DCI'S APPEARANCE AT THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002500020021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 14, 1977
• Content Type: MF

-.1..6 se,
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14 October 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant to the Director
(Public Affairs)
DCI's Appearance at the Economic
Club of New York
REFERENCE: Your Note, Same Subject, Dated
3 October 1977
1. Per your request for a suggested questioner for the DCI
during his appearance at the Economic Club of New York on
7 December, a well-qualified and appropriate nominee from the
news media is Robert L. (Bob) Keatley. Mr. Keatley is the
Washington-based correspondent for the WALL STREET JOURNAL,
covering economic and foreign affairs. From 1964 to 1968,
Mr. Keatley was the Asian Bureau Chief in Hong Kong for the
JOURNAL and has been in Washington since that time.
2. Attached are two stories he has done on the Soviet
economy and one on SALT, for your information.
Attachments: a/s
Hernert L. Hetu
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Approved For Rerksese 2004/02500020
? Globai Riesp6rt
Proriiises, protniSes' or borrow- '
? ing Itussiab style. ? .
; The Soviets are becoming incieasingly
? dependent an prominnory notes as a means
of financing their imports, according to the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.?
In most casee, these are *e.year notes.
that both American. ntid European .export77
crs are accepting in lieu at cash. The pa-.
Interest. rates of 8.75%. normally
ries to 7.5%. Offen, importers Jack up their
prices to lift the effective Interest charge :4
to 10% or no, with full knowledge of the-I
? ' --
Soviets.
The exporters discount the notes to West.
ern banks, turning the promissory' paper
Into what the" CIA calls "a 'marketable
'Credit Instrument that Is often vieu'red? hy
Western bankers as an alternative to direct -
lending to the U.S.S.R." ? .0 .
By liSh6, firomissorg natcS.,- the Soci?.;-:'.
annuld some bank ? concern
? Awn nierimiding .fo the,
'". U.S.S.R. It ritso lets thc Russians prtC
- tend theg aren't paying, Interest rrricx
- !that are, In reality, much higher than
. basic Western
? , ? .
Atoscov:, IsexpeCte:d to use the method
whenever possible to get medium-and long-
-term private financing In the next year, It
?alsp., Is. expected .to need a ,rnedluzn-term
keaeral-purpose syndication Lp consolidate
:some ?ok its debt:" -
i47!.iBank. of Atnerica recently Syndicated
.$32 ;Million of. these .promissory. notes at
.
ratesup to 1.63 ..percentage points. above
:the. bank, bornswing 'chru.ge Jar.' dollars in
..LOadorr.'...MoscaW doesn't like lo.PaY .More
;than 1.22,5 points above' the Lbndon at but
t;it ? has.: to, or: 'Pay. much high:e0 :ireint?;end
Ices,;?i*?. ?
all, Moscow this yes- I cied to
.i.raise _between . bWion..and:.tZ :billion
thisough such actions. ..
- --RomaT.
" ?-?'.-:%-? ?
:1
1-3
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3.
ihtiver
Enitigek!ka
SS Re-
? leatireovere. to. -meet longer-term'
ameitirrt-- cc6iRipt-ipt _ceivity increase would- have
3.euting- the 19e0s-even rear
?. . _
- - ? ? a e. -The study claims Moscow can
nacres:Weather Des drain manpower from rw?al aret
? 7 .
?
2' . ? -? aer:.77; industrial. labor- needs as this "col
- Due to or
. .1?-?;,??
. ?
: ?
..---
, Staff Reporter of TEDILW.ALs. Seam= lotrarsea
WASHINGTON-The- Soviet Union wIU
..have slower economic growth rates during
the next few years because of labor short-
-ages and bad: weather,- according to- two
? newly releaseditudies by the Central Intern g ence. Agency: ": ;Ae: 47i
The _studies support...ffte- einirjusicin ? of
e Many analysts that the U.S.S.R. faces dial-,
e cult' economic, times for a. wide ? variety, of.
ls reasons-some aggravated by the Soviet pa? -
litical" system and others-such as climate,.
of Russia's control-74a
broad conclusion isids Some experts:
to believe. Moscow ,theiefore is increasingly.
