SOVIET ARMED FORCES FIELD MANUAL 1948-PU-48

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000200530003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 26, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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L, LJ I r m.,h i i v i v 5B(;k / u vru.-1 L uu v
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
DATE DISTRO6Feb 1953
Soviet Armed Forces Field Ma=al NO. OF PAGES 14
1948-PU-48
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAIES INFO MATION AFFECTIND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITES [TATED. MITHIM THE MEN-IMO OF TI T![ 10. SECTIONS 791
AMD 7141 OF-THE 0.8. co-, 115550-E0. ITS TRAM {YI!l ION O NICE.
CATION OF ITS CONTENT! TO ORDRECF JPT {Y Ax U NAUTHON I EEO 1.11:111T%-
FOIT{T LAN. THE .1E1RODUCT-IOX OF THIS FORM IF PRO?
'!A'I:TDl4~[39.11 ~; 1 Qn
familiar with t were iven for t
purpose in 1950
This instruction9 however9 is hampered by the strict security
measures applyingto the handling of the manual.
NO. OF ENCLS. Z1
(LISTED BELOW) (A)) t13)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1
1; The Soviet Armed Forces'Field Manual 1948 (Polevoy Ustav-
Vooruzhennylli. Sit 1948 goda Q abbreviated- PU 8) is published in two
volumes: volume I deals with tactics of battalions and regiments;
volume II ap 'lies to divisions and corps? It was distributed to
units in 1949 in a very limited number of copiest regiments and
separate battalions received one,, divisions and higher units, two
copies.. PU-48 is classified "Secret",, kept in safes in the secret
document sections rif the respective units j and may be .sewed to
officers only upon signed receipt,- It cannot be teen. out of the
office. - -
2.. Pu.-48 is written in a very concise style, and yet, each volume
consists of 300-400 pages. Officers are required to be thoroughly
V1 AIR %(411je 12.1
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AM U XI,%/A 92/ixi
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General Remarks
. If ordet to understand correctly the real ed importance of
- It . shquld be borne is
miad that World'WarrII~has ecaused ua l drastic revision of 'the basic
act1dal"doctrines of the Soviet Army. The most important changes
,eppear to be as follows;
(a)
Defensive Battle: Prior to World War II Soviet tactical
doctri ie did not recognize defensive battle as an independent
tactical operation. The old manuals either completely dis-
regarded this operation, or passed over it as a very exceptional
situation, limited from the tactical point of view by the
elements employed: manpower, time, and terrain. The army was
trained and indoctrinated for offensive tactics .w ; ch were over-
emphasized. Offensive tactics are an old tradition in the
Russian Army, at least with respect to instruction, although
the study of war history may prove to the contrary. The
traditional offensive tactics harmonized well with the
..aggressiveness of the Soviet Regime and the Communist ideology,
fot`only.beoause they corresponded to the character of`the?
ideology, but because the very concept of defense was con-
eldered a recognition of weakness. It was considered dangerous
to give the armed masses of the population an official basis
for the belief that the Soviet state might be weak enough to
have.to fight a defensive battle., Consequently, the offensive
doctrine dominated in the combat training of units as well as
in the military education of individuals.
(1) The Soviet point of view on prisoners of war clearly
illustrates this difference between the Soviet conception
of warfare and that of other nations. According to Soviet
Army regulations, the term "surrender" does not exist.
No individual, therefore, has the right to stop fighting,
and no commander is authorized to issue such an order to
that effect, no matter how hopeless the combat situation is,
and how senseless it is to continue the fighting. Even
when his unit is surrounded and completely out off, each
individual must fight until his "last breath". A Soviet
Army man can only be taken prisoner if a severe wound makes
him unconscious and thus not responsible. This regulation
has two results:
a. After World War II several hundred thousand Soviet
prisoners of war were. sent to forced labor camps and
resettled in Siberia because they could not prove that
they had been severely wounded or unconscious at the
time of their capture.
b. For the same reason, the USSR has never recognized the
international Geneva Convention in regard to prisoners
of war.
(2) Although the character of the Soviet Regime has not changed sixes
Wo 1 wa:' J I ., the disastrous experiences of the first period
of the war induced Soviet army leaders to accept the
possibility of defensive battle, provide for its definition,
give it a recognized place in the field manual, and regulate
its application. Thus, for the first time in the history of
the Soviet Army, the defensive battle has acquired its full
and legal place.. (Other innovations concerning the
defensive battle will be mentioned in the slction dealing
with defensive tactical operations.;)
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(b) New Combat Formations. Based on the experiences of World War I.
