FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100070006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 27, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

NSC BRIE FM8pproved For
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P79R0089~00100070006-3
27 August 1953
FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
The French government's exchange of sultans in Morocco will enable French
authorities to revamp the protectorate's administration along the lines that they desire;
however, the basic conflict between Moroccan desires for home rule and the French
wish to maintain absolute control remains unresolved. American unpopularity in
the area will increase, and US treaty rights and airbases are endangered.
On 20 August the French cabinet finally yielded to pressure from the Resi-
dency General and French vested interests in Morocco and approved the removal of
Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef as sultan of Morocco, replacing him with a cousin, Moulay
Mohamed ben Arafa. The latter, who had been declared the religious ruler of Morocco
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by tribal chiWL4QKeI11FeI'l 2.
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the iatest crisis, was
duly confirmed as sultan by religious elders on 21 August.
French-proposed "reforms," alleged to be the point at issue between the
former sultan and French authorities, will be approved by the new sultan, whom the
French feel sure they can control. These measures. superficially modernize the local
government by imposing a ffront of quasi-democratic institutions. Theoretically they
provide- r a,
:ration of executive, legislative, and judicial power; but actually
9 "
they legalize direct French administration in the protectorate.
France's gains through ousting the sultan are far outweighed by its prospective
losses. Replacement of the able and moderate Ben Youssef by an aged, reactionary
figurehead will win some temporary political support from feudal tribesmen and
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seekers of political plums. On the other hand, this g trf
the alienation of the growing middle-class, which includes the bulk of the Western-
educated and politically conscious Arabs and Berbers.
The anti-sultan movement was spearheaded by El Glaoui, the pasha of
Marrakech. The movement was built up by Residency officials and condoned by
Resident General Guillaume in contravention of the French Foreign Ministry's in-
structions. El Glaoui has won a persona; victory to the embarrassment of Paris,
but his pliability cannot be considered permanent. His demand, will probably be
excessive and his activities c:au the French more trouble. The French may there
fore nave to resort again to divide-and-rule tactics in order to cu-urb JF'l Glaoui.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
Dethronement of the popular sultan will increase the animosity toward the
French, already widespread among both Berber and Arab subjects. It will further
embitter the approximately two million Arabs and Berbers who sympathize with the
nationalist Istiglal party, which has about 100,000 hard-core members. It will
increase the likelihood of their becoming prey to anti-American propaganda spread
by the Communists, who number about 5,000 with a hard-core of several hundred
and a European directorate.
The Istiglal party may now abandon moderation and resort to underground
terrorism. Although it is not known to have any military equipment a nd could not
now stage a full-scale rebellion, it will try to obtain foreign support, secure weapons,
and subvert native troops. Despite extensive security measures, isolated incident,;
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of violence ar.' taxing l
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Prolonged political agitation would force the French to retain their larL=t
military establishment. in Morocco. It now consists of more than 66,000 army, T"',
air and quasi-military forces.
France' policy i- assured of the support of other colonial powers, t-orticu
larly the United Kingdom and the Netherland ; but Spain, which holds a protectorate
over northern "ail,JrocLo. is not likely to give more than tacit approval so ions ar it
i~.: t}c:l
continues
,v of rapprochernent with the Arab state:j, There has been itnanii
fate denurcu- t.url of France by the Arab-Asian bloc, It. ha deiuEancded Security Council
action and v obably be supported in this maneuver by i he an ~oionial natiuns.
Bitter debate !WP the United Nations General As-.semhiv pr;)`ia'~nniy will follow. The
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"tow
S41Ci' ;I t tilt a9tt
Union, inx ou , to sec a rift in the Western alliance, will benefit frotx: any con-
The removal of the sultan worsens the position of the United States in
Morocco. American popularity among the natives in general and the nationalists in
particular will diminish because they hoped for support for their aspirations.
French settlers and vested interests in Morocco a e highly suspicious of
American intentions. This attitude will be sharpened following the expression on
21 August of official US concern. Moreover, the Residency General will probably
repeat previous charges that American officials have assisted the nationalists.
The four operational American air force and naval air bases in Morocco
will be targets for sabotage if the Communists or the nationalists resort to terrorism.
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 Local French pressures on Paris may also prolong the delays in building the other
two bases provided for in a French-American agreement of December 1950.
The new French-dominated sultan may be asked to denounce the US-Moroccan
treaty of 1836, the basis of American treaty rights in Morocco. France has long
sought to annul the extraterritorial privileges which only the US continues to hold
and which were upheld by the World Court in August 1952. Abrogation of this treaty
would end the commercial open door in Morocco which has existed since the signing
of the Treaty of Algeciras in 1906.
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