PHILIPPINE MILITARY UNITS IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300230006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 4, 1969
• Content Type: TRANS

CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS
Approved For Re&ase /0 : CIA-RDP71 B00364RW0300230006-4
- 2
Pros:
1. We would "steal the thunder" from Senator
Symington by virtue of hitting the newspapers before
his press conference does, thus offsetting some of the
negative publicity (from our point of view) which we
expect he will attempt to generate. This would be,
particularly so if we were able to attach this device
to a high administration official, as distinct from
merely one of the regular briefing sessions.
2. We would define the third country forces
fighting in Vietnam in terms emphasizing their own
national self interest and thus undercut the "mercenary"
image.
Cons:
1. We would be throwing down the gauntlet with the
Symington Subcommittee, in a somewhat contrived and
obvious ploy to counter in advance his scenario, thus
risking exacerbation of relations with the Subcommittee
when we have ?a long time to go ahead of us.
2. We would be unlikely to get much favorable
coverage via the device of a response to a planted ques-
tion, because: (a) as a matter of actual result, this
just won't generate much news, unless a major official
in the administration made the statement; (b) the "non-
mercenary",approach is nowhere near as news worthy as
the "mercenary" approach; and (c) war moratorium publicity
around the time period of November 12 is going to have a
blanket effect on most other news anyway.
Before making a recommendation on this subject, I
think you and I should talk about it again, probably with
Ambassador, Johnson. Then one of us can chat again with
Mr. Lehman of the White House staff. In any event, we
will want to respond in counter attack to whatever Senator
Symington does say, and we have material available for
this and will be prepared accordingly.
Attachment.
cc: EA - Mr. Green
J - Mr. Getz
EA/P - Mr. Neilson
P - Mr. McCloskey
H - Mt. Prentice
CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS
St to Dept. review completed .~
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 :,CIA-RDP71B00364R000300230006-4
f
 DRAFT November 4, 1969
Approved For Release 2002/07/02: CIA-RDP71 B00364RO 300230006-4
. CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE
Subject: Philippine Military Units in Vietnam
QUESTION: Can Philippine military units in Vietnam be
described as American mercenaries?
ANSWER No; not accurately so. A mercenary is someone
who is hired by a foreign country to fight for
a foreign country. The Philippine military units
in Vietnam were sent by the Philippine government
under Philippine command, to help a neighbor
threatened by invasion. It has always been the
view of the United States Government that the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
dispatched PHILCAG to Vietnam because'the Philippine
Government considered that the Philippines had a
stake in the outcome in the issue in Vietnam and
that the dispatch of these Philippine troops was
in pursuit of the highest policy interests and
goals of the people of the Philippines.
QUESTION: Well, did the Philippine Government just volunteer
to send its military personnel to Vietnam?
ANSWER : Yes. Back in 1964, the Philippine Government told
us that it thought the outcome of the war in Viet-
nam was very much a matter affecting its national
interests. It wanted to make a contribution to
deterring this Communist aggression in Asia. In
April 1965, the GVN specifically asked for Filipino
help.
QUESTION: But was there a price tag put to the U.S. on that
help?
ANSWER : No. Although the PR was willing to participate in -
the Free World defense of Vietnam, it wanted to
be sure that by doing so it wouldn't dilute its
own sorely needed efforts to combat internal
insurgency and to foster domestic economic growth.
The Philippine claim on our intention and our
abilities to assist in internal development has been
consistent and valid right along through these
recent years irrespective of the dispatch of the
PHILCAG unit.
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300230006-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300230006-4
QUESTION: Just what was worked out?
ANSWER : We and the Filipinos developed several arrangements
whereby the two Filipino aims -- participation in
Vietnam and internal stability and growth -- could
be met. We agreed to equip three engineer, con-
struction battalions for domestic rural road and
school construction in Vietnam. We agreed to supply
two small vessels for anti-smuggling operations.
And we agreed to help fund overseas allowances for
Filipino military personnel in Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 CIA,RDP71-B00364R000300230006-4
 UkCLASSIFI INY~ vAL n ~~NF
^ EQppr ft Itb 2002/07/02: CIA-R 1 B0~36,
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
C FE
DATE
6 November 1969
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
buildin
)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
g
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
O LC
5
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
A 149"
.
FORM
3-62
^ UNCLASSIFIED
610 USEDITPREV IO S ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ USE ONLY
X1