THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110032-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 15, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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September 15, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Deputy Chief Mowry's public statement that
the patrolmen ought not to have arrested
the boys. The confidence of various groups
in society In the fairness of the police is of
course the key to public cooperation.
The incident also illustrates the value of
a police community relations division under
an able and forthright officer like Chief
Mowry. It was his first test in a highly de-
manding job, and he deserves the commu-
nity's confidence. Washington's Metropoli-
tan Police constitute one of the most effi-
cient forces in the country. It is now show-
ing that it understands the value of restraint
and tact as well.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, both
Deputy Chief Mowry and - Inspector
Causey have been captains of the 14th
precinct and are good tactitions in com-
munity relations work and because of
this, enjoy the respect of every segment
of the committee.
I would hope and expect, and I am
sure many of my colleagues would agree,
that they will get the fullest coopera-
tion in their endeavors for 1. am certain
the community will be far better off for
their efforts.
It is both interesting and pleasing for
me to note that Howard Mowry comes
from an old and much respected Rhode
Island family. So I take this oppor-
tunity to wish him well in his new posi-
tion and to reiterate my interest and
hope for a vigorous effort against crime
by those who are charged with the re-
sponsibility of law enforcement in the
District of Columbia.
WHO WILL WATCH THE
WATCHMAN?
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, for some
time It has been the proud boast of the
managers of America's space effort that
unlike the Soviets, our experiments are
conducted in full view of the public.
This, it has been asserted, is character-
istic of the differences in our form of gov-
ernment and the closed society of the
Communist world.
Now, a dark cloud has been cast on
that claim. Assertions of censorship and
news management have been made by
the respected science writer of the Wash-
ington Evening Star, William Hines.
Some of the clumsy attempts at cen-
sorship are both silly and stupid.
But, more importantly, they seriously
undermine not only this Nation's con-
fidence, but that of the world, In our
ability and determination to tell the
of the damaged areas. I was told they
were "not available." I asked why U.S.
television networks were carrying films
by Vietcong photographers but were
seemingly unable to obtain footage show-
ing the effects of our raids. There was
no explanation.
And now there are distressing signals
that the space program is falling prey to
the same dread disease of secrecy.
It would be my hope, Mr. President,
that the communications media them-
selves, which argue so eloquently for the
freedom of the press which our Constitu-
tion guarantees them, would increase
their protests against news management
and censorship.
Mr. Hines has done a great service
both to his craft and to the public in his
article which appeared in the September
1 issue of the Star. I ask unanimous con-
sent to have it printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Sept. 1, 1965]
WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMAN?
(By William Hines)
The Pentagon has surprised almost every-
one with its promptness in applying the first
squeeze of censorship and news management
to its new manned orbiting laboratory (MOL)
program.
Most people assumed that soon after the
military got a manned role In space, it would
start classifying it, but few could have fore-
seen the rapidity with which restrictions
came. The elapsed time from President
Johnson's announcement of the start of MOL
at his press conference last week to the Pent-
agon's first fumbling bit of news manage-
ment was exactly 2 hours.
The restriction was picayune and worse
than pointless: It was unenforcible.
Reporters trooping to an MOL briefing at
the Pentagon were instructed that they
would not be allowed to make tape record-
ings or to mention the name of the official
(Dr. Albert C. Hall, Deputy Director of Re-
search and Engineering), who was briefing
them. This exchange then occurred:
"Why not?"
"Because that's the way we prefer to do It."
The briefing was highly technical and con-
tained many points that could be misunder-
stood by reporters and thus misinterpreted
for readers who, in the final analysis, will be
paying the expensive tab for MOL. A tape
would have been helpful.
The briefing was later transmitted by tele-
phone to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administrations Houston Center, where a
large contingent of reporters was covering
22997
traducer of a free news flow. The space
agency gives news management the old col-
lege try every time a manned spacecraft goes
up.
Of all the significant news locations in a
Gemini flight, the only one not covered by
the combined news media (meaning press,
radio, and TV) is the most important one of
all, the mission control center at Houston.
It is not a secret place, nor one in which
unnecessary traffic is discouraged. Flight
Director Christopher C. Kraft already has
stated publicly that he would rather have a
Soviet observer In his control center than
an American journalist. Further, every
clerk and secretary among the 4,600 NASA
civil servants who could spare 6 or 10 min-
utes from work was encouraged to look in.
On one flight the motion picture actor
Jimmy Stewart was an interested observer.
Even newspaper publishers have been ad-
mitted, possibly on the theory that they are
not really . "working press," and hence
harmless.
But neither camera nor tape recorder nor
pen-and-paper reporter is allowed In the
nonsecret room at any time during a flight.
This is a measure of how fax we have come
in 20 short years. Even in the supersecret
atom bomb project, the national press had
a "pool" representative, William L. Laurence
of the New York Times. This is not to sug-
gest that there has been any "ooverup" to
date. In the course of missions, Kraft gives
regular, full, and apparently frank accounts
of flight activities, and opens himself to
detailed questioning. So do his associates.
A mission commentary of less consistent
accuracy and authenticity Is broadcast.
But whether or not there has been sup-
pression to date is not the point. All flights
so far have ended happily, and nothing suc-
ceeds like success. There has been no rea-
son for a coverup.
The point is that the opportunity for news
management definitely exists in mission con-
trol-and it is an axiom of political science
that where opportunity exists; there are al-
ways people waiting to seize it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BASS in the chair). Is there further
morning business? If not, morning
business is closed.
SCENIC DEVELOPMENT AND ROAD
BEAUTIFICATION OF THE FED-
ERAL AID HIGHWAY SYSTEMS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the unfin-
ished business be laid before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK, A bill (S.
9(Rd) fn r~rnvjAn fnr .-in r7 o.,e,.~..+
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE September
15, 1965
wit 'Page 1'L, lines 1 and 2, after the word il.sion that billboards were permitted.
`pay" in line 1 strike out the words "the We are saying to them that they must
Federal pro rata share of".
On page 16, line 15, after the word "pay" 1 emove billboards on the 50-50 alloca-
strike out the words "the Federal pro rata Von that has always been proposed.
share of the". There is a difference in the Interstate
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would
like to explain the purpose of the amend-
ment which I have offered for myself
and the Senator from Montana [Mr.
METCALF]. The committee bill provides
that the cost shall be allocated between
theFederal Government and the States
in the same proportion that costs are al-
located for construction of the Inter-
state Highway and primary systems?-
that is, 90 percent to be paid by the Fed-
eral Government and 10 percent by the
States, in_ respect to the Interstate High-
way System, and 50 percent by the Fed-
eral Government and 50 percent by the
States with respect to the primary
system.
I support the objectives of the bill, and
voted to report it to the Senate. But
yesterday, at the close of the session,
I stated my reasons for having presented
this amendment in committee, and the
reasons which lead me to offer it today.
In the subcommittee this amendment
was adopted by a large vote, but in the
full committee the action of the subcom-
mittee was reversed by a vote of 8 to 5.
I offer this amendment for two princi-
Pal reasons. One reason is that it is a
national program, it is so declared by
the bill and by the President.
The second reason for requiring the
full amount to be paid by the Federal
Government is that the bill would im-
pose a penalty upon States not acceding
to its program--the penalty being the
denial of all Federal-aid funds for con?-
struct4on of highways. With such a
penalty, and no State could accept such
a penalty, the program proposed in the
bill-worthy as it is--cannot be consid-
ered a true voluntary-Federal-State aid
program. The denial of all funds to a
State would amount to millions of dollars
to a State
878tem, which is new, which goes
through new areas and new territory.
We say that under the law we will give
tae same proportion of assistance to the
State to remove billboards that we gave
f,r'r the financing of other highway sys-
tuurns, such as under the 90-10 Interstate
System.
So far as the secondary systems are
c4mcerned, we have always had the right
to erect billboards. ThisIs a prevailing
system in all the States. Yet, we are
si ying to the States that they must re-
rr ove the billboards or they will not be
p ormitted to share in the Federal high-
w ry program. It is coercion.
We are taking away from the States
their police power to remove billboards
and we are saying they have to make
compensation.
This is a national program. We have
d,( cided we are going to remove billboards
fr)m the interstate and secondary sys-
tens. Therefore, I concur that we
should pay that cost out of the national
bt ciget. We should not force the States
to: forgo all of their participation in the
interstate program if they do not want
to take away a man's livelihood, or a
corm's business, which he has had for
many years.
: feel strongly that the States should
use, their funds for secondary road sys-
teias and the farm-to-market roads, and
for,: the development of primary high-
ways on the present allocation, and
should not be forced to compensate the
billboard operators. I feel strongly that
thu cost should come out of the Federal
butiget.
..-herefore,
ment.
In the ease of California it would Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, even
a Inu the to a denial of California miition would though the remarks of the distinguished
amou In de own State it wouan- ld Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of
. my amount to $74 mrlllion. In other States the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr.
it would be in similar proportions. - per ding legislation will ont be germane to thk
The bill would effectually require the uni For
per. ding s consent ( that t the chairman I ask
States to accept this program and that the Foreign g consent m e ch[Sena-
their legislatures legislatures appropriate money to Relations Coed to sp speak or
pay for its cost. It is a worthy program, not ot to exceed ceed 1 1 be allowed to speak for
I voted to report it to the Senate, but not to hour.
I do not approve its mandatory features. YouNG of Ohio in PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Over 100 Federal-aid programs have objoetjon so the chair). Without
of
enacted. None mandatorily re- objecti, is so ordered. The
rule of
le
quires State acceptance. If it is to be germaneness is waived.
exercised, I believe the Federal Govern- k r, COOPER. Mr. President, I do not
ment should pay its full cost. intend to object, but I wish to have the
I understand there are others who assurance that the amendment which
desire to speak. I shall not speak has been stated will be the pending ques-
further at this time.. tion - at the conclusion of the remarks
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, will by the distinguished chairman of the
the Senator yield to me for a moment? Pori sign Relations Committee.
Mr. COOPER. I yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I con- Chair states to the senior Senator from
cur in this amendment for all of the rea- Kentucky that his amendment will be
sons outlined. This is a coercive pro- the rending question.
gram. Mt. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
We are saying to the States that they the Senator yield briefly without losing
have to go into the secondary road sys- his light to the floor?
tern where always we have had the pro- Mc. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ? PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objectio it is so ordered.
THE S R flN IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC .
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
formation of a provisional government in
Santo Domingo under the leadership of
Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news.
It provides reason for cautious optimism
as to the future and testifies as well to
the arduous and patient efforts of the
OAS mediating team. I wish to pay
tribute especially to Ambassador Bunk-
er for his wisdom and patience in han-
dling this difficult affair. The forma-
tion of a provisional government is not
the end of the Dominican crisis, but it
does bring to an end a tragic and dan-
gerous phase of the crisis. Many prob-
lems remain, particularly the problem of
establishing the authority of a demo-
cratic government over the Dominican
military. Nonetheless, the situation now
seems to be moving into a less danger-
ous and more hopeful, phase. At this
time of relative calm it is appropriate,
desirable and, I think, necessary to re-
view events in the Dominican Repub-
lic and the U.S. role in those events.
The purpose of such a review-and its
only purpose-is to develop guidelines
for wise and effective policies in the
future.
I was In doubt about: the advisability
of making a statement on the Domoni-
can affair until some of my colleagues
made public statements on the floor.
Their views on the way in which the
committee proceedings were conducted
and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as
a whole, are so diametrically opposed to
my own that I now consider it my duty
to express my personal conclusions
drawn from the hearings held by the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
The suggestions that have been made
that the committee was prejudiced in
its approach against the administra-
tion's policies are, in my opinion, with-
out merit. The committee was impar-
tial and fair in giving a full and detailed
hearing to the administration's point
of view, so much so, in fact, that it
heard only one witness from outside the
Government.
U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was
characterized initially by overtimidity
and subsequently by overreaction.
Throughout the whole affair, it has also
been characterized by a lack of candor.
