THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 3, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
110
3 March 1967
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HIGHLIGHTS
Another demonstration against "false peace"
was held in Saigon on 3 March. North Vietnamese
troops in the highlands of South Vietnam continue
to display increased aggressiveness against US
forces.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the Pleiku/
Kontum/Cambodia tri-border region continue to
display increased aggressiveness against US 4th
Infantry Division Operation SAM HOUSTON (Paras.
1-3), Communist mortar crews on 2 March shelled
a US Marine airstrip near Khe Sanh Special Forces
camp in Quang Tri Province, but inflicted only
light casualties and damage (Para. 4). Indications
continue to be received of a major enemy troop
buildup threatening the US/South Vietnamese Special
Forces camp at Ba To, in south-central Quang Ngai
Province (Paras. 5-7).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Another public protest against "false peace" was
held on 3 March in front of the French Consulate
(Paras. 1-3).
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IV, Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: M st of
the North Vietnamese politburo dropped out of sight
for a ten-day period following Tet (Paras. 1-2).
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A poster in Peking states that a North Vietnamese
delegation was in Peking in February talking over
Chinese aid (Para. 3). U Thant and the North
Vietnamese consul general in Rangoon met to discuss
Vietnam, according to the DRV Consul (Paras. 4-5).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. In two separate attacks on 2 March, the
command post of one of six US 4th Infantry Division
battalions participating in Cambodian border sur-
veillance Operation SAM HOUSTON in Pleiku and Kontum
provinces was shelled by an estimated 90 rounds of
mortar fire,, US casualties were two killed and 16
wounded, The US countered with artillery fire
against the suspected mortar emplacement, but re-
sults are unknown,
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The s arp y intensified arass-
ment and pro ing campaign against Operation SAM HOUSTON
may indicate that preparations for major enemy offensive
action irk the highlands are reaching their final stages.
On the other hand, this Communist activity is almost
certainly a reflection of increasing Communist sensi-
tivity to continuing allied incursions into or near
their Cambodian border redoubts, Heightened Commu-
nist resistance in recent days could also represent a
determined attempt to divert attention from a suspected
resupply and infiltration effort in the Pleiku/Kontum/
Cambodia tri-border region.
3. In Quang Tri Province, Communist forces on
2 March placed mortar fire on a US Marine forward air-
strip, at Khe Sanb, 30 miles south-southwest of Quang
Tri city near the Laos border. Two marines were killed
and eight wounded. In addition, one helicopter was de-
stroyed and one damaged although the airfield itself
sustained minimal damage and remains operational. There
is no evidence that any mortar rounds were directed
against the nearby special Forces camp at Khe Sanh, al-
though this installation has been subjected to intensi-
fied enemy reconnaissance operations,
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Major Communist Threat in Quang Ngai
4. There are continuing indications of a major
Communist troop buildup near the US/South Vietnam-
ese Special Forces camp at Ba To, in south-central
Quang Ngai Province.
Approximately 750
South Vietnamese CIDG Popu ar Forces personnel, to-
gether with a small contingent of US advisers, are
garrisoned at Ba To.
5.
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u e to p ans for a major Quang Ngai Campaign" by
the 2nd and 3rd NVA div.i.:,ions during the spring-
summer period of 1967. F_ I
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enemy plans called for diversionary attacks
by the 2nd NVA Division in the northern and central
portion of the province in coordination with a major
3rd NVA Division offensive in the Duc Pho district
of southeastern Quang Ngai.
6. Since 1 February, however, a series of al-
lied spoiling operations in the northern and southern
coastal areas of Quang Ngai Province have inflicted
losses in excess of 1,000 killed on enemy main force
units which traditionally operate in these locales.
Although these operations have clearly reduced the
combat effectiveness of several of the regimental
formations identified in the current Ba To buildup
the enemy threat to the allied base nonetheless re-
mains substantial.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Another apparently GVN-inspired youth
demonstration against foreign peace initiatives
occurred in Saigon on 3 March, although its size
and orderliness suggested official efforts to
impose restraint. Only two days earlier, Premier
Ky had assured Ambassador Lodge that he would try
to put a stop to such demonstrations.
2. Politically sophisticated Vietnamese
sources have told the US Embassy that the govern-
ment's obviously fabricated story of a "coalition"
government-in-exile was part of a scenario to
justify the launching o antipeace and anti-
French demonstrations.
irst, the government felt
it had to counter a growing tendency among the
Vietnamese people to believe that a negotiated
settlement and a coalition government was imminent.
Second, the GVN wanted to commit popular opinion
to its own negative position concerning the issue
of negotiations with the Communists. Third,
the source said the GVN hoped to create a climate
for a possible purge of some political undesirables
with neutralist or pro-French tendencies, including
the Buddhist militants in Saigon should they become
publicly active again.
3. indicated that
some groups o Vietnamese wou e ieve the story
of the alleged coalition government-in-exile
despite its being purely a government propaganda
ploy. On 3 March, the Constituent Assembly adopted
a resolution opposing unjust peace movements, al-
though it is likely that the assembly was well
aware of the government's work behind the scenes
to capitalize on public protests.
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port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. For a ten-day period following the Tet
holiday, almost the entire North Vietnamese politburo
dropped from public view. Although such public in-
activity is not unprecedented, it has frequently in
the past been an indicator of a high-level party
meeting. Of the 11 politburo members, only Defense
Minister Giap and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
are known to have appeared in public from 14-24
February.
2. The politburo in general appears to have
been relatively inactive throughout the entire month
of February. The only known out-of-country trip
which might have occupied any one of these individuals
was a visit to Peking by an unidentified high-level
delegation from 11 to 18 February. Only Ho Chi Minh
and Vo Nguyen Giap among the politburo members are
known to have made public appearances in Hanoi during
that seven-day period.
3. A poster seen in Peking dated 24 February
reported a speech made by Chou. En-lai on 17 February
in which he stated that "Li Hsien-nien (Chinese
minister of finance) has just finished talking to
Vietnamese comrades about Chinese aid to Vietnam."
U Thant and North Vietnamese in Rangoon
4. According to Western press reports, the
North Vietnamese consul general in Rangoon has said
that he met with UN Secretary General Thant "to
discuss the Vietnamese problem" during the latter's
visit to Burma. The consul did not elaborate on
the content of the conversation.
5. Col. Ha Van Lau, the DRV's chief representa-
tive to the International Control Commission, has been
in Rangoon for the past week. He reportedly left
for Phnom Penh on 3 March. Col. Lau is one of North
Vietnam's chief spokesmen on the war and as such may
well have taken the lead in explaining to Thant the
DRV's position.
3 March 1967
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