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IF YOU WONDER HOW THE U.S. GOT INTO THE WAR IN VIETNAM--

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00001R000200410001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 9, 1999
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 13, 1965
Content Type: 
MAGAZINE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000200410001-0.pdf [3]124.3 KB
Body: 
~r- YOUMYOMDER HOW THI; U*S9 E G 0 T IIO Y ~ml 2 VIA R ll4 VllTNAM- question keep's coming .up: How did the U. S. ever get into the war in Viet- The nam? What started, it? And when? And why? Did the U. S. pick this spot to make a stand against the Communists? On these pages, a Washington newsman traces the history of the Vietnam crisis from its beginnings a quarter of a century ago. CPYROHT i by Paul Martin Washington Bureau. Chief for the Gannett Group . of Newspapers '.CPYRGHT Many Americans are wondering how the United States got so involved in the war in Southeast Asia. This is a significant chapter in the Communist design for postwar territorial expansion, a story of foreign intrigue that . goes back to the breakup of the old world order in the chaos of World War II. Before the war, three associated states of Indo-China Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam-were under French colonial rule. Taking advantage of the prostrate condition of Vichy France in 1941, the Japanese occupied Indo-China and used it as a base for further attacks on Thailand, Burma, Malaya,' Indonesia, and the Philippines. During the war in the Pacific, 1941-45, the United States provided military aid to Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow-trained. Communist and veteran Soviet agent who led a native re- sistance movement against the Japanese in Indo-China. President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin of the Soviet Union d:_C4.:ss 'd the iu ':.: a c'. Ti~+~u~l' sue. i in ebe_-aa in. 1943 and Yalta in 1945. looSeVe]t pmn0Se3 that the area he p.a,'e.3 'z e.; ;Come kind of international trusteeship at the war's end, to prepare the people for independence in perhaps 20 to 30 years. Stalin agreed. The Communist leader said he did not pro- pose to have the Allies shed blood to return Indo-China to French masters, whom he termed "rotten" and' "corrupt." Roosevelt said Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had assured him that China had no postwar designs on Southeast Asia. When the French tried to regain their position in Indo- China after the war, Ho Chi Minh seized power, proclaimed a "people's republic," and fired on Hanoi, Dec. 19, 1946, starting " fVLF0l . Release 1999/09/07 CI 56 The policy of American military and economic assistance to anti-Communist forces in the area started in 1950:. under the Truman Administration. The U. S. Government agreed to provide arms and am- munition to French Union forces fighting the Communist-led Viet Minh in Indo-China. Another agreement for dilact eco- nomic aid to Vietnam was signed in 1951. Altogether, the U. S. paid approximately 3 billion dollars of the costs of the losing French struggle against the Viet Minh. 'After the Communists completed their conquest of China in 1949, the Viet Minh were supplied across the bor- ' der from Red China. When Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower took office as Presi- dent in 1953, world attention was focused on the Korean War, which had been going on for 2;I years. Mr. Eisenhower sent word to Peiping by Prime Minister Nehru of India that, unless truce talks showed satisfactory progress, the U. S. intended to "move decisively without in- in o< U- of w p a,:4 .w-culd to 1=,;er be re- sponsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula." An ar ce was a; Panmta?, July 2-6. I9?aR ending three years of warfare in Korea, at a cost of 157,530 - American casualties, including 54,246 dead. The struggle for supremacy in Asia shifted to Indo-China. Mr. Eisenhower gives a lengthy account in his' book ."Man- date for Change" (Doubleday, 1961) : "Toward the end of 1953, the effect of the termination of' hostilities in Korea began to be felt in Indo-China.... The Chinese Communists now were able to spare greatly in- creased quantities of materiel in the form of guns and ammu- 9 W(Y14$ 0b2tfQft1,8r use on the In- U.S. NEWS i WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19. 1905

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[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00001R000200410001-0.pdf