These are general conclusions I have
reached from a painstaking review of the
salient features of the extremely com-
plex situation. These judgments are
made, of course, with the benefit of hind-
sight and, in fairness, it must be con-
ceded there were no easy choices avail-
able to the United States in the Domini-
can Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task
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a'nt , t,om 1.5 7 965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
22999
of diplomacy to make wise decisions when Another theme that emerges from the such as the recently discredited Came-
inican crisis is the occurrence of a lot; these studies claim to be scientific
D
bl
a
om
y
cy
they need to be made and U.S. diplom
failed to do so in the Dominican crisis. striking change in U.S. policy toward the but beneath their almost unbelieva
It cannot be said with assurance that Dominican Republic and the possibility- opaque language lies an unmistakable
the United States could have changed the not a certainty, because the signs are military and reactionary bias.
course of events by acting differently. ambiguous, but only the possibility-of It is of great importance that the un-
What can be said with assurance is that a major change as well in the general certainty as to U.S. aims in Latin Amer-
the United States did not take advantage Latin American policies of the United ica be resolved. We cannot successfully
of several opportunities in which it might States. Obviously, an important change advance the cause of popular democracy
have changed the course of events. The in the official outlook on Dominican af- and at the same time aline ourselves
reason appears to be that, very close to fairs occurred between September 1963, with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies;
the beginning of the revolution, U.S. when the United States was vigorously yet that is what we seem to be trying to
policymakers decided that it should not opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, do. The direction of the Alliance for
be allowed to succeed. This decision and April 1965, when the United States Progress is toward social revolution in
seems to me to have been based on exag- was either unenthusiastic or actually Mani fan intervention se toward thour e suo-
gerated estimates of Communist in- opposed to his return.
fluence in the rebel movement in the What happened in that period to pression of revolutionary movements
initial stages and on distaste for the re- change the assessment of Bosch from which are supported by Communists or
turn to power of Juan Bosch or of a gov- favorable to unfavorable? It is quite suspected of being influenced by Com-
ernment controlled by Bosch's party, the true that Bosch as President did not dis- munists. The prospect of an election in
PRD-Dominican Revolutionary Party. tinguish himself as an administrator, but 9 months which may conceivably pro-
The question of the degree of Commu- that was well known in 1963. It is also duce a strong democratic government is
nist influence is of critical importance true, however, and much more to the certainly reassuring on this score, but
and I shall comment on it later. The es- point as far as the legitimate interests the fact remains that the reaction of the
sential point, however, is that the United of the United States are concerned, that United States at the time of acute crisis
States, on the basis of ambiguous evi- Bosch had received 58 percent of the was to intervene forcibly and illegally
dence, assumed almost from the begin- votes in a free and honest election and against a revolution which, had we
ning that the revolution was Communist that he was presiding over a reform- sought to influence it instead of sup-
dominated, or would certainly become so. minded government in tune with the pressing it, might have produced a strong
It apparently never occurred to anyone Alliance for Progress. This is a great popular government without foreign
that the United States could also attempt deal more than can be said for any other military intervention. Since just about,
to influence the course which the revolu- President of the Dominican Republic. every revolutionary movement is likely to
tion took. We misread prevailing tend- The question therefore remains as to attract Communist support, at least in
encies in Latin America by overlooking how and why the attitude of the U.S. the beginning, the approach followed in
or ignoring the fact that any reform Government changed so strikingly be- the Dominican Republic, if consistently
movement is likely to attract Commu- tween September 1963 and April 1965. pursued, must inevitably make us the
nist support. We thus failed to perceive And the question inevitably arises enemy of all revolutions and therefore
that if we are automatically to oppose whether this shift in the administra- the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt
any reform movement that Communists tion's attitude toward the Dominican oligarchies of the hemisphere.
adhere to, we are likely to end up oppos- Republic is part of a broader shift in We simply cannot have it both ways;
ing every reform movement, making our- its attitude toward other Latin Amer- we must choose between the Alliance for
selves the prisoners of reactionaries who ican countries, whether, to be specific, Progress and a foredoomed effort to sus-
wish to preserve the status quo-and the U.S. Government now views the vig- tain the status quo in Latin America. which
e to make is the
e unanswered arquest on arising reform movements of Latin good enough.
the status quo in many countries is not ica-such as Christian Democracy Amer-
in principal
The principal reason for the failure Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in out ofthe unhappy events in the Domini-
of American policy in Santo Domingo Peru and Accion Democratica in Vene- can Republic and, indeed, the principal
was faulty advice given to the President zuela-as threatening to the interests of unanswered question for the future of
by his representatives in the Dominican the United States. And if this is the our relations with Latin America.
Republic at the time of acute crisis. case, what kind of Latin American po- It is not surprising that we Americans
Much of this advice was based on mis- litical movements would now be regarded are not drawn toward the uncouth revo-
judgment of the facts of the situation; as friendly to the United States and We are ries of thenon-Communist left.
some of it appears to have been based beneficial to its interests? W not, as we like the ik claim Foueft.
rth
on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, I should like to make it very clear that of Julyuly speeches, nation most oct truly are, revolu-
close earth;
y to bthe the
simply inaccurate information. On the. I am raising a question not offering an ry, much on
basis of the information and counsel he answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the contrary, much t being e earth. o We n received, the President could hardly have current attitude of the U.S. Government ry os sober and satisfied and comfortable
acted other than he did. toward reformist movements in Latin are rich; and institutions are stable and
I am hopeful, and reasonably con- America. On the one hand, President and and even venerable; and our Revo-
fident, that the mistakes made by the Johnson's deep personal commitment to old old and ven venerable; abl that matter, was
United States in the Dominican Repub- the philosophy and aims of the Alliance lution of 17 upheaval compared as not to th
lit can be retrieved and that it will be for Progress is clear; it was convincingly much and Russian evolutions and to
possible to avoid repeating them in the expressed, for example, in his speech to French
and Rimpending ussian r revin
future. These purposes can be served, the Latin American Ambassadors on the current
n America, Asia, and Avo u and t.
however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. fourth anniversary of the Alliance for
policy are thoroughly reviewed and Progress-a statement in which the Our heritage of stabiilty and conserva-
analyzed. I make my remarks today in President compared the Alliance for tism is a great blessing, but it also has
the hope of contributing to that process. Progress with his own enlightened pro- the effect of limiting our understanding
The development of the Dominican gram for a Great Society at home. On of the character of social revolution and
crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, pro- the other hand, one notes a general tend- sometimes as well of the injustices which
vides a classic study of policymaking in ency on the part of our policymakers not spawn them. Our understanding of
a fast-changing situation in which each to look beyond a Latin American politi- revolutions and their causes is imperfect
decision reduces the range of options cian's anticommunism. One also notes not because of any failures of mind or
available for future decisions so that in certain Government agencies, particu- character but because of our good for-
errors are compounded and finally, in- larly the Department of Defense, a pre- tune since the Civil War in never having
deed, there are few if any options except occupation with counterinsurgency, experienced sustained social injustice
to follow through on an ill-conceived which is to say, with the prospect of without hope of legal or more or less
course of action. Beyond a certain point revolutions and means of suppressing peaceful remedy. We are called upon,
ur sympathy and support to movements
the ominican story acquired ne itability of a Greek tagedye of in them. This dubious and costly a research projects, otherefore, to give our unerstanding and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 15, 1965
which are alien to our experience and I think that in the case of the Domini- willing to support if not positively op-
jarring to our preferences and prejudices, can Republic we did close our minds to posed tot osch,
We must try to understand social rev- the causes and to the essential legitimacy ]EventsB of the days following April 24
olution and the injustices that give It of revolution In a country in which dem- demonstrated that Reid had so little
rise because they are the heart and colic ocratic procedures had failed. That, I popular support that it can reasonably
of the experience of the great majority think, is the central fact concerning the be ; argued that there was nothing the
of people now living in the world. Ia participation of the United States in the United States could have done short of
Latin America we may prefer to assc-6 Dominican revolution and, possibly as armed intervention, to save h(s regime.
date with the well-bred, well-dressed well, Its major lesson for the future. I The more interesting question is why
businessmen who often hold positions cf turn now to comment on some of the the United States was so reluctant to
power, but Latin American reformers events which began last April 24 in Santo see Bosch returned to power. This is
regard such men as aliens in their ow: i Domingo,
countries who neither Identify with their When the Dominican revolution began at6 a titud of of U.S.
the larger ngedtisn much why since
own people nor even sympathize with on Saturday, April 24, the United States when had changed so much sinas
their aspirations. , Such leaders are re- had there options available. First, it warmly hen Bosch, then a raced was
and
garded by educated young Latin Amer. could have supported the Reid Cabral supported portrted as and few if any if anLatin American
leans as a "consular bourgeoisie," W Latin American
government; second, it could have sup- presidents have ever been supported by
which they mean business-oriented corgi, ported the revolutionary forces; and the United States.
servatives who more nearly represent thin third, it could do nothing. in the interests, of foreign businessmen than The administration chose the last nZ he next cruciao pTue day, April 27,
the interests of their own people. Men course. When Donald Reid Cabral when h story came rs, Tuesday, Mona
like Donald Reid-who is one of thou: asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday and leaders, including Molina
better of this category of leaders-may morning, April 25, he was given no en- Urena and sy seeking Deno, called at the
have their merits, but they are not the. couragement. He then resigned, and negotiations. U.S. Embassy At tht mediation and
force of the future in Latin America. considerable disagreement ensued over lo At that time the the rebel., military
It is the revolutionaries of the non- the nature of the government to succeed situation looked very bad for the
or ,
Communist left who have most of the him. The party of Juan Bosch, the B nnett, whad onhad forces. Ambassador
popular support In Latin America? The PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, times to who been instructed fou r
fur
Radical Party in Chile, for example' asked for a "U.S. presence" at the trans- times r work for a cease fire and for
Is full of 19th century - libertarians fer of government power but was given the idr not have a hority y junta, felt
whom many North Americans would find no encouragement. Thus, there began mediation, 'dad not have ,;ew, would o mediate;
highly congenial, but It was recently at that time a chaotic situation which ,intervention," in his view, wohave been
crushed in national elections by a group amounted to civil war in a country with- Mediation at that point
of rambunctious, leftist Christian Demo- out an effective government. might have been accomplished quietly
crats. It may be argued that the What ha and without in
ou-r hours military ftherAm-
hristian Democrats are and-United- peened in essence was that film: Twenty-four hours later the -
Christand to a ocats arse extent some the Dominican military refused to sup- bassador was pleading for the marines,
of tare-more, de now, it may be _ port Reid and were equally opposed to and as we know some 20,000 soldiers
noted, them h than mr a the Intervention w, it a Bosch or other PRD leaders as his suc- were landed--American soldiers.
the than prior to of cessor. The PRD, which had the support on the afternoon of April 27 General
the United States are re the not Dominican Re- O. some military officers, announced that Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about
public-but
and popular not
have they y Cm. They. Rafael Molina Urena, who had been to cross the Duarte bridge into the city
ar with support. AThey President of the Senate during the Bosch of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause terms have they
also
copper come to u companies in hith that is regime, would govern as s Provisional appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt
something which the predecessot aons' President pending Bosch' return. At themselves rebuffed at the American
servativP g which the
,, this point, the military leaders delivered emba
s
was eces,,o t
s
y
o
n
ill
?? .. e
Unw
CULL
ing ou April 25 the air force and navy began Domenmulch emoassles in Santo
do. firing at the National Palace. Later in Domigo. The e administration has in-
The movement .of, the future in :Latin ? the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. terP"eted this as evidence that the non-
The is social revolution, The ques- . ; Embassy to use its Influence to persuade Communist rebels recognized growing
tion is whether it is to be Communist or Communist influence in their movement
democratic revolution and the choice the air force to stop the attacks. The and were consequently abandoning, the
which the Latin Americans make will _ Embassy made it clear it would not In- revolution. Molina, Urena has said sim-
dep in hicd heart on how rc Unid States tervene on behalf of the rebels, although ply that he sought asylum because he
uses its great influence. It should be on the following day, Monday, April 26, thought the revolutionary cause hope-
very clear that the choice is not between the Embassy did persuade the military less.
social revolution and conservative oli- to stop air attacks for a limited time. An opportunity was lost on April 27.
garchy but whether, by supporting re- This was the first crucial point in the Ambassador Bennett was in a position to
form, we bolster the popular non-Cam- crisis. If the United States thought that bring possibly decisive mediating power
form, left or whether, by supporting Reid was giving the Dominican Republic to bear for a democratic solution, but he
unpopular oligarchies, we drive the ris- the best government it had had or was chose not to do so on the ground that
ing generation of. educated and patriotic likely to get, why did the United States the exercise of his good offices at that
young Latin Americans to an embittered not react more vigorously to support him? Point would have constituted interven-
and hostile form of communism like On the other hand, if the Reid govern- tion. In the words of Washington Post
that of Fidel Castro in Chile. ment was thought to be beyond salvation, Writer Murrey Marder-one of the press
In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, why did not the United States offer posi- people who, to the best of my knowledge,
I commented as follows on the prospect tive encouragement to the moderate has not been assailed as prejudiced:
of revolution: forces involved In the coup, if not by it can be argued with considerable weight
I e not predicting violent revolutions in -providing the "U.S. presence" requested that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States
Latin America or predicting elsewherp- Still less as I by the PRD, then at least by letting it threw away a fateful opportunity to try to
advocating them. I wish only to suggest be known that the United States was not prevent the sequence that produced the
that violent social revolutions are a possi- opposed to the prospective change of re- American intervention. It allowed the rela-
bility in countries where feudal oligarchies gimes or by encouraging the return of tively leaderless revolt to pass into hands
resist all meaningful change by peaceful Juan Bosch to the Dominican. Republic? which it was to allege were Communist.7
mans. We -m steno not, iinsour visi nee b for In fact, according to available evidence, The overriding reason for this mistake e Charter of Punta del Este, close our mi ds to the U.S. Government made no effort to was the conviction of U.S. officials, on
the possibility that democratic procedures contact Bosch in the initial days of the the basis of evidence which was frag-
may fail in certain countries and that where crisis, mentary at best, that the rebels were
democracy does fail violent social convulsions - . The United States was thus at the out-
may occur. set unwilling to support Reid and un- 1 Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E3.
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September 15, 196-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
dominated by Communists. A related
and perhaps equally important reason
for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate
on April 27 was the desire for and, at that
point, expectation of an antirebel vic-
tory. They therefore passed up an im-
portant opportunity to reduce or even
eliminate Communist influence by en-
couraging the moderate elements among
the rebels and mediating for a demo-
cratic solution.
Owing to a degree of disorganization
and timidity on the part of the anti-
rebel forces which no one, including the
U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves,
anticipated, the rebels were still fighting
on the morning of Wednesday, April 28.
Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently
recommended that the antirebels under
Air Force General de los Santos be fur-
nished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. De-
fense Department stocks in Puerto Rico.
