ECONOMIC - SOLID FUEL, COAL MINING SOCIOLOGICAL - STANDARD OF LIVING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700220022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT Economic - -Solid fuel, coal mining
Sociological - Standard of living
HOW
PUBLISHED Daily newspapers
WHERE
PUBLISHED Bucharest
DATE
PUBLISHED 30 May - 26 Aug 1952
LANGUAGE Rumanian
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DATE DIST. 3/ Mar 1953
NO. OF PAGES 15
SUPPLEMENT-TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1952 PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RUMANIAN COAL INDUSTRY
Zc-omment: The following report, taken from Rumanian newspapers,
gives information on the production achievements and difficulties of
the Rumanian coal industry, as well as proposed solutions. In June
and July 1952, according to the Rumanian press, many complaints were
made against the -cinistry of Coal and Petroleum Industries, the Min-
istry of Health, and the Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose In-
dustries in regard to difficulties in the coal industry. It is in-
teresting to note in this connection various ministerial changes
that occurred in the ministries which were under criticism. For ex-
ample, Mihai Szuder was placed in charge of the Ministry of Wood,
Paper, and Cellulose Industries in place of Constantin Prisnea (Scan-
teia 30 May 1952). Octavian Berlogea was appointed Minister of Health
in place of Vasile Marza, who was declared unsuitable and negligent
(Scanteia 12 August 1952). On 26 August, Scanteia reported that the
Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries had been divided into the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries and the Ministry of
Coal Industry. Viliam Szuder was appointed Minister of Coal Industry.
The problems of coal were brought into prominence in the press
when Gheorghiu-Dej met with a committee of 40 Rumanian miners in Bu-
charest in mid-June 1952 to discuss difficulties in the industry. This
was followed by a second conference at Petrosani at the end of June
when further complaints and suggestions were heard from representa-
tives of mines throughout the RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) and the
government policy for improvement was stated. On 4 July, a decree of
the Council of Ministers incorporated into law the proposals made by
Gheorghiu-Dej at the second conference. In June and July, the Ruman-
ian press published reports from individual mines on local conditions.
An examination of reports made at the conferences. together with those
appearing in newspapers, gives a general picture of the coal-mining
industry.
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CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
STATE NAVY NSRB DISTRIBUTION
ARTY AIR FBI
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Plan Fulfillment in Principal Rumanian Coal Mines
The following list shows the chief Rumanian coal mines, as mentioned in
the newspapers examined for this report, with their production plan fulfill-
ments in -iercentage and their principal products when mentioned.
Location
Product
Period
Percentage of
Fulfillment
Source
Bihor Regiune
Derna-Tatarus State
Anthracite,
Jan-Jun 52
Plan not
(1)
Coal Enterprise
bituminous coal
fulfilled
May-Jun 52
104
(2)
24*
(3)
Cornitel
(4)
Derna
Budoi
Tatarus
(2)
Sarmasag Coal Basin
Coal, lignite
Jan-Jun 52
102.2
(5)
May-Jun 52
104
(2)
Jan-Jun 52
10 days ahead
(6)
Jan-Jun 52
of schedule
105 [sic]
(2)
200*
(3)
Rosin Mnntnna
(7)
Jibou Raion
(8)
Sorecani State
Coal, thin layers
Jan-Mar 52
103
Coal Enterprise
of brown coal
Apr 52
101
May 52
94.2
7 Noembrie
Jun 52.
