APPRAISAL OF CUBAN AN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250078-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 78
• Content Type: REPORT

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APPRAISAL OF CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA
INTRODUCTION
Since the missile/bomber crisis of October 1962 and the subsequent
w, .hdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons and associated personnel, the
miiitarv posture in Cuba remains essentially a significantly improyed
Cuban military establishment backed by Soviet air and ground units,
highlighted by air and coast defense systems, particularly an integrated
island-wide air defense network of high-performance aircraft and
surface -to-air-missiles.
SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA.
Since mid-February, substantial numbers of passengers have
departed Cuba en route to the USSR. Fairly reliable reports indicate
that some have been withdrawn. Our photographic surveillance has
permitted us to make a head count of about 2, 1001 However, it has not
been determined how many of the outgoing Soviet passengers are civilian
or military. In addition, some of the outgoing passengers may have
been Cubans on the way to the U?SS_ . for training. Moreover, also pc.-5-
ibly offsetting in part these withdrawals several hundred new Soviet
arrivals in Cuba have been reported. Evidence presently on hand thus
does not permit a firm conclusion as to the actual numbers of Soviet
militar? personnel that have seen ;,aitr lrawn. In view of the foregoing
JCS and DIA review(s) completed. 1
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and coupled with the fact that no basic changes have been observed in the
Soviet military establishments in Cuba, we have not yet revised the estimate
of Soviet military strength as being in the magnitude of 17, 000.
We have no indications that Sovie personnel and equipment
Withdrawn from the four Soviet military camps at Holguin, Remedios,
Artemisia, and Santiago de las Vegas. About 5, 000 Soviet troops have
been estimated to be in four highly mobile armored groupings at these
camps, well equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons, and .bout 5, 000
involved in the 24-site SA-2 missile system. The remainder are manning
the other Soviet-controlled installations and equipment or are attached
to Cuban ground, air, and naval units as advisors and instructors. There
are also military personnel from other Bloc countries, principally
Czechoslovakians, probably totalling -ioi: more than a few hundred. Based
on all available evidence, we believe oasic Soviet capabilities in Cuba have
not been diminished since the withdrawal of the strategic weapons, and
our estimate of Soviet troop strength in Cuba remains essentially unchanged.
The precise Soviet intentions for their continued military presence
in Cuba are not definable at this time, particularly since the scope and
in Cuba. The Soviets prob4J -ly calculate that such a military presence
phasing of the projected Soviet troop withdrawal are not yet clear.
ever, Moscow apparently ho e to maintain a sizable military presence
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serve as a politico-psychological deterrent to a possible US/OAS inter"-
elo~
vention in force. They also probab'r value possessing a means to apply
pressure and assert influence on Cuban policy in any critical stage of
disagreement with Moscow. I The Soviet troops in Cuba could play a ke
role in the maintenance of a Communist regime. I The Soviets a. so pro-
bably assess that a prolonged military presence in Cuba will establish a
precedent in the Western Hemisphere. l
role in Cuba. Castro, on occasion, has already indicated his opposition
to the Soviet failure to challenge continued US overflights. The presence
bf Soviet combat groupings may also strain Soviet-Cuban relations because
' Retention of sophisticated weapons systems under Soviet control - -
such as the MIG-21 aircraft, SA-Z's, coastal defense cruise missiles,
and the KOMAR guided-missile boats - - may eventually raise irksome
questions of Cuban sovereignty and some Cuban resentment of the Soviet
of their ability to intervene in Cuban affairs.
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Th Soviet` ilitary pre''sence in Cuba could have, so
influence on anti-Castro elem ents who desirg to revolt against the regime.
However,-, Castro's internal security apparatus is in itself highly effective
and, to date, has proved quite capable of suppressing the sporadic anti-
government actions attempted thus far in Cuba.
to control the Cuban population would not be greatly degraded by the
removal of all Soviet troops. -y
i
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CUBAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES
The numerical strength of the Cuban ground forces is about 175, 000 - -
approximately 75, 000 in the standing army and 100, 000 in the ready
reserve. In addition, there are some 100, 000 home-guard militiamen
of insignificant combat capability utuseful as a police reserve. The
standing ground forces have, ornpleted basic unit and combined arms train-
ing at battalion combat team level.
The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been
enhanced by new equipment brought in during 1962 and by further training
and experience, including mobilization during the crisis. The Cuban
ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and
to repel small-scale attacks from abroad. Their ability to defend against
a large-scale US military invasion would be limited by their lace of
training and experience and joint operations on the division level. In such
a contingency, they would have to revert fairly. quickly to static defense
or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban
military establishment would be able or likely to carry out prolonged
operations of this type.
The most significant change in the Cuban military situation since
July 1962, other than the introduction and removal of Soviet strategic
weapons, is the improvement in air defense capabilities resulting from
the presence of the Soviet-manned radar and communications networks,
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SA-2 missile sites, and MIG-21 fighters. The strong Soviet air defense
presence - - supplemented by the Cuban-manned jet fighter force composed
of 67 MIG-15/17/19's and a consideral?le quantity of Cuban anti-aircraft
artillery - - now gives Cuba an integrated air defense system. Although
Cubans may be trained eventually to operate'the more advanced Soviet
,
air defense equipment, there are orrly 4 indications that such train-
ing is presently taking place; and for some time Soviet manning will be
required for effective use of the equipment.