the Civil War, and on the eventual development of armaments, the
Soviet Army field manuals (prior to World War II) were built around the
concept of mass use of infantry echeloned in depth, supported by
artillery and tanks. The combat formation of an infantry division
in attack or defense consisted of two or three echelons of
regiments placed one behind the other. In the first months of
WW II it was proved that the massed and depth formations of the
Soviet Army were quite inadequate for modern warfare. As the
artillery support was insufficient and the air force unable to
neutralize enemy artillery and prevent aerial attacks, the units
of the second and third echelons very often suffered more
casualties than the first echelon and were disorganized even
before they could be put into action. This experience induced
the Soviet Supreme Command to reconsider the adequacy of
echeloned formations and to adapt them to the requirements of a
modern warfare as imposed by the enemy. Late in 1942 the
Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces issued Directive
#00306 which abolished the archaic echeloned combat formations
and prescribed completely new formations which,until that time,
were quite unknown in the Soviet Army. These new formations
tested during the later part of W.1At_ War II Arad their effectiver_eas,
and became part of Soviet tat'. le tactics. They are fully
recognized by now and have been taken as a basis for the "Soviet
Armed Forces Field Manual 1948". As specified by this manual
the new combat formations are. the wedge (uglom vpered) ; the
1nve c d d r,e Cr glam r:-..lza.d) ; staggered to the right (ustupom
vpravo); staggered to the left (u.stupom_vlevo); and the line
-
formation (v linlyu). ZS
ee Eano1o&1:=e (
Arttil.lf ry . More than ever before the PU-48 manual emphasizes
the importance of artillery, which is given the most distinguished
place in the armed branches. In the Russian, and eventually in
the Soviet Army, artillery was always a favorite arm, but never
to such an extent as now. PU-48 places artillery even above the
cherished mechanized troops, and officially calls it "Queen of
Battle".
(d) Tanks and Mechanized Forces. PU-48 relegates tank units to a
lesser importance than before and at the beginning of World Waa Ti.
But if tank units are assigned a more modest position among the
other armed forces, their importance is still stressed, and they
are considered capable of independently carrying out all tactical
assignments.
AA Artillery. PU-48 stresses the ' importance of AAA, undoubtedly as
a consequence of the rapid development of the air force. This
applies to PVO and tactical AAA units as well. In combat, the
latter are now placed much closer to the front lines than before
(the small caliber AAA units, one km, and the medium caliber
units, two km behind the first infantry lines).
(f) Air Force. PU-48 classifies the air force as a supporting arm.
The strategic task of long range bombing is recognized, but no
emphasis, whatsoever, is placed upon it. Following the pattern of world
war, II, the main task of the air force is tactical support of
ground forces in combat.
(g) Airborne Troops. The airborne.,troops appear for the first time
in the Soviet field manual. The importance and tasks of these
troops are sufficiently emphasized to secure them an adequate
place among other arms.
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The Encircling. Battle. This operation was Ao mentioned in
Soviet field mani.ale be-fore PU-48. The exper once gained' during World
1 ?11 :en several successful encircling battles were fought
Stalingrad. was the first - resulted in an entire chapter of the
new' 'dual. 'The encirclement of,. enemy forces ' is conisidered the
;necessary final phase of any j offensive which cannot be
fully exploited without such an operation.
Combat In Populated Areas. This too is a new feature of PU-48.
Regulations for this type of operation are based on numerous
experiences in Ws,?'lt Wa, ~ MQMl i .Ze5 the rte
this tactical operation, gives rules for it and points to the
necessity of training personnel for close combat fighting.
QQrnbtrnatic~ac s
'5
The various formations used in combat are not fixed and 'must be
applied according to the particular situation encountered. The main
ones are the following: ZS-4e Fit 'It, zn* (A117
Wedge Formation (Uglom Vpered)
For this-formation one regiment is placed forward, and two in
tke`rear'.9 to the left-and right, thus forming a triangle
;pointed at the enemy positions. It,is used normally .n an attack
van a strongly fortified position. The attack starts with the
frontal. engagement of the leading regiment, with the .purpose of
attracting enemy attention to the c.enter and thus forcing him
to divert his troops from the flanks in order to reinforce the
endangered center. As soon as the enemy flanks are exposed,
the second line regiments attack both enemy flanks.' . In the
final stage such an attack leads to the encirclement of enemy
forces and their complete annihilation.
{ b Inverted wedge Formation (Uslom Nazad)
his is a reversed wedge formation, with two regiments in front
'One in the rear, making thus a triangle with its base
toward the enemy. This formation is used normally in an attack
on an enemy position when its center is strongly fortified.
The two first line regiments start an attack on both enemy
flanks, forcing him to divert his forces ,from the center in
,Order to reinforce the endangered flanks. When he does this
,
the centrally located second line regiment attacks the enemy
position; his forces are out into two separate groups with no!
aentr'alized command. In the last phase the attacking forces
appear in the enemy's rear and encircle the two separated
enemy groups.
Staggered to the Right Formation (Ustupom Vprayo)
.Staggered to the Left Formation (Ustupom Vlevo)
For these formations all three regiments are deployed in such
away that every succeeding.regiment is behindand to the-right,
or to the left,, of the preceeding one. These formations are used
in.the'at.tack on enemy flanks (no further information available).
Luc Formation (V liniyu)
In this formation all.three regiments are lined up'parallel to
the enemy front. There is no second echelon in this formation.