92
(2)
Curturis
Jul 52
153.7
(9)
Hunedoara Regiune
Valea Jiului
Aninoasa
Lupeni
Vulcan
Jieti-Lonea Coal
Petrila
Petrosani
1951 plan in
11 months
Jan-Mar 52 103
Apr-Jun 52 96
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186 (10)
(2)
(11)
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Location
Timisoara Regiune
Anina
Sinersig
Doman
Secul
Prahova Regiune
Filipestii-de- Coal
Padure State Coal
Enterprise
52 Nonfulfill-
ment
Z.VUUUCT ____ _ Period Fulfillment Source
Valea-Palangii Very thin strata
Margineanca
Margineanca No 3 Lignite
Doicesti
Sotanga
Arges Regiune
Schitu-Golesti
Coal Basin
Poenari
Godeui
Berevoiesti
Pescareasa
1 Mai
Capeni
Vulcan
Suceava Regiune
Campulung-Muscel
Bacau Regiune
Comanesti
Ref ira
Galion
Lumina
Vales Trostului
Buzau Regiune
Cisla
Jinidentified7 Regiune
Ojasca
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Lignite, coal Jan-Mar 52 101
Apr-May 52 Ncnfulfill-
ment
Coal
Coal
Coal, lignite
Apr-May 52 Nonfulfill-
ment
Apr-May 52 Nonfulfill-
ment
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Achievements in Coal-Mining Industry
Gheorghiu-Dej reported achievements in the coal-mining industry in his
speech before the second miners' conference at the beginning of July, as
follows:
In 1951, coal production was 17.9 percent greater than in 1950. The 1951
wages of the miners were 1.5 times that of 1938. The increase in real wages
was even greater. Investments in the coal-mining industry increased. Thus,
in 1949 investments for economic and sociological factors totaled 62,100,000
old lei. Those of Sovromcarbune alone were 24,400,000 old lei. In 1951, in-
vestments in the entire industry were 267,900,000; those of Sovromcarbune were
145,400,000. In 1952, the total investments amounted to 357,400,000 and those
of Sovromcarbune 310,600,000 old lei.
The level of public health facilities also increased. In 1952, there
were three hospitals and 14 dispensaries for miners. There was also a greatcr
amount of living space provided. More than 175,000 square meters of living
area were available. In Vales. Jiului, for example, there were 64 apartments
and four cultural halls in 1950. This increased to 118 apartments and 18 cul-
tural halls in 1951. By the end of 1952 there will be 900 apartments. In
Comanesti and other regions 128 dwellings were constructed in 1950 and 246
dwellings were added in 1951. There is now a theater in Vales. Jiului and nu-
merous cultural and artistic teams have been trained. The area has been made
accessible by the construction of the new Bumbesti-Livezeni railroad. A new
road has opened up the Valea Trotosului. In 1952, more than 7,000 miners are
to be sent to vacation centers. The food and industrial goods supplies have
been improved at 89 state stores. A seniority system, progressive wages,
prizes, and decorations were introduced among miners.(16)
Other exomples of achievements in the coal mining industry as reported
by the Rumanian press are as follows:
The Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enterprise has continually increased pro-
duction. New mines have been opened. Electric power stations are being set
up for heavy work. Rails lines are being constructed to facilitate trans-
port, and individual miners regularly exceed quotas.(1)
However, until recently, the Filipestii-de-Padure State Coal Enterprise
carried on mining in a primitive manner. Now, it uses machinery produced do-
mestically or imported from the USSR. (17) Dozens of scrapers, mechanical
cutters, and screw conveyers are used to raise and transport coal. A special
combine for thin strata has recently been received from the USSR. Underground
transport is 70 percent mechanized, ari surface transport, 80 percent. The
first 35-horsepower diesel mine locomotives to be produced in the RPR are now
in use.(18) Transport to the surface is 100 percent mechanized at the entire
enterprise. Machines in the central shaft assure rapid removal c.f coal. New
lathes have been acquired and a hider z repair shop established to maintain
the equipment.
In the first 5 months of 3.952 the investment plan was fulfilled 134-2
percent. Labor productivity rose 8.5 percent from January to May 1952.(17)
New success-s in the domestic production of mine machinery were evident.