Considerable improvement has occurred within the past year in
Castro's capabilities to combat guerrilla elements within his own country.
Castro now has a "vertical envelopment" capability involving the use of
land,-based helicopters and paratroopers, thus severely restricting the
ability of anti-Castro guerrilla elements to carry out sustained operations
insignificant strength.
Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely
2
limited by the lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans probably
could only undertake an overseas operation in limited strength of some-
what less than a battalion. However, for political as well as military
reasons, the Castro regime is most-rmlikely, under present circumstances,
to undertake military operations of this nature,
POSSIBLE MILITARY THREATS FROM CUBA
The principal conventional military actions against the United States
from Cuba which can be envisioned are possible air raids on Southern
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Florida by single or several MIG's or B-26's, or hi
400250078-1
-and-run demolition/
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sabotage carried out by squad-sized groups using motor torpedo boats or
the KOMAR guided-missile boats. Although juch possibilities are
recognized, these actions are considered highly unlikely because of the
risk involved in provoking a re ;-d-atory response from the United States.
However, Castro has deme)nstratc?d a fanatic,'s zeal and ursp`redic"t-
able temperament. We cannot totally discount the possibility that, should
he deem it necessary to sustain his cause or his position, he might
attempt aggressive actions against US shipping, the Guantanamo Naval
Base, or possibly even the Southeastern portion of the United States.
An added threat to US security could be posed by the possibility of
use of Cuban ports for logistic support of theeir submarines. However,
we have no firm evidence of Soviet intentions to establish a submarine
base in Cuba, and every report concerning this contingency is parsued
thoroughly.
Based on the conclusion that, with the 1962 withdrawal of missiles
and bombers, no such systems are presently in Cuba, we do not believe
a nuclear threat from Cuba currently exists. Although the Cubans almost
certainly use some caves for storage of supplies, ammunition and equip-
ment, intensive intelligence collection and analysis has failed to provide
any evidence to substantiate numerous and persistent rumors and reports
that ballistic missiles are hidden in caves and secret installations in Cuba.
Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation of all available information has
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produced no evidence of the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Storage
facilities at the missile sites were either never completed or have been
abandoned. In addition, there is also no evidence of the elaborate secur-
ity precautions which the Soviets customarily take with respect to such
weapons.
In general, we believe that situations are unlikely t o develop in which,
Castro would openly intervene in the Western Hemisphere with substantial
forces in the face of prompt and vigorous US and probable OAS counter-
action. Castro probably prefers to continue his extensive propaganda
campaign and to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to insur-
gency in other Latin American countries, with particular emphasis on
guerrilla training and ideological indoctrination of revolutionary leaders
invited to Cuba and sent back to lead anti-government activities in their
homelands.
Inc onclusion, while current Soviet/ Cuban military capabilities do
not constitute a direct threat to the United States, continued Soviet mili-
tary,,support and presence will pr-ogreys ve,Ly.s r9n then Communist Cuba as
an active, relatively secure base for subversion and as a potential mili-
tary operational base.
US DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN/SOVIET THREAT
A 'has been previously dis . ussed. he continued presence of Soviet
military units in Cuba do not, per se, pose an immediate threat to the
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United States , nor will their departure at some future date have any sig-
nificant -impact on our deployments to provide for the security of the
Southeastern United States. What is of significance is the continued
presence of Soviet troops in this hemisphere and of weapons systems that
could conceivably be employed in a hit-and-run attack against the United
States, our aircraft or our shipping. The recent "shrimp boat" incident
lends credence to such a potential. On balance, however, it is difficult
to envision circumstances in which either the Castro regime or the Soviet
authorities would find such a course of action to their advantage. Never-
theless, the defenses of Southeastern United States have been significantly
strengthened. Two Hawk battalions, one Nike battalion, and irr- reased
numbers of fighter aircraft have been deployed to 'Southern Florida to
cope with such an eventuality. However, the bulk of US forces deployed
during the October crisis have returned to their normal stations. Our
continuing analysis reveals that present arrangement of forces planned for
Cuban contingencies is appropriate, regardless of whether Soviet units
remain or depart Cuba.
US FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR POSSIBLE INVASION OF CUBA
In the `event the invasion of Cuba becomes necessary, it is contemplated
that most o all of the strategic reserve forces in CONUS, including Army,
Navy, Air and Marine forces, will be employed if and as required.
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The time required to overthrow the Castro government cannot be
estimated prior to the commencement of hostilities. The initial assault
may cause the collapse of organized Cuban resistance. However, plans
are based on the worst possible: outcome of the initial operationa; namely,
Cuban reaction is such that the initial US assault forces must await
reinforcement before proceeding with assigned tasks. Based on estimated
Cuban capabilities, it is possible that major combat operations might
terminate in a matter of days. However, the duration of possible subse-
quent operations to eliminate pockets of resistance, overcome guerrilla
forces, and to establish full control of the island could last for a much
longer period. The exact length of this period cannot be accurately fore-
seen.
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