Repeating this recommendation later in
the day, Bennett said that the issue was
one between Castroism and its opponents.
The antirebels themselves asked for
armed U.S. intervention on their side;
this request was refused at that time.
During the day, however, the situation
deteriorated rapidly, from the point of
view of public order in general and of
the ant~rebels in particular. In mid-
afternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartol-
ome Benoit, head of a junta which had
been hastily assembled, asked again, this
time in writing, for U.S. troops on the
ground that this was the only way to
prevent a Communist takeover; no men-
tion was made of the junta's inability
to protect American lives. This request
was denied in Washington, and Benoit
was thereupon told that the United
States would not Intervene unless he said
he could not protect American citizens
present in the Dominican Republic.
Benoit was thus told in effect that if he
said American lives were in danger the
United States would intervene. And
that is precisely what happened.
It was at this point, on April 28, that
events acquired something of the pre-
destiny of a Greek tragedy. Subse-
quent events-the failure of the mis-
sions of John Bartlow Martin and Mc-
George Bundy, the conversion of the
U.S. force into an" inter-American force,
the enforced stalemate between the reb-
els under Caamano Deno and the Imbert
junta, the OAS mediation and the tor-
tuous negotiations for a provisional gov-
ernment-have all been widely reported
and were not fully explored in the com-
mittee hearings. In any case, the gen-
eral direction of events was largely de-
termined by the fateful decision of April
28. Once the Marines landed on that
day, and especially after they were
heavily reinforced in the days immedi-
ately following, the die was cast and the
United States found itself deeply In-
volved in the Dominican civil conflict,
with no visible way to extricate itself,
and with its hemisphere relations com-
plicated in a way that few could have
foreseen and no one could have desired.
The danger to American lives was
more a pretext than a reason for the
massive U.S. intervention that began on
the evening of April 28. In fact, no
American lives were lost in Santo Do-
mingo until the Marines began exchang-
ing fire with the rebels after April 28;
reports of widespread shooting that en-
dangered American lives turned out to
be exaggerated.
Nevertheless, there can be no ques-
tion that Santo Domingo was not a par-
ticularly safe place to be in the last days
of April 1965. There was fighting in the
streets, aircraft were strafing parts of
the city, and there was indiscriminate
shooting. I think that the United States
would have been justified in landing a
small force for the express purpose of re-
moving U.S. citizens and other foreigners
from the island. Had such a force been
landed and then promptly withdrawn
when it had completed its mission, I do
not think that any fair-minded observer
at home or abroad would have considered
the United States to have exceeded its
rights and responsibilities.
The United States intervened In the
Dominican Republic for the purpose of
preventing the victory of a revolutionary
force which was judged to be Commu-
nist dominated. On the basis of Ambas-
sador Bennett's messages to Washing-
ton, there is no doubt that the threat of
communism rather than danger to
American lives was his primary reason
for recommending military intervention.
The question of the degree of Commu-
nist influence is therefore crucial, but it
cannot be answered with certainty. The
weight of the evidence is that Commu-
nists did not participate in planning the
revolution-indeed, there is some indica-
tion that it took them by surprise-but
that they very rapidly began to try to
take advantage of it and to seize control
of it. The evidence does not establish
that the Communists at any time ac-
tually had control of the revolution.
There is little doubt that they had in-
fluence within the revolutionary move-
ment, but the degree of that influence
remains a matter of speculation.
The administration, however, assumed
almost from the beginning that the
revolution was Communist-dominated,
or would certainly become so, and that
nothing short of forcible opposition
could prevent a Communist takeover.
In their apprehension lest the Domini-
can Republic become another Cuba, some
of our officials seem to have forgotten
that virtually all reform movements at-
tract some Communist support, that
there is an important difference between
Communist support and Communist
control of a political movement, that it
is quite possible to compete with the
Communists for influence in a reform
movement rather than abandon it to
them, and, most important of all, that
economic development and social jus-
tice are themselves the primary and most
reliable security against Communist
subversion.
It is, perhaps, understandable that.
administration officials should have felt
some sense of panic; after all, the For
eign Service officer who had the misfor-
tune to be assigned to the Cuban desk
at the time of Castro's rise to power has
had his career ruined by congressional
committees. Furthermore, even with-
out this consideration, the decisions re-
garding the Dominican Republic had to
be made under great pressure and on
the basis of Inconclusive Information.
In charity, this can be accepted as a
reason why the decisions were mistaken;
but it does not change the conclusion
that they were mistaken.
The point I am making is no`--em-
phatically not-that there was no Com-
munist participation in the Dominican
crisis, but simply that the administra-
tion acted on the premise that the
revolution was controlled by Commu-
nists--a premise which it failed to es-
tablish at the time and has not estab-
lished since. The issue is not whether
there was Communist influence in the
Dominican revolution but its degree,
which is something on which reasonable
men can differ. The burden of proof,
however, is on those who take action,
and the administration has not proven
its assertion of Communist control.
Intervention on the basis of Commu-
nist participation as distinguished from
control of the Dominican revolution was
a mistake in my opinion which also re-
flects a grievous misreading of the tem-
per of contemporary Latin American
politics. Communists are present in all
Latin American countries, and they are
going to inject themselves into almost
any Latin American revolution and try
to seize control of it. If any group or any
movement with which the Communists
associate themselves is going to be au-
tomatically condemned in the eyes of the
United States, then we have indeed given
up all hope of guiding or influencing
even to a marginal degree the revolu-
tionary movements and the demands for
social change which are sweeping Latin
America. Worse, if that is our view, then
we have made ourselves the prisoners of
the Latin American oligarchs who are
engaged in a vain attempt to preserve
the status quo-reactionaries who habit-
ually use the term "Communist" very
loosely, in part out of emotional predi-
lection and in part in a calculated effort
to scare the United States into support-
ing their selfish and discredited aims.
If the United States had really been
intervening to save American lives, as it
had a moral if not a strictly legal right
to do, it could have done so promptly and
then withdrawn and the incident would
soon have been forgotten. But the
United States did not intervene primar-
ily to save American lives; it intervened
to prevent what it conceived to be a
Communist takeover. That meant, in
the terms in which the United States de-
fined the situation, that it was interven-
ing against the rebels, who, however
heavily they might or might not have
been infiltrated by Communists, were
also the advocates of the restoration of
a freely elected constitutional govern-
ment which had been forcibly over-
thrown. It also meant that the United
States was intervening for the military
and the oligarchy-to the detriment of
the Dominican people and to the bitter
disappointment of those throughout
Latin America who had placed their
hopes In the United States and the Al-
liance for Progress.
On the basis of the record, there is am-
ple justification for concluding that, at
least from the time Reid resigned, U.S.
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23002
policy was directed toward construction
of a military junta which hopefully
would restore peace and conduct free
elections. That is to say that U .S. policy
was` directed againstthe return of Bosh
and against the success of the revel
movement.
In this connection It is interesting to
recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he
was In power in the Dominican Republic
between February and September of
1963. He had been elected, as I hate
already mentioned, in the only free and
honest election ever held in the Domin.-
can Republic, in December 1962, with
58 percent of the votes cast.
The United States placed such impor-
tance on his success that President Ken,
nedy sent the then Vice President John-
son and Senator Humphrey, among
others, to attend his inauguration in
February 1963. In September 1963, whet!
he was overthrown in a military coup,
the United States made strenuous of
forts-which stopped just short of send.
ing the Marines-to keep him in power
and thereafter the United States waited
almost 3 months before recognizing the
successor government. Recognition
came, by the way, only after the succes-
sor government had conducted military
operations against a band of alleged
Communist guerrillas in the mountains,
and there Is a suspicion that the extent
of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated
by the successor government in order to
secure U.S. recognition.
It may be granted that Bosch was no
great . success as President of the
Dominican Republic but, when all his
faults have been listed, the fact remains
that Bosch was the only freely elected
President in Dominican history, the only
President who had ever tried, however
ineptly, to give the country a decent gov-
ernment, and the only President who was
unquestionably in tune with the Alliance
for Progress.
Despite these considerations, the
United States was at the very least un-
enthusiastic or, more probably, opposed
to Bosch's return to power in April 1965.
Bosch himself was apparently not eager
to return-he 'vacillated in the very early
stages and some well-informed persons
contend that he positively refused to re-
turn to the Dominican Republic. In any
ease, he missed a critical opportunity.
But the United States was equally
adamant against a return to power of
Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the
nearest thing to a mass-based, well-
organized party that has ever existed in
the Dominican Republic. The stated
reason was that a PRD government
would be Communist dominated.
This might conceivably have hap-
pened, but the evidence by no means sup-
ports the conclusion that it would have
happened. We based our policy on a
possibility rather than on anything ap-
proaching a likelihood. Obviously, if
we based all our policies on the mere
possibility of communism, then we
would have to set ourselves against just
about every progressive political move-
ment in the world, because almost all
such movements are subject to at least
the theoretical danger of Communist
takeover. This approach is not in the
lb4NGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 15, 1965
national Interest; foreign policy must be
based on prospects that seem probable,
hopeful and susceptible to constructive
influence rather than on merely possible
dangers.
One is led, therefore, to the conclusion
that U.S. policymakers were unduly
timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble
on the forces of reform and social
change. The bitter irony of such ti-
midity is that by casting its lot with the
forces of the status quo, in the probably
vain hope that these forces could be
induced to permit at leastsome reform
and social change, the United States
almost certainly helped the Communists
to acquire converts whom they otherwise
could not have won.
How vain the hopes of U.S. policy-
makers were is amply demonstrated by
events since April 28. The junta led by
Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded
the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved
quite intractable and indeed filled the
airwaves daily with denunciations of the
United States and the Organization of
American States for preventing it from
wiping out the Communist rebels.
These are the same military forces which
on April 28 were refusing to fight the
rebels and begging for U.S. intervention.
Our aim apparently was to use Imbert
as a counterpoise to Caamano Deno in the
ill-founded hope that non-Communist
liberals would be drawn away from the
rebel side.
In practice, instead of Imbert becom-
in our tractable instrument, we, to a
Certain extent, became his: he clung
tenaciously to the power' we gave him
and was at least as intransigent as the
rebels in the protracted negotiations for
a provisional government.
The resignation of Imbert and his
-junta provides grounds for hope that a
strong popular government may come to
power in the Dominican Republic, but
thathope must be tempered by the fact
that the military continues to wield great
power In Dominican pol'tics-power
which it probably would not now have if
the United States had not intervened to
save it from defeat last April 28. Even
with a provisional government installed
In. Santo Domingo, and with the prospect
af an election In 9 months, there remains
the basic problem of a deep and wide-
s,pread demand for social change. The
prospect for such social change is cir-
(aimscribed by the fact that the military
has not surrendered and cannot be ex-
lected voluntarily to surrender its en-
trenched position of privilege and out-
r ageous corruption.
The United States has grossly under-
estimated the symbolism of the Bosch
c)nstitution of 1963. It can be argued
that this contains unrealistic promises,
bit it has stirred the hopes and idealism
oi' the Dominican people. The real ob-
jections to it, the part of conservative
Dominicans,. seem to be that it provides
far separation of church and state and
tt at it provides that Dominican citizens
hi,ve the right to live in the Dominican
Republic if they so desire-that is, that
Dominican citizens who happen also to
be Communists cannot be deported. In
passing, one may note a similarity to the
U.3. Constitution on both of these points.
The United States has also misread the
dedication of the Dominican miltary to
the status quo and to its own powers and
privileges. It may be said that the Unit-
ed States has overestimated its ability
to influence the military while failing to
use to the fullest the influence it does
have.
The act of United States massive mili-
tary intervention in the Dominican Re-
public was a grievous mistake, but if one
is ;going to cross the bridge of interven-
tion, with all of the historical ghosts
which it calls forth throughout Latin
America, then one might as well cross
all the way and not stop in the middle.
It is too late for the United States to re-
frain from Intervention; it is not too
late to try to redeem some permanent
benefit from that intervention. Specif-
ical.ly, I think that the influence of the
United States and the Organization of
American States should be used to help
the Dominican people free themselves
from the oppressive weight of a corrupt
and privileged military establishment.
It is entirely possible, if not likely, that
if the military is allowed to retain its
power it will overthrow any future gov-
ernment that displeases it just as it has
done in the past. The OAS mediating
teach made a contribution by bringing
about the installation of a provisional.
government; the OAS can still make a
solid contribution to Dominican democ-
racy by urging or :insisting that as part
of a permanent.solution the Dominican
military establishment be substantially
reduced in size and some of the more
irresponsible generals be pensioned off or
sent on lengthy. diplomatic holidays
abroad. If the United States and the
OAS are going to impose a solution in
the Dominican Republic, they might as
well impose a good solution as a bad one.
Since preparing these remarks, I note
in this morning's press that General
Wessin has been induced to leave the
Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a
step in the right direction.
The Foreign Relations Committee's
study : of the Dominican crisis leads me
to draw certain specific conclusions re-
garding American policy in the Domin-
ican Republic and also suggests some
broader considerations regarding rela-
tions between the United States and
Latin America. My specific conclusions
regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo
are as follows:
First. The United States intervened
forcibly in the Dominican Republic in
the last week of April 1965 not primarily
to save American lives, as was then con-
tended, but to prevent the victory of a
revolutionary movement which was
judged to be Communist-dominated.
The decision to land thousands of ma-
rines on. April 28 was based primarily on
the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo
Domingo.
