PROPOSED AGENCY POLICY FOR CAPTURED PERSONNEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000100400186-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 186
• Publication Date: January 3, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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3 January 1956
MEI()RANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel
SUBJECT: Proposed Agency Policy for Captured Personnel
1. Attached for your consideration is the report prepared by
this 'Working committee concerning proposed Agency policy in connection
with captured Agency personnel. The committee has not regularly on a
weekly basis since the date of its establishment and feels that it has
given intensive oOnsUeration to the subject assigned to it. The stated
objective of this committee was to reviov, insofar as possible, current
material relating to cases of prisoners of war and other captured per-
Bonnels and on the basis of this review to recommend to the senior
committee a proposed Agency policy covering "captured" personnel. A
general program designed to prepare Agency employees so that they-might
effectively carry out such a policy was to be Included in this report.
This committee has conducted such, a review including case histories and
documentary material both official and unofficial pertaining to the
prisoner of war question. In this connection, considerable reference
has been made to the complete report of the Secretary of Defense?s
Advisory Committee on,Prisonere of War.
2. The attached report is designed to serve as a basis for
establishing a definite Agency policy covering captured personnel.
Detailed issuances drawn within the framework of the proposed policies
are obviously subject to change since changes in Caimmist leaders and
practices often have a direct bearing on Communist attitudes toward
-- &MUMSM
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"foreign elements." Consequently, Agency policy in this matter must
permit flexibility in order that we may adopt counter measures to meet
such changes as may occur.
3. Additionally, it is our belief that any policy which may be
adopted concerning captured personnel must be understood and accepted
by any board of inquiry appointed in an individual case to be a guide,
establishing the conduct which this Agency should expect of its per-
sonnel. Hoards of inquiry which my be appointed should have authority
to waive adherence to these principles of conduct only where the circum-
stances of the individual case justify action which is not strictly in
accordance with the proposed principles of conduct.
4. The working group has not recommended policy statements relating
to punitive measures against persons who violate than principles.
Discussions revolving about this question led this group to the con-
clusion that the evaluation of wd.sting legal processes to achieve this
end was beyond the scope of their, immediate capabilities. However, it
is their opinion that personnel assigned to risk-of-capture areas should
fully understand that alll acts committed and/or statements made by them
while in custody will be reviewed by competent officials of the Agency
in the light of the circumetaioes surrounding their detention.
Office of Training Technical Services Staff
('1 f'ice of Personnel Office of Security
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1. The committee has taken as its objective the development of policy
statements which, if implemented, will maximize the defense of security
information known to Agency personnel in forward operating areas.
2. These statements fall into two major categories: (1) those pertaining
to responsibilities assumed by the Agency; (2) those pertaining to responsibili-
ties assumed by the employee. "Agency personnel" as used in this statement
refers to staff employees and staff agents.
3. It is almost self-evident that the Agency should exercise caution
and care in assigning personnel to overseas areas and/or missions where risk
of capture is possible. Persons even on TDY status who have knowledge of
benefit to the opposition ideally should never be placed in a position where
risk of capture exists. On the other hand, operating demands sometimes
necessitate some compromise with this ideal. Moreover, risk of capture is
not an all or nothing matter; it varies both in time and place. Therefore,
it shall be the policy of this Agency:
To-assign keenc4 verso=el to overseas areas only after the
neaencv znaz may accru zroomm su asagWanti.
4. Agency personnel become increasingly competent as they gain in trade-
craft skills and knowledge about the Agency. Personnel policies, encouraging
rotation of employees from headquarters to field stations, or from one
operating area to another, are designed to extend the capabilities of the
Agency as a whole. Furthermore, the motivation of operating people is, often
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enhanced by knowledge about "the big picture*" the chief objectives and goals
of a project. However, these policies run in conflict with ideal intelligence
principles, particularly that of need-to know. Again from an ideal intelli-
gence standpoint, activities in risk-of-capture areas should be conducted by
persona knowing the least about Agency operations but highly skilled in trade-
craft. Therefore, it shall be the policy of this Agency:
Sidmi ssi Anti in 1Qt,~ a Mang r that ris-of-cantata diminishes as
kn2wledg2 of -Agency, Ope atjon ncrsases,.