For example, in 1952, various types of wet drills and mine locomotives were
produced for the first time.(19) Emil Klnmancsek, director of Petrila mines
reported that mechanization in his enterprise was 70.94 percent greater than
in 1948 as a result of increased domestic equip:ueui, uciu - ~-oio ,...,l, .,
from the USSR. The latter category includes electric compressors, electric
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and pneumatic loading machinery, scrapers, electric locomotives for under-
ground transport, electi~ic cranes, pneumatic drills, electric transformers
and lamps, ventilators, and other tools obtained through Sovromcarbune. As
a result of new ventilation and safety measures, not a single explosion oc-
curred in the mines in 1951.(20)
All work was mechanized at 7 Noembrie, principal mine of Sorecani State
Coal Enterprise.(2) At Comanesti the installation of a compressor in June
1952 assured the success of the cyclic graph method and permitted labor pro-
ductivity to increase 25-40 percent.(3) Mines such as Vulcan, considered
exhausted and unprofitable by private enterprise, were reopened with the aid
of machinery.(15)
Miners of Rosia Montana have enjoyed a higher standard of living than
ever before because of improvements in food and supply.(7)
Difficulties in Coal-Mining Industry
Difficulties and errors in the coal-mining industry were brought to the
attention of Gheorghiu-Dej by a committee of 40 miners at the first mining
conference held in mid-June. Miners, representing the chief enterprises in
the RPR made complaints about the poor food supply, inadequate living quar-
ters, lack of mine cars, poor miner timbers, vital need for trained personnel,
errors in the organization of competitions, and ineffective political work.(14)
Difficulties in the coal-mining industry were again discussed by Gheor-
ghiu-Dej, and miners at the second conference. Such difficulties discussed
at the two conferences and subsequently by the July press included the devia-
tionism of Vasile Luca, neglect of the industry by ministries and director-
ates, financial difficulties, poor union operations, poor management, inade-
quate transport facilities, poor maintenance and supply of equipment, lack of
power, labor procurement and personnel troubles, poor food supply, poor
health and protective measures, Insufficient living quarters, and lack of
cultural facilities, as follows:
The deviationism of Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker, and Teohari Georgescu
complicated the entire mining situation, according to Gheorghiu-Dej. In-
sufficient vigilance against hostile elements occurred on all levels. Sabo-
teurs crept into organs of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Hostile ele-
ments attempted to sabotage the Five-Year Plan. This was evidenced by the
disorganization of normal exploitation, by poor application of technological
processes, by failure to take measures for the safety and protection 1?
workers, by disorganization of transport, and by the sabotaging of new
tools. (16) Emil IQamancsek, director of the Petrila mines declared that the
deviation of Luca, Pauker, and Georgescu was reflected in his enterprise by
an unjustified reduction in turnover capital, and the failure to obtain in-
vestment funds on time.(20)
According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the ministries and directorates neglec-
ted the coal-mining industry. The Ministry of Coal and Pec:rol.euci Industries
did not give enough support to organization and did nothing to liqu,.datc er-
rors. The ministry failed to procure sufficient manpower, t:o ,^.tunntain labor
discipline, and to train personnel. The heads of the ministry sere more in-
terested in petroleum than in coal (16) '.ntcti__. R^':^'
plained that inspectors of the Ministry ofaCoal -andyPetrol.eum Industries did
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not speak to workers at all and thus were not aware of complaints. N. Dari-
ciu of the Schitu Golesti mine complained of the lack of vigilance of th?::
General Directorate of Coal and of the ministry.(3)
The Ministry of Health was said to have neglected health and labor
welfare.(2) The Council of Ministers in a decree of 4 July 1952 ordered the
Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries to report to the Council of Min-
isters on plans for the mechanization of mining by 15 November 1952, on the
training of personnel by 15 November 1952, on organizational measures by
1 November 1952, and on proposals for a planning institute by 15 September
1952.(21)
The lack of collaboration between unions and enterprise management
was in part responsible for the failure of production plans, said Anton
Raica of the Anina mine in Timisoara.(2) Mihail Mujic, member of the execu-
tive bureau of the General Confederation of Labor explained that the de-
ficiencies in the coal mining industry would have been less if the union or-
ganizations had been more concerned with the problems of the coal industry.