Second. This fear was based on frag-
mentary and inadequate evidence. There
is no doubt that Communists partici-
pated In the Dominican revolution on
the rebel side, probably to a greater ex-
tent after than before the landing of
U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it
cannot be proved that the Communists
would not have taken over the revolu-
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September 15, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - A 23003
tion neither can it be proved that they Western Hemisphere-and its probable
would have. There is little basis in the repercussions within the United States
evidence offered the committee for the and possible effects on the careers of
assertion that the rebels were Commu- those who might be held responsible-
nist-dominated or certain to become so; seems to have been the most important
on the contrary, the evidence suggests single factor in distorting the judgment
a chaotic situation in which no single of otherwise sensible and competent
faction was dominant at the outset and men.
in which everybody, including the Unit- I turn now to some broader and long-
ed States, had opportunities to influence term implications of the Dominican
the shape and course of the rebellion. tragedy, first to some considerations
Third. The United States let pass its relating to the Organization of Ameri-
best opportunities to influence the course can States and its charter, then to the
of events. The best opportunities were problem of reaction and revolution in
on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, Latin America, finally to a suggestion for
the PRD, requested a "United States a freer and, I believe, healthier relation-
presence," and on April 27, when the reb- ship between the United States and
els, believing themselves defeated, re- Latin America.
quested United States mediation for a Article 15 of the Charter of the Orga-
negotiated settlement. Both requests nization of American States says that:
were rejected, in the first instance for No state or group of states has the right
reasons that are not entirely clear but to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
probably because of United States hostil- reason whatever, in the internal or external
ity to the PRD, in the second instance affairs of any other state.
because the U.S. Government anticipated
and desired a victory of the antirebel
forces.
Fourth. U.S. policy toward the Do-
minican Republic shifted markedly to the
right between September 1963 and April
1965. In 1963, the United States strong-
ly supported Bosch and the PRD as en-
lightened reformers; in 1965 the United
States opposed their return to power on
the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch
or PRD government would certainly, or
almost certainly, become Communist
dominated. Thus the United States
turned its back on social revolution in
Santo Domingo and associated itself
with a corrupt and reactionary military
oligarchy.
Fifth. U.S. policy was marred by a lack
of candor and by misinformation. The
former is illustrated by official assertions
that U.S. military intervention was pri-
marily for the purpose of saving Ameri-
can lives; the latter is illustrated by ex-
aggerated reports of massacres and
atrocities by the rebels-reports which
no one has been able to verify. It was
officially asserted, for example-by the
President in a press conference on June
17 according to an official State Depart-
ment bulletin-that "some 1,500 inno-
cent people were murdered and shot, and
their heads cut off." There is no evi-
dence to support this statement. A
sober examination of such evidence as
is available indicates that the Imbert
dependence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an
armed attack or by an extracontinental or
Intracontinental conflict, or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America, the Organ of Consultation
shall meet immediately in order to agree on
the measures which must be taken in case of
aggression to assist the victim of the aggres-
sion or, in any case, the measures which
should be taken for the common defense
and for the maintenance of the peace and
security of the continent.
The United States thus had legal re-
course when the Dominican crisis broke
on April 24, 1965. We could have called
an urgent session of the Council of the
'OAS for the purpose of invoking article
6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do
so. The administration has argued that
there was no time to consult the OAS,
although there was time to consult-or
inform-the congressional leadership.
The United States thus intervened in
the Dominican Republic unilaterally-
and illegally.
Advising the Latin American countries
of our action after the fact did not con-
stitute compliance with the OAS Char-
ter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would
advising them before the fact have con-
stituted compliance. One does not com-
ply with the law by notifying interested
parties in advance of one's intent to vio-
late it. Inter-American law requires
consultation for the purpose of shaping
a collective decision. Only on the basis
of advance consultation and agreement
could we have undertaken a legal inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic.
It is possible, had we undertaken such
consultations, that our Latin American
partners would have delayed a decision;
it is possible that they would have re-
fused to authorize collective interven-
tion. My own feeling is that the situa-
tion in any case did not justify military
intervention except for the limited pur-
pose of evacuating U.S. citizens and
other foreigners, but even if it seemed
to us that it did, we should not have
undertaken it without the advance con-
sent of our Latin American allies. We
should not have done so because the
word and the honor of the United States
were at stake just as much-at least as
much-in the Dominican crisis as they
are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin
and all the places around the globe
which we have committed ourselves to
defend.
There is another important reason for
compliance with the law. The United
States is a conservative power in the
world in the sense that most of its vital
interests are served by stability and
order. Law is the essential foundation
of stability and order both within socie-
ties and in international relations. A
great conference is taking place here in
Washington this week on the subject,
World Peace Through Law. As a con-
servative power the United States has a
vital interest in upholding and expanding
the reign of law in international ' rela-
tions. Insofar as international law is
observed, it provides us with stability
and order and with a means of predicting
the behavior of those with whom we have
reciprocal legal obligations. When we
The territory of a state is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of
force taken by another state, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatever.
These clauses are not ambiguous.
They mean that, with one exception to be
noted, all forms of forcible intervention
are absolutely prohibited among the
American States. It may be that we
should never have accepted this com-
mitment at Bogota in 1948; it is obvious
from all the talk one hears these days
about the obsoleteness of the principle
of nonintervention that some U.S. offi-
cials regret our commitment to it. The
fact remains that we are committed to
it, not partially or temporarily or insofar
as we find it compatible with our vital
interests but almost absolutely. It
represents our word and our bond and
our willingness to honor the solemn com-
mitments embodied in a treaty which
was ratified by the Senate on August 28,
1950.
There are those who might concede
the point of law but who would also argue
that such considerations have to do with
our ideals rather than our interests and
are therefore of secondary importance.
I do not believe that is true. We are
currently fighting a war in Vietnam,
largely, we are told, because it would be
a disaster if the United States failed to
honor its word and its commitment; the
junta was guilty of at least as many matter, we are told, is one of vital na-
atrocities as the rebels. tional interest. I do not see why it is
Sixth. Responsibility for the failure any less a matter of vital interest to
of American policy in Santo Domingo honor a clear and explicit treaty obliga-
lies primarily with those who advised tion in the Americas than it is to honor
the President. In the critical days be- the much more ambiguous and less for-
tween April 25 and April 28, these offi- mal promises we have made to the South
cials sent the President exaggerated re- Vietnamese.
ports of the danger of a Communist take- The sole exception to the prohibitions
over in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in
of these, recommended U.S. massive mil- article 19 of the OAS Charter, which
itary intervention. It is not at all states that "measures adopted for the
difficult to understand why, on the basis maintenance of peace and security in
of such advice, the President made the accordance with existing treaties do not
decisions that he made. constitute a violation of the principles
Seventh. Underlying the bad advice set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article
and unwise actions of the United States 6 of the Rio Treaty states:
was the fear of another Cuba. The spec- If the inviolability or the integrity of the
ter of a second Communist state in the territory or the sovereignty or political in-
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23004 ~NGIZE SIbNAL REED - SENATE September 15, 196,5
violate the law ourselves, whatever shirt
term advantage may be gained, we ire
obviously encouraging others to violate
the law; we thus encourage disorder and
instability and thereby do incalculaile
damage to our own long term interef ts.
There are those who defend U.S. u:i-
lateral intervention in the Dominican
Republic on the ground that the prin i-
pie of nonintervention as spelled out in
the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argu-
ment is unfortunate on two grounis.
First, the contention of obsoleteness jigs-
tifies an effort to bring about changes in
the OAS Charter by due process of law,
but it does not justify violation of the
Charter. Second, the view that the prin-
eiple of nonintervention is obsolete is one
held by certain U.S. officials; most Lai-in
Americans would argue that, far from
being obsolete, the principle of nonia-
tervention was and remains the hefxt
and core of the inter-American system.
Insofar as it is honored, it provided the in
with something that many in the United
States find it hard to believe they could
suppose they need: protection from tae
United States.
Many North Americans seem to be-
lieve that, while the United States does
indeed participate In Latin American Et-
fairs from, time to time, sometimes by
force, it is done with the best of inten-
tions, usually indeed to protect the Latin
Americans from intervention by some-
body else, and therefore cannot really be
considered Intervention. The trout le
with this point of view is that It is not
shared by our neighbors to the south.
Most of them do think they need protec-
tion from the United States and the his-
tory of the Monroe Doctrine and tie
"Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their
fears are not entirely without -
founda-tion. "Good intentions" are not a very
sound basis for judging the fulfillment
of contractual obligations. Just about
everybody, including the Communists,
believes in his own "good intentions." It
is a highly subjective criterion of n)-,
tional behavior and has no more than a
chance relationship to good resuli.
With whatever justice or lack of it, many
Latin Americans are afraid of the Uniti=,d
States; however much it may hurt air
feelings, they prefer to have their sex';
rity based on some more objective stand-
and than the good intentions of tire
United States.
The standard on which they rely most
heavily is the principle of nonintervei r-
tion; however obsolete it may seem to
certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and
pertinent in Latin America. When we
violate it, we are not overriding the mere
letter of the law; we are violating whit
to Latin Americans is its vital heart and
The inter-American system Is rooted
in an implicit contract between the Latin
American countries and the United
.States. In return for our promise not ;o
interfere in their internal affairs they
have. accepted a role as members of of it
"sphere" and to support, or at least n it
to obstruct, our. global policies. In the
Dominican. Republic we violated our part
of the bargain; it remains to be secti
whether Latin Americans will now feel
free to violate theirs.
In the eyes of educated, energetic and tions in their own countries, whether one
patriotic young Latin Americans-which clay they will find themselves facing U.S.
is to say, the generation that rill make marines across barricades in their own
or break the Alliance for Progress-the home towns. .
United States committed a worse offense I, myself, am sure, as I know President
in the Dominican Republic than just in- Johnson and, indeed, most. U.S. citizens
tervention; it intervened against social are sure, that our country is not now
revolution and in support, at least tem- and will not become the enemy of social
porarily, of a corrupt, reactionarv :mi.li-
tary oligarchy.
It is not possible at present to assess
the depth and extent of disillusion with
the United States on the part of demo-
crats and reformers in Latin America. I
myself think that it is deep and wide-
spread. Nor am I reassured by assertions
on the part of administration officials
that a number of Latin American govern-
ments have secretly expressed sympathy
for our actions in the Dominican Repub-
lic while explaining that of course they
could not be expected to support us
openly. Why cannot they support us
openly, unless it is because their sym-
pathy does not represent the views of
their own people and they do not dare to
express It openly? In fact, real en-
thusiasm for our Dominican venture has
been confined largely to military dicta-
tors and ruling oligarchies.
The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that
a policy that purported to defeat com-
munism in the short run is more likely
to have the effect of promoting It in the
long run. Intervention in the Dominican
Republic has alienated-temporarily or
permanently, depending on our future
policies-our real friends in Latin Amer-
ica. These, broadly, are the people of the
democratic left-the Christian and social
democrats in a number of countries, the
APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Demo-
cratica Party in Venezuela, and their kin-
dred spirits throughout the hemisphere.
By our intervention on the side of a cor-
rupt military oligarchy in the Dominican
Republic, we have embarrassed before
their own people the democratic re-
formers who have counseled trust and
partnership with the United States. We
have lent credence to the idea that the
United States is the enemy of social revo-
lution in Latin America and that the only
choice Latin Americans have is between
communism and reaction.
If those are the available alternatives,
if there is no democratic left as a third
option, then there is no doubt of the
choice that honest and patriotic Latin
Americans will make: they will choose
communism, not because they want it but
because U.S. policy will have foreclosed
all other avenues of social revolution and,
indeed, all other possibilities except the
perpetuation of rule by military juntas
and economic oligarchies.
The dominant force in Latin America
is the aspiration of increasing numbers
of people to personal and national dig-
nity. In the minds of the rising gen-
eration there are two principle threats to
that aspiration-reaction at home and
domination from abroad. As a result of
its Dominican actions the United States
has allowed itself to become associated
with both. We have thereby offended
the dignity and self-respect of young and
idealistic Latin Americans who must now
wonder whether the United States will
one day intervene against social revolu-
revolution in Latin America. We have
made a mistake in the Dominican Re-
public, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in
1961, but a single misjudgment does not
constitute a doctrine for the conduct
of future policy and we remain dedi-
cated to the goals of the Alliance for
Progress.
We know this ourselves but it remains
to convince our true friends in Latin
America that their social revolutions
will have our sympathy and support. It
will not be easy to do so, because our in-
tervention :in Santo Domingo shook if it
did not shatter a confidence in the
United States that had been built up over
30 years since the liquidation of the
Caribbean protectorates and the initia-
tion of the "good neighbor policy."
It will be diffl.cult but it can be done.
President Johnson took a positive step
on the long road back in his statement
of rededication to the Alliance for Prog-
ress to the Latin American Ambassadors
on August 17. It remains for us to elimi-
nate the ambiguity between the anti-
revolutionary approach symbolized by
Project Camelot and the preoccupation
with problems of counterinsurgency on
the one hand and the creative approach
of the Alliance for Progress on the other.
If we do this-and I am both sure that
we ban and reasonably hopeful that we
wall-then :I think that the Dominican
affair will be relegated in history to the
status of a single unhappy episode on the
long road toward the forging of a new
and creative and dignified relationship
between the United States and Latin
America.
in conclusion, I suggest that a new and
healthier relationship between the
United States and Latin America, must
be a freer relationship than that of the
past.
