THE RUSSIAN POPULATION OF SINKIANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000200430001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION GSOLFIDEMIIAL
SNOW' Ni I INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
China (Sinkiang)
The Russian Population of Sinkiang
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1. : The Russians living in Sinkiang are also referred to as
Kuei4hUa(naturalized people). According 'to a 1941 survey they numbered
13,408Lor:slightly less than .0 of the total population of Sinkiang.
2. History 44Anikiang: The relationship between the peoples and governments of
China and Russia, up to 1917, was filled with mutual trust and was unusually
:cordial and friendly. pp until the twentieth century other foreigners in
China were referred to, by the Chinese, as *white devils". Russians were
excluded from this Category. As further concrete evidence of good relationship
between Ghia& and Imperial Russia, it is interesting to note that despite their
lengthy oammon frontier. up until the end of the Tsarist rule and the advent
of Soviet Government, Leis. had never been involrAd in a war with China. The
only exception to this statement would be the Boxer Uprising (1900), when
Russian troops joined an international force to quell the killing of foreign
residents in China.
In Sinkiang, Chinese-RUssian relations were equally good. During the /ekub
Beg rebellion (1862 to 1874), however, Russia brought to the attention of
the Chinese Government the unrest and disorder along the Russian-Siliklaug
border and offered to help administer the region until China could do it
herself. The Chinese Government at that time was too busy with the internal
strife in China proper and therefore ignored Russia's complaints together
with her offers of assistance. Under these circumstances, Russia was forced
to take the matter into her own bands. She dispatched her troops into Sinkiang
under the command of General Iolpakovsky in 1871. Russian troops occupied
the northwestern portion of Sinkiang, the Iii, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions,
and brought peace and order to that portion of the province. The main bulk
of her troops were stationed at lake Sairam Nor and in the village of Tura
Su, in the Borokhoro Range. Evidence of these two encampments is still to
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be seen. In July71881 a treaty was concluded between Russia and China concerning
Sinkiang. Under this agreement, Russia withdrew her troops from Sinkiang, but
was granted 1 the right to conduct free trade there and to establish and maintain
four Russian consulates for the protection of its citizens in S4racitung These
consulates were established in Chuguchak (Tahcheng), Kuldja (Ining), Urumchi
(Tihwa) and Kashgar(Shufa). Only one other country was allowed to establish
a consulate in Sinkiang! That country was the UK, it established its consulate
in Kashgar. In the four cities wrere the Russian consulates were maintained'
they were allowed to also maintain their awn residential concessions, in which
they owned property such as homes chUrdhes and warehouses. No other government
was granted this privilege in Sinkiang.
po until the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians residing in Sinkiang
were small in number and consisted mostly of merchants, traders, technicians
and professional men. In May, 1918, the first group of Russian Cossacks entered
Sinkiang. This group consisted of approximately 500 Semirechinskii Cossacks.
When the new anti-Bashevik front wa& established in southern Siberia, this
group requested from Governor Yang Tseng-hsin (Governor of Sinkiang from 1911
to 7 Jul 28) permission to re-enter the Semireohie regionvnow part of the
Kazakh SSR.,. They were not only allowed to re-enter Semirechie, through
Ohuguchak, but Governor Yang had the goodness of returning their arms to them.
This' wasa period of intense civil and military strife in Semirechie, where
Onssack.bands held positions along'the frontier until the collapse of Admiral
Kolcbak forced first one group and then others to cross into Sinkiang.
After the fall of Semirechie and Siberia 4 in March 1920, the Strartang border
was crossed by' the remains of the Semirechinskii,Cossack brigades of Ataman
A I DutOv and Ataman General N P Scherbakov, and the Semireohinskii Costack
partisan divisions Of Ataman 'B V Annenkov and a'corpt under General Rakich.
These COS sack forces, which totaIed'more than 20 thousand men, were partially
disarmed' by Sinkiang border troops and given the choice of either remaining
in the province or proceeding farther east. The officers were allowed to
'retain their arms for the purpose of controlling their ten. The Sinkiang
authorities', and especially Governor Mang himself, wire very sympathetic and
provided every-peisible boMfort and aid to' these 'Men. 1'er-instance, the
troops under Ataman Dutov in Suiting and those under General BakiCh outside
of Chnguchak-remained as military units for almost two Years, being fed,
clothed, and sheltered entirely by the Sinkiang Provincial Government. After
thise-men started breaking'away fecatheirmilitark.units' and either settling
in Sinkiang 'or moving on farther east,Pthey were aided in accomplishing their
Choice by either the Sinkiang Government,' or' more often by pereonal,funde of
Governor Yang Tieng-hain.,' Those who elected to remain in Sinklang found a
true and' Sincere friendAn Governor Tang. He not only used a fee as his
personal advisor4 but employed large nuMbers in the Sinkiang Provincial:
Government andplaced Cossack' officers in charge Of provincial troopt. By
1928 there were no' more than' three thousand White 'Russians remaining in
Sinkiang.