It is frequently used for an attack on an.unfortified .enemy
position, against an inferior enemy, against an enemy who is
.Unprepared for defense, or moving into position at the time of
the "attack, against demoralized enemay, an enemy in retreat, and
a.a~ays iaa the pursuit of the defeated enemy.
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6. It .ld be borne in mind, the.manual states, that the above
mentiohed combat formations are in no.cass: standard patterns to be
used blindly regardless of the actual tactical situation. In the
development of modern combat there may appear many unforeseen phases
for Which?no rules can be given in advance. Therefore sound
judge ent, the correct understanding of the tactical situation, and
the" itiative of commanders are most important elements of victory.
Since' troops in combat are commanded and deployed by officers, the
outcome depends greatly on the ability of officers. Combat formations
are'considered basic concepts and must be used whenever appropriate.
Since the='enemy and his intentions represent'an important tactical
element, however, no decision on the combat formation can be made
unless there is sufficient information on the enemy forces, their
defense positions, strength, order of battle, and presumed intentions.
This important information can be obtained only when all commanders
concerned correctly understand the importance of the reconnaissance
and intelligence services and use them properly. Well organized
reconnaissance services are the "ears and eyes" of a commander. On
the other hand,, since the best decision taken by a commander is of
no value unless transmitted in due time to all his subordinates
down to the last soldier who is to carry it out, it is'the respon-
sibility of commanders to organize an adequate signal and liaison
service and to maintain it 24 hours a day, regardless of combat
conditions. It must always be remembered that "liaison is the nerve
system of the army".
PU-48 also states that it is the duty of commanders to initiate,
encourage and develop constructive initiative of. noncommissioned
officers and soldiers. Left to himself in difficult combat condi-
tions, each individual noncommissioned officer and soldier must be
able to evaluate correctly the situation and decide what is the best
action for his unit as a whole. It is the sacred duty of every
soldier and noncommissioned officer to strive forward
disre
ardin
,
g
g
all dangers and difficulties, and to use his firearm, hand grenade
and bayonet to attack the enemy in order to open the way for the,
advance of his unit.
Arms and Serves
$. The USSR Armed Forces are composed of the following arms and cervices:
infantry, artillery, air force, tank and mechanized units, combat
engineers, +a. sra%,P troops, navy, and rear services.
Infantry
9. The infantry is the principal arm of the ground forces which is
qualified to perform independently any tactical assignment. it is
the only arm able to conduct olpse combat,,and to take and hold an
enemy position. Since it.possesses a high degree of flexibility and
maneuverability, the infantry is easily able to regroup in combat, to
.Use various formations and to conduct all tactical assignments:
attack, defense, combat in the enemy rear zone, combat to break an
encirclement, combat in a forest zone, combat in the mountains, and
combat in populated areas. Provided with powerful modern weapons
and equipment, the infantry'can engage and successfully conduct a
fight against any and all enemy arms. All the other arms are
supporting arms and therefore'attached to the infantry. Under normal
conditions the senior infantry commander is in charge of"the tactical
task to be performed and all other units such as artillery, tanks,
air force, .which may.be'needed to accomplish the task, are attached
to the infantry unit and subordinate~6to its commander.
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Artillery
10. The artillery represents the striking. power of the ground forces.
Possessing an enormous fire power and the capacity to'destroy, the
artillery can independently'perform various tactical assignments.
It'can'destroy enemy fortifications, concrete, wooden and earth
Pill-boxes; it is able to oppose and destroy enemy tanks, to open
passab..es'in the enemy barbed wire system or in a mine field.
Endowed with flexibility and maneuverability, the artillery can give
fire'support'to the advancing units in all phases of an attack.
It is the responsibility of artillery to neutralize by its fire the
enemy gun emplacements, to destroy the enemy manpower, as well as to
keep down the enemy emplacements which may reopen fire during the
later stages of the advancing attack. It takes upon itself the
fight against the enemy tanks and repulses the counter-attacks
launched by the enemy.
11. With its long range fire, the artillery can take under fire the
enemy rear zone and destroy ammunition dumps, warehouses, bridges,
railroad facilities, command posts and other targets located deep
behind. the engrny, positions. in combat, as a rule, the artillery
units within-6-division are organized into"divisional artillery
groups" (divizionnyye artilleriyskiy gruppy. - DAG); in regiments
they form "regimental artillery roups"(PAG), and in battalions,
"battalion.artillery groups"(BAG). In larger strategic units, the
artillery is organized into. corps and army artillery groups. Each
group is assigned a commander, who is normally the senior artillery
officer within such a group, and who is referred to as group
commander. Depending on the tasks assigned, the regimental and
battalion artillery groups are called either "infantry support
"
roups" (podderzhki pekhoty - PP) or "infantry close support groups
rposredstvennoy podderzhki pekhoty - NPP). The latter are
normally organized in the zone of the main effort.
12. On the basis of fire power, and for the particular mission which is
to be accomplished, the ground force artillery is divided into a
series of ground target artillery groups and AA artillery. Groups
are as follows: the battalion, regimental, divisional, corps, army,
and heavy artillery groups (artillerya bol'shoy moshohnosti - 8M),
as well as the artillery groups at the disposal of the Supreme
Command (Rezerva Glavnogo Romandovaniya). Provided with multiplicity
of calibers, variety of. guns and ammunition which characterize
modern artillery, artillery units can participate in combat tinder
any terrain conditions. Thanks to its valuable characteristics and
because it has a splendid record of achievements in combat, artillery
enjoys the highest rem act among the other arms as well as their
undivided sympathy. It is with full justification that in the Soviet
Army, artillery is considered and referred to as the "queen of Battle".
Ant,- i~roraft Artillery
13. AAA is a special type of artillery which provides cover against
enemy air attacks. According to the assigned tasks the anti-
aircraft artillery is divided into: Army . Axti ravart Artillery
and Territorial Air Defense ,< a1r arJ Artillery (Zenitnaya
ArtiXleriya Territorii PVO Strany). In combat the carps and
division AAA is organized into AA sub-groupss corps AA sub-groups,
and divisional AA sub-groups (korpusnaya i divisionnaya zeni nays
artilleriymkaya podgruppa - RZAP and DZAP). These groups are
composed of organic AAA units of the respective corps and divisions,
and have the tactical task of providing the antiaircraft, - defense
for all corps and divisional units in any tactical situations.
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The AAA units'belonging to an army are organized into army AAA sub-
groxps (Armeyskiye Zenitnyye Artilleriyskiye Podgruppy - AZAP) and
have the
task-of anti-aircraft protection of the army headquarters,
storage areas, bridges, railroad facilities, etc located in the
rear zone. Each AAA group is assigned a commander who is normally
the senior officer within this group. The plan of AAA defense within
a.division is prepared by the commander of divisional'artillery; in-
corps and armies these plans are prepared by the respeotive deputy
AQMr,. 1Adn s art! l lerv for AA ~defe e. cbinbat, the AAA .:T ;. t
"pr4 eo.t g ~ . eriem " air. attack t' ke;;'p d.t tons; ? si'$ i'
(a) Small caliber AAA (Malokalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya - MZA) -
one thousand m behind the first infantry line.
(b) Medium caliber AAA (Srednekalibernaya Zenitnaya Artilleriya - SZA)
two thousand m behind the first enemy line.
At a river crossing the small caliber AAA units take positions right
on the river's bank and constitute the forward zone of troop air
defense. These AAA units cross the river together with troops
assigned to the bridgehead and give them constant protection against
enemy air attacks. At the same time the medium caliber AAA units
organize the second zone of tactical air defense, taking positions two
to three kin behind the river in order to protect the concentration of
troops assigned for the river crossing. These artillery units are
responsible for the air defense of crossing points and bridges until
the entire operation of river crossing is completed.
Air Force
14. The Air Force is the arm which gives aerial support to the ground
forces in combat. Its characteristics are high speed, excellent
maneuverability, and a large radius of action. The Air Force is able
to conduct aerial bombardments of enemy troop concentrations,
fortifications, and various communication targets in the enemy rear
zone. The Air'Force is also able to-fight the enemy air force in the
air. According to its tactical tasks the entire Air Force is broken
down into the following basic roups: strategic aviation (daltnego
deystviya), tactical aviation (blizhnego deyetviya), combat support
aviation, and ' diving' aviation. The Air Force is able to-perform its
strategic and tactical tasks either independently, or in cooperation
with the ground forces. In the latter case it is usually attached
to,the ground force unit with which it cooperates and subordinate to
the respective ground force unit commander. The strength of the Air
Force lies in its'mass attack and destructive power. The largest
Air Force tactical unit is an air army (Vozdushnaya Armiya).
Zwks
15. Tank units represent the shook and fire power of the ground forces.
They have a high degree of maneuverability on the battlefield
combined with large fire power and considerable radius of action.
Tanks can carry out a variety of offensive and defensive tactical
assignments in cooperation with other arms and, under favorable
conditions, even independently. Destruction of enemy manpower and
fortifications are the main tasks of tank units. Due to their
ability to cross trenchej, climb steep grades, and ford rivers,?tanks
can be used on any terrain and under any climatic conditions.
Their main tasks are as follows:
ECRST `8 E, " ~` CPMA` : O
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The most valuable use of tank units is, in the exploitation of
the breakthrough, to carry the combat into the depth of the
enemy's defense positions.' Their task in such.cases is to get
into the enemy-rear zone as soon as.possible in order to neutralize
remaining centers of resistance, destroy communications and
supply facilities, at the same time avoiding any serious engage-
ment with enemy forces which may delay the advance of the tanks..
Tank units cannot be assigned the task of taking over and holding
enemy positions and areas.
(b) Tank units can be used successfully only in a mass attack.
Distributing tank forces and attaching them to the attacking
columns is to be considered an exceptional case and should be
resorted to only to repel a counterattack. Used independently,
without infantry support, tanks cannot achieve 'a breakthrough
of enemy positions. Therefore large tank units must normally be
used in the direction of the main effort, and not before the
enemy resistance system has been shaken. Their task is not the
-breakthrough, but its exploitation. A tank division is the
largest tactical tank unit.
Mechanized Troops
16. Mechanized troops are composed of motorized infantry and all other
fully mechanized arms attached in sufficient strength to the motorized
infantry (the backbone of any mechanized unit). Possessing a high
degree of.maneuverability, the mechanized units are able to indepen-
dently perform all tactical assignments. Mechanized units can cover
100-120 km in a day, which gives them a great advantage over the
infantry.
17. In combat, mechanized units are held in the second echelon, and are
not put in action before the infantry takes over the first lines of
enemy positions. In general, their task is the exploitation of a
successful attack. When they reach the line of enemy regimental
reserves, mechanized units have completed the first phase of tactical
exploitation. The following phase is penetration through the second
zone of defense and destruction of enemy divisional reserve groups.
The largest mechanized unit is'a mechanized army.
Combat En,gine ers
10. The task of the engineer units is to assist the ground forces by
clearing the way for their advance in an attack on enemy positions,
for a breakthrough, for combat in the fortified zone, and the
protection of ground forces in defensive operations.
19. Conditions of modern warfare, characterized, as they are by mass use
of technical equipment, provide ample opportunity for the use of
engineer units in combat. These units have therefore an important
position among other arms-and are assigned the following tasks:
(a) Opening of passages through a fortified defense zone for
infantry, tanks and artillery in an attack. This requires
solid training and technical skill.
(b) Preparations for river-crossings and other operations
requiring construction of technical facilities to overcome
obstacles.
Organization of defense positions, with the application of all
technical means to render them impregnable.
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Airborne Troops
. n~~u.. ...roue, r~~~:.. ..,. ... _.
20. Airborne 'troops ' represent a new' arm which is assigned the task of
combat in the enemyy rear. The airborne'units are transported to the
z?i a Of'.action_byr planes or gliders. Once landed or . parachuted', 'they
immediately expand the area of control, perform the assigned tasks,
arid=;organize defense positions in order to hold the captured area
unt3:l - reinf orcements arrive. The warfare of airborne troops is
characterized by many unusual and changeable tactical situations
which'-e.annot be foreseen. Their units are usually fighting in
encirclement, very often in forests and populated localities; they
have'to force river crossings and to overcome various other obstacles.
fil th~$ requIrep a solid training# Skill in o
mited technical equipment and weapons that can be taken on aflflight.
U
note: l Ithe Navy is a
separate-acme ranch, independent of the army and with.its, own
in FU-?
ministry, a chapter entitled "Navy" is included 50X1
21. Naval units independently perform various operations on the high sea
.as well as ashore (landing operations, naval infantry, etc). Their
main task is defense of Soviet seas. In addition, naval units perfor
the following tasks:
(a) In cooperation with the ground forces, the navy participates in.
landing operations of troops. As naval units have a. high degree
of maneuverability and speed they take upon themselves the task
of attacking and destroying enemy naval units on the high sea,
and vessels and naval installations in enemy ports and harbors.
(b) To protect Soviet. territory, the navy has the task of inter-
cepting approaching enemy vessels on the high sea and destroying
them prior to their landing or shelling the shores.
ReIr Services of the Soviet Army
22. The','Itaft of the rear services is to provide for, and to ensuree an
uninterrupted flow of all necessary supplies from the rear zone to the
fighting units. They provide clothing', food, medical supplies, and
finance. Unless provided with sufficient supplies the line units are
unable to perform the assigned tactical tasks.
interrogator's note: Artillery, engineer, automobile and POL
supplies in the Soviet Army, although actually parts of the rear
services, are protected by the sections to which they are attached]
Duties and. Responsibilities of Commanders and Staff Personnel
23. All the commanders and staff personnel, PU-48 states, must organize
and, coordinate their activities in such a way that they can function
as a team for the achievement of the common goal, ie, victory. In
this respect, constant close cooperation and maintenance of communi-
cations among the individuals concerned is the best guarantee of
success. It is the task of the commanding officer to train his staff
personnel and to familiarize them with their tasks in wartime. Any
decision taken by the commanding officers must be communicated in
proper time to the chief of staff, who must immediately inform the
personnel of his staff to prepare the necessary orders and transmit
them to the respective units. In detail the functions ate, ag
follows:
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(a) COnanding. officer. The commanding officer of a unit" has
i divided authority over his eratiire personnel. This authority
is vested.in him by military jurisdiotian;' eoneequently, every
dir'ect' order ' of the CO' is ".at " the same tine 'An order" of"'the.
a"fvr the combat-
' itherland . ' h--'CO' is 'also responsib
1
e6idiMe6s ofhis unit, and through his staff personnel directs
his'unit in combat, assigning tasks and targets, directing
movements and dislocation of the entire unit or parts thereof.