He changed that the executive committees of coal unions had concerned them-
selves only with the publication of pamphlets and the presentation of talks;
that the unions had "divorced themselves from life" and had failed to deal
with concrete problems; that they had failed to encourage the use of the cy-
clic graph and other Soviet methods, and had failed to urge the adoption of
the Nicolae Vasu and Vasile Dicu innovations. As a remedy, Mujic urged un-
ionists to become acquainted with the economic and technical aspects of coal
production; to push cultural and educational work, and to maintain revolu-
tionary vigilance.(22)
In his speech to the miners, Ghtorghiu-De,j declared that coal pro-
duction fell behind the needs of Industry because of poor managements, as
shown by the following conditions: Many mistakes were math in the manage-
ment of enterprises and ministries. There was a general lack of materials,
tools, and labor. The productivity of available labor did not increase in
proportion to the mechanization of processes. Mork was poorly organized and
labor discipline was poor. Mine equipment suppliers, such at, Strugul.. and
Union, failed to respect delivery schedules. Enterprise technical organiza-
tions did not concern themselves sufficiently with the nrenarat_on of reserve
faces. Those of Ojasca, Capeni, and Cisla persisted in using old method.; in-
stead of the longwall method. Some technical organizations did not apply la-
bor protection measures. Only 4'( percent of all miners participated in the
competitions. Administrations and technical managers did not supply faces
with cars for removal of coal. Planned economy was not used in mines and en-
forcement of the Five-Year Plan was poor. (16)
Other examples of poor management cited in the press are as follows:
The Jieti-Lonea mine in Valea-Jiului remained behind in its produc-
tion schedule. This was due chiefly to a series of mistakes made by admin-
istration, the party committee, and he enterprise committee. They failed
to carry out the orders of the General Directorate of Sovromcarbune. The
management of the mine did not prepare its plans well, either for exploita-
tion or development of new faces. Often the management assigned all miners
to exploitation in an effort to meet the production schedule, and thus ne-
glected developni:ut. There was no :tpa;.,- lap. r.,.....,.. ..cl'
nc-
grganized. The party committee was not active and the enterprise committee
did not make serious efforts to organize c ocmetitions. In addition, the en-
terprise committee failed to popularize methods and Stakhanov_te ex-
periences.(23)
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Errors by the administration of the Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enter-
prise resulted in failure to fulfill the production plan. Primary party or-
ganizations were not able to draw all miners into competitions for the ful-
fillment of the plan. They were not familiarized with the plan and thus
could not fight as individuals to surpass quctas. The great majority of
miners, workers, technicians, and engineers did not know their specific du-
ties nor the over-all plan requirements. For example, at the Ccrnitel mine,
the section chief did not receive the plan for the second quarter of 1952
until 17 May. Miners of Derna, Budoi, Tatarus, and other sections did not
learn their individual quotas on time. Contracts for socialist competition
were of a generalized nature and failed to specify particular objectives. The
quality of work was not emphasized.
In many cases miners agreed to "surpass the norm," or "achieve econ-
omies," without any mention of what the norms were or how economies were to
be achieved. Another serious error was the fact that no Stakhanovite was
confirmed. The proper conditions were not created for leading workers to be-
come Staknanovites.
In January 1952 the administration of the Derna-Tatarus State Coal
Enterprise embarked on a program of technical organizational measures. These
included the most efficient use of mine timbers and underground and surface
transport to save work time. This program failed. The enterprise management
also failed to carry on a concerted campaign for conservation of materials.
The waste prevalent in the bituminous coal plan is an example. A'
coal-tar boiler leaked, spreading vapors over the surrounding area. Signifi-
cant quantities of coal tar and oil were thus lost. Director Filip Nicolae,
the man chiefly responsible, was warned that this would happen, but took no
preventative measures. Distilled oil was handled carelessly and allowed to
flow freely. Technicians and engineers confined themselves to office work
instead of dealing with concrete problems. Consequently, accidents and er-
rors resulted in the loss of hundreds of tons of coal and caused higher pro-
duction costs. The General Directorate of Coal and the Ministry of Coal and
Petroleum Industries failed to support the administration in such matters.