TA -1928 the'second'eave of Russian emigrants treamed into Sinkiang,' continuing
until' 'the fall of '1933. Itooincidedwith the collectivization Of farms and
the subsequent' famine in the areas of the USSR which adjoin Sinkinne. Thip
wave brought approximately 28 thousand Russians into Sinkiang. Of this 'number
some 20 thousand settled in KUldja, four thoUsand'in.ChUguchak, three thousand
in the Altai Region and one'thoUsand in Urumchi Thus, by 1933 the Russian
population in Sinkiang had swelled to well over 31 thousand people.
After the assassination Of Governor fang on 7 Jul 28, the White Russians in
Sinkiang lost a-great deal of their influence but still managed to 'get along
fairly well. Their position was strengthened after the start of the MonaMmedan
religious uprising in February 1931. Governor Chin Shu-jen,upon finding his,
own forces poor'in quality enlisted the aid of the White Russians to fight
against the Tungan General Ma Chung-yin, leader of the Mohammedan forces.
Their participation in this military struggle on the side of the Sinkiang
Provincial Government was an important factor in the victory over General
Ma Chung-yin in 1934. Governor Chin was replaced, as Governor of Sinkiang,
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by General Sheng Shih-tsai on 12 Apr 33 with the aid and backing of the White
Russian forces. It was learned by the White Russian troops, during the seige
of Urumehip the capital, that Governor Chin was planning to have them annihilated
and replaced by Soviet troops which were standing by at Changki. These Soviet
troops consisted of two regiments of one thousand men each, who wore Chinese
uniforms and who claimed to be White Russian volunteers from the Tarbagatai
and Altai Regions. The White Russians refused to be disarmed and to march
out of the city as ordered by Governor Chin. Instead, they joined forces with
the Manchu troops of General Sheng, defeated the Chinese forces of Governor
Chin and proclaimed General Sheng as the new Governor of Sinkiang. In the
autumn of that year it became evident to the White Russian leaders in Sinkiang
that Governor Sheng? as Governor Chin, also had strong pro-Soviet leanings.
Therefore, to prevent the Soviets from gradnelly taking over the province the
White Russian leaders, General P P Papengut, General K V Smirkin, General
N I Behteev, Centurion I V Nbgutnov, Colonel A V Hilovaky and Lieutenant
P Voieikov undertook a plan to throw White Russian know-how and troops in
support of General Ma Chung-yin, who than would be assured of final victory.'
This move would have terminated further Soviet penetration of Sinkiang, which
was the main concern and interest of the White Russians. A message written by
Papengut to Gmirkin was intercepted by Governor Sheng and thus the plot was
reVealed. The above mentioned six men were immediately arrested, imprisoned
and never heard from again. Governor Shang continued as Governor of Sinkiang
until 2 Sep 440 permitting the Soviets a free hand in the province. The White
Russian population during his term as Governor of Sinkiang decreased from
31 thousand to approximately 13 thousand. The difference of 18 thousand people
was due to the White Russians either having been killed in battleo imprisoned
and executed by Governor Shang following the revelation of the plot against
him, or being arrested, imprisoned and then returned to the Soviet union for
public trial, and execution. The latter was done for the purpose of impressing
the people of the USSR that all enemies of the Statoo no matter where they may
seek refuge, are eventually caught and punished ,?or a detailed description
of the role that the White Russians played in the Sinkiang war against General
Nk Chung-yin and his Moslem folkgwers? see enclosure.. This information WS
,furniShed by a different tourced/ From 1933 to 1943, Sinkiang was almost
completely dominated by Governor Sheng 's Soviet advisors. In 1943 Governor
Sheng made a complete turnabout in his policy toward the USSR. The White
Russians who came to Sinkiang prior to, or during, the bolshevik Revolution
were all eliminated. Therefore, of the 13,408 remaining in Sinkiang in 1941,
almost 411 were of the type who took no firm political stand. Prior to 19430
the White Russians who remained in Sinkiang were forced to accept Soviet pass-
ports and the approximately 1,200 who resided in Urumchi were ordered to
move to either Kuldja or Chuguchak and some ultimately to the USSR. After
the Soviets withdraw from Sinkiang in 1944 they were able, in September 19440
to sponsor a rebellion in the northwestern part of Sinkiang which again put
then in control of the Illo Terbagatai and Altai Regions of Sinkiang. These
three regions proclaimed their independence from Sinkiang and took on the name
of the East Turkestan People's Republic. Thus, the remaining Russians in
Sinkiang again found themselves under Soviet control. A few of those residing
in Kuldja were able to escape to the east in late 1946 during a temporary
relaxation of East Turkestan-Sinkiang border controls. The Soviete used a
trick in 1947 to weed out the remaining Russians, in the Mat Turkestax
People's Republic who were not content to remain under their influence.