5. Persons in areas where risk-of-capture is great, obviously need a
solid basic cover story. These legends must be perfected beyond present
Agency standards and adequately supported through carefully conceived back-
stopping measures. If the individual is captured, it must be recognized that
the cover story has a high probability of eventually being destroyed no matter
how ingeniously it is backstopped and conforms with some truthful facts. The
defense against this possibility is a series of variations within the frame-
work of the basic legend. Therefore, it shall be the policy of this Agency:
That every Agency employee urior to osure to'risk-ofcaDturg
shall be trained in a cover story and variations on It that
conform to ,ound, intelligence-defense doctrine.
6. Agency employees, in general, are motivated to evade capture.
Certainly a deliberate defection to the enemy would be grounds fbr treason
charges. Therefore, it shall be the policy of this Agency that:
Every Agency neraon, if caught in a dangerous situation, will
attempt to avoid capture by all means at his command.
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7. The overwhelming evidence concerning persons who have been captured is
that methods can be applied to force even the most resolute person to reveal
information. Furthermore, sound intelligence operating principles call for
initiating, where possible, corrective steps on the assumption that vital
information has been or will shortly be compromised after the capture of an
Agency person. To impose an unbending insistence that captured persons should
withhold all information indefinitely is both a hazard to the persona mental
stability and unessential for Agency operation. The practice of providing
Agency personnel with cover stoires is based on the assumption that those persons
may be coerced into talking at some time.
This "cover story" ideally should be based on a completely developed
"cover life" of considerable intensity and focus. The ramifications and details,
persons involved, situations engendered, should appear to be valid and authentic.
When, therefore, the individual is taken into custody, his account of his
cewrt activities should be plausible and ready for exposure with a fund of
elaboration. The history as given to his captors should be restricted to the
cover aspects of his life and to noothor. If necessary, and after a suitable
show of resistance, the prisoner may be allowed to sign a deposition confessing
to "crimes" arising out of his "cover story." The only information that CIA
prisoners may properly impart to the enemy are the facts and details of the
"cover story." Communication on any other aspect is prohibited, and any such
will end in disaster for the individual and the service. This should be the
policy for the prisoner even in the face of discrepancies detected by the
enemy, and even when clear-cut evidence of the covert activity of the agent is
in the enenj ?s hands. Covert activities by the prisoner or others should
never be admitted or confirmed by Agency personnel.
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The chief defense objective is to impede and, if possible, to thwart
the interrogation process. This may be accomplished by adhering to the
confines of the "cover story" with maw details and by overloading the
interrogators with a wealth of inconsequential non-classified information
whose accuracy must be checked. Various devices, such as feigning illness,
exhaustion or collapse demanding medical attention, can sometimes be effec-
tive. If some classified information falls into the hands of the enemy,
the interests of the Agency and of the individual will be served best by
the prisoner's consistent refusal to confirm this information and denial
of knowledge about it. Therefore, it shall be the policy of the Agency that:
Captured Agencypersonnel will use their cover stories Ig
ede iv
every means at their coa?e?and to protect all sensitive material
known to them.
8. Captured Agency personnel have a responsibility to contrive
opportunities for escape and to attempt escape when success is likely.
Pseudo-cooperation such as cooperation with prison rules, obedience to the
captor's regulations, courtesies and feigned acceptance of indoctrination,
even to the extent of public utterances consistent with the "cover story",
may gain those freedoms and privileges that make escape possible. In some
cases captured Americans have been physically tortured, not to elicit
Information, but because they.had ignored, disregarded or violated the
prison routines and regulations. Therefore, it shