DISCUSSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001200110035-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: December 21, 1952
• Content Type: REGULATION

TOE' SECREApp~ci am set ft1I,'2.9 : CIA-RDP83-00036R0 200110035-8
Transcribed for abd by cem
21 December 1952
APPENDIX "B"
DISCUSSION
1.. As used herein, "clandestine" will refer to those offensive and defensive
secret intelligence operations, the detection of which will embarrass the operators.
2. During the war, the collection of foreign intelligence information neces-
sary to the prosecution of the war, by clandestine methods, was engaged in by a
number of agencies including G-2, WDGS, ONI, FBI, and OSS, supplemented by the
activities of certain personnel of the Department of State. Since the termination
of formal hostilities, certain of the agencies operating during the war in the
clandestine field have curtailed or terminated their activities.
3. The need for foreign intelligence information which can be collected only
by clandestine methods is an integral and essential part of the continuing need
for complete foreign intelligence to insure the national security.
14. In the course of the survey, the following categories of personnel have
been interviewed and, in some cases, have submitted written reports and comments:-
a. State Department officials having knowledge of the work and require-
ments in this field;
b. Representatives of 0-2 concerned in clandestine methods for collecting
foreign intelligence information:
c. Representatives of ONI concerned in this type of work;
d. Representatives of FBI with complete knowledge of their operations
in this field in the areas and centers assigned to them by Presidential Orders;
e. Officials of SSU (formerly OSS) and field personnel of that organization
who happened to be in Washington.
The Department of State, in its visa control, has continuing need for informa-
tion on foreign individuals desiring to enter the United Statesand on individuals
residing abroad who claim right to American passports. The Department of State,
in performing its mission to determine the policy of the government in relation to
international problems, has continuing need for foreign intelligence information,
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001200110035-8
 TQP SECRI-Zpproved For R.4ease 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036R#1200110035-8
particularly in political, economic and financial fields. However, as a matter
of policy, the Department of State prefers not to engage in the collection 'of
foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods. The Department of State,
in order to perform its departmental intelligence mission, therefore requires
assistance from other agencies.
6. a. The War Department has a continuing need for foreign military intelli-
gence information in order that the Secretary, and in turn the President,
shall have accurate and current military intelligence on all other countries,
any one or more of which may at any time become a threat to the national
security. Some of the information required in some countries and much of it
in others, cannot be obtained by overt methods. To supply this deficiency in
wartime, the Military Intelligence Division developed facilities for collecting
essential information by clandestine methods. In the continuing emergency,
these facilities are still in operation and are being currently expanded in
certain areas. Provision for these facilities and their operation has been
made in budget estimates for fiscal year 1947.
b. The War Department also possesses and operates, under the direction
of the Director of Central Intelligence, certain facilities formerly under OSS
and later SSU. NIA Directives No. 3 and No. 4 provide for the liquidation of
these facilities by the end of fiscal year 1917. Such liquidation, however,
can be accomplished in whole or in part by the transfer to other agencies, or
to the Central Intelligence Group, of such facilities as shall be necessary to
them in performing their parts of the national intelligence mission. So far as
available information indicates, the operation of certain facilities formerly
under OSS and later SSU, is necessary to the performance of the national
intelligence mission. The G-2, USFET and the Military Government in occupied
territories in Europe characterize these facilities as kinecessaryfl to them and
would desire their integration in USFET if no other use for them were to be
determined. The Foreign Activities Correlation Division of the Department of
State, speaking specifically of the X-2 activity of SSU, states that, "The
X-2 type of work should not be cast aside hastily and forgotten. The wartime
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "Hu
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : C A-RDP83-00036R001200110035-8
 ? . ? Approved For Rase 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036Rgpr1200110035-8
TOP SECRET
unit can will boast of some valuable talent and. certain communication faci-
lities that should be capitalized upon during peace by an organization of a
permanent character."
7. During the war, the Navy Department developed and operated clandestine
facilities whichtere essential parts of the mechanism for collecting foreign
intelligence information. Currently, owing to drastically curtailed funds, the
Navy Department does not maintain facilities for collecting essential naval
intelligence information on foreign countries by clandestine methods. The need
for such information exists, however - witness the TOP SECRET "Current Intelli-
gence Requirements, " dated 15 April 1946, from the Chief of Naval Intelligence,
copy of which is on file in C.I.G. Substantial portions of these "Current
Intelligence Requirements" could not be met by the overt means currently available
to the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The Navy Department possesses the capability
of operating by clandestine methods insofar as available competent personnel is
concerned. It does not possess that capability insofar as essential financial
support is concerned. The Navy Department at present requires assistance from
some other agency to meet the need which its own available facilities do-not meet.
8. During the War, by Order of the President, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation collected political, economic, financial, industrial and counterintelligence
information by clandestine methods in Central and South America and the Caribbean.
The FBI also stationed personnel in several European centers in order to cover
certain activities directed against the security of the United States from those
centers. Certain' security operations of the FBI outside the United States are a
necessary part of its mission pertaining to the internal security of the Nation,
since much foreign activity intended to be detrimental to the United States is
directed from outside the United States. The operation of the FBI in the political,
economic, financial and industrial fields, outside the United States - while
authorized in wartime by Presidential Order and continued currently by Congressional
appropriation - is apparently without legal authority in peacetime and might not
be sustained if competently challenged.
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001200110035-8
 TOP SEClroved For Rase 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036Rf200110035-8
9. To summarize:
a. State Department has the continuing need for certain foreign intelli-
gence information which can be collected only by clandestine methods, but has
not developed means for performing such collection in peacetime.
b. Navy Department has the continuing need for foreign intelligence informa-
tion which can be collected only by clandestine methods, but currently does not
possess adequate funds to permit such collection activity.
c. War Department has the continuing need for foreign intelligence informa-
tion which can be collected only by clandestine methods, and possesses the means
for meeting that need, including certain SSU facilities presently under the
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
d. FBI has the continuing need for certain types of foreign intelligence
information which can be collected only by clandestine methods, and possesses
the potential means for meeting that need. However, FBI is legally restricted
in the scope of its operations.
10. To insure that each of the agencies subject to NIA coordination has its needs
in the field of clandestine intelligence information collection properly met, four
courses of action appear to be open to consideration, as follows:-
a. Each Department to operate its own Service to carry out its own depart-
mental intelligence mission, all to be subject to central coordination.
b. A single Department to operate a Service for the benefit of other
Departments as well as for itself; this to be subject to central direction so
as to insure that each Department receives full benefit of such service.
c. A central Service to be established and operated by the Director of
Central Intelligence, such central Service to replace the departmental services.
d. A central Service to be established and operated by the Director of
Central Intelligence, in addition to and coordinated with such departmental
services as the Departments may require to discharge their own responsibilities.
11. Analyzing the foregoing courses of action it would appear that:
a. Each Department now operates its own clandestine intelligence information
collection service to the extent permitted by the facilities available to it for
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036 R001200110035-8
 -TOP SEC~,I4pproved ForiWease 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036 1200110035-8
such service. Maintenance of the status quo would avoid interruption of exist-
ing services and would maintain the essential departmental responsibility for
providing departmental intelligence. Distribution of this responsiblity favors
security, both as regards operating personnel and as regards secret funds. It
also insures that technical specialists are available to the departmental ser-
vice having a specific need. If the operation of the several clandestine
collection services were coordinated centrally, the inadequacies caused by
varying and at times insufficient departmental facilities, might be compensated.
On the other hand, the problem of coordination will be difficult and there may
be duplications and inefficiency incident thereto.
b. Operation by a single Department for the mutual benefit of all would not
be entirely satisfactory, for a certain degree of departmental bias would be
inevitable, even under central direction; the organization would be necessarily
of such size that the security of the numerous personnel required under one
head would be difficult to insure and maintain; positive control by a central
agency would be difficult to effect in practice, however attractive it might
appear to be in theory.
c. A central clandestine collection service, intended to replace the several
departmental services, might not replace them actually, as testimony brought out
in the hearingsshowed that, even with such a central service, any departmental
intelligence agency might consider it necessary to continue its own secret
service. If departmental agencies were eliminated, a departmental head would
not have any single agency of his own which he could hold exclusively responsible
for providing departmental intelligence information. A central service would be
less responsive to the detailed needs of individuals at the working level within
Departments.
d. A central clandestine collection service, performing those tasks which
can be accomplished most efficiently centrally, in addition to the several
departmental services and coordinated with them, would provide a simple, efficient
means of meeting the needs of all. Centrally coordinated, such a system has the
advantages of singleness of purpose, unity of control, and possible economy of
effort in operations in the field.
APPENDIX "B's
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIkBP83-00036R001200110035-8
 Approved Foelease 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-0003"60(001200110035-8
ZrOP SECRET
12. From the foregoing analysis, the course of action outlined in 10 d is
favored: to wit, the establishment of a central clandestine intelligence inforn,ion
collection service, to be operated by the Director of Central Intelligence for the
benefit of the agencies subject to NIA coordination, as a service of common concern,
in addition to and coordinated with such services as the Departments deem necessary
to accomplish their missions.
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001200110035-8
 SECRET (When pilled In)
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, fore, addressee, title a length)
Draft NIA Directive re Provision for the Collection of
Foreign Intelligence Information by Clandestine Methods; llpp.
(Includes Report by DCX and Discussion)
ABSTRACT
DCI cited paragraphS3 b and c of the President's letter of 22 January
1946 which assigned CIG common concern functions. This draft directive
would assign to CIG responsibility for a central clandestine intelligence
information collection service (exclusive of electl_4jC communications
intercepts) to be operated for the common ;concern. This'would be in
addition to operations of other agencies necessary in the discharge
of'..these responsibilities. The DCI would cogQrdinate all foreign
intelligence collection; the FBI could 1s.Kn.t:o its activity to internal
security of the nation.
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036ROO1200110035-8
'FORM 2523 O?IT10Me ?etvlous (1!?IS~
4.4Y HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX SECRET