It' is the duty of the CO in any situation to serve as an .
example to his subordinates, showing endurance, combat diseiplihe
and""ielf-sacrifice in the performance of the assigned tasks. The
CO is directly responsible for the individual and collective
actions of his subordinates, for maintenance of weapons and
equipment, and for training of the personnel under him. In
combat, keeping always in mind the task assigned to his unit and
the actual tactical situation, the CO has the right, and duty,
to make decisions and to carry them through. The. CO is
responsible for his actions solely to his Immediate superior.
(b) Chief of staff. The chief of staff (executive officer in
regiments and battalions) is the first deputy of the CO, and as
such, he takes upon himself the responsibility for combat in the
CO's absence. Through his staff personnel, the chief of staff
enforces the decisions of the CO, putting them into the form of
written ores, and then transmitting them to the units and
individuals concerned. It is a direct responsibility of the
chief of staff to see to it that all directives and orders of the
CO are strictly executed, and within the proper time. The chief
of staff must be thoroughly familiar with the battle situation
at all times and be able to brief his CO, as well as make
suggestions for further dispositions and decisions required by
the changing battle situation. The chief of staff is the only
person in the unit who has the authority to issue orders and
directives in'the name--Of the CO. Such orders are signed,
"By Order of the Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff" his same
and rank).
Chief of operations (Nachal'nik Operativnogo Otdela). The
chief of operations is the immediate assistant to the chief of
staff and his first deputy. In compliance with instructions
received from the chief of staff, the chief of operations
prepares all battle orders, putting the verbal decisions and
directive's of the CO into proper written form. It is his
responsibility to see that the orders given by the CO are
strictly complied with and properly carried out. The chief of
operations reports directly to the chief of staff and makes
suggestions pertaining to the field of operations. In peace-.
time the chief of operations is responsible for the combat
training and ",a6inbat readiness of the unit, and in this respect
exercises supervision over all subordinate units.
(d) Reconnaissance officer (Nachal'nik Razvedyvatel'nogo Otdela).
The RO is the assistant of the chief of staff for reconnaissance.
His responsibility is to maintain constant communication with
subordinate units and to be familiar at any time with the combat
situation. The R? immediately reports all changes affecting the
combat situation to the CO and makes suggestions to counteract
enemy moves. He also maintains the operation reconnaissance map
compiled from information received through reconnaissance service
which he organizes. He carefully studies enemy moves, trying to
anticipate and-to offset enemy plans. He prepares and transmits
to subordinate units daily reconnaissance bulletins which contain
all new information on the enemy, as reported by the reconnaissance
service. As a rule, in combat the RO-is close to the CO and
belongs to the forward echelon of the unit's headquarters.
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(t
CO] ir3mun icationa Officer. The communication bf ',icer is the
696ista at of the chief of staff for cosnnunit Lions. His
responsibility is to organize and to maihtain wire, radio And
other means of communications with subordinate and neighboring
units, He ` prepares a chart of the o ganization of the, communica-
tion'service within his unit, assigns eode-names for units and
individual officers, determines the length of wavee and,
emergency waves, and the pert ds of wave shifts. He is
responsible for the organization of a wire-tsppi.ng service to
insure,,, security in telephone conversations, and checks radio
service. The communications officer is personally responsible
for a 'permanent and uninterrputed communications network,. between
the commanding officer and his subordinate units. He a*sit the
chief of staff in the preparation of battle orders insofar as
they pertain to the organization of the communication service.
Artillery commander. The artillery commander is deputy
commanding officer for artillery. The artillery commander's
staff serves as command organ-for all artillery-units. The
.artillery staff is.composed of the chief of, staff (executive
officer), two operations officers, the reconnaissance officer,
and a communications officer; all these persons are 'assistants''
to the chief of staff. -On the basis of directives received from'
the artillery commander., the artillery staff prepares battle
orders for the artillery units, determining their tasks, fire
plans, plan of displacement of artillery positions in combat
and plan of artillery support fire in various phases of battle.
The artillery' staff is an executive organ, and at the same time
a controlling organ of the commanding officer and' the artillery
comm,ander,' respectively,'which'supervises artillery units with
respect, to fulfillment of assigned tasks. The place bf the
artillery commander is 'Ili'ith the commanding officer in the
forward echelon of the unit's headquarters. Usually one other
artillery officer from the artillery staff is attached to this
forward eohelQn.
Types of Battle
24. in_PU-k8 the various types of battles are catalogued as follows:
('a)
Offensive battles. Offensive battle is the normal type of
combat. Success of an offensive battle depends very'much on the
..synchronized cooperation between all participating arms and
branches, on. adequate leadership, thorough preparation of
necessary means and equipment, solid training of personnel, and
properly organized intelligence and reconnaissance services.