The United' States Is a world power
with world responsibilities and to it the
inter-American system represents a sen-
sible way of maintaining law and order
in the region closest to the United States.
To the extent that it functions as we want
it to function, one of the inter-American
system's important advantages is that it
stabilizes relations within the western
hemisphere and thus frees the United
States to act on its worldwide responsi-
bilities.
To Latin Americans, on the other
hand, the inter-.American system is po-
litically and psychologically confining.
It has the effect, so to speak, of cooping
them up in the western hemisphere,
giving them the feeling that there is no
way to break out of the usually well-in-
teritioned but often stifling embrace of
the United States. In their hearts, I
have no doubt, most Latin Americans
would like to be free of us, just as a son
or daughter coming of age wishes to be
free of an over-protective parent. A
great many of those Latin Americans for
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September 15, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 23005
whom Castro still has some appeal-and Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the So far as I am concerned, this was
there are now more, I would guess, than Senator yield? simply a matter of whether this country
before last April 28-are attracted not, I Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. was going to stand aside and risk an-
feel, because they are infatuated with Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should other Cuban type Communist take-
communism, but because Cuba, albeit at like to express my complete accord with over, or whether we were going to move
the price of almost complete dependency the position taken by the Senator in his on the theory that this looked very much
on the Soviet Union, has broken out of most interesting and very important as though it might be a Communist take-
the orbit of the United States. speech about the Dominican Republic over, and that we would rather take the
It is the nature of things that small and the events which have taken place chance of moving when it might not be
nations do not live comfortably in the there. necessary, than take the risk-as Presi-
shadow of large and powerful nations, It has been my privilege as a junior dent Eisenhower did-that this would be
regardless of whether the latter are member of the Committee on Foreign a Communist takeover.
benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has Relations to sit through most of the We have information now that the
always been uncomfortable about Ger hearings which have been held on the Communists In the Dominican Republic
many and France; Ireland has never Dominican Republic and to read that are stronger than Castro was when he
been able to work up much affection for part of the testimony which I did not started out to take Cuba.
Great Britain. And in recent Years actually hear. We have information, available to the
some of the Eastern European govern- I believe that this speech is overdue, Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to
ments have demonstrated that, despite sound, and wise. I hope that it will be believe there is a real threat of Commu-
the Communist ideology which they given great effect by the policymakers of nist subjugation and conquest of that
share with the Soviet Union, they still the executive branch of our Government. island. That we do not wish to see take
wish to free themselves as much as they Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, i place.
can and as much as they dare from the thank the Senator very much for his I have heard some criticism of the fact
overbearing power of Russia. It is natu- comment. that the President sent more troops than
ral and inevitable that Latin American Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- were necessary. In Louisiana we had
countries should have some of the same dent, the Senator from Arkansas is cer- some contact with this type of problem.
feelings toward the United States. tainly entitled to his opinion with regard I recall a time, while my father was a
Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate to the action of the President of the prominent official in Louisiana govern-
requirement for a new and more friendly United States, as are all Senators. How- ment, when some people who could not
relationship between Latin America and ever, I should like to say as a member win an election decided to take charge
the United States in the long run is not of the Committee. on Foreign Relations, and organized an army at the airport.
closer ties and new institutional bonds I do not believe the Senator from Arkan- The National Guard arrived and the only
but a loosening of existing ties and in- sas' remarks reflect the sentiment of fellow who was injured was a man who
stitutional bonds. It is an established that committee on this matter. The shot himself with his own shotgun try-
psychological principle-or, for that members of the committee were invited ing to get through a barbed wire fence.
matter, just common sense-that the by the President to give him advice on At another time, in the city of New
strongest and most viable personal bonds the decision to send American troops to Orleans, when the police force was un-
are those which are voluntary, a volun- the Dominican Republic. That is true der control of the existing organization,
tary bond being, by definition, an ar- of the distinguished chairman of the which was opposed to our group and
rangement which one is free to enter committee also. When that decision would not assure our faction an honest
or not to enter. I do not see why the was made, not one dissenting voice was election count, we called out the Na-
same principle should not operate in heard. The Senator was there. He had tional Guard. After awhile we agreed
relations between nations. If it does, an opportunity to advise the President on a procedure to assure a fair election
it would follow that the first step toward about what should be done. I believe his and we took out the National Guard.
stronger ties between Latin America and advice was taken on that occasion. We got an honest count.
the United States would be the creation Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Sena- On both occasions the man in charge
of a situation in which Latin American tor is mistaken. We were not asked as of the troops did not have to shoot any-
countries would be free, and would feel to what action should be taken. We body, but he said:
free, to maintain or sever existing ties as were told what had been done. As far The best way to be sure you do not have
they see fit and, perhaps more important, as we knew, it had been done. to fight is to have enough troops there so
to establish new arrangements, both Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is not the opposition will know that they cannot
among themselves and with nations out- my impression. My impression is that defeat you if there is to be fighting.
side the hemisphere, in which the United the Senator attended the meeting at the
States would not participate. White House. He was there. I know I
President Frei of Chile has taken an was there.
initiative to this end. He has visited Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was there.
European leaders and apparently indi- Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Not one
cated that his Christian Democratic American marine had been landed up to
Government is interested in establishing that time.
new political, economic, and cultural Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the decision
links with European. countries. For the had been made.
reasons suggested, I think this is an in- Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not go-
telligent and constructive step. ing to quote the Senator because that
I think further that it would be a fine was a secret meeting and much secret
thing if Latin American countries were information was discussed.
to undertake a program of their own for My understanding was that the Presi-
"building bridges" to the world beyond dent-and I say this with regard to our
the western hemisphere-to Europe and Republican friends also-said certain
Asia and Africa, and to the Communist things to indicate that he did not want
countries if they wish. Such relation- to act until he had consulted with us;
ships, to be sure, would involve a loosen- and the decision had not been made.
ing of ties to the United States in the My impression of the matter was that
immediate future, but in the long run, I the Senator from Arkansas made a sug-
feel sure, they would make for both hap- gestion of what should be done. He can
pier and stronger bonds with the United use his best judgment on the protocol
States-happier because they would be about matters of that sort. But my im-
free, -stronger because they would be pression was, insofar as the Senator's
dignified and self-respecting as they suggestion, was concerned that it was
never had been before. followed.
That would be my advice to the Presi-
dent. "Do not send 200 or 300 marines
and have them exterminated. Send
enough boys so that if there is a fight,
and the opposition will know that if they
start a fight, they will be defeated."
The Senator had a different idea than
I did in regard to the Bay of Pigs. My
thought about the Bay of Pigs was that
the idea of helping people to go there and
liberating that island was not a bad
idea. The only thing was that we did not
send enough people to whip Castro.
If that were to have been done, that
would have been the time to do it, in my
judgment. Many people would like to be
free of Castro's enslavement on that is-
land. If the general philosophy of the
Senator's speech had been followed,
Castro would have taken not only that
island, but the Dominican Republic, also.
If we follow the general view that if
the Communists attempt to take over,
we ought to do what is within our power
to keep that from happening, not only
would we not have lost the Dominican
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23006 IcQNGRESSIONALRECORD - SENATE September-
Republic to the Communists; we would
never have lost Cuba to, the, Communi ats.,
Suppose President Eisenhower hact, it
to do all over again, and he had heird
one group argue the Fuibright doctrine:
"Do not interfere; you might be criti-
cized"; and another group saying, "I1:iis
is a Communist takeover; go on in"
Suppose President Eisenhower, sincEge,
anti-Communist, and good man that he
is, had been confronted with suct' a
situation again.
I believe he would not have taken a
chance that there would be a Commurist
takeover. He would have gone in. He
would have resolved the doubt in an ef-
fort to try to save the people from Com-
munist subjugation.
So far as I know-and I believe thlu is
correct-every responsible person Rho
had, any contact with the matter urged
the President to do what he did; and the
President proceeded to do what he
thought was best, after explaining the
problem as he saw it. He invited eve, g-
one, including the distinguished chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions [Mr. FULBRIGHTI, to offer advice.
I had the opportunity to offer my advice.
My advice was: "If you have any thought
whatever that. this might be a Comrr.u-
nist takeover, please, Mr. President,
move, because the American people will
never forgive you if you merely sit hire
and watch the Communists take that
island."
Mr. SM:ATHERS. Mr. President, vrill
the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. SMATHERS. I want to assoeic.te
myself with the remarks just made by
the distinguished Senator from Loui3i-
ana, I am one of those who was pririi-
leged to sit in on the particular meeting
that has been referred to. There we
many there from both sides of the aisle.
As I recall, the distinguished minoriy
leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] was present, is,
of course, was the distinguished char-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions [Mr. FUL$RIGHTI. I believe the
overwhelming consensus was that -1ve
wanted to be certain that the island of
the Dominican Republic was not lost to
the Communists. No one was absolutely
certain as to what was happening. At
this point there was no time for a stu 3y
by the Foreign Relations Committee or
any other committee. The country was
on fire; people were dying; property was
being destroyed; Communists were )n
hand and chaos was in charge. Some-
thing had to be done and it had to be
done based on the best information th m
available. The President was told 5y
our Ambassador, by the representatises
of the CIA, the Peace Corps, the USIA,
and the Air Force, .the Army, the Ma-
rines, and the Navy. All spoke with `a
loud and unanimous voice-and they
said, "the revolution has been going ')n
for 4 days--it is now out of hand and yrlu
Mr. President must send ii} troops to
save lives and property." It was very
clear that at the White House, at that
time that the overwhelming consensus
was of the belief that we had better see id
in enough forces to make certain that
the indiscriminate shooting and looti7lg
would be stopped, and that the Commi-
nists would not take over. I do not agree
that too many troops were sent into the
Dominican Republic. For that matter,
I do not ,believe we are sending too many
troops to Vietnam. If one argued the
same philosophy as that expressed by
the, Senator from Arkansas, perhaps he
could say we are sending too many
troops to Vietnam, because we are now
beginning to win there.
Surely no one would argue that we are
not supposed to win just because we are
opposing Communists, and some misled
liberals who are on their side. We are
fighting Communists in Vietnam. We
are having to oppose them-one way or
another, all around the world, and for
a certainty they sought to. take over the
Dominican Republic just as they did
Cuba, and that was a matter of grave
concern to us when the President sent
in our troops to Santo Domingo. I do
not see anything wrong with that, as the
distinguished Senator from Louisiana
has indicated. What is wrong with try-
ing to save a country from communism?
We had already lost Cuba to Castro.
It has been admitted that there were
only about 12 known Communist leaders
in Cuba with Castro when he started his
revolution. He was acclaimed-when he
started out-the greatest social revolu-
tionary to come along in modern day.
I remember when the New York Times
and other newspapers were writing lyri-
cal articles about Castro and what a
great man he was. I recall his appear-
ance before the American Society of
Newspaper Publishers . and Editors,
where he was lauded and applauded. I
also recall when he sat with the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations in the Capi-
tol and I asked him, "When are you going
to have elections?"
Castro replied, "There is no use in
having elections, because I will be elected
over and over again."
Castro made that statement in the
Committee on Foreign Relations, and
still many thought he was a great demo-
cratic leader. Castro proved that it was
not necessary to have a large number of
Communists present in order to deliver
a country to communism. When a coun-
try like Cuba falls to communism it costs
us hundreds of lives and millions of
dollars. So we could not afford to take a
chance in the Dominican Republic.
I do not understand the philosophy of
the Senator from Arkansas in this re-
spect. I have the greatest affection and
highest respect for my former chairman,
the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FUL-
BRIGHT], but I do not understand, for the
life of me, what the objection is to send-
ing enough troops to the Dominican Re-
Public to do the job, or even perhaps
sending 200 or 300 more. The job was
done. The country has not been lost. It
is today moving in the direction of estab-
lishing a constitutional government, so
that, hopefully, constitutional rights will
be in the near future preserved.
I again totally associate myself with
the remarks of the distinguished Senator
from Louisiana.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, if it could be done as the Senator
from Arkansas proposes, I would much
prefer to treat the Communists with
15, 1965
Christian fellowship, love, and truth,
without having to resort to violence. A
number of fine people, such as Cardinal
Mlndszenty, used that approach, but did
not get fair with it. If we are to keep
the Communists from taking over, we
cannot rely on them to tell the truth; we
cannot rely on them to admit that they
are Communists; we cannot rely on their
regime not to murder and exterminate
people who do not agree with commu-
rdsm.
I would be willing to take a chance on
meeting Communists in free elections.
Why will they not agree to free elec-
tions? They will not agree to them here
or anywhere else. About the only time
Communists are willing to agree to free
elections is when the Communists can-
not win by force of arms nor by black-
mail, assassination, or brutality. They
have yet to win their first free election.
A program of good will, kindness,
truth, and love they neighbor, while it is
fine to be extended toward Communists,
is never seen coming from the opposite
direction, toward us.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to
try to keep the record straight-and it
was not my intention to engage in a gen-
eral, running debate on how much we
disagree with communism -I assure the
Senator from Louisiana that I am not a
Communist and. do not wish to promote
that system.
The policies I am talking about in-
volve a judgment as to whether they do
or do not promote communism.
The only election in the Dominican
Republic that we are told was absolutely
free and without any threat, was the one
that resulted in the election of Mr. Bosch.
But he was thrown out by a coup.
