COEXISTENCE IN THE FAR NORTH RECENT NORWEGIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100060001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1958
• Content Type: IM

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CONRDENTIA.
Cop j No.. "-
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR-GM- 6
15 April 1958
COEXISTENCE IN THE FAR NORTH:
RECENT NORWEGIAN- SOVIET RELATIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GONdit E
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COEXISTENCE IN THE FAR NORTH:
RECENT NOR WEGIAN- SOVIET RELATIONS
The settlement of the long-standing Norwegian-Soviet sea problem in the
Varangerfjord is one in a series of recent events indicating a change in Soviet
policy toward Norway. Viewed as a whole, the Soviet moves appear to be designed
to convince Norway of the Soviet desire for peaceful coexistence and to weaken
Norway's orientation toward the West. As concerns the territorial sea problem,
the Norwegian-Soviet settlement has the effect of the sanctioning by Norway of
the Soviet claim to a 12-nautical-mile limit at a time when many of the Western
governments at the current Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea are urgently
trying to secure world-wide acceptance of a narrower jurisdiction. Norwegian
officials, however, emphatically deny the implication that Norway and the USSR
have reached an understanding whereby Norway has formally recognized Soviet
enforcement of a l2-mile territorial sea limit.
In the past few years, Moscow has directed its efforts toward encouraging
contacts of all types with her Nordic neighbors and toward settling issues
bilaterally, emphasizing the advantages of friendship and cooperation. Since
early 1956, agreements have been reached between Norway and the USSR concerning
rescue operations in the Barents Sea, the regulation of seal hunting in the
North Atlantic, the provisional settlement of
pre-1940 continued Soviet purchase of Norwegian salt heerring, a ncomdelayedon
cultural exchange, and a trade pact for exchange of f even more reaching importance is the agreement for the developmentdsof hydroele tricfar-
power resources on the Pasvikelv (Pasvik'River), which forms part of the
boundary between Norway and the USSR. The Soviet offer to accept bids from
Norwegian companies for the construction of one of its proposed power plants
in this extrerhe northern region, an area where employment is badly needed, is
further evidence of continuing Soviet efforts to gain the goodwill of its
Arctic neighbor.
Cooperation between Norway and the USSR does not necessarily mean any
significant change in the relations of the Norwegian Government with the West.
From a psychological point of view, however, it indicates to the Norwegian
people that it is possible to work out practical, mutually advantageous agree-
ments with the Soviet Union. This series of moves in the Far North serves to
illustrate the fact that the Soviet Union has by no means limited its economic
penetration to the Middle East, Far East, and Africa.
In 1947, agreement was reached concerning the location of the land boundar
between Norway and the Soviet Union, and 2
administration of the border was settled byymutualaaccord. At this of the y
preliminary discussions were held concerning the problem h this only
l
sea north of the mouth of the Jakobselv (Jakob River). Since the the vi eeviewpo poin ints
of the two countries and their claims to territorial waters differed radically
the Norwegians claiming 1+-nautical miles and the Soviets 12 -- the Joint
--
Commission decided to keep this question open for future diplomatic negotiations.
Since the end of World War II, the USSR has been involved in a series incidents concerning its claim to a 1..2-mile territorial sea. The Soviet claim
is based on the existence of three statutes promulgated in 1921, 1927, of
the first of which set the 12-mile limit in the Barents Sea area for fishin m
ri hts. and 1935,
g After the war, seizures of fishing vessels by the Soviets became g
increasingly frequent in an effort to discourage nationals of non-Communist
countries from fishing in waters adjacent to the USSR.
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''nn yerf ord
00
Pechenga
CONFIDENTIAL
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OPEN SEA
12 NAUTICAL MILES
BY ARCS OF CIRCLE
PRINCIPLE (RED DOTS
MARK CENTERS) 70
NORWAY-U.S.S.R.
DELIMITATION OF TERRITORIAL SEA
VARANGERFJORD AREA
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CONFIDENTIAL
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vessels were apprehended in a contested
In 1956, several Norwegian fishing
area of the Varangerfjord;
and in an attempt at clarification of the boundary to negotiate issue the Norwegian cabinet repetaccepted d a poffer
Soviet theinally,
USSR. This time the proposal was Norway and the Soviet Union
on 15 February 1957, a Convention was signed by
concerning the territorial-sea limit between the two countries in the Varangler-gave i fjord, and on 18 March the St2ELiLnE a
to the ratification of the treaty.
decade to resolve.
Article 1 of this Convention stipulates that the maritime border .between
Norway and the USSR proceeds in a straight line from boundary post
of Norwegian-
to the intersecting point of the outer boundary 415
otin map) ) sea (point A). Neither of the contracting parties is
Sovdt arrow
i territorial rd t to extend its territorial sea beyond a straight line (black dotted
line on map) drawn from the intersecting point (A) to point B, the midpoint of
gian-
a line from Mys Nemetskiy (Kapp Njemetsky) to Kibergr~es. eo A ra joofint t o Norwewe gian
Soviet Border Commission was appointed to compute the g g p
point (A), the outer boundary of Norwegian-Soviet territorial
sea, and r ie fp the middle (point B) of the line between Mys Nemetskiy and
sa alsso o for o buo s showing the
Kibergnes. The Commission was further instructed to set up y
direction of the borderline in the sea.
ximately 10 months later, the Norwegian Statsr&d (Council of State),
Appro app roved an agreement for a "customs
by a Royal Resolution of 6 December 1957, pp
zone" between Norway and the USSR. This accord was based essentially on
Union
Union
2
early
of the general practice and on the recoiseanthan doesaNorwayt the As Soviet as o
claims a wider belt of territorial
Norway had adopted a 10-nauticawa mllimited in zoneea. Its
extension in the Varangerfjord rinciple to
At present the USSR uses the arcs of circles p The
dotted line A-B.
determine its 72-mile territorial sea 1ch(nge antthenS viet method.. If the
Norwegians are concerned about a possible rina ciple, which the Norwegians
Soviet Union were to adopt the base line p
themselves employ, it could run a base line from the the mouthlineof therea obsely
(boundary post No. 415) to Mys Nemetskiy and f this meas outward
placing the lines 12-nautical miles (solid red and dasW1dhin theonNorwegianthe thus customs zoea (blue
Soviet territorial sea limit partly
forording on map). Hence, the Royal Resolution of 6 December was aim with
the S estalling a possible move to include thebasicallydrelinqui hedlall claivimset
f
territorial-sea limit. Conversely, Norway
to the waters east of the dotted line (red-shaded area on map). Owing to strategic, economic,
and political interests, maritime nations
conscious of the need to define the seaward limits sf
their have be spheres of sinofesove verey reignty. When nations proceed to stake claims over adjacent seas conflicts inevitably develop, especially when there
uni sal
are action, of interest between nee at thevGeneva
are wide divergences uEven
agreement on the widthttr
Conference, which appears unlikely, the problem of the method of determining
their outer limits will still remain.
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C0NflBEWT,4L
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