?ilInterested in:better _eelations .withethe,U.Sa
.Newi arms-control agreernenti, for iil?
could. reduce the military's drag on the civill"
t ?
Flan economy; the CIA believes-that iron): ?
el.3%: to 15%,,ofe the - Soviet. gross,- national:
.-? ? :
product: goes to; defense.. ? eee....eeer 'lee;
:-And better ? relations could ? lead to
e creased .trade, especially_ Russia-xi import on
seforeign technology. That would improve la..
? bar productivity and partially 'offset 'Mane
i,-;powershortages. It might also increase out
-'put of export-quality goods :needed' to, fi-
t!. nance grain :
_Whettker. these-broader.- hroader political judge.
Merits' prove - true, the two CIA stadies-:^
which ;.eonffne themielvs to narrovier lssuJs -,
problem% that...emelt cause Soviet
...planners much worrytte'el",eFill.t."44;siZ,:=
Poor Grain Crepe Seen r '"
e Most surprising is a:CU forecast of poor',
grain cm-ups daring the next tali years due to
significant climatic, changes currently talc-
trig place:. The agency officials who drafted'
the-report don't believe the 197&Soviet.gral?
[harvesti-ae record 224 .224 metric 7 tons,,
pounds eickr;Contradicts their tit.therf:
'negative longer term prediction -Z" ki
DurIng the current live-year plait period'
ry.rhicit: ends i98:0;' the Ca-believes thea
?..erige-Saviei7..grain-Crop', yield will be; aboute
,200."millIon metric tonscabout'17-rnilliCit
lovethe offiefal iota' leforeeVetii, this le 25
or 311 million tens below expected So-f-'",
.:viete!needeelf:elivestoltel*.edsf-,-lexpand ...is 7
7 'plannedeefe,e,.. ereeeert;'-eer-%,,-"--. -.".`-av
One- fmplicatlon is that Mag-cOw ;mil ie..%
. ?
main a major grainlriniorter, in some years
'as big:a buyer as :after. the. disastrous 1975
:harvest- Howevere'the CA: believe!) Russiae
;eviller counter most shortages - reducing)
-.'needi,7.Such.a?by7.5langhtering!livestock,;:.
rather than let herds expand on schedul%a45.
; Goal of Self Sufficiency
If -Such - shortages. oCcurelt'wOulds- be:
.! Major: setback-for'. for' _Kremliridilariaers!'f For.
both politleat tincreconotnic?reasons,. the Sce.'?
? viet Union wants to be -self-sufficient ? in:
grain and even remain a inajor supplier: to.
Eastern Europe:- In addition; Russian lead-,
era have 'promised the public an 'improved...,
diet featuring moremea.t and dairy- prod-;
uete: this requires increased amounts of
mal ..;
Thus a period:Of; persistent shortiges
''e9u1014di/Kilfitrtt414-tanldelita
--t;1.-J dize farm. output goals" iespeni.
, agency's long-range weather forei
farm products. available as raw. Materials recta. Neither can itnieet civillai
!lot' the food-Processing . incluetry, It. weuld: reducing the 3.7 million people in
force Moscow to spend hard currency On forces; "anyereducticue would h
grain rather than on technological goods and ::,stilestanti-altc) have a significant it
-it. might cause internal Political problems if civilian work 'force that cineentl:
'Promises of higher living standards aren't eajmese , Leo. riewieet peasease? e
!'.The reason for this pessimistic prediction ;lee l'.,The.basic solution, . according I
'lie the etreather. "The- 1975' drought does not I is. to inake 'adra.stie changes in e
appear to be an aberration but part of a driere:centive -Systeme:7' For, exempt,
'trend which can be: expected, tneccur with i'ruleS Could -be changed to let Rus
varying degrees of intensity. for some timeeepast ...mandatory retirement. ag
to .come," e the-CIA : report: states. This,Lworrien, 60 for men) Without suffe
:means,. . it. 'concludes; : "a-return to the i:,.cial,- losses. Mere basic economic 1
harsher conditions .of the ar1y.1960s"-wherei ? tion 7Could.have even. greater_ Imp-
...the U.S.S.R. also bjEuil harvest problems ;: -- ..ttierarriuniit7.Party has rejecte.e
.,The CIA sayeclimate,chpnges across thi.' eproach fo'r?fear it would lose lig
..:allorthern7-7-Hemiiphere": : promise '''' drier coiltrel over tteepelellee.e.e.eeeee --
-weather for the. Soviet Union. The agency '..t--,'-:'?!. ' '''?' -
', says this. will most heavily .affect "the south-
. .
