THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KURDISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500080005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Military Situation
In Kurdistan
Top Secret
SR 79-10162CX
oveN mber 1979
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N, ationa T S
Foreign o
Assessment
Center
The Military Situation
In Kurdistan (v)
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An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 1 October 1979
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by I
I
of
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Eastern Forces Division and of Theater
Xt
Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Eastern Forces Division,
Office of Strategic earch
telephonel
25
,
xi
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Political Analysis and with the National Intelligence
Officers for Near East/South Asia and for West-
ern Europe=
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SR 79-10162CX
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The Military Situation
In Kurdistan'
Key Judgments The Iranian Kurds are likely to launch widespread guerrilla war in
Kurdistan this winter if their current negotiations with the Iranian
Government fail. Despite Tehran's recent apparent successes, Kurdish
forces remain largely intact, reportedly are gaining new recruits, and are
initiating small assaults on isolated government outposts.
Tehran's military position in the region almost certainly would deteriorate
quickly should the Kurds begin major guerrilla operations. Government
forces in the northeast are an assortment of half-strength regular units,
supplemented by gendarmes and paramilitary troops loyal to Khomeini.
Command and control of these disparate forces are difficult, morale is low in
some units, and with winter setting in, resupply and air support will become
Iraq is the neighboring state that would be most directly affected by a
prolonged Kurdish guerrilla war in Iran. Baghdad's forces have the situation
in their own Kurdish areas under control so far and are prepared to act
ruthlessly to stamp out unrest there. Prolonged fighting in Iran, however,
would raise the possibility that Iraqi Kurds will become increasingly
involved in supporting their Iranian counterparts. Moreover, if Iranian
Kurds were successful, they might well turn their attention to helping Iraqi
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The degree to which the Kurds can take advantage of Tehran's weakness
and cause trouble for Iraq and Turkey will be determined by their ability to
resolve differences within their own ranks. The Kurds reportedly are
attempting to deal with this problem, but their success thus far appears
limited.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Background
Present Situation
Regular Forces in Kurdish Areas
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The Military Situation
in Kurdistan
Background
The last major Kurdish uprising climaxed in late 1974
and early 1975, when some 30,000 Iraqi rebels led by
Mulla Mustafa Barzani and supported by Iranian
artillery, air defense, and logistic units faced some
100,000 Iraqi troops augmented by Kurdish irregulars.
By early 1975 the government forces had pushed the
rebels into a narrow strip along Iraq's borders with
Iran and Turkey. That March, Iran withdrew its
support and the rebellion collapsed.
During the next four years, a handful of Kurds led by
Jalal Talabani,'a longtime Barzani rival continued the
struggle against the Ira is
In contrast, Iranian Kurds were relatively quiet until
early this year. Shortly after the fall of the Shah, they
seized the Army garrison at Mahabad, which holds
special significance for Kurds as the capital of a short-
lived Kurdish republic in 1946. By late summer,
augmented by some Talabani and Barzani forces,
Iranian Kurds had overrun most of the smaller
military outposts between Shahpur and Sanandaj and
were threatening several of the larger towns in the
region. Tehran responded by rushing in reinforcements
and launching a counteroffensive which returned all
major towns and highways to its control, while the
Kurds melted into the countryside.
In Iran
Kurdish forces in Iran remain largely intact, having
generally avoided the Iranian Army's superior fire-
power. In early 1979, when they were on the offensive,
most engagements consisted of the Kurds' surrounding
small outposts, whose defenders surrendered their
weapons and supplies and were allowed to evacuate
unharmed. Later, when the Army took the offensive,
jets and helicopters bombed and strafed Kurdish
positions, whereupon the Kurds withdrew to avoid
casualties, and the Army advanced.