For example, the enterprise did not have a technical manager for 9 months.(l)
At Schitu-Go]esti technicians such as En ir.eers Ivancovici ?nu7,
Ciuca Lru7, Georgescu ?nu7, and Voinoveanu L'nu/ did not concern themselves
with work problems. Soviet, methods were not introduced properly and Stakhano-
vites were not recognized. Inspectors of the General Directorate of Coal
showed no interest in solving such problems. At Sarmasag and Derna-Tatarus
competitions were not successful. Workers were not properly indoctrinated.
The exchange of experiences between leading workers, and the support of Sta-
khanovit.es was poor. Organization of competitions at Anina was poor. Plan
preparation was unsatisfactory at the Sorecani State Coal Enterprise. Mining
enterprises of Prahova Regime organized competitions in a bureaucratic man-
ner. Margineanca No 3. for example, fulfilled i'.s plan only 91+ percent, in
part because of the failure to institute compet tions. Lhe second miners'
conference Vasile Farasan declared that more emphasis on competition's was
necessary at Codlea.(2) Managements of mines in Comanesti l!d not give
enough support to the miners.(3)
Stakhanovites and leading wcrkers reported to Gheorgihiu-Dej that.
transportation underground and on the surface was enadequate. The following
examples were cited.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Tiberiu-Harco of the Sorecani State Coal Enterprise stated that the
enterprise suffered from a lack of vehicles. Constantin Damian of Timisoara
Regiune reported on the poor organization of transportation at Sinersig, Do-
man, Secul, and Anina.(2) Antohie Ratoi said that transport for workers and
for coal was needed at Anina.(3) The Filipestii-de-Padure and Sotanga mines
have very limited transportation facilities on the surface.(2)
The lack of a railrced to Poenar, Godeni, and Berevoiesti forces miners
to transport coal manually. The lack of mine cars forces loaders to be idle
for hours. The ministry was called upon for aid, but failed to respond.(3)
Means for transporting workers to the mines were needed in the Schitu-Golesti
Coal Basin.(2) Lack of cars and diesels was chiefly responsible for the fail-
ures to fulfill plans.(24)
Following the second miners conference, newspapers continued. to point
out transportation difficulties as follows: The number of cars at Lup_eni was
inadequate to meet the demands of the mine.(9)
Jiet-Lonea mine No III had particular difficulty with transport and
efforts to improve the situation were unsuccessful. There was no rational use
of underground cars nor were they ma?ntai.ned in repair. The checking of elec-
tric locomotives is unsystematic. For example, on la June, locomotive No 3
was returned to service by the repair shoe but it broke down again after a
few hundred meters of use. As a result, the entire mine achieved only 29 per-
cent of planned production on 4 June. Locomotive No 2 broke down on 25 June
immediately after repair. Technician Benedict Crisan, chief of transport, is
responsible for poor organization of repair. Engineer Adalbert Sultz, chief
of the electric mechanical service, is responsible for the poor repair
work. (25)
6. Inadequate Equipment and aintenance
Equipment was in short supply and naintenance was poor according to
Stakhanovites and leading workers at the second conference. The following
examples of inadequate equipment and maintenance were found in the newspa-
pers surveyed for this report.
The Comanesti Coal Erterpri.se successfully installed a compressor
at the Rafira mine. This compressor served 30 drills and permitted the mine
to fulfill its May plan 120 percent. However, this was one of the few bright
sports in the Comanesti equipment picture.(14) Poor equipment delivered by
Unio of Sato-Mare caused trouble. Engineers did not do enough to i n -.,'--ice
new work methods, using the excuse twat they lacked tools.(3)
Repair of equipment r?equir-~d too much tome. For at the Ga-
lion Mine of Comanesti. two drills were not repaired for 2 weeke because of
the negligence o' Engineer itefanche (fru). At the Lumina mine 4even pneu-
matic drills could not be used for 2 weeks t_ot.is_ Engineer Fopesc _ t'a,led to
have them repaired. Gasoline lamps r.oraproperly ma,ntarxd. ocue a.eters
failed to inspect the lamps and thus they burned r,:-..y - hour_ it toad of 8.