::ern fringes of the grain belt,,!! which in re-
'cent. years have been large producers. 1.kss
rainfall; ...' particularly ' in theseeemarginal
- areas, will mean lower yieldeeee:e../:-:-7.'...
Effects of Weather' '-'1 '',.. '''.. -5..":,;?..'.:.7f:
.-..:. eAs proof of the Iniportance Of weather
:ilia CIA concludes that more than half of the _
' Soviet Union's annual harveefincreaee since '
1962-ra period of wetter-thanenorinal weathe
:6e:ewes .due to climate ?rather :than im-
proved afficiency:..;.e; ; :17:;::'...,:-:.:4':::.:- ? -.: i,?:.':'
.5A"tils adverse etionemiefactor.ivill Wage,'
...gravated_by .labor -Shortages,. according- to
.?the Other . agency' study- It says "the. Soviet
- ecimomy, hobbled since the early 1960i bly
' sluggish'. technological advance,--faces . a
, ilowdovn) in: .employment 'growth through
-. the 1980s that Could further arrest the pace'
;'?otits economic developmenta"'e.
- One main reason is a long-terra. deeline
?-..j.lit'the'birthrtite;-?,..which Means fewer paten
...traik7.workers;_beeaMeiteiallablii?,each year..
Foieexample;:..tiften'increaking 2.1% in .1975; -
-I the, Work 'force--ruse-only e..950..lasf. year; in ,
7:1988,.:the Increase will be only 02% X:...,7,.:V.
In addition. there 'isrs.'t ,anyegreat reser-4
-Veit: of -.potentialorkera'rtoe.tapXAlreader '
".894-4..e,Pi? the iviinieii" betWieri, age's 20 and 54
.tire; einpl4iyi4;e:e;eiffe:.9,3% of -tite?=iitenebere
'-*eeri ages; 20 arid 59 have. jobs Practically
the only peteritier-Sourcee, of additional la,,,:e
Ieor.; thereforeeiare'among the young .(16-19)-'1:
:.ancl. the eel:1r ed.,:the study
Five-Tear- Flans"-,:Re6ordee?-.:7-7.-re'i-A?':;:":'
'ee'te,Th. ie.. Putsep:isPeeiali::pre"r.m-"'um'?? o'n.'effi--.:
C.iency.S,HoweVefe, the 4 Soviet . record...isn't.
:'good; " five-yearPlans generally fall short: Of
their 'productiVitee'eewhicit. means 'carie
;ffnuatiore; ofe,what,thee,Cieeei'-alle ;"the 'unLe
! usuagje:, wastefuleeuse :eat .e7la.bor f'ain..-ethe
1U-s?S?R?t7.-`;`:;,;:.:1--.ti":0:?,,ei.:?fee-7.-et,4..V..:',...,:,--,..1..e.:;,-,;:.7
For eicample;:ttie. cuirent-.'(1976
year ? plan . calls-, for -Ian., annual- economic.
growth of 5%..- But to achieve?thiS. the CIA '
believes prod produCtierity-L:output. -per' hour ' of
WOrk -would have to increase 3.5% yearly ,
during... the 'period.- But productivity in-:
..:creeeed Only about half that rate (1.85e an-
nually) in the previous plan, making the
. higher new goal; an unlikely accomplishment.
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STA
Are Ernnrinrs Blocking
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B Poems'. Meier FY such officials ciente? s
first used a demand for equal numbers of
WASHINGTON-Two year's sso, In the
ieviet ant! :American lontorailee riflen,.vo
cold, snewy mid remote Rtf3:;taii pert of '
weepans to hinder erre i eteitrol efft rts.