They advertised in all the Russian language papers in the Eait Turkestan
People's Republic to the effect that all Russians must register with their
local police as to their country of preference; This notice continued to
explain that an agreement had been concluded with the US, UK, France and
other non-Soviet nations that they would accept those Sinkiang Russians who
wished to move to their countries. Moot of the Russians saw through this
obvious trap and indicated the USSR, or Sinkiang, as their preference. Those
who failed to see through the trap, or would not let themselves see it, and
indicated the US or some other country other than the USSR, mysteriously
disappeared never to be heard from or seen again.
3. 1;swwwwalaIjagas Most of the White Russians in Sinkiang used to live in the
urban centers of Kuldja, Chuguchak and Brumehi. There were, however, very
few, if any, Russians residing in Drumchi between the years of 1943 and 1949.
Another concentration of Russians was located in the Altai Region, in and
around Sharasume (Chenghwa).
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4. Ocalipatio:. As the group with highest average of education and technical
tretyytre in the province, the White Russians have been useful both in time
Of peace and izi periods of internal strife. Most of them are peasants and
laborers, however, they have also served as automobile drivers and mechanics,
aided in the training ,of provincial military forces and made use of their -
military experience in actual combat. Normally they lead an existence much.
like .that of other White Russian emigre commun.ities in China.. They had their
Own Organizations, published their own newspapers and otherwise attempted. to
preserve 'their cultural 'identity. In comparison to the other peoples of
Sinkiang they were considered to be heavy eaters, their diet consisting of
approximately 50% 'cereal,. 40% meat and '10% vegetable.. In general they
accommodate themselves to .shifting political tides in oo far as these do not
threaten their .very existence..
? St
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1 of Enclosure One
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1. In February 1931 a Moslem uprising started in the oity of Eami (aomul). Sinkiang
Provincial troops were dispatched from tkumchi (Tihwa) to punish the inhabitants
of Hami for killing a government tax gatherer. The Moslems within the walled
city of Hami fought off these Chinese troops with rifles and boiling oil, but
finally were forced to retreat to the nearby mountains. The word of this
uprising spread throughout Sinkiang and soon all the Mohammedan peoples of
Sinkiang flocked to the area to join the "Religious War". It was decided
by the Sinkiang Islamic peoples to enlist the aid of General iffi Chung-yin,
"Big Horse", a Tungan warlord who dominated western Eansu Province. JiallIKA
4han, the "Tiger Prince" of Hami and Radio. Atag Hadji went to Eansu Province
to persuade General Na Chung-yin to be their military leader. He accepted and
in April 1931 made an amazing dash across the Gobi Desert, with an initial ,
force of 500 Tungan cavalry troops. Governor gh4 Shu-jen, found that his
Chinese troops were no match for these skilled Tungan warriors and so enlisted
the aid of the White Russians, who were remnants of Cossack forces and therefore
were also skilled horsemen and fighters. The first White Russians to be
mobilized into the Chinese Army were those who resided in Drumchi and in other
eastern areas of Sinkiang.
2. In the spring of 1932 the Sinkiang Government mobilized the male White Russians
in Kuldja (Ining), for the purpose of replacing the Russian divisions which
were stationed in Chikurting (Tsikiotsing), near the town of Hami. They were
able to mobilize only three hundred men. The normal quantity should have been
approximately 500-550. Each group of one hundred men was an independent unit.
There was no overall command and each unit left a week apart, one after the
other. The unit into which I was mobilized, left Kuldja on 1 Oct 32. We were
ordered to Turfan and in proceeding there we did not use the main roadway but
travelled through the Tien Shan mountains. Each unit was supervised by a
Chinese officer. The entire three units, of one hundred men each, were not
armed. Our unit arrived in Turfan on 25 Oct 32 and the men were quartered
in the local camel caravan-sarai. We were later joined, in Turfan, by one
of the other units. The third unit, we learned, was sent to Shanahan (Piohan).
In the middle of November, the brother of Zang Tupan (General Sheng Shih-tsai)
? visited both Shanahan and Turfan and brought with him, from Urumchi, rifles
? for all the men and 13 shells per person. In the middle of December we received
orders to advance on Hami. Our two units left separately, as before, and
stopped at Chikurting. We later learned the reason why, for sAch a long
? period of time, our units were not armed. It turned out that the Chinese
first disbanded the Russian division in Chikurting? sent all the men to Uramehi
through Kuchengtze (Kitai), and then passed their weapons on to us. Prior to
50X1 the arrival of the Minister of War, from Urumchi, we were assigned duties and
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Esaul PprIgabniirrg, was appointed
Commander of our unit. Ivan Vasilievion mogutnoT was appointed Senior Officer
and Commander of the first platoon of our unit. The second platoon was to be
commanded by Liubishkin. the third by Lazar Stp4ov, the fourth by Podesaul
Shevelev and the quartermaster for the entire unit was to be Filons)civ. The
latter was also appointed Chaplain.