The limited information available suggests that the
combined strength of the Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish
groups in northwestern Iran is between 10,000 and
20,000 trained personnel. This number, however, is
likely to increase dramatically during the next few
months as the Iranian groups are swelled by new
The Iranian rebels will not lack weapons. Normally
well armed even in peacetime, the Kurds have aug-
mented their arsenals with arms captured from Army
depots-small arms, grenade launchers, mortars, and
ammunition. They also captured at least 13 tanks and
a similar number of artillery pieces at Mahabad (two
of the tanks have since been retaken by government
forces). In addition, large quantities of arms and
ammunition reportedly have been smuggled into
Iranian Kurdistan since early 1979. Tehran has
charged the USSR, Israel, and Iraq with complicity in
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the smuggling. Iranian Kurdish leaders do have close
1 ties to Communist and leftist organizations]
Iranian rebels, although they are providing shelter for
TC?r[ic fleeing across the border. However, a consider-
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Revolutionary Guards, a militia force composed
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no direct evidence that the Iraqis are supporting the precarious.
largely of ethnic Persians fiercely loyal to Khomeini,
are also stationed in Kurdish areas to back up the
Army. During this summer's fighting, the government
brought in as reinforcements additional Revolutionary
f?ards and some 5.000 to 7,000 Army troops,
Despite the apparent success of its offensive this
We have summer, the overnment's military position remains
Government forces in northwestern Iran include an
assortment of units numbering between 30,000 and
40,000 regular and militia troops. The one armored
and two infantry divisions stationed in Kurdish areas
Iranian press reports state that some ,
Government forces
are spread thin, morale is reported to be low, several
soldiers were recently executed for helping the Kurds,
and many units are drastically understrength because
of desertions.' The troops are at the end of long and
tenuous supply lines and, with winter setting in,
providing resupply and air support will be increasingly
' Under the Shah, soldiers of minority extraction were generally
stationed far from home. The revolutionary government has allowed
minority soldiers to be garrisoned in their home areas, a gesture it
probably now regrets
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facilitate its control of the Kurdish population.
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Kurds as well, but their familiarity with the climate
and terrain and their ability to live off the land
probably will enable them to fare much better than the
Army.l
A strip 15 to 20 kilometers wide along the TurkishKnd
Iranian borders has been cleared of civilians and
turned into a free-fire zone. Heliborne commandos and
mountain infantry units conduct almost daily oper-
ations in search of dissident Kurds. Numerous military
strongpoints are positioned on high points along the
border and throughout the security zone. The govern-
ment has also engaged in a major roadbuilding and
resettlement program during the past four years to
Coordinating the activities of the Revolutionary Guard
units and the government forces is a major problem in
the northwest. The Army generally despises the
Revolutionary Guards as ill-trained troublemakers,
whereas the Guards look upon the Army as filled with
potential counterrevolutionaries. The Guards are
mostly ethnic Persians brought in from elsewhere in
the country, and they tend to be brutal in their
I these fire fights were exacting a
lated outposts. As of mid-May 1979,
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Neither the Talabani rebels based along the border
east of As Sulaymaniyah nor the Barzani forces
located farther north at Qandil Mountain have been
able to establish a secure base of operations inside Iraq.
Instead, small groups have infiltrated the security
zone, avoided government patrols, and attacked iso-
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daily toll of about seven military personnel killed or
wounded. More recently, however, the level of rebel
activity in Iraq has declined, as Iraqi Kurds have
turned their attention to helping their Iranian brothers.
In Iraq
In contrast, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is rela-
tively calm. Some 110,000 Iraqi troops and
paramilitary personnel form a pervasive security force. I
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Although Tehran has accused Baghdad of helping the
rebels, we have no direct evidence to support the
xi refugees fleeing Iran-as many as 80,000,11
X1 ome of the refugees are Iraqi
Kurds who fled Iraq alter the collapse of the 1975
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for the Talabani and Barzani rebels.