Vladivostok. the eactind strategic arms
Sehen Moscow agreed to figure nurresert at
Viedivostok, it's said, they titer stressed
the "throw-weight? !NAIR? - namely test
Restart missiles are bleger .old more pew-
erful. thus perhaps superktr. When siu?lies
showed that sheer size end brute force !eel
serprisingtv little militery significance. ac
-
whether the treaty will ever be convened. cording to this etory. the doubters erabeed
The lame-duck Ford administrates: is the cruise missile aed Hackfire bomber Is?
passing the problem to Jimmy Cacteri sees.
once in office, he may decide to eta:t all I
Naturally. SALT'e greatest sltepttce-
over. I netably Defense Depiietment officiithe-ssy
control agreement almost was own.
But not quite. President Ford and eoviet
Communist Party General Secretary
Leered Brezhnev drafted a general U.:,?..Afte
that left certAin iseues for later: ther re-
main unresolved. Now teres
reasons for lh!'s lore' detee?Ind I otherwise. Tliey claim cruise iniseiiee and
perhaps outright fititure-Inceitee :Pi. tekeefire bombers threitten to &eine/ the
elite- Because the talks concern the main restricte the Peteelans while istilies the U.S.
I'LVOiditble complexities of nuclear ret' rot westing neetspe staeney. reit es ettee
weapons systems of the superpowers. any push ahead with certain weapons projects,
agree.ments would be difficult in the best of they doubt the wisdom of signing terme el-
tIrrie.s. ? ready negotiated. And they deny they're ..
But these aren't the best of times or
merely fieding excusee for cloine nnthing.
Soviet-Arnerican relations. Thus tee erre
"This building Is serious about SALT.-
posed second etretegic Arms Limitation -Insists a Pentagon strategist. who suggests'
Talks treaty S ALT iii has alea foundered on ?
the P.ussians aren't..
ruclear thereore-disputes about the pur-
In this view. Moscow. while talking
pose:s and deeirebiiity of arms control ef-
about arms controls, is busy building new
torts. Doueters so far have blocked SALT .
II foe reitsons whien they call technical but wespons whose purposes seem sinieler,
are often also quite emotional, such as gut Not only are 34,,v,ral new long :arige nee-
dtetrust of the Russtane eits under construction but a new meesirre
What Mr. Carter does about SALT Will r ;tete. rniereeitststreiesci rreelel fee tesse
I ell much about how he plans to rnaemse. bm -. use reeitest Western ietsrope Is tieing
foreign affairs, for this is among the early developed. There is also a massive theleup
problems he must face. Existing iiontrols ? of cenventional weaponry by the Museotte
on offensive nuclear weapons expire next
Oetober: it no new ones are in force by
then or if the old ones aree't extended, offi-
cial restraints will end:Then each side wilt
be legally free to build nny nuclear err:se-
lls budgets and techisoloey can provide.
Mr. Carter says he favors tight controls
and hopes to have "a comprehensive
agreement" by fall. Otherwise. weed
be very likely to ask for an extensional the
present iSALT D agreement," he adds. in
any -case. the partially completed SALT It
treaty could be junked.
"Everything we've done could prove ac-
.. aderalc." says one official who has spent
much of the past few years working on its
complex provisions.
- Elusive 'Good Will' -
Yet the remeining obstacles to an ac,
cord seem relatively minor to expert who
want the deal completed. These stumbling
e blocks are two weapons which -weren't
even discuesed at Vladivostok, the-Ai-nitri.
can cruise missile and a Russian ixeriber
which the West calk Backfire. SALre
Mende contend neither now poses a sub-
ztanttal new strategle threat, and so devis-
ing sensible controls should be re:ativeiy
eaeyegiven good will.
But good ,.4.111 doetin't alwatet exist
ettALT s invoiest! le se sis :a d--
a. riseee fee. :se teeter
? MOM?. it Lir oteer reneerss etst use
themeIssues to oppose any agreement."
? -. .
domirseted Warsaw Pact.
"The Soviets seem to he preparing to
fight and win a war if one comes," say:: a
Pentagon official, "This causes us to quee-
tion their long-term objectives."