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3. When our unit was leaving Turfan, Centurion Mogutnov and Baharev, from the third
unit, and I were left in Turfan for the purpose of transmitting money to Kuldja
to the femilies of our unit. The money' had to be given to a chauffeur, Qrigoriy
Ifeonidovioh Ivanae, who was returning from Hami. He was to treeemit the money
to Kuldja. We spent three days in Turfan awaiting the arrival of Ivanov and
only, on the fourth day were we able to give the money to him and leave Turfan
to catch up with our troops.
4. When we rode up to the fortress of Shanshan, we noticed that the city gates were
closed And soldiers stationed all along the city walls. We walked to the fortress
to eat, since all the restaurants outside of the city gates were closed. When
we found a restaurant in the fortress and sat down to eat, we were approached
by the local Chief's interpreter who asked us to immediately report to the
local Commander. When we arrived at the local Chief's office, we were met
by, his wife, who was a Russian. She immediately asked us if we had received
her message. We received no message and she was very surprised that we hadn't.
At this pant, the local Chief came into our room and told U.S. that on 25 December
our third unit had been in battle with the Moslems near a fortress, the name of
which I now do not remember. We were told that the dead end wounded were
scattered throughout the area adjoining this fortress. The local Chief
announoed to as that we could go no farther because the Moslem forces in the
area totaled approximately 300 men and there was no way by which we could
penetrate their lines and join our forces. He offered that we tempararily
move to and live in his Yemen, which we did. After this, he summoned us and
asked us to look over the fortress so that we could give him our opinion as to
how it could be best defended in case of an attack by the Moslems. The local
Chief warned us that the 60-man garrison in the fortress was composed entirely
of Tungans? as were also their officers. After we discussed the best means by
which this fortress could be defended, we asked the Chief to send a telegram
to Sheeg Tupen asking that he immediately send us several uishik" (local donkeys),
shells for our rifles and 25 pistols with shells. We then appointed our own
guards on the fortress walls and a duty officer. By the way, in addition to
the two other officers and myself, we also had five Cossacks. All together,
there were eight of us.
5. On the next day, at approximately 9,00 to 10g0Ca.m., the duty officer informed_
us that the rebels were approaching the fortress. We Russians and the local
garrison immediately took positions on the fortress walls and awaited the
rebel attack. The rebels did not immediately attack the fortress, they stopped
and grouped themselves in a large orchard five to six miles from the fortress.
When dusk was approaching, the 'rebels went to the Tungan village near the
fortress. In the early morning they began their attack on the fortress but
did not attempt to penetrate. They merely tried to feel out our strength and
influence the local garrison, all Tungans, to join them. They shouted that
the garrison should turn against the Chinese Chief and their officers becauSe
this was a religious war, and since they, the Tungane have the same faith,
they have no business defending the Chinese. The,Tu4an garrison, at our
direction, retorted by giving several volleys as a reply to their proposal.
The rebels withdrew, from the adjoining village back to the orchard and remeined
there until the next day.
6. On 29 December at 3:00azethe rebels again advanced on the fortress and within
half an hour had already broken through the gates and captured most of the
fortress city. The Tungae garrison retreated to their quarters and fought off
the rebels from there. The rebels made no concentrated or serious effort to
capture them, but turned all of their attention on us and to looting the town.
We occupied a corner of the Yemen and were under constant and heavy attack
from all directions. At this time, in addition to the eight of us, there were
also two Chinese officers who had brought us the shells, rifles and pistols
from Urumchi. We had to hold off the attack until 9:00 a.m. and only at this
time did we receive the unexpected news that all three Russian enits of 100 men
each, and a Chinese squadron under the command of General Stun, had forced the
rebels to evacuate the fortress and to take up battle on the open feelds
surrounding the fortress. One of our units sent a platoon to the fortress,
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? 3 ? of Enclosure One
which? we were able to hoist up-to the fortress wall by use of a rope and then
clear out the fortress of all rebel forces. By this action we were able to
clear the fortress and open the doors to allow one of the units to enter the
fortress?and to garrison the-fortress walls. With sunaet,the rebels withdrew
to the nearby mountains. In this battle, the Moslem residents of Shanahan and
the surrounding area, totaling approximately one thousand people, took part
it the firing against our forces. Some of the Moslem troops were armed with
fire-arts, but the majority- were armed with steel spears which were formed
out': of telegraph wire. They obtained this telegraph wire by cutting the
'existing telegraph connections and utilizing the cable.
7. On the next day by the order of General Siun, who took oommand of all of our
farces,' all' the,three Russian units formed into one group and as a result of
'a vote taken amongst the Russian officers, Centurion Megutnov was appointed
COmmander. Nbgutnov in' turn appointed Shevelev as his Chief of Staff. I was
appointed 'Quartermaster far the whole Russian division., The next 'few days Were
spent in 'pursuing the rebel forest. On.7 Jan 33 GeneraSiun gave command to '
the Russian division and his squadron to move on to the Lukchat (Dakotsia)
'fortress and 'from there to the town of Turfen.' The reason for this was that
hed'obtained information that the rebel forces which we had dispersed had
looidedlo metre against this town. We stayed there overnight and thin headed
.in the direction of Tureen. Irpen reaching the village'orRalahocho? we'were.
.met by the rebel forces 'and fought .with themlor-two days. They seemed to
leek rifle fire using primitive fire-throwing weapons and steel spears
exclusively. General Siun did not execute the plans that hetimselthed 'made.
Re was unable te join our forces and was,eaptured by the rebel forms which
had already captured Turfan. ,021, thethiid'days-havinglost our Commander
4112eitealising that we did not' have sufficient emmtutitionv and,Turfuthaving
already been oeptured by the rebels who were able to' regroup and rearm there,
*aided to withdraw our headquarters in to Shanahan Aerie is had left *away
of audition.. ' ,
.4s 11
8. We had to withdrew underfirekind when-our wagons.withthemounded, under'
proteotion of one group of 100 men, reach Halakooho they were approached by
two rebel messengers, one of which was a Russian, Patevskiv, and the other
*iter,'Gaise, (hie fethily'nene'I do not remember, but 'hi Wa, a former
Russian officer). The messengers announeed that Turfan,wes in-their+ands)
'General Situvand,thosOuseiens.whovere,with him, wire captured.butarealive
and. being treated wel14, They offered that WI;prossed-to Turf= to see, withz
our ,own. eyes, 'that they are being 'treated well and later 'turn in sur.weepone
for which they would guarentoe.our immediate return to Kuldje. The messengers
also demanded that the wagons whieh'wers carrying the wounded and the acoom-
laving group of 100 ten also return and proceed to Tuifant Centurion, Mogutnov,
it secant', agreed to this offer and dispatched Captain Tokarev with the order
that we return immediately. The wagons with the wounded 'were under ray charge.
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_
...fOrtreds of-LUkchuri. After approximately an hour or two Captain MI:area
Aagain made his appearance and said that we were once, again commanded to return
AC'Ralakochot because that is what the rebel messengers. demanded. We held a
tAating:of.allthe officer4,discussed our position and'announcedthat not
,onlyi-Wel.'but the Cossacks also would' not return, but would 'proceed to
Shanahan -where We have additional ammunition and where we could leave our
veunded. Early the next morning Captain Tokarev announcied to us that we could
proceed- to Shanahan, but that he would keep a few COesacks and:remain in Lukchun
for the purpose of keeping Lukohuh-from falling into the hands of the Tungans.
That night we arrived at Shanshani and several ho'' slater Captain Tokarev
'also arrived with his smAtv.group. The following night Esaul Zilarev arrived
from Halthocho and announced that the regiment, under Centurion Mogutnov would
,4
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- 4 - of Enclosure One
leave that evening destined for Shanshan and that he was sent to us with a
fictitious command to return to Halahoeho, but that this was merely to confuse
the rebels. Sure enough, after several hours, our forces under the command of
Centurion Mogutnev arrived and Mogutnov thanked as for not obeying his oommand.
It seems. that our refusal.to return prolonged the negotiations, gave them a chance
to.regroup and await the right moment for withdrawal from the area. We learned
that after the withdrawal of our wagons and men the rebels had completely surrounded
the remaining forces.
9. When our division arrived in Shanahan the rebels gave is only one hour to rest and
then started a battle by attacking the fortress. The battle was hard and constant,
,from the hour of 9:00 a.m. to sunset and continuing for two days. Our position
became very critical because of the loss of many men.and the shortage of ammunition.
In addition to the rifles, we had two machine guns, but the rebels not only had
many machine guns but also cannons. After the last battle, we decided to retreat
to the mountains and traverse the mountains to Kuchengtze. This plat was quite
hazardous because the mountains were covered with enow. However, we realised
that we could not hold off in Shanahan indefinitely. By this time,, there was no
communication with Urumehi ()rev other towns because all telegraph lines had
been morel. After the last battle we moved the wagons, with the, wounded, ,.into
the ,mountains under the protection of one group of 100 men and left two groups
in Phanshan. The following morning the rebels approached Shanahan with a fere@
of Warml thousand horses and, men and with orders to immediately capture the
fortress* This battle raged all day and by evening, the rebels had penetrated
our flanks* We thus had to retreat within the walla of the fortress. One group
took up positions within the fortress and the other one immediately outside. The
rebels this time did not retreat to the bills, but stationed their forces in a
village post outside of the fortress walls. At dusk, an airplane appeared and
dropped a message into the fortress. The message asked, us to held on to the
fortress since additional forces were on their way to rescue us. This moulage
reload our spirits, but we were concerned about our wagons with the wounded and
the group of one hundred men that accompanied it. We were almost ready to send
,pertiecout to searoh for them when it got dark, when otir guards informedue that
something was moving on the' road to Shaneharron "arbui" (*arts). We sent a party
tolinrestigate and when they returned it WAS reported that it was our' groupof
100. with.' theingane returning heeauee they had mot a Ohinepe division which Wei
coming to our aid.. This informatibn was correct because after several hours our
forces' and the wagons returned" following the artillery and tanks. The cavalry
and infantry detaohments.of the Chinese division together with their Commander,
General Sheng, , stationed themselves outside of the fortress walls. On the
following day, early in the morning, there was a battle and the rebels after heleitng
off for several hours retreated to Tui..