The lack of tools and their improve- ma,:.tensr,ce xela.nc, to tort wt;, C.uss-
nc_-ti fulfilled its production plan only pnr'ent ., ...?,L-ned nehir.d
scuedule in the preparation of new mine focus.Cl4)
At Sector IV of Jieti-Lonea in Vales Jiul0. miner_ :._ _camg=:e i by
the lack of cars and air hose. Proposal; for improver,,; the work v- re ,r,nored
and Engineer Ion Ungureanu failed to help overecmc ..:'f :c~;c.i? Th.-ere was
no . egular ropai Plan at the Mine.
m..._ _ c ._ _..
not have the needed tools.(23) Lupeni did n_, _:la;. '._ast:.no and failed .l ,
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provide enough dynamite so that time was lost waiting for a supply.(9, 24)
Lupeni lacked mine timber of good quality. Many groups lost production time
cutting timbers to correct dimensions. This work should have been done at
the surface.(26) Despite large-scale mechanization at Lupeni production was
not successful.
One of the rensons for the failure of Anina to fulfill its plan was
the lack of cars, mine timbers, and other equipment. Chains were used for
lifting coal because screw lifts were not available. There was a shortage
of mine timbers throughout Schitu-Golesti. This was especially evident at
Poenari,(2) The Poenari and Godeni mines did not fulfill April and May 1952
plans because of the lack of machinery, rails, and other equipment.(3) The
Alms Coal Basin did not have the proper drills and equipment to work a very
thin strata. Mines of Filipestii-de-Padure needea special tools and equip-
ment for the exploitation, of lignite. The Codlea and Capeni mines were short
of antigas motors and lamps due to late deliveries by the General Directorate
of Coal.(2) 1 Mai Mine of Codlea needed dribs, mine hammers, drill bits, a
source of air for pneumatic tools, and lamp burners. (27)
Mihai Szuder, Minister of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries
stat^d that poor work by the ministry and by industrial enterprises of the
ministry under his predecesso] had made the work of the miner difficult and
had placed handicaps on the development of coal mining. These enterprises
did not supply enough miner timbers. Those which they did supply were thin
and green. The management of units sought to hide the failure to deliver
timbers. They forced mining enterprises to take a certain percentage of un-
usable wood as a condition for receiving quantities of acceptable wood. The
Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries, and the Ministry of Coal
and Petroleum Industries were accessories, because they did nothing to remedy
this situation.
Units under the Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose must correct
errors in the supply of mine timbers because of the importance of ::oal min-
ing, the need for these timbers to increase production, and for the protection
of the health and lives of the minere.(26)
Engineer Ion Tundrea reported to Gheorghiu-DeJ that the Derna-Ta-
tarus and Sarmasag enterprises of Bihcr Region= lacked electric power. This
limited production during many months of the year. Despite this, the direc-
torate and the ministry showed laxity in the delivery of electrogenous groups
which 'ere urgently needed. (3) At the cor.ference Ioar, Ji~sri called for the
electrification of Berevoiesti.(2)
Stakhanovite Grigore Siller of the Fetrila mines dc~_'_ared at the _on-
ference that there was a need for trained personnel. Youths? 1P 019 or
younger, working in the mines caused a.cidents because they were no. sc.f'ft-
cier.tly prepare. Workers did not know how to oor,serve e: or produc-
tivity combined with the longwall -tethod for greater outp.m had been applied
at 32 faces in the Valea Jiului.(1.)
In the coul industry as a whole '.:here are -.c,
The first Stakhanovites were confirmed in December 1951. Toe nunioer ii: '+a-
lea Jiului. Sotanga, and other mine areas has grown rapidly since that time.
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More than 1,900 miners in Vales, Jiului, Anina, Comanesti, Filipestii-de-Padure,
Sorecani, Ojasca, Petrila, and Sarmasag earned the title of Stakhanovite or
leading worker by using the cyclic graph method, the retreat method, or as a
result of better training of personnel. In Valea Jiului alone 500 miners be-
came leading workers. Their achievements were popularized daily by newspaper
articles and pictures, by radio programs, and in cultural halls.(22)
Groups of miners at Petrila received awards for extra production.