Coupled with distrust of the P.ussians is
the drive of advancing technology. Military
men find it difficult to foreclose an option
once a new weapons possibility arises. The
cruise missile, a small pilotless jet, prom-
ises to be a versatile weapon, and the eere
era's don't want to surrender it. Yet, Ironi-
cally. many Air Force generale are In no
rush to develop cruise missiles because
they would threaten the existence of some
present-day forces. perhaps replacing tact-
ical aircraft squadrons.
And though some Navy admirals. would
like to put these weapons aboard subma-
rines, other admirals gee this idea as a
budeetary threat to alternative ship and
sub tierces they want to build: So there is a
widespread insistence upon the right to
build cruise missiles without much urgency
to go ahead and do so.
Which strikes many other officials as lu-
dicrous. The point of arms control talks,
they emphaeize, is after alt to control
arms. "SALT limits the services' preroga-
tive in planning new weapone: that's why
they don't like lee InsiStS ries officiel. "If
yee inlet:try sieves.. ei se its se.
then :voile. rsssee ai;),
sentroi agreements," complaizis an-
ether. .
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-rr.ris Limits!.
0165M$12509(120024.-3irix-rarge S.faLl?
.gt:.?
? rl'..sion itrulse reisstles woelt 'ce toss
E:',),N anti vulnerable to provide s. ',itirant
a et! tier advantages anywAy. iShorterange
ins wouldn't be covered by SALT. Ito
they inelst nothing crucial ht sacrificed t..
ire'kty restricts their tleveitemicnt.
Ina- officials also insist the U.S. would
rin no great risks it the Bus:Saes werts at-
to build a fleet of Liacitere bunglers:
-Tres plate was designed as a "peripherie
weittert-fur potential use In Euroce or -
eel:est China, rattier than eget:est more
dUiflt targets. it is suptersed to :Iterate
? 1.(._,w ?altitutles? over nienium ranges at.
se, isles -scree:le_ eel!, If It Mee ti.i.eitco ll.,a
:s.d,
!ruin Ci:Statil ,
resen some U.S.' elates. SALT preponeres,
contending the Bat:Mira would be velnese-
ble say the strategic usiportaneti of this.
potential Is marginal at best; Ail-rtes.:11s
eethere must be tight control.; atfesitine
the Baclifire or the Russians will tetee a
everris.orne advantege.
7 ?tst eantiary Lr. Bresitnev cave Socres
stra-
tegic weapon, and thus shoeldn't be in-
dieted in SALT terms. The Cenral Intell!-
. gence Agency found this assertion essen-
tially, though not wholly. ce..rreet. -
" ... There is.aiereement.... that it is prt- ?
madly -it peripheral weapon at this pont.
And that is where the deployment has-been
so far." a CIA official Wel Cenerces last "
-3tlrnmer.
Pentagon experts, however, stress that.
clepending on bese location, flight alettude
arid load carried, the ?Backfire "bee a caps
? a:petty for an intereontinennes mission?' .-
Thus they want controls. Mr. Resserieer
warns -that demanding. tots many conces-
sions would cause Moscow to revive. the is-
sue of U.S. planes In Europe widen could
strike the U.S.S.R. - somethinte which
Washington wants left dormant. So he is,
ready to be more permissive than the Pen-
tagen.
Missile (ih.e and Take ?
As things stand now. SALT. IT would
limit each nation to 2,?ICA1 "rietivery vehi-
cles." including. long-range missiles- and ?
bombers, of which 1,320 could have multi.
pie werbee.ds, or etillers. Other clauses-
would limit the Soviet right to increitee the-
317:e of- their- miseilee, thus direlreshing
throweveight worries; Moscow has also
agreed that aircraft can be armed with
1,50)-mile-range cruise missiles,- which
would be art advantage for the larger
American bomber force;
t The cruise-carrying bombers would be
called MIRVs for verification purposes.
thus counting them-against the 1.320 limit.
The U.S. would make room -for such a
hrenber force by, converting sub:star:nes
launched Poseidon mieeltesenew MIR.Ved,
to itarry only a single warhead apiece. r
Those terms eoulil have been eitmed
is. putting aside Beckfire tem:tiers and
cruise. rtheelleee But such arruieements
would have struck ntany Americana as
sham controls, so further options, were de- .
veloped within the U.S. administration. .