10. After the withdrawal of the rebels, Shang Tupan asked for Centurion Nbgatnov?to
report to him and they decided to change our division to a regiment consisting
of three hundred men. The Commander of the regiment was to be Centurion Mogutnav
and the Chief of Staff,. They They named me Qmartermaster for the regiment and
adviser to the Commander on all matters pertmirling to supply and finance. After
spending approximately* ten days in Shanahan, Sheng Tapan left two regiments in
Shanahan, under the command of General/al and the rest of his troops and our
regiment advanced on Turfan. They left me in Shanahan with the wounded and
assigned ten men for garrison duty. The forces that ?left Shanahan occupied both
Tartan and Toqsun (Tokosun). After this, Shang Tupan left for Urumchi taking
Centurion Mogatnov with him., The Commander of the remaining forces was General
IAA& and Rakut was left in charge of our forcep. Approximately two weeks passed
when a division of rebels under the command of"Hodja Nies Hadji arrived from
Chikurting. This division circumvented Shanahan and occupied the fortress of
Lukchun. Some troops were sent from Turfan to Lukchun and it was liberated
from the rebels.
U. At this time we received a telegram from Urumehi through Chikurting that the
rebels were already in Urumchi and had occupied the entire city. In the same
telegram we were commanded to abandon all of our past stands and to retreat in
the direction of Urumchi in two columns. We were ordered to retreat from
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I
COMIDENTIAL/SSCURrIY INFORMTION
- 5 - of Enclosure One
Shanahan to Kuchengtze and from Kuchengtze to Turfan and from Turfan to arumahi.
Everyone started preparing to retreat and, we Russians who were left in Shanahan
decided to. retreat with the Chinese forces to Kuchengtze On the night or the
pecond day after receiving the telegram, however, our group of 100 men arrived,
They had been operating south of Lukchun and brought me an order, that under
the protection of this force of 100 men, we were to join with the regiment in .
Turfan. After many arguments with the Chinese Commander, we left for Urfan.
In Turfan we joined with our own regiment and two days after our arrival, we left
Turfan for Urumchi. Two days prior to our arrival, Centurion Rakut was relieved
of his commiesion and was replaced by Captain Tokarev, who was previously
Commander of the first group of 100 men. The first day of our trek was without
any spectacular happenings, but beginning with the second day and until our
arrival at Urumchi? we advanced amid battle.
12. We arrived in Urumchi in the first few days of March 1933, and after having
stayed there for two to three days our regiment, together,withthe Chinese,
forces under the command of Shang Tupan, was sent to, the mountains which lie
between Prumaht and Kuchengtze. A large concentration of the rebel forces
Wes reported to be located there. The rebels were forced to abandon their positions
in, that region but were not annihilated because they had carefully preconceived- '
plans for retreat. When the. regimentwas returning to Urwachi, every step of the
way had, .to be won from the rebels. After this campaign, the entire regiment -was
given several days leave and it was planned then to send it back to rurfan. By
the way, when our regiment arrived from rurfan to Urumchi, a second Russian
regiment was already formed, composed of Russians from Urumohi and Chuguehak
(Tahoheng). Atter several days three more separate groups of 100 men each .
errivednfrom Euldja. These were assigned to serve in the 3rd Regiment. The
3rd Regiment was composed mostly of Cossacks who had served in the. lit Beni Division.
13. When our regiment reoeived orders to again leave for Turfan, the Cossaaks,and
their officers...eked the Commander of the regiment, Centurion Mboutnov, to request
Governor Chin Shu-jen to postpone the,marnh on Turfan for several days in view of
the fact that in. several days it would be Russian Easter and the men ladled to
celebrate this holiday in peace. We were to go to Turfan,, together with the
Chinese forces, under the command of Sheng Tupan. Governor Chinrefused the
tents appeal and commanded them to immediately leave for Turfan. The Chinese
forqes had already left Urumchi and were awaiting our arrival south of the city.