The group under Vasile Marian, for example, received 8,393.57 lei in addition
to their regular wages. The chief of the group received 1,051.41 lei, in-
cluding 186.05 as a prize. Miner Ion Iancu received 1,013.83 lei and a prize
of 217.97 lei. Car Operator Constantin Petru received a prize of 138.71 lei
i.. addition to wages of 645.20 lei for contributions to transport. Others,
however, received no prizes. For example, miners D. Bunduc and R. I. Nuta,
lost prizes of 185.72 and 115.59 lei, respectively, for absence without
cause.(31)
The following groups at the Tebea mines were successful, Miners of
Sector I, under Sub-Engineer Cornel Bocanici fulfilled their plan 174 percent.
Groups under Leading Miners Nicolae Ana and Azarie Balatz produced two norms
each. Groups and teams of leading miners under David Traian, Constantin Zariu,
Lazar Tudoran, Teodor Groza, L. Barastanu, and Teodor Tndrei exceeded norms
50-87 percent while cutting in half the time required for mounting cranes.(11)
At Petrila 12 Stakhanovites and 221 leading workers were qualified as
a result of competitions and the use of the retreat method and the Juravliov-
Pokrovski method. (4) A group under Stakhanovite Gheza Kopetin of Section III,
Lonea-Jieti, began work on their 1954 quota in June 1952.(32) In Valea Pa-
langii, near Filipestii-de-Padure, Miner Ion Cismar.:, Nicolae Destfu, Ion
Lipianu, and others fulfilled daily quotas 155-175 percent.(17) The team of
Leading Worker Stefan Motig was outstanding at Se:ul.(13) Twelve groups of
miners in Vales. Jiului were working on 1953 q?_otar in July 1952.f33) Stakhano-
vite Sava Raichici of Anina was terminating his 195' quota at the end of flay.
The youth brigade of Antoh.te Taroi was starting 1953 quota at that time.(3)
Miner Alexandru Bran pledged that he would become a Stakhanovite.(33)
3. Higher Wages
Gheorghlu-De,1 assured the 40 mine represent at,iwes at th'! mid-June
conference that the government was actively concerned with the Solut.on of
two problems, the improvement of the material well teing of the miners and
improvement in the production of coal. jo omieed a second :orfe:ense in
early July at Petrosani to announce governme polity for bringing about the
two improvements. (14)
At the second conference. he announced a new wage and prize system, as
follows:
In place of t?i,e, old system of wage by -:at_ gory, a new ystem of wage
by job will be introduced. For example, a miner en a frontal ;,tope will re-
ceive 22.12 lei per day for fulfillment: of norm-.. as compared to 17.75 or
19.92 under the old system. A beginner .will also rece:7e :e; per day
as compared to 15.48 or 17.70 per day. The greatest wage, 26.,;3 lei per day
will be given to operators of :Dine cuttcr~: and combines stiunolate *.re use
of new techniques. Due to work conditions in Aninr_, miners there wi1;. receive
more pay than in Valea Jiului or at lignite Tines. Brigade leader--. wi11 re-
ceive an increase of 30 percent for .,,,derground work or for organization of
principal ,lobs. Other
brigade leaders will receive i- per,ert in?.rea:;ee, not-
gade'leaders in whose units all men fulfill _dvsil norms will re-:eive a
50 percent increase.
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Miners will receive double pay for r.... _ .. th-. .. 7-rz t;. Lc!r.sent
and triple for more than 10 percent, beginai ,y rith tko _ t! p-rc: L. This
will replace the old system which called for dcub' _ p; ':p t.~o 20 pow cent and
triple for exceeding the norm by more than 20 par:.-nt. For :,dergrcun3 nu
iliary work a premium of 50 percent will be pail for averfulfillment of up to
20 percent and double wages for more than 20 percent. A special system of
eollactive prizes will be introduced for exceeding the rursher of cyclss in
the norm under the cyclic graph method.