The mission given to units participating in an offensive battle
.must be simple, clear and definite. A successful offensive
battle must lead to the encirclement of the enemy, complete
annihilation, and the gaining of the enemy's rear zone for the
further exploitation' of victory. A successful offensive battle
presupposes superiority of Soviet forces over the enemy in one,,,
or several, tactical elements: manpower, equipment, terrain,
time-or morale. Offensive battle is used to break through the
enemy's defensive positions protecting their retreating forces
against an inferior enemy, and always When there" is an
opportuni.ty.to destroy the enemy completely. Having accepted
rather reluctantly the conception of defensive battle, the
PU-k8 emphasizes that the offensive battle is the normal type
of combat. Emphasis is now placed on this point in all Soviet
Army instructions, and is also stressed in maneuvers and-during
all high command inspections in Germany.
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--12-
(b) Defensive battle. A defensive battle is resorted to when time
id.. seeded for regrouping Soviet forces, 'or to allow unhampered
concentration if the enemy forces are considerably stronger;
also...when .there Is 'a need to complete 3o*iet forces with
replacements,' equipment, ammunition and other supplies; or in
order'.:to - attract enemy attention and strength to ' one eebtor,
Whieft aii..offensive is contemplated in-another:; Whatever the - Say immedhtc purpose of a defensive..lefl .. .t should be ". ID6
borne in m :nd that this type of combat 's aIWays of a temporary
character and cannot bring about decisive results. Every
'defensive battle should bpcome an offensive battle when the
Jnoment is favorable and thus lead to the destruction of the
enemy forces.
Encircling battle. The basic aim of the encircling battle,
which is the normal continuation of a successful offensive
battle, is to keep enemy forces tightly surrounded and to
prevent all attempts at help from the outside, or breaking out
from the inside. The encircling battle may be used either to
surround the enemy forces in order to annihilate .?n or to
hold the enemy in encirclement and force them to capitulate by
preventing the arrival either of reinforcements and ground or
aerial supplies. In the latter case, the forces not required
for containing the encircled enemy are used to exploit the
battle in the enemy rear zone. A predominant role in the
encircliagv,,'..~ battle is assigned the artillery which holds the
enemy under constant or periodical fire and brings destruction
and disorganization into his ranks.
Combat in populated areas. Combat in populated areas may be part
of an offensive or a defensive battle. It is characterized by
the close proximity of the contending forces, and individual
close combat fighting. One of the most important problems, and
one ?'"tu s which khe success of such combat depends to a great
extern, is the organization of command in the individual email
units which are often left unsupported and dependent upon the
ins Iative of their immediate comes ders. Inte*sive training,
exper! nee, and initiative of lower commanders, including
platooax and section leaders, are prerequisites, and the beet
guarantee for successful combat in populated 'areas. Leadership
is more important in this type of battle because the combat to
full of unexpected turns; these sudden enemy moves require
immediate 'and energetic countermeasures, and there is no time
to ask for instructions. Very often combat in a populated
center takes the form of a series of fights in encirclement;
in these circumstances, every building'or block of houses,
represents a fortress. Under such conditions the combat becomes
decentralized and depends almost entirely upon the experience,
bravery, endurance, and initiative of the Individual. The
ypes of battle described above do not represent anything
i'ermanent and unchangeable. The very definitions,provided by
this manual should not be interpreted in a stiff and inflexible
way, PU-48.states; on the contrary, the offensive battle may
temporarily become a defensive one, or vice versa. Both
battles may take the form of an encircling battle, or of a
battle in the encirclement, etc.' Under such variable do#ditions,
therefore, every commander must use his own judgment, experience
and initj.ative?to evaluate properly all changes in the existing
situation, and to take the necessary steps needed to achieve
the final goal, regardless of the type of combat required.
-Attack and. Defense . .
25. The rifle division is the highest tactical unit; rifle corps is the
lowest strategic (operativnaya) unit.
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SECRET/SECURITY FCRNLTIOR
2
,lti ' e b ttalions up to 11, km.
re .vents up to three k*.
grQupij the second ob Jective, the zone of enemy'
he" id epi 4o#aG. of troops for an attack, mechanized division,
re 10404 ale ;a1~eii *ond' echiloza, with the task of taking the leatl'
,br - `. *+'el ttee'+ -divisions have to carry the battle into US'
depth Of 4ni* On itions .
Every unit regardless of its s1ze,, mast have a reserve is to a 0 ' >L possible enemy' move's and for the reinforcement
during the attack. Normally reserves do not exceed one third
the, vnitls h and are of the follow . sizes;
tl ri "le'", a ivleiclns as soon as the first en lines are .
(1} M'I* 'iy&p o a reserve -- one regiment
(2) Rifle roXIment reserve .~- one battalion
('} Rifle batta,J.on reserve one company
f e3, +'~t, iflo 3Oups reserve
one platoon.
