird these 141n104, oppo.
(11cI-h4hr-tzu)
(325 6n'/125 ml')
sit' Khabarovsk at the cooflueocr of the
Anmr and U44orl Illvers.
Treaty of Algun ( 18511)
Trvaly of Peking (I8(iO)
Amur-Ussurl 14Iaod4
Neither treaty allocated the more than 700
Trrnty of Argun ( 1858)
Treaty of Irking (Iti00)
Islands in the Anna and Ussurl Rivers.
Upper Argun River Flood Plain
Continuing shifts in channels pose practical
(285 km'/110 ml')
difflrultivs In denulreatIon of boundary.
Trrnty of Ncrchinsk (
1089)
Generally, Chiocsv maps show boundary
also, for Miim-short-h Vicinity only
Treaty of Kinkhln (1727 )
TslLslhar Agreement (1011)
BOUNDARY AGREEMENT AT ISSUE
Tana rs
(41,000 knt'/10,000 mi')
Bilateral Agreement between Russia
and Great Britain (1395)
Tian-chou-11 Area
(000 km'/350 rri' )
Treaty of Kiakhta (1727)
T.;z(sihnr Agreement (1911)
LAND BOUNDARY REQUIRING DE-
MARCATION OR REDEAMARCATION
Western Sector
(3,000 km/1,850 mi)
Treaty of Peking (1860)
Treaty of Ili (1881)
Lake Khanka to Turnen River
(550 km/340 mi)
Treaty of Peking (1860)
along wvslrrmuost channel whereas So-
viet maps depict It along rnslernnntst
channel.
The Chinese were not a party to the treaty,
an(] the tract, in possession of the USSII,
has never been recognize(] by sub,,,quent
Chinese regimes as belonging to the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union bases it4 delimitation of
the boundary between the Argun River and
the Sino-Soviet-Mongollan tripoint on the
Tsitsihar Agreement, which no Chinese
government has ratified. This boundary is
8 to 16 kilometers south of the Chinese
alignment based on the Treaty of Kiakhta.
Chinese claim the loss of 440,000 square
kilometers based on the westernmost ex-
tension of mobile pickets sent to reguletc
use of pastures by nomads in Central Asia.
The USSR maintains that the boundary is
correctly demarcated on the basis of perm-
anent Chinese outposts.
Twice demarcated during the last half of the
19th century; the difference in the degree
of precision with which the boundary is
depicted on recent Soviet maps in compari-
son with the relatively generalized delinea-
tion shown on recent Chinese maps suggests
a need for redemarcation.
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 China-USSR Border: Eastern Secte- ;_: China-USSR Border: Eastern Sector
Relea h a mnaya/Hel Ala4zu Island Ar d
Chi r,
onal boundary `I Rellmad rPt t ' b1I1mNIIdR1I dary ~?-- ge~lrord''
emMd ,
oval boon ry, p MInNUotlNt I dll ub AONd
Indmrtl da In db ul -goad ~ ~ `',r ~~ '. ' fl p u w p
InbinNadminletml boundary 41 t ~, l ; .: IAINfl Iidminl~grltlwbaunduy ( ee S. Pe
80e14117,200,00a ~, , `., joeb ti9,70o;00tl ~~
", odnde eh ml on
Aoundan # ~W7
0
~ Min
lelute Mills Whose, dl a In allrym t4 /. _?..n
b_ Eli tW 1E0 2pp 2E0 ^+\ l? c O~~b6 1 ld~ ilhb 3E0 "~
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ttu Itllomelero ~f T ~k a: 4 w UAa'll i
f
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