The Senator from Louisiana is saying
that the whole movement of U.S. troops
was to prevent Communists from taking
over. At the meeting at the White
;house it is my impression-and I believe
the press reports will confirm it-that we
were told that the movement was to save
American lives. Much was said about
the saving, of 1,500 American lives and
several hundred other lives. It- was put
on the basis of saving innocent people,
particularly Americans and the nationals
of other countries. I said in my speech
that I thoroughly agreed with that pro-
posal.
When a situation endangers the lives
of people who had nothing to do with the
occurrence, it is quite proper for us to
act. That was the theory on which our
action was based at the meeting. We
were not told that a Communist take-
over was in progress.
I recall asking-and perhaps someone
else asked--what the situation was with
respect to communism. We were told
that three individuals had been identified
as Communists. This is out of several
thousand who were engaged in the up-
rising.
I must say this in all charity to the
Director of the CIA, who had been sworn
in that very noon, so he could not have
been expected to know what had taken
place. He had been the Director of the
CIA only about 10 hours, perhaps 6 hours.
I do not blame him at all for either in-
advertence or anything else. About a
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week later, after the situation had been
reviewed, it was announced that 55 per-
sons were Communists.
No one believed that Rafael Molina
Urena was a Communist. He had been
the President of the Senate under the
Bosch regime. Under their Constitu-
tion, as I understand it, since Bosch did
not return, Molina was what we would
consider to be the legitimate successor.
I understand that that was the process
of succession. He was designated by the
party in power, the PRD Party, which is
the only legitimate party which had won
an election, by 58 percent, in 1962. The
party was thrown out by a coup, as the
Senator knows.
This was an effort to reestablish them-
selves. The leaders of this revolution
were not accused of being Communists.
The Senator is assuming the very fact
in controversy. The very fact that I
question is that there was any firm and
convincing evidence that this was a Com-
munist takeover, that the revolutionary
power, the revolutionary movement was
dominated and controlled by Commu-
nists.
We had 13 meetings on this matter.
To me, there is very little evidence from
the testimony of administration wit-
nesses. Every witness was an adminis-
tration witness except Munoz-Marin,
who is certainly no enemy of the admin-
istration. He has been a very close friend
of this administration. As the Senator
knows, he was a long-time Governor of
Puerto Rico. There was no serious and
convincing evidence, or even anything
close to being convincing evidence, that
the leaders of the revolution in the be-
ginning were Communists. They were
members of the PRD Party. They were
people who wished to reaffirm their claim
to the presidency. They had been
thrown out by a coup.
The Senator assumes that this was a
Communist takeover.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I decline to yield further.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raised the point
in my speech that there was not any evi-
dence to show that it was a Communist
plot. I think that it was more likely a
PRD revolution.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
has failed to distinguish between non-
Communist liberals who were involved
there and the hard-core Castro-trained
Communists who were trained to take
over. When Castro took over Cuba,
knowing the experience we have had if
we had followed the Fulbright doctrine,
the takeover would have occurred never-
theless, because many sincere liberals
were opposed to Batista while hard-core
Communists were prepared to kill the
Socialist or non-Communist liberals and
take the place over.
That is what they did and they did
it as quickly as these honest and sincere
people who believed in freedom dis-
covered that they had made a mistake
and fallen into a trap. The people dis-
covered that it was then too late. They
could not extricate themselves. Some of
those people gave up their lives and were
injured and taken prisoners at the Bay
of Pigs invasion when they tiled to lib-
erate Cuba from Castro.
We had enough information to know
that the Dominican revolt was a move in
the direction of communism. This
country had all the justification that it
needed to intervene. It had sufficient
justification to require our going in there
and protecting our citizens and the citi-
zens of other countries.
Oddly enough, De Gaulle can find more
reason to criticize our country, a country
which has defended France more than
any other country, than any man who
has ever had a position of great respon-
sibility and power in the free world.
Mr. de Gaulle found fault with the
United States sending troops to a coun-
try to protect human life. However, De
Gaulle's Ambassador rushed down and
asked that the French Embassy be pro-
tected by American troops against irre-
sponsible revolutionaries who were run-
ning down the corridors with machine-
guns and killing people. We took it
upon ourselves to protect innocent peo-
ple from friendly nations, people who
were not a party to the revolt at all.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, There is no ques-
tion about that.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
suggests something that is inconsistent,
with respect to this Nation contributing
troops in this situation. We did not do
it when Mr. Bosch was run out of there.
As a practical matter, the President
was right in taking the position which
he did in the military coup which in-
volved Mr. Bosch. It was a fight be-
tween one crowd of anti-Communists
and another crowd. I do not believe that
we would have had any right to go in
there with troops at that time. However,
on the other hand, if this were a Com-
munist takeover, or if it had the possibil-
ity of being a Communist takeover, if we
had the information, which we did, that
a great many hard-core Communist Mos-
cow-trained or Castro-trained Commu-
nists were in there seeking to start a
revolution and to take charge and take
over the country, we should have at-
tempted to frustrate that effort if we
could.
I believe the record shows that every
person whose advice the President
sought on Capitol Hill, be he Republi-
can or Democrat-and if any Senator
wants to question this statement, he can
say so-either advised the President to
go or did not advise him not to go.
I believe that every single person ad-
vised the President to go, with the ex-
ception of the suggestion made by the
Senator from Arkansas, and, to the best
of my knowledge, the President followed
that advice.
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, the
Senator from Arkansas talks about his
recollection with regard to how many
Communists we thought were in Santo
Domingo. It was all a guess. My recol-
lection is that it was approximately 58.
And the 58 were Communist leaders.
Actually nobody had any idea for a cer-
tainty how many Communists were
there or how many of the revolutionists
were on the Communist side.
At the time that Bosch was thrown out
by internal revolution, I do not believe
that anybody advised the then President
of the United States that our people were
being fired on and that our property was
being destroyed, nor that we should send
troops. I do not believe that the then
Ambassador, nor the Army, nor the Navy,
nor the CIA, nor the Peace Corps gave
such advice. I do not believe that any of
the people who, on this April 1965 occa-
sion, advised the President that we needed
troops there to protect our property and
the lives of people, advised that we should
send troops on that other occasion.
When Bosch was forced by a coup to leave
Santo Domingo and move to Puerto
Rico.
I believe that it might be said about
that meeting at the White House to which
we have been making reference, and I do
not believe this will violate to any great
extent the rules with regard to keeping
such meetings secret-that everybody
who was there recalls that when the Pres-
ident was advising us as to what he
was going to do-a telephone call come
through, the fellow who was talking from
the Dominican Republic said that he was
at that moment under the table and the
bullets were coming through the window
and surging all around him.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Bullets were
whizzing through the window of the
Embassy by the Ambassador.
Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator is cor-
rect. At the very moment of the tele-
phone conversation, bullets were coming
through the window. What is the Presi-
dent supposed to say-"Let us go out and
reason with these people?" This was no
time to reason. These people were not in
a reasoning mood. Something had to be
done, and the President was advised to
take a firm and courageous course and he
took it.
At that time, we thought that some
1,560 people were killed in the first few
days. Remember the President did not
send our troops until the revolution had
been going on for 4 days. Everybody's
hindsight is better than their foresight.
It may be that there were not 1,560 people
killed. However, many of them were
killed, and millions of dollars worth of
property was destroyed. Our Embassy
was being fired upon. Other embassies
were being looted. Thank God our troops
finally showed up.
The Senator from Louisiana has
pointed out that by virtue of the fact
that we had our troops down there, some
5,600 people, nationals of other coun-
tries, were safely evacuated. Because of
the presence of our troops, there was no
great loss of life.
If we had delayed; if we had had a
study; if the President had vacillated,
hundreds and hundreds of other people
would have been killed and untold dam-
age would have been done. But most
importantly that country would be in
the hands of the Communists today.
One of the significant things that is
never talked about when we discuss this
Dominican matter is the Organization of
American States. At its fourth inter-
parliamentary session-in the official
meetings or consultations, the Orga-
nization of American States directed that
one of their groups go to Santo Domingo
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 23008 CQQNGRESSIONAL.RECORD - SEN LTE September 15, 1965
and make a study. These are Latin peo ample, the Senator from Florida [Mr.
pie, not from the United States-bu SMATRERS] says 1,560 were killed in the
from various countries of Latin America;, first.4 days.
The official OAS group concluded tha As of May 8, the Red Cross confirmed
the President of the, United States dl a count of 150 dead and 605 wounded in
the only sensible and practical thins hostilities, They were not Americans.
that could have been done under the cir- ? No American citizens was killed or shot
cumstances, when he dispatched troopl or injured until after the Marines were
to restore law and order. * landed and. the Marines exeha?!nged shots
I repeat these are Latins, familiar witlt with the revolutionists.
the area, the conditions, the people. So subsequent events did not confirm
They approved the President's action- the advice about the necessity and the
It seems to me that what we ought tai danger that came from the Embassy.
be doing is applauding the President. Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, a
Thank. God that most of the people arty parliamentary inquiry.
doing that. The Gallup poll shows tha Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Press-
85 Percent of the people approve. of wha dent, I believe I have the floor.
the President did in Santo Domingo. ' Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, who
believe that those people who approve of has the floor?
the action of the. President are correct, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
And I believe a majority of the membero Senator from Louisiana has the floor at
of the Foreign Relations Committee, and this moment, unless he will yield for a
a majority of this Senate believe our parliamentary inquiry.
President acted correctly and courag&F Mr. LONG, of Louisiana. I have not
ously, yielded, Mr. President. I wish to make
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Press- this statement, and I will try to cut it
dent, the President had the advice of it short.
nine-man American team in Santo Do-- I know the Senator from Arkansas
mingo. The team, included those who [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has a responsibility to
had responsibility, anybody in charge o: the Senate. He is trying to discharge It.
any organization, from the Peace Corp.? I shall try to cooperate with him.
up to the Ambassador himself. He had It is one thing to think about these
the advice of the State Department, and matters, ask for hearings, bring people
the. advice of his own White House staff, in, see what. the record shows, and take
which .is supposed to be available to hire: a nice vacation and analyze the matter,
for such purpose. Some reference watt and come back in a_week and say, "I am
made to the fact that the man from they not sure this was necessary at all."
CIA had only been there a short time. But it is quite another thing if the
But that man was ;a naval admiral, ant; man is there, and shooting is going on,
he was not merely saying what he and he must move now or it will be too
learned in 5 days; he was giving the besi, late. He cannot stop to figure whether
judgment he could based on the advice, 315 or 575 or 1,500 people have been
fe;pert who have years. studying sucL. killed. He must move now.
b f ars. _x It is easy to find fault with the Presi-
If those who had responsibility to tell = dent of the United States. Senators
us how to deal with the Communists ir, ? have, and I am sure they will continue
Santo Domingo, and how to deal with the to do so.
Communists in the Dominican Republic; But one thing, we cannot say about
and all those people, so far as I know the man who is President of the United
unanimously-and the record will show- States: We cannot say he cannot move.
provided such advice to the President, I say to the Senate that when hurricane
who would say that should be done? Betsy hit Louisiana last week, the worst
The Senator said when he was there, disaster in our history, I called the Presi-
that perhaps he did not advise us not to, dent and said, "Mr. President, the most
go because he thought the decision had horrible thing that has ever happened
been made. That is my understanding, to Louisiana has just occurred. The
My understanding is that the President', people ought to see you and know that
had taken the precaution to do what he their Government and their President
should have done, that is, to put the car- are interested in their welfare. It will
riers in a position so that he would have give them the courage to try to hold out
the troops available if the decision was and try to help themselves, if they just
made to go in. know that help is on its way, and that
Now he has been criticized for going in they have this great country on their
with too much. I suppose next year he side."
will be criticized for going too soon. That man has on his hands the wax
But if we were compelled to move, I in Vietnam, but he called me and said,
would want to be able to avoid a com-, 'Be at the White House in 15 minutes.
plete Communist takeover. If we had to if you are not at the White House in
go in, it was better. to go with too much, 15 minutes, I will be on my way to
too soon than to go with too little too. Louisiana by myself." I got there and
late. we went down there, and he told those
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator, people that all of the redtape would be
yield? cut, and that help was on its way.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield. We are getting help. If I had to
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of choose between one man who thinks it
what the record shows, I based my speech might not be all that serious, and says,
upon the records of the hearings before "Let us wait and get the report and
the committee. Many wild rumors were analyze it and think about it a little
published In the newspapers which our longer," and the man who. says, "Wait
own people did not confirm. For ex- minute;Sf-we do all this, it might be
too late," I think:[ would take the fellow
who could move.
Many, battles have been lost by waiting
to see. The South would be a separate
nation today-and I am glad we are
not--had it not been that a citizen of
Louisiana, Gen. P. G. ? T. Beauregard,
waited until the smoke lifted on the first
day of the Battle of Shiloh, down in
Tennessee.
Had that man had the aggressive in-
stincts of o& President, he would have
pushed Grant's army into the Tennessee
River before General Buell was able to
bring up a whole new Federal Army to
join the fight. On that occasion, Albert
Sidney Johnson had bled to death in his
saddle pressing the attack. When John-
son (lied, and Beauregard found himself
in command, he preferred to halt the at-
tack and renew it on the following day.
By that time Beauregard was facing two
Union armies instead of one.
Had Beauregard possessed the initia-
tive: of our President, he would have run
the Union Army into the river on the
evening of the first day, and instead of
Grant defeating the Southern Army, and
proceeding to capture one army at Vicks-
burg and another at Appomattox, Grant
would have been relieved of duty as an
incompetent, and Lincoln would have
never found himself a great general.