Somehow we found out that our regiment was not being sent to Turfan, bklt far Some
reason, was being sent out to certain massacre. At that time, the 3rd Regiment
was not armed. Whop Centurion MOgutnov arrived from Governor Chinle,headquarters
and announced the iiew order, the Cossacks refused to comply because they had
already learned of the plan to dispose of them. The Commander of our regiment
immediately went to the 2nd Regiment and gave me the order that Cossacks from the
3rd Regiment would arrive and that I was to issue them hand weapons, rifles and
shells. In'thie manner,,within several hours, we managed to arm over 100 men. ,of
the 3rd,Regiment. Op the next day, this was12 Apr 33, Centurion Mogutmeiedewted
for the 3rd Regiment early in,the morning and after approximately one hour sent
an order.tolds second,-in,-command? Captain Tokarev?.that'he slowly, several men at
a time, start sending men into, the fortress, The second group of 100 with full
military,gear,and weapons was, sent first and then the. third group was sent over
into the fortress in the same manner. I was ordered to remain, with the wagona
and wounded men and the first group in the Yang Han., We, who remained in the
Yang Han, did not know what ,was happening and only at about noon did we hear
shooting in the fortress. This battle within Urumehi did not continue for a long
time, After this, Captain Tokarev received from,the 2nd Regiment, orders that he
establish communication 'with the fortress which had been wrested from the hands of
Governor Chin. Oommunications were immediately set up and messengers ware sent
every one or two hours. Until dusk we received messages that everything was in
our control. The situation looked very good for us, since the Russian forces had
full control of the city. The local arsenal was in our hands, out of which the
whole of the 3rd Regiment was armed,.
14,, At approximately llt,00 p.m. a messenger arrived with an order that we get the
wagons and the wounded ready and that everyone should be ready to march again.
At the exact moment that we received this message, we heard new shooting in the
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CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION
- 6- of; Enclosure One
50X1
fortress?-After,approximatelyone,hour.after receipt, of the meseage which ,
instructed,us,to march out of the city? we. received. a new message which ordered
uLtcvimmediately.advanceon the fortress in the direction of the airdrome. Captain
Tokareiv decidedto,retreat only if he received further orders. At about 4:00 a.m.
the,wagons,,protected by several Cossackt, departed from the citOrst but the rest
remainediwith Captain Tokarev.in the Yang Han. When the wagons reached the.
airdrome they were shot at from the radio stationl.. but were able to reach the
fortres0 gates anyway. Approximately one hour.later the wagons with the wounded
Were.,-.:oined"by the group of 100 men under the command of Captain Tokarev. . .
15. When we arrived in the fortress, we found out that the Russian leaders had hoard
that. Governor Chin had the,intention.of sending the let Regiment. out to certain
massacre-end then was intending to send the .2nd and 3rd to be annihilation the
3rURegiment having been ordered to leave the city without any weapons. Re then
planneCto invite Soviet troops who were standing _by itGbangki, and by' this
method to rid himself of our influence and to gain the military strength of the
SoViet Army. to help him crush the rebels. It was learned that .there were two
Soviet regiments standing by at Changki, awaiting Word from Governer Chin to step
into the conflict. They had arrived there, by truck from Chuguchak (Taheheng).
In View of this, the Russians decided to start a revolution -of their own. They
first occupied the Tamen of Governor Chin and later the fortress wallsi Rverything
went. beautifully. Governor Chin's convoy' was annihilated, his cavalry entsoldiers
vn,the wells were also defeated., The entire :fortress was in the hinds of the
Russians, with the exception of tons. small little corner where the Chinese held
out. 3y evening the picture had changed completely. The Chinese undertheimise
of 'Apathy with our cause,, started going up into the, fortress and onto the city
wale/. They breught our Cossacks cigarettes end alcoholic beverages, but later
attacked them, killed most of the guards, took their weapons and, opened lime on.
the Russian forces within the oity. Ay morning, the situation became critioal
and-our Commander decided to retreat frog UrumahL That isp,why we received the
order in. the Tongan to retreat towardsthe_fortress, it was for thellinvet of
uniting all of the Russian forces. When we arrived in the fortress, out ,Commander
forme&a new amnia and decided to.send.Oenturion Mcgutnowtatiheng Tupan, asking
hiwto join his Zeroes with ours and at the sane time offered thelisnshurian
Wiwi. to gather up arms and help us. Mogutnov returned after having met Shwas
Topaz and reported that he had agreed to join cur farces if we would allow him to
beiAhe next.. Governor of Sinkiang. The lohnchurians had:also:agreed to bear arms
fox us. -Atter these councils and the arming of the Mknchurians,. Sheng.
marched onthe:tortrese and thsChinese fweecwere forced tomithdraw. ernor
Chink with several of his officers and soldiers from mchi, rotrelted.to
Chugliehek.. The fortress WO then occupied by :Shang Tupan-and the_Tang Ian V. the
Manchurians.
16.' On the-following morning, our regiment want back to the. Tang Ran ta,ourassigeed
quarters.: The 2nd and 3rd Regiments remained. in the fortress.: Duringithe
upheaval, the rebel Moslems, stationed their armies near Urumihi but Were IAVA1408
sort of opanised or divided opinion as to what, their-mextaovi should be mUd
therefore, did not take advantage of the internal whieval, The Soviet troops
also failed to move and withdrew under the, coverage of darkness. Afterthia
upheava4,whichwas called, the revolt of 12 April and was celbrated every yaiW
our regiment rested for a long time., Part of the officers and Cossacks wereA,:;
allowed to. return home. for reasons of bad health or inflicted wounds.
. During the autumn of this year, 19339 there. was a revolt inthe fortress of lure,.