Masters, engineers, and technicians of the dining sector who con-
tribute directly to the increase in the number of ,cycle, achieved in cut-i.ng
will receive a prize of 5 percent of the basic monthly salary for esch average
cycle achieved. A new system of prizes will be introduced fur administrative
workers and for engineers, technicians, and functionaries. -(ualified adminis-
trative workers will be awarded 35 percent of their tasic salary for fulfill-
ment of the production plan by the sector or face for which they are responsi-
ble, and an additional 3 percent for each percentage of ov_rfulfil2ment. Me.n-
agement personnel will be awarded for fulfillirg ant e::cer_ding the production
plan by sector, mine, or shaft served, on condition that the planned produc-
tion cost and salary fund be maintained. Engineers and technicians will re-
ceive supplementary pay for fulfilling and exceeding ;:he pler. for opening and
preparing new sources of production.
At mines where coal is extracted for coke, engineers and technicians will
be awarded for the achievement of the standard and for reduction of ash con-
tent.
k. closures for Improvement
To achieve a stable cadre for the coal industry, Ghecrg)`i>-De?) continued,
9,000 apartments will be set up under the Five-Year Plan. Of these 5,000 will
be built in Valea oiului. An additional 9,000 rooms and halls for dwellings
and cultural work will be set up. M.,w villages and colonies at mines will
have food stores, social and cultural, institutes, sport, health, club, movie,
theater, library, and school facilities. Thus, 21 dispensaries, o polyclinics,
2 hospitals, 24 nurseries and kindergttrders, 20 schools, and :8 slabs will be
established. Vegetable growers will live near mines to provide- local food
supplies. Special stores will be organized. for the exclusive supply of sal-
aried employees of the coal industry with food and industrial products.
To assist in the training, of new personnel. grants will ire garde in
cdvanco for household:;. Trnese will be up to 1,0n0 lei with mcntnly jayments
to he returned in upp to 13- year(.. Those who wish to build houses will be
given loans, free land, an.i material at r_oat. Norms for miners with spe.iail
problems will be reduced as follows: for those who qualify at the pace of
work, 50 p:orcent during the first month and 25 percent during the next 2
months; for graduates of special and professional schools, !:11 percent The
first. month, 25 percent the second month, and 10 percent the thir.i ,uonth.
is'inerr who qualify naw workers at the place of work .i.11 250
lei for each individual trained and a reward for fulfillment of norms by
orkern trained up to 150 1-1.
lnbor protection measures will include vent ilizatJon, l.i;;ht.tng, un-
ti?:rground and surface sanitary facilities, `ire-fighting and emergency equip-
ment, and life-saving teams at large mines or those having ges.(l6)
On i! SiL~ly, the Council of Ministers and the Central. r_ r +ttee the
Aurntnian Workers' Party issued it decree ineorporatlrF the promises, of Gheor-
ghiu-De,i into la..(21j
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1. Scanteia, 14 Jun 52
2. Viata Sindicala, 1 Jul 52
3. Ibid., 3 Jul 52
4. Romania Libera, 12 Jul 52
5. Scanteia 25 Jun 52
6. Viata Sindicala, 6 Jul 52
7. Scanteia, 17 Jun 52
8. Ibid., 24 Jun 52
9. Viata Sindicala, 30 Jul 52
10. Scanteia, 26 Jun 52
11. Ibid., 29 Jul 52
12. Viata Sindicala, 31 Jul 52
13. Ibid., 5 Jul 52
14. Scanteia, 21 Jun 52
15. Romania Libera, 9 Jul 52
16. Viata Sindicala, 2 Jul 52
17. Scanteia, 20 Jun 52
1.8. Ibid., 18 Jun 52
19. Ibid., 19 Jun 52
20. Romania Libera, 17 Jul 52
21. Viata Sindicala, 4 Jul 52
22. Ibid., 26 Jul 52
23. Scanteia, 22 Jim 52
24. Viata Sindicala, 29 Jun 52
25. Ibid., 13 Ju]. 52
26. Ibid., 30 Jul 52
27. Ibid., 8 Jul 52
28. Ibid., 23 Jul 52
29. Ibid., 15 Jul 52
30. Ibid., 11 Jul 52
31. Ibid., 25 Jul 52
32. Ibid., 28 Jun 52
33. Ibid., 11 Jul 52
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