But, Mr. President, we have a Presi-
dent who moved. He moved in the tradi-
tion of our great country, and in the
tradition of all great Americans, who do
not believe in waiting until the smoke
lift:; in Santo Domingo or until the dust
settles in China to do something about
these things. Mr. President, I thank the
merciful Lord that our President pos-
sesses a sense of urgency and that he
possesses initiative.
I yield the floor.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the
Senator from West Virginia will cooper-
ate, as always, with his colleagues. He
knows that the subject matter which has
been discussed is important. As the
assistant majority leader has stated,
legislation is pending in the Chamber.
It, too, deals with important subject
matter of concern to the American
people.
I ask unanimous consent, however,
that the Senator from Delaware be per-
mitted to address the Senators on a
subject which is not germane.
Mr. ROBERTSON. How long does
the Senator from Delaware wish to hold
the floor?
Mr. RANDOLPH. Approximately 10
minutes. He talked with me about an
hour and a half ago about his request.
At that time, we (lid not know that the
Senator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Louisiana would take as much
time as they have taken.
I, too, wish to go forward with the
pending legislation, but I feel that I
at least implied to the Senator from
Delaware that I would submit this
unanimous-consent request, and ,I do so
with the understanding that he speak
not more than 10 minutes.
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22998 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 15, 1965
On page 12, lines 1 and 2, after the word
"pay" in line 1 strike out the words "the
Federal pro rata share of".
On page 16, line 15, after the word "pay"
strike out the words "the Federal pro rata
share of the".
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would
like to explain the purpose of the amend-
ment which I have offered for myself
and the Senator from Montana [Mr."
METCALF]. The committee bill provides
that the cost shall be allocated between
the Federal Government and the States
in the same proportion that costs are al-
located for construction of the Inter-
state Highway and primary systems-
that is, 90 percent to be paid by the Fed-
eral Government and 10 percent by the
States, in respect to the Interstate High-
way System, and 50 percent by the Fed-
eral Government and 50 percent by the
States with respect to the primary
system.
I support the objectives of the bill, and
voted to report it to the Senate. But
yesterday, at the close of the session,
I stated my reasons for having presented
this amendment in committee, and the
reasons which lead me to offer it today.
In the subcommittee this amendment
was adopted by a large vote, but in the
full committee the action of the subcom-
mittee was reversed by a vote of 8 to 5.
I offer this amendment for two princi-
pal reasons. One reason is that it is a
national program. It is so declared by
the bill and by the President.
The second reason for requiring the
full amount to be paid by the Federal
Government is that the bill would im-
pose a penalty upon States not acceding
to its program-the penalty being the
denial of all Federal-aid funds for con-
struction of highways. With such a
penalty, and no State could accept such
a penalty, the program proposed in the
bill-worthy as it is-cannot be consid-
ered a true voluntary Federal-State aid
program. The denial of all funds to a
State would amount to millions of dollars
to a State.
In the case of California it would
amount to a denial of $336 million an-
nually. In my own State it would
amount to $74 million. In other States
it would be in similar proportions.
The bill would effectually require the
States to accept this program and that
their legislatures appropriate money to
pay for its cost. It is a worthy program.
I voted to report it to the Senate, but
I do not approve its mandatory features.
Over 100 Federal-aid programs have
been enacted. None mandatorily re-
quires State acceptance. If it is to be
exercised, I believe the Federal Govern-
ment should pay its full cost.
I understand there are others who
desire to speak. I shall not speak
further at this time.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me for a moment?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I con-
cur in this amendment for all of the rea-
sons outlined. This is a coercive pro-
gram.
We are saying to the States that they
have to go into the secondary road sys-
tem where always we have had the pro-
vision that billboards were permitted.
We are saying to them that they must
remove billboards on the 50-50 alloca-
tion that has always been proposed.
There is a difference in the Interstate
System, which is new, which goes
through new areas and new territory.
We say that under the law wp will give
the same proportion of assistance to the
State to remove billboards that we gave
for the financing of other highway sys-
tems, such as under the 90-10 Interstate
System.
So far as the secondary systems are
concerned, we have always had the right
to erect billboards. This is a prevailing
system in all the States. Yet, we are
saying to the States that they must re-
move the billboards or they will not be
permitted to share in the Federal high-
way program. It is coercion.
We are taking away from the States
their police power to remove billboards
and we are saying they have to make
compensation.
This is a national program. We have
decided we are going to remove billboards
from the interstate and secondary sys-
tems. Therefore, I concur that we
should pay that cost out of the national
budget. We should not force the States
to forgo all of their participation in the
interstate program if they do not want
to take away a man's livelihood, or a
man's business, which he has had for
many years.
I feel strongly that the States should
use their funds for secondary road sys-
tems and the farm-to-market roads, and
for the development of primary high-
ways on the present allocation, and
should not be forced to compensate the
billboard operators. I feel strongly that
the cost should come out of the Federal
budget.
Therefore, I concur in the amend-
ment.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, even
though the remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr.
FULBRIGHT], will not be germane to the
pending legislation (S. 2084), I ask
unanimous consent that the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee [Sena-
tor FULBRIGHT] be allowed to speak for
not to exceed 1 hour.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
YOUNG of Ohio in the chair). Without
objection, it is so ordered. The rule of
germaneness is waived.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not
intend to object, but I wish to have the
assurance that the amendment which
has been stated will be the pending ques-
tion at the conclusion of the remarks
by the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair states to the senior Senator from
Kentucky that his amendment will be
the pending question.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield briefly without losing
his right to the floor?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
formation of a provisional government in
Santo Domingo under the leadership of
Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news.
It provides reason for cautious optimism
as to the future and testifies as well to
the arduous and patient efforts of the
OAS mediating team. I wish to pay
tribute especially to Ambassador Bunk-
er for his wisdom and patience in han-
dling this difficult affair. The forma-
tion of a provisional government is not
the end of the Dominican crisis, but it
does bring to an end a tragic and dan-
gerous phase of the crisis. Many prob-
lems remain, particularly the problem of
establishing the authority of a demo-
cratic government over the Dominican
military. Nonetheless, the situation now
seems to be moving into a less danger-
ous and more hopeful phase. At this
time of relative calm it is appropriate,
desirable and, I think, necessary to re-
view events in the Dominican Repub-
lic and the U.S. role in those events.
The purpose of such a review-and its
only purpose-is to develop guidelines
for wise and effective policies in the
future.
I was in doubt about the advisability
of making a statement on the Domoni-
can affair until some of my colleagues
made public statements on the floor.
Their views on the way in which the
committee proceedings were conducted
and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as
a whole, are so diametrically opposed to
my own that I now consider it my duty
to express my personal conclusions
drawn from the hearings held by the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
The suggestions that have been made
that the committee was prejudiced in
its approach against the administra-
tion's policies are, in my opinion, with-
out merit. The committee was impar-
tial and fair in giving a full and detailed
hearing to the administration's point
of view, so much so, in fact, that it
heard only one witness from outside the
Government.
U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was
characterized initially by overtimidity
and subsequently by overreaction.
Throughout the whole affair, it has also
been characterized by a lack of candor.
These are general conclusions I have
reached from a painstaking review of the
salient features of the extremely com-
plex situation. These judgments are
made, of course, with the benefit of hind-
sight and, in fairness, it must be con-
ceded there were no easy choices avail-
able to the United States in the Domini-
can Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task
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September 15, 1965 COl`TCrRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE (22997
Deputy Chief Mowry's public statement that
the patrolmen ought not to have arrested
the boys. The confidence of various groups
in society in the fairness' of the police is of
course the key to public cooperation.
The incident also illustrates the value of
a police community relations division under
an able and forthright officer like Chief
Mowry. It was his first test in a highly de-
manding job, and he deserves the commu-
nity's confidence. Washington's Metropoli-
tan Police constitgte one of the most effi-
cient forces in the country. It is now show-
ing that it understands the value of restraint
oJ' the damaged areas. I was told they traducer of a free news flow. The space
were "not available." I asked why U.S. agency gives news management the old col-
tElevision networks were 'carrying films lege try every time a manned spacecraft goes
b:r. Vietcong photographers but were UP.
f all the significant news locations in a
st-emingly unable to obtain footage show- Gemini flight, the only one not covered by
ir$!the effects of our raids. There was the combined news media (meaning press,
ni explanation. radio, and TV) is the most important one of
And now there are distressing signals all, the mission control center at Houston.
that the space program is falling prey to it is not a secret place, nor one in which
the same dread disease of secrecy. unnecessary traffic is discouraged. Flight
Director. Christopher C. Kraft already has
Ott would be my hope, Mr. President,
stated
that the communications media them- Soviet observe Observer in that his s would rather have a
control center than
sflves, which argue so eloquently for the an American Journalist. Further, every
f7 eedom of the press which our Constitu- clerk and secretary among the 4,600 NASA
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, *1th tl3n guarantees them, would increase
Deputy Chief Mowry and Inspects their protests against news management
Causey have been captains of the 14th aid censorship.
precinct and are good tactitions in cone- \ Mr. Hines has done a great service
munity relations work and because ofoth to his craft and to the public in his
this, enjoy the respect of every segment a*icle which appeared in the September
I would hope andF expect, and I am
sure many of my colleagues would agree,
that they will get the fullest Coopera-
tion in their endeavors' for I am certialn
the community will be far better off for
their efforts.
It is both interesting, and pleasing for
me to note that Howard Mowry comes
from an old and much, respected Rhode
Island family. So I take this oppor-
tunity to wish him well in his new posi-
tion and to reiterate my interest and
hope for a vigorous effort against crime
by those who are charged with the re-
sponsibility of law enforcement in the
District of Columbia.
WHO WILL WATCH THE
WATCHMAN?
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, for some
time it has been the proud boast of the
managers of America's space effort that
unlike the Soviets, our experiments are
conducted in full view of the public.
This, it has been asserted, is character-
istic of the differences in our form of gov-
ernment and the closed society of the
Communist world.
sislt'o have it printed in the RECORD. r
a3 follows:
[itrom the\Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Sept. 1. 1965]
Wuu0 W ,L WATCB THE WATCHMAN?
($y William Hines)
The PentagoA,has surprised almost
tc Its new manned orbiting laborato
p; 'oaram.
lost people assulrcd that so
ax ilitarv got a manned role in sli
The restriction
than pointless: It
picayile and worse
Now, a dark cloud has been Cast on y'Wh not?" a, a }
ins
11
fi
l
I
l
h
ua vac u? w a, rr
as a
ys w as 9
na
ana
"at-F readers who.
n t
e
Some of the clumsy attempts at con- piping the expensive tab for MOL. A tap
sorship are both silly and stupid. w uld have been helpful.
But, more importantly, they serio y The briefing was later transmitted by tele-
undermine not only this Nation's n- p'.iohe to the National Aeronautics and Space
fideriCe, but that of the world, i Our Aiministrations Houston Center, where a
large contingent of reporters was covering
ability and determination to t the
tl is flight of Gemini 5.
truth. T#e same "no tape, no attribution" rule
Since the time of the Bay of Pigs was invoked at Houston, but was ignored by
fiasco when Mr. Arthur Sylvester, the a any reporters who refused to be bound by
voice of the Pentagon, asserted the Gov- secrecy they knew could not be enforced.
ernment's right to lie to save itself, we Txpb recordings were made and freely circu-
have seen recurring examples of news Is ted.
IYlanagemerit and cover up and censor- The handling of the MOL briefing is by no
x> ea.ns unique. The current longstanding
ship. We have seen a President reciting ntw gag on Russian space accomplishments
cheery little items of economic good tid- is another excellent example.
Ings to a national television audience, Soon after the Kennedy administration
days before the appropriate Government curie in, the Government ceased reporting
bureau would ordinarily release such S iviet space launchings, including attempts
news and the sole purpose is to con- that failed. Manifestly the Russians knew
teal or counteract such hard and un- when they launched; they also knew we
happy facts as the chronic unemploy- knew. The people left in the dark were-
and are-those here in the United States
who are. paying for the Nation's elaborate and
Some time ago, Mr. President, after p:usumably efficient spacecraft detection sys-
the Pentagon had claimed smashing VbC- tem. Nobody in the Government defends
tortes in our air strikes against the North this policy, yet it persists.
Vietnamese, I asked to see photographs The Defense Department is not the only
civil servants who could spare 5 or 10 min-
utes from work was encouraged to look in.
Oil one flight the motion picture actor
Jimmy Stewart was an interested observer.
Even newspaper publishers have been ad-
mitted, possibly on the theory that they are
not really "working press," and hence
harmless.
But neither camera nor tape recorder nor
pen--paper reporter is allowed in the
no trot room at any time during a flight.
a "pool" representative, 'William L. Laurence
of the New York Times. This is not to sug-
gest that there has been any "cover-up" to
date. In the course of missions, Kraft gives
regular, full, and apparently frank accounts
of flight activities, and opens himself to
detailed questioning. So do his associates.
A mission Commentary of less consistent
accuracy and authenticity is broadcast.
But whether or not there has been sup-
pression to date is not the point. All flights
so far have ended happily, and nothing suc-
ceeds like success. There has been no rea-
son for it coverup.
The point is that the opportunity for news
management definitely exists in mission con-
trol-and it Is an axiom. of political science
that where opportunity exists, there are al-
ways people waiting to seize it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BASS in. the chair). Is there further
morning business? If not, morning
business Is closed.