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One v.'ould have excluded Backfire from
SAL-re main terms but would have applied
"collateral restraints.- Theo would in
dude a ceiling on the number of these.
bombers. (The CIA thin ke Mescow wents
to build -SOO Backfires eveaeleity and new
has about 95.i There would eleo have been
restrictions on aerial tinkers whieh could
extend the plane's range. blue a. ban
against basing it at alrfielde nearest the
U.S. Ruse tan sources have indicated they
would accept something of the sort in a
SALT package.
In return, the U.S. would have accepted
strict limits on its se based lone-range
cruise missiles: a few might be permitted
but not many. Presumably, that would
make the deal sweeter to Moecow.
And, as a selling-point fur skeptical Sen-
ators. who mese ratify any treaty; there
. would, have been a reduction of the 2, WO
delivery-vehicle limit to 2.200 or so. Such a
. cut weuldn't affect planned U.S. forces
much, out would require Mo.,icow to scrap
some 330 older weapons.
But none of these proposal could:be-
come U.S. negotiating positions, let alone
an agreed treaty, unless Gerald Poed got
his own- administration together In eepport
7 of them. le,th the epublican right harass
-
? ing him daring the past election cempiCen.
? the President put off ileeleione till after
Election Day and now it'.4 tee late; there's
.?no chance- of a deal before Mr, . Carter
comes to town.
The new President will' inherit a' mass
of completed work on a second arms con.
trot- agreement plus ideas about how befin..
Isle the job.- What he does with SALT should
tell much about the kind of leadership he
intends to give the country. ? -
Arr. Meaner/, a member of thr Jeurnee
Weehiagfoe harm% rep,rts wt oreigti
al/airs. ? J
-
11
I he proposed second
Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks treaty has also found-
er ed on nuclear theology?
disputes about the purposes
and desirability of arms con,
tralefforts.
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STAT
TO:
FROM:
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
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Executive klgistxy
SUBJECT: ?Oar
REMARKS:
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522 FihlierRagriktei*CMWASPE:OSIfkiNg9QM 6411KIWWWPCi.,2cleie, Jr. , Pre siden
September 12, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner,
I was delighted to learn from
will be able to address our December 7th dinner meeting to be
Grand Ballroom of the New York Hilton. The reception for the
head table guests is scheduled for 6:30 p.m., dinner will be
and the program will start at 8:30 and end at 10:00 p.m. It
fair, and we expect an attendance of about 1,000.
that you
held in the
speakers and
served at 7:00 p.me
is .a black tie af-
ST
STT
It has been the Club's long established custom to have two speakers,
except in the case of heads of state, and as I informed 1
the other speaker that evening will be the new British Ambassador, Peter Jay.
The title of the Ambassador's speech will be "Fat Years, Lean Years - Can We
Control Our Fate?" As I understand it, he plans to discuss the international
eceapmic erbareas.ela if....-Jeee..E.r.e.e...Ileurad., including those of Great Britain, and to
review possibilities for escaping from the up-down cycles that bring on recesSTAT
sions.
In considering what you might choose as a topic,
and I were intrigued with the idea of an analysis of the q29,Lamee-e.e.tue.t.ealleaPa
-04;a2121c in thajlennonaleeLezald. I have the impression that you have been de-
voting a good deal of personal study and attention to this subject in connection
with your new responsibilities. In any event, such a topic would seem to be
an extraordinarily good fit with Ambassador Jay's address although, needless to
say, you are completely free to speak on whatever subject you choose- We would
appreciateeknowing reasonably soon of your decision, however, so that we can
correctly inform our members and take appropriate steps to assure you of the
maximum audience. in terms of both quality and quantity.
Immediately following the two speeches of 20 to 25 minutes each we
have two highly qualified individuals who act as questioners of the speakers.
We find this to be more pertinent and interesting than an unpredictable miscel-
lany of queries from the floor. If you have any thoughts as to pho
ga9i_sugz.titan,gx on the subject of your speech, we would be grateful for them.
Your welcome from The Economic Club and its guest will be a very warm
one, and we are looking forward eagerly to having you with us.
Most sincerely,
,
Edwin A. Locke, Jr.
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