rather than in Iran, where they are potential recruits
A hands-off policy would -se-em-too
make the most sense for Iraq, which is susceptible to a
Kurdish insurrection of its own. Iraq would prefer to
have the Kurds in Iraq, where they can be controlled,
In Turkey
The Kurds in Turkey appear to be too deeply divided to
stage a coordinated uprising. A bewildering array of
political parties and factions contend for Kurdish
leadership, and there are deep tribal rivalries as well as
urban and rural differences which no local leader has
yet been able to overcome. These Kurds number about
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summer are likely to remain, but few additional troops
can be expected because of both the need to control
other restive minorities and the chaos prevailing in the
armed forces. The weakness of the Army's position is
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Over the next few months the Iranian Kurds almost
certainly will carry out their threat to wage widespread
guerrilla warfare, should their current negotiations
with the government fail. Despite the arrival in
Kurdistan of a delegation from the Ayatollah
Khomeini in October, they continue to mount small
attacks on government forces, and protesters and
leaflets in Kurdish towns state that major guerrilla
attacks will begin this winter; few Kurds have surren-
dered their weapons, despite Tehran's offers of mone-
tary rewards to do so. Their likely immediate strategy
will be to carve out sanctuaries along the border with
Iraq by cutting roads, ambushing convoys, and isolat-
ing and overwhelming the small military outposts Iran
has reestablished in the area. They are also quite likely
to take advantage of the hostility of the Army and the
local population toward the Revolutionary Guards by
avoiding regular units whenever possible and concen-
trating their attacks on the Guards. Such a campaign
could escalate this winter, when Kurdish forces prob-
ably will be significantly larger and when poor weather
will limit the air support available to government units
and restrict movement of armor and artillery to the
The government has begun a recruitment campaign to 25X
augment the Revolutionary Guards, which could well
make up the bulk of any further reinforcements.
widespread. The Revolutionary Guards attempt to 25
make up in enthusiasm what they lack in training, but
they have generally done poorly when not backed by
regular forces,, particularly by air support.
Iraq will be the neighboring state most affected by a
continuation of the Kurdish revolt in Iran, because
most of the rebel bases are near their common border.
Baghdad will act ruthlessly to put down any sign of
trouble among its own Kurds. Militarily, it should be
able to keep the situation from getting out of hand
unless Iranian Kurds are completely victorious. Its
Kurdish population is smaller than Iran's or Turkey's,
whereas the forces it uses to police its Kurdish areas
are larger-and it has another 60,000 to 75,000
combat troops readily available as reinforcements.
Iraqi units have had extensive experience in counter-
insurgency operations, are reasonably proficient, and
are supported by a large force of helicopters. Q
The Army's superior firepower virtually assures its
hold on most major towns, at least as long as supplies
and morale hold out. The Kurdish population in several
towns, however, is quite hostile toward government
forces-particularly the Revolutionary Guards-and
some urban uprisings are likely. The government's
ability to respond to a guerrilla campaign in the
countryside will be limited by a lack of trained
upport be forthcoming, Iraqi Kurds are likely to
Thus far, Baghdad has been relatively successful in
keeping the rebels from establishing bases among the
Kurdish population of northern Iraq. As a result, the
Talabani and Barzani groups have been unable to
increase their size significantly for the past several
years. To change this situation, Iraqi Kurds will need
major support from Iranian rebels. Should such
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attempt to carve out secure areas on their side of the
border, particularly in As Sulaymaniyah Province.
The casualties from a prolonged upsurge in Kurdish
activity could pose political problems for new Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and almost certainly would
reduce severely the amount of attention Iraq could
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The Kurds' ability to succeed in Iran and to cause
problems for Iraq and Turkey will be determined by
the extent to which they can submerge their tribal,
political, and national differences. The Iranian Kurds
are split along tribal and political lines, and some of the
tribes are cooperating with the government. The
Iranian Kurds do not have close ties to the Barzani and
Talabani Kurds from Iraq and, despite instances of
cooperation, scattered clashes have occurred between
Iranian and Iraqi Kurds. Turkish Kurds generally
have few ties with their Iranian and Iraqi counterparts,
and the two groups of Iraqi rebels feud almost
constantly. The three national governments have used
these differences to set the Kurds against each other in
the past, and they almost certainly will attempt to do so
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 Regular Forces in Kurdish Areas
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(Lake
Urmia
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Infantry division
Armored division
Infantry brigade
Mechanized infantry brigade
Kurdish area
Approyed
Reza fye,h
Tabriz
Saqq z?
R000500090'005-7
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