SCENIC DEVELOPMENT AND ROAD
BEAUTIFICATION OF THE FED-
ERAL AID HIGHWAY SYSTEMS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the unfin-
ished business be laid before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S.
2 4) to provide for scenic development
a road. beautification of the Federal-
aid ighway systems.
T PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objet 'on?
The being no objection, the Senate
resume the consideration of the bill (S.
2084) to ),provide for scenic development
and road\beautifi.caticn of the Federal-
aid highs systems.
ENDMENT NO. 451
Mr. COO. Mr. President, on be-
half of :mss f and the Senator from
Montana [M METCALF], I send an
amendment to h.e desk and ask that it
be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read the amend-
ment (No. 451), as follows:
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September 15, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 22999
of diplomacy to make wise decisions when Another theme that emerges from the such as the recently discredited Came-
they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a lot; these studies claim to be scientific
failed to do so in the Dominican crisis. striking change in U.S. policy toward the but beneath their almost unbelievably
It cannot be said with assurance that Dominican Republic and the possibility- opaque language lies an unmistakable
the United States could have changed the not a certainty, because the signs are military and reactionary bias.
course of events b
ti
diff
tl
y ac
ng
eren
y. ambiguous, but only the possibility-of
What can be said with assurance is that a major change as well in the general
the United States did not take advantage Latin American policies of the United
of several opportunities in which it might States. Obviously, an important change
have changed the course of events. The in the official outlook on Dominican af-
reason appears to be that, very close to fairs occurred between September 1963,
the beginning of the revolution, U.S. when the United States was vigorously
policymakers decided that it should not opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch,
be allowed to succeed. This decision and April 1965, when the United States
seems to me to have been based on exag- was either unenthusiastic or actually
gerated estimates of Communist in- opposed to his return.
fluence in the rebel movement in the What happened in that period to
initial stages and on distaste for the re- change the assessment of Bosch from
turn to power of Juan Bosch or of a gov- favorable to unfavorable? It is quite
ernment controlled by Bosch's party, the true that Bosch as President did not dis-
PRD-Dominican Revolutionary Party. tinguish himself as an administrator, but
The question of the degree of Commu- that was well known in 1963. It is also
nist influence is of critical importance true, however, and much more to the
sential point, however, is that the United
States, on the basis of ambiguous evi-
dence, assumed almost from the begin-
ning that the revolution was Communist
dominated, or would certainly become so.
It apparently never occurred to anyone
that the United States could also attempt
to influence the course which the revolu-
tion took. We misread prevailing tend-
encies in Latin America by overlooking
or ignoring the fact that any reform
movement is likely to attract Commu-
nist support. We thus failed to perceive
that if we are automatically to oppose
any reform movement that Communists
adhere to, we are likely to end up oppos-
ing every reform movement, making our-
selves the prisoners of reactionaries who
wish to preserve the status quo-and
the status quo in many countries is not
good enough.
The principal reason for the failure
of American policy in Santo Domingo
was faulty advice given to the President
by his representatives in the Dominican
Republic at the time of acute crisis.
Much of this advice was based on mis-
judgment of the facts of the situation;
some of it appears to have been based
on inadequate evidence or, in some cases,
simply inaccurate information. On the
basis of the information and counsel he
received, the President could hardly have
acted other than he did.
I am hopeful, and reasonably con-
fident, that the mistakes made by the
United States in the Dominican Repub-
lic can be retrieved and that it will be
point as far as the legitimate interests
of the United States are concerned, that
Bosch had received 58 percent of the
votes in a free and honest election and
that he was presiding over a reform-
minded government in tune with the
Alliance for Progress. This is a great
deal more than can be said for any other
President of the Dominican Republic.
The question therefore remains as to
how and why the attitude of the U.S.
Government changed so strikingly be-
tween September 1963 and April 1965.
And the question inevitably arises
whether this shift in the administra-
tion's attitude toward the Dominican
Republic is part of a broader shift in
its attitude toward other Latin Amer-
ican countries, whether, to be specific,
the U.S. Government now views the vig-
orous reform movements of Latin Amer-
ica-such as Christian Democracy in
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in
Peru and Accion Democratica in Vene-
zuela-as threatening to the interests of
the United States. And if this is the
case, what kind of Latin American po-
litical movements would now be regarded
as friendly to the United States and
beneficial to its interests?
I should like to make it very clear that
I am raising a question not offering an
answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the
current attitude of the U.S. Government
toward reformist movements in Latin
America. On the one hand, President
Johnson's deep personal commitment to
the philosophy and aims of the Alliance
It is of great importance that the un-
certainty as to U.S. aims in Latin Amer-
ica be resolved. We cannot successfully
advance the cause of popular democracy
and at the same time aline ourselves
with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies;
yet that is what we seem to be trying to
do. The direction of the Alliance for
Progress is toward social revolution in
Latin America; the direction of our Do-
minican intervention is toward the sup-
pression of revolutionary movements
which are supported by Communists or
suspected of being influenced by Com-
munists. The prospect of an election in
9 months which may conceivably pro-
duce a strong democratic government is
certainly reassuring on this score, but
the fact remains that the reaction of the
United States at the time of acute crisis
was to intervene forcibly and illegally
against a revolution which, had we
sought to influence it instead of sup-
pressing it, might have produced a strong
popular government without foreign
military intervention. Since just about
every revolutionary movement is likely to
attract Communist support, at least in
the beginning, the approach followed in
the Dominican Republic, if consistently
pursued, must inevitably make us the
enemy of all revolutions and therefore
the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt
oligarchies of the hemisphere.
We simply cannot have it both ways;
we must choose between the Alliance for
Progress and a foredoomed effort to sus-
tain the status quo in Latin America.
The choice which we are to make is the
principal unanswered question arising
out of the unhappy events in the Domini-
can Republic and, indeed, the principal
unanswered question for the future of
our relations with Latin America.
It is not surprising that we Americans
are not drawn toward the uncouth revo-
lutionaries of the non-Communist left.
We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth
of July speeches, the most truly revolu-
tionary nation on earth; we are, on the
contrary, much closer to being the most
unrevolutionary nation on earth. We
are sober and satisfied and comfortable
and rich; our institutions are stable and
old and even venerable; and our Revo-
lution of 1776, for that matter, was not
much of an upheaval compared to the
p s
f
.'
o example, in his speech to Trench and Russian revolutions and to
future. These purposes can be served,
in
the American Ambassadors on the current and im however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. fourtht annive
si
d
rsary the All ante for Lat n America,
a,
and Africa.
policy are thoroughly reviewed and Progress-a statement in which the Our heritage of stabiilty and conserva-
analyzed. I make my remarks today in President compared the Alliance for tism is a great blessing, but it also has
the hope of contributing to that process. Progress with his own enlightened pro- the effect of limiting our understanding
The development of the Dominican gram for a Great Society at home. On of the character of social revolution and
crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, pro- the other hand, one notes a general tend- sometimes as well of the injustices which
vides a classic study of policymaking in ency on the part of our policymakers not spawn them. Our understanding of
a fast-changing situation in which each to look beyond a Latin American politi- revolutions and their causes is imperfect
decision reduces the range of options cian's anticommunism. One also notes not because of any failures of mind or
available for future decisions so that in certain Government agencies, particu- character but because of our good for-
errors are compounded and finally, in- larly the Department of Defense, a pre- tune since the Civil War in never having
deed, there are few if any options except occupation with counterinsurgency, experienced sustained social injustice
to follow through on an ill-conceived which is to say, with the prospect of without hope of legal or more or less
course of action. Beyond a certain point revolutions and means of suppressing peaceful remedy. We are called upon,
the Dominican story acquired some of them. This preoccupation is manifested therefore, to give our understanding and
the inevitability of a Greek tragedy. in dubious and costly research projects, our sympathy and support to movements
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23000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 15, 1965
which are alien to our experience an i I think that in the case of the Domini- willing to support if not positively op-
jarring to our preferences and prejudice;. can Republic we did close our minds to poked to Bosch.
We must try to understand social rev- the causes and to the essential legitimacy Events of the days following April 24
olution and the injustices that give it of revolution in a country in which dem- demonstrated that Reid had so little
rise because they are the heart and core ocratic procedures had failed. That, I popular support that it can reasonably
of the experience of the great majority think, is the central fact concerning the be argued that there was nothing the
of. people now living in the world. In participation of the United States in the United States could have done, short of
Latin America we may prefer to asst - Dominican revolution and, possibly as armed intervention, to save his regime.
ciate with the well-bred, well-dressed well, its major lesson for the future. I The more interesting question is why
businessmen who often hold positions of turn now to comment on some of the the United States was so reluctant to
power, but Latin American reformers events which began last April 24 in Santo see Bosch returned to power. This is
regard such men as aliens in their own Domingo. part of the larger question of why U.S.
countries who neither identify with the x When the Dominican revolution began attitudes had changed so much since
own people nor even sympathize with on Saturday, April 24, the United States 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was
their aspirations. Such leaders are ro- had there options available. First, it warmly and repeatedly embraced and
garded by educated young Latin Amer- could have supported the Reid Cabral supported as few if any Latin American
scans, as a "consular bourgeoisie," by government; second, it could have sup- presidents have ever been supported by
which they mean business-oriented con- ported the revolutionary forces; and the United States.
servatives who more nearly represent the third, it could do nothing. 'The next crucial point in the Domi-
interests of foreign businessmen then The administration chose the last nican story came on Tuesday, April 27,
the interests of their own people. Mc n course. When Donald Reid Cabral when rebel leaders, including Molina
like Donald Reid-who is- one of the asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday Uxre:na.and Caaniano Deno, called at the
better of this category of leaders--moo morning, April 25, he was given no en- U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and
have their merits, but they are not the couragement. He then resigned, and negotiations. At that time the military
force of the future in Latin America. considerable disagreement ensued over situation looked very bad for the rebel,
It is the revolutionaries of the no31- the nature of the government to succeed or constitutionalist, forces. Ambassador
Communist left who have most of the him. The party of Juan Bosch, the Bennett, who had been instructed four
popular support in Latin America. The PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, tunes to work for a cease fire and for
Radical Party in Chile, for example, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the trans- the formation of a military junta, felt
is full of 19th century libertariais fer of government power but was given he did not have authority to mediate;
whom many North Americans would find no encouragement. Thus, there began mediation, in his view, would have been
highly congenial, but it was recently at that time a chaotic situation which "intervention." Mediation at that point
crushed in national elections by a group amounted to civil war in a country with- might have been accomplished quietly
of rambunctious, leftist Christian Dem3- out an effective government. and without massive military interven-
crats. It may be argued that tae What happened in essence was that tion. Twenty-four hours later the Am-
Christian Democrats are anti-United the Dominican military refused to sup- bassador was pleading for the marines,
States, and to a considerable extent sorle port Reid and were equally opposed to and as we know some 20,000 soldiers
of them are-more so now, it may be Bosch or other PRD leaders as his sue- were landed-American soldiers.
noted, than prior to the intervention of cessor. The PRD, which had the support on the afternoon of April 27 General
the United States in the Dominican Re- of some military officers, announced that -Aressin Y Wessin's tanks seemed about
public-but they are not Communists Rafael Molina Urena, who had been to cross the Duarte bridge into the city
and they have popular support. They President of the Senate during the Bosch of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause
have also come to terms with the Amor- regime, would govern as Provisional appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt
scan copper companies in Chile; that is President pending Bosch's return. At themselves rebuffed at the American
something which the predecessor con- this point, the military leaders delivered Embassy, some of their leaders, includ-
servative government was unable to do an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, ixig Molina Urena, sought asylum in
and something which a Communist gc v- and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of Latin American embassies in Santo
ernment would have been unwilling to April 25 the air force and navy began Domingo. The administration has in-
do. firing at the National Palace. Later in terpreted this as evidence that the non-
The movement of the future in La do the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Communist rebels recognized growing
America is social revolution. The VINE- Embassy to use its influence to persuade communist influence in their movement
tion is whether it is to be Communist or the air force to stop the attacks. The and were consequently abandoning the
democratic revolution and the choice Embassy made it clear it would not in- revolution. Molina Urena has said sim-
which the Latin Americans make Still tervene on behalf of the rebels, although ply that he sought asylum because he
depend in. part on how the United States on the following day, Monday, April 26, thought the revolutionary cause hope-
uses its great influence. It should be the Embassy did persuade the military less.
very clear that the choice is not betwoen to stop air attacks for a limited time. An opportunity was lost on April 27.
social revolution and conservative sill- This was the first crucial point in the Ambassador Bennett was in a position to
garchy but whether, by supporting re- crisis. If the United States thought that bring possibly decisive mediating power
form, we bolster the popular non-Co m- Reid was giving the Dominican Republic to bear for a democratic solution, but he
munist left or whether, by supporting the best government it had had or was chose not to do so on the ground that
unpopular oligarchies, we drive the 31s- likely to get, why did the United States the exercise of his good offices at that
ing generation of educated and patriotic not react more vigorously to support him? point would have constituted interven-
young Latin Americans to an embittered On the other hand, if the Reid govern- tion. In the words of Washington Post
and hostile form of communism like ment was thought to be beyond salvation, Writer Murrey Marder-one of the press
that of Fidel Castro in Chile. why did not the United States offer pose- people who, to the best of my knowledge,
In my Senate speech of March 25, i