40 miles west of Kuldja? which, was started by .a Chinese commander,calledakana,
against Governor Shang Shih.;-tsai.. The reason for this revolt-vas stated by
Chang,. was. that Governor Shang had gone to the USSR and signed some sort of..
treaty which WO not profitable for China. After this revolt, all three Ruselan
regimentLwere organising into a single Russian division whose appointed comma**
Was"Captain'Pavel Petrovich Zananglat. His Chief of Staff was to be Nikolai' '
IvanovichAebieng. Commander' of the Yang Han was to be Captain Nikolai-NikOlaevich
A4onovs and the Quartermaster was to be Konstantine Vasilievichrgarkka. All of '
them were commissioned as generals in the Chinese Army. The rebels entered
Chuguchak and the 2nd Regiment was assigned to fight in that area. The man who
was assigned to command the 2nd Regiment was Colonel A IF,Hilovskv. Hilovilwis.
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CORFIDENTIAL/SECURIT/ INFORNATION
? 7 ? of EnolOsure One
50X1
Chief,of,Staff was Captain Dimitrly Karpovich Shelostiqt. In the autumn of the
Same year, 1933, after the battles.in Ohuguchak for reasons not known tome,.
General Papengut, General Behteev? and General Wrkin were arrested. Lieutenant
-Pavel Petrovich VOieikov, Captain Shelestiuk,and Centurion Mogutnov were likewise
arrested and killed in the Yemen in Urumohi.
18. In December 1933 Urumchi was completely surrounded by the rebel fames, which
,numbered some eight thousand men., The Beige of Urumdhi continued for two months.
.14 the beginning, Just 48 the rebels approached the town, it was proposed by
Governor Sheng that an offer be sent to Kuldja to mobilize more Russians, but
this offer. was :declined. Atter the fiercest battle,. which took place on '19 Jan 34,
.when the rebels broke through into the town, the White Russian forces received.
&message from Governor Shing which said that fresh forces from Tarbsgatai and
Altai) under the command of an officer calling himself Vlsiliev.:Would soon Join.
the struggle._ Shortly after this message, Approximately 15 biplenow,iiith.Soviet
Merkings, started flying over the town dropping bombs. onto the positions of the.
rOolo. It became clear to us that. under the guise ofWhite Russian Tarbegatai
' inCAltai,troops, Soviet troops had entered this conflict. Ikon reaching SAMASS..
troops were unable to advance any further because part. of
VAivrebel troops were withdrawnfrom Utumchi and were transferred to meet te
conceding Soviet force. The 3rd Regiment of White Russian troops. was Aispatoked
from Urumehi.to aidthem. These troops were under the_command of Rerunshage,i.
With.the arrival of our regiment,. the rebels were defeated and withdrew
back to Urumohi and:, the next morning abandoned the,seige etUrumohi. All of our
three regiments and the Soviet forces, which consisted of one. cavalry and? ene
lesontrrregiment, were ordered to chase the rebel forces which were retreating
in &southerly direction. Awing this. period when we fought side hy side With
the Soviet troops,. we were able to obeervca number of things about them. . They
vers ,dressed in oommen Chinese Army uniforms 'with to insignia at all. Their -
0:tiditiVW*10.4 dither,blaek or :grey fur ositt with side WO*. TX* WWI' sump
consisted: of only four to five hundred met, whereas the infantry regiment bed I,
cemplement of one thousand men.. They were equipped witiLan,asserhnent of.fire?
arms. Some,had Zoglish carbines,,some 0l6-typeRtssian rifles and ethers were
armed with newSoviet otrioh lineiki" oemi-automatic riles with a fiveTrisuld
? clip. These Soviattroopm were also equipped with many mdihmiar" machine guns,. one
battery of heavy truoke and armored oars.. Moms. of their equipment, as
their: uniforms, had any identifying merkings. at all. ,As.montioned previously,,
those Soviet troops had constant aerial support. The biplanes which they used
were extremely valuable in tracing the rebel movements and positions It ,is,
Interesting to note that after the initial bombing flights:overlirumol&L, at which
.time the biplanes were plainly marked with Soviet markings,, their markings werir,'
painted out I believe I can say, without prejudice, that our White Russian troops
were far superior to the Soviet troops. Their soldiers showed Ao individual
initiative or ingenuity., they were like automatons who only acted upon the advice,
or command, of dodeone else. They certainly were no match for the craft,' .Moslem
tribesmen. During,:the.chase of General Na Ghung..yin,s.force0 toward:leo*
(Shuf0,there were innumerable times when our ill-peguitiped-Chia&cks had to
rescue the Soviet forces from complete ami4hilation. .The vabol,foreos were.
finally defeated. andAheir general, Na Chungryin? ch.10:jul 34:crossed over
with &fewer his men into the. Soviet territory at. Irkeshtan? the rest. of his
forces remained in the town of Khotan (Notion). This,. for all intents and
purposes it can be said, ended the religious war of that period.
,end
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