The battle: dispoeition of a rifle division in attack is determined.
by the divisional comnding oftioer j his decision is based es
,the task ass es 'to the division and on his evaluatio` of all
taa;tioa~l elemem*s influeneing the battle situation..pie t,y
of a raintoreed rifle division in attack on a forti.fjed position
is pr''i*e*ted in 8nclesure (3), on an overlay + of Central
l mope 1t u,uw,, dheei , First ad vion L, %ova so "1
(51,
'. , Ft! $ .lnda! the following instructions On defense;
(a) Rifle corps and rifle divisions are assigned defense son**
(gym}osa o'so.pon) as followpt rifle corps are assigned defense
arise Fad' e to 20-25 km, rifle divisions to
12-J5 $ ~ viea reennts' are assigned defense sectors acb-astok
oboroay} to . s,ix , km, and rifle battalions up to three ka.
fib) Eves or qed Adefanse in modern warfare met be oriented in
snob a way an to be prepared to withstand any and all of the
to1lo atbaeks:
(l) Abeto a n directiea,
Follows;
(1) Rifts *,orps up to. 12 kla.
(2) Rif ,e , na up to six km.
50X1
gU-M8 gives the following instructions for the attacks
(a) Rifle turits are assigned attack zones (polosa nastupl,eniya) U
e &G S eF para9A '5 z1 o ng roses
a division is assigned a zone of two to toiz k16
Jeo ivo of the divisib> , An this- case, is the Sens art .
.' "' 9 I ], 'OM'ION
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-1k-
~ ~e~p~ces~nne'saaaad~.nfgrQ~frgimAiZa~tloA of defense rests with the
cer.
(d) The'-defense position of a rifle' division is composed of two
defense zones (oboronitel'nykh polos) :
(1)
Afirst defense zone with a high' Beta*ity of machine yon fire,
AT araillerypladed'on the flanks and joints, and switch
artillery positions (otsechnykh artilleriyekikh positaiy)
composed of groups of divisional-towed and felt`-propelled
artillery. In exceptional cases- tanks buried in the gro .
cari'be used as artillery pieces. note:
According to Soviet tactics, the infantry which holds the
first defense lines must stop. attacking enemy's infantry;
it does not, however, have to stop enemy tanks, which are.
permitted to pierce the first defense infantry lines so that
they can be destroyed by the artillery on switch.positionsj
(2) A second defense zone composed of two or three lines of
infantry trenches, barbed wire entanglements, mine-fields
and AT trenches.
(3) The depth between the first and the second defense zone
for a division is about 10-12 km. Two rifle regiments are
normally located in the first, and one rifle regiment,
representing the divisional reserve, in the second zone.
A successful defense depends considerably on fortification of
positions, proper organization of a centralized cotmand leader-
ship, developed reconnaissance network, and the combat readiness
of all fire-arms.
28. The pu-k8 manuari gives the following details in regard to situation
maps:
(a) Regardless of his rank and position, every commander must maintain
a situation map.
(b) Order of battle information on such maps made in the
following way. ,
(1)
All enemy units are presented in blue; Soviet units, except
artillery and CW wits, in red; black is used for the Soviet
artillery units,. CW units are-marked in black with a
yellow frame or yellow hatches. All writings on the map are done from left to right.
(e) In addition to working maps, reference maps (otchetnaya karts)
have to be maintained in every headquarters.' On these maps all
changes occurring in the battle situation are recorded.
Maps containing information on the order of battle are classified
secret; they must be registered and handled as any other secret
military document.
ENCLOSMY A : 8- h, cvi ; far-i'48 Cc~nb at. F t4 With Legend
B)' r .a -141%, of' 1 4, l; 1 #WC Shett 5 tvat Edition - AUS
1, No 44 6 (AMS M. 64 J n . or, Mich s shaym the .p1o Mi, of a rein-
-x9:'?; ^d r If'Ie ?i v k.iw in atts : en a fortified peait:t m.
3ECU /5k,0Ii R1T'i INFO TV)k
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EN LOSURE (! } SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION
Wedge
b) In1I
'Ited Wedge
S aggere oche
Le !'t
o Staggered to t e Right
.
line Formation
PU 48 }Combat Formations
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EN'CLCSURE (B) SECRET/SECpRITY INFORMATION
Page 2
Wend
1, 2,'' 3... "Infantry regifie~ats ' .
R VJlsieat4l Artillery Group, 55th Art Regiment
Rogue t&l Artillery O 25 Art Regi*e*t
i7th HeavyAWank and Self propelled Regiment
?
9328. Separate' AAA Battalion-
932u
8 i?nal Artillei*y tree, 39th Field Art Brigade
9 64th 'Separate AT Battalion
10. Signal battalion
11; 495th Carpe AAA Regiment
12; 57tb,Oda Rifle Division
1,3. 39th Gds Rifle Div, 28th Ode Rifle Corps and 31st Gds Rifle Div,
19th Oda Rifle Corps
14+. 21st. Meal?Division
11. Field art maintenenoe shop and field automotive maintenance shop
1 . Rear services
11. First ob3eotLve
Ia. Second objective
19. Enemy art battalion, 105 mm
20. Enemy.art battalion, 155 mm
21. Enemy tanks
22. Enemy infantry up to regimental strength
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SECRET 5C.&R?r(
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'--4 ---1- !fir)ilroac~~
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