PROPOSAL FOR(Sanitized)OXCART PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500060118-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 118
• Publication Date: April 10, 1963
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2003/1 1T1 .R I E&R~-10313Aa00500060118-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
10 APR 1963
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT: Proposal for Surfacing an LRI Prototype
as Cover for the OXCART Program
1. The OXCART program initiated in 1959, has during the
ensuing years and up to the present time progressed through the devel-
opment and initial construction phase and, surprisingly, through an
entire year of flight testing and flight training without a single exposure
or significant security breach which resulted in attracting public atten-
tion to the program.
2. This accomplishment becomes even more remarkable
when it is appreciated that practical considerations have forced us to
adhere to a pattern that is widely known and associated with the U-2
program and involving such elements as Lockheed, Kelly Johnson,
tc.
3. This record, which has exceeded our most optimistic
expectations, was not established through fortuitous circumstance
and at least passing recognition should be accorded-those who have had
responsibility for the security of the program since its inception.
4. With the advent of the R-12 procurement, it should be
recognized that the program cannot be contained in the same manner
as in the past. More than 7, 000 persons in industry already are either
fully or partially cleared. In addition, the,increased frequency of
flights will almost inevitably result in an incident under circumstances
that we may not be able to control. The magnitude of the program in
itself negates any effort at complete concealment, and there is already
Copy /
Approved For Release 2003/11/TS0fIA Q?0D313A0005000601I
 Approved FoLelease 2003/1T1O (M I-0031,ZA000500060118-1
25X1A
an awareness in the aviation industry that Lockheed is engaged in
a highly classified project of a unique nature. (A summary of
examples of this awareness has been prepared by the Security
Branch, OSA, and is attached at Tab A.) It must be assumed
that public exposure is only a matter of time and steps must be
taken now to prepare to meet this contingency and to protect the
OXCART phase of the program.
5. In addit".on to concealing the true mission of the
OXCART vehicle and plausibly ascribing to it a different purpose,
there is the more difficult and potentially explosive political
problem of explaining and justifying the limited competition pro-
curement of the aircraft and the secrecy which cloaked its develop-
ment. The possible political connotations of the latter will almost
certainly not go unnoticed by those Members of Congress who a?
unwitting of the program, and the resultant clamor for investigation
could quickly get out of control, unless effective measures are taken
beforehand to cope with such a development. The current TFX
controversy has further compounded and accentuated this aspect
of the problem. To a lesser degree, but still of considerable concern,
is the anticipated reaction of the technical press and possibly some
components of the aviation industry itself.
6. Our success to date in protecting the OXCART/AA 12
programs from public exposure is cited as an argument in favor of
continuing our present policy without change. Under this concept
we would not voluntarily surface any part of the program until
forced to do so by some untoward incident or compromise.
7. Conversely, it is argued that such a course deprives
us of the selection of the time and circumstances of such surfacing
and. also deprives us of the psychological advantages inherent in a
voluntary surfacing as opposed to a situation in which it will be
obvious to everyone that we are being forced by circumstances
beyond our control to explain belatedly a program which we would
have preferred to conceal from public view.
8. Whichever course is selected--i. e. , controlled or
uncontrolled surfacing--the problem of providing a plausible cover
story is the same. The elements of the cover story would be identical
a
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/11/ . IA IR?)313A000500060118-1
 Approved For Retease 2003/11 /TOPIA 0313A 90500060118-1
in each instance; however, it seems logical that the plausibility
would be significantly enhanced if the surfacing were voluntary.
On balance, we conclude th;Lt a controlled surfacing offers advan-
tages which outweigh the benefits deriving from our present policy
which is becoming more untenable with the elapse of time and in-
creased tempo of operations.
9. The cover story which will be employed in surfacing
the AF- 12 portion of th(; program must contain as many elements of
truth as possible, short of jeopardizing the OXCART version. With
this as a primary consideration, it becomes more and more obvious
that the best solution is to surface the long-range interceptor proto-
type, the first one of which will be available by approximately mid-
July 1963.
10. It is proposed that the Defense Department announce
that a prototype of a long-range interceptor developed by Lockheed
Aircraft Company for the USAF will commence flight tests at Edwards
AFB on or about 15 July 1963. Whether the LRI, currently designated
the X-22, will go into full production will depend on the decision of the
Secretary of Defense which, in turn, will be based on the results of a
major study and evaluation of further AF interceptor needs currently
underway at the Pentagon and due on the desk of Secretary McNamara
early in June.
11. The announcement will further state that the LRI proto-
type is the result of a limited design competition between Convair
and Lockheed in 1959 which resulted in the selection of the LAC design
using the Pratt and Whitney J-58 engine. The stringent security
measures applied to the development program from its inception re-
sulted from a decision by the previous administration to deny to the
Soviets critical information on our future air defense systems which
could vitally affect their decisions with regard to offensive weapons
systems and countermeasures. The program was reviewed by the
present administration in 1961, and the decision was made to con-
tinue development of the aircraft under the same rigid security policy
then in effect.
12. Armament is provided by the Hughes Aircraft Corporation
and is a version of the ASG- 18 long-range radar and GAR.-9 air-to-air
missile. This system has been undergoing tests in a B-58 at Edwards
AFB for the past two years.
25X1A
25X1A Approved For Release 2003/11 /To Pi R 313A00050006011
 Approved FQx.Release 2003/TZ': 6IK(RRi 1-003`i A000500060118-1
13. Performance figures on the LRI will not be revealed,
and beyond this announcement the high security level that has charac-
terized this development will be continued i.h order to protect perform-
ance information.
14. There remains the question as to the timing of the
controlled surfacing. It would be desirable to have available, at the
,.ime of the announcement, a prototype which could be displayed at
Edwards AFB. This would require a delay in surfacing the LRI at
least until mid-July 1963. Assuming that the Senate TFX hearings
will have been concluded by then, this would have the added advantage
of surfacing under a more favorable climate than presently exists. If
the disclosure were made in the midst of the TFX hearings, any effort
by the Senate Committee to avoid its introduction into the controversy
would be almost painfully obvious and probably futile.
15. Conversely, if we delay the surfacing, it is with the
attendant risk that an incident may occur in the interim with resultant
loss of the advantages which would accrue from a controlled surfacing.
16. In`cither case, it is proposed that no mention will be
25X1A
25X1A
supervised by the Department of the Air Force. No further disclosures
will be made.
of the Department of Defense with control and test operations being
cry e as a highly c assi-ied research program under the sponsorship
17. At the present time there are twenty-one Congressmen
briefed on OXCART. They are primarily members of the House Armed
Services and House Appropriations Committees, and members of the
Senate Armed Services and Senate Ap;ropriations Combined Subcom-
mittees (See Tab B)..
25X1A
18. One favorable aspect o'. the program lies in the fact
that it will be extremely difficult for any Congressman to make a
partisan political issue of the subject. The limited design competition
and rigid security policy were established during a Republican adminis-
tration and endorsed and continued by a Democratic administration.
Nevertheless, it appears highly desirable that prior to any announcement
Approved For Release 2003/111103 I iT0313A000500060
 Approved For.Release 2003/111 CE I-003taAO00500060118-1
being made some additional key members of Congress be fully briefed
on the OXCART program. In this way it might be possible to quell any
Congressional conflagration oven before it started. Such briefings
probably should include Senators McClellan, Dirksen, Mundt, and
Goldwater, and Representative Halleck. It might also be advisable
to solicit the recommendations of those Congressmen already briefed
as to what other measures we might undertake to achieve our objectives
with Congress.
19. It is not Lnticipated that the aviation industry in itself
will constitute a major problem; however, it would be prudent to be
prepared to brief the pop men in certain aircraft corporations if there
were indications of an unfavorable reaction. The technical press may
attempt to make a cause celebre of the announcement, but in the ab-
sence of strong reaction from the industry and Congress, it is believed
that the critical comments will be short-lived.
20. It should be noted that at present we have an agreed inter-
departmental contingency plan for OXCART which has been reviewed and
approved by such august bodies as the Special Group and the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Although a number of persons
have expressed reservations as to the plausibility of this plan, which
relates the vehicle to an airborne satellite launch system, should an
incident occur tomorrow we would have little choice but to proceed in
accordance with the approved plan.
21. Recommendations:
a. That the Ad Hoc Cover Committee be
convened as soon as possible to consider the proposed
surfacing of the LRI as a cover mechanism for OXCART.
b. That the Committee resolve and make a
recommendation on the timing of the surfacing.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
H RBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)
Approved For Release 2003/11' J):FCIWORE-P0313A00050006
 Approved For-Release 2003/11/?PCIEEDR iT00313&000500060118-1
25X1A
SAL/OSA /DDR II
Copy 1-!
Copy 2 --
Copy 3 --
Copy 4 --
Copy 5 --
Copy 6 --
Copy 7 --
Copy 8 --
Copy 9--
Copy 10 -
Copyl.l -
Copy 12 -
Copies 13
25X1A
D/NRO
D/NRO
Col. Geary
DD /R
DD /R
AD / OSA
DAD / OSA
C/SS/OSA
SA/DDR
D/TECH/OSA
D/FA/OSA
C/PS/OSA
through 20 -- SAL/OSA
Approved For Release 2003/1' 1/OpC&HOROT00313A000500060118-1
 25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For$olease 2003/11/19 : CIA-RbP63-O013$0Od
7 ', C'> .i~ FOR: Deputy Director (Research)
Project OXC.--T
(Awareness in Aviation Industry)
1. T: his : ei:_?randu is for your information.
a~ ^ S3cuY qty stL.-1. has invited to my attention
?wU .. 'u _.aary o cxaa ,.:s of the increasing extent
of ,. vn ss in uncleared inc s .> trial circles of pro jec-;.
1-~ecently, it se- .s that almost daily a. now indi-
c:a _on appears twat in the aviation business circles more
.Ln .-3 re people are putting two and two together regarding
?__:. > >a o ct . As touched upon in the attached, the sources
r ewe Y_ :. ion a .~ ; oven \rlt lout actual leaks of clas-
~i t c infor ration them, are ol13u ;h indicators available to
sa_-:, c : t a calculated estimate of t-he nature of Kelly John-
soa ` s endeavors. Some of the "estimates" are right on the
The possibili-,'1y of leaks can not be discounted,
o: coarse. In this rc la ?d as at 13 March 1963 the follow-
number of persons w,:-2.^e cleared for OXCART:
CIA
Other U. S. Government:
Total U. S. over,;::::-:
industry (Fully & Faraially Cleared)
Total Cleared
. With KI DLOC1 coning alcnj it roust be anticipated
that -;l e problemm, of coLatainin- aformation concerning the
existence and s to ess o_ -Z 2 and, of course, KEDLOCK,
will e that much. more difficult to handle.
6. OSA Security is "beefing up" its staff and in addi-
tio~~ to monitoring the security of these programs will
Approved For Release 2003/11/19 : CIA-I DP63-UA3,, - ' 00500060118-1
 Approved For elease 2003/11/19' CI-A-RDP6.3=0034.34000500060118-1
25X1A
page 2
C : _ ;;w o r eact prof p 1y to plug LY leaks and 1-00 C lose
a Lions . You .,guy desire, however , to
o: the Director, the info3 cation
~ o s ,y aci~_x ss thviselves -ix, this considerable problem
o etx o that our maximum of i=ort is riveted upon the best
solution.
a1-- is __ents of , gis Office -,o
alb --... ww,. v a ..... .v
tr __ e -ad: avoi.`n- to protect these ultra-sensitive
'C. LED2OIID
COLONEL, USAF
.ssistant Director
f:
~~,Pecial Activities)
25X1A
9
li
12
13
14
as
is ribu:ti0ii
Cy 1 ,, L. 2
-
3-
cilk
J 1,.11' N>/
25X1A
pr (23 Larch 1,L)63)
DD/-d
) D/OSA
pS/CSA
SAy L /0 SA
DD/OSA
SA
c /OSA
L iD/O SA
AD rIN/O SA
DD/Sec
S3/OSA
RB/OSA
Approved For Release 2003/11/19.; GIL-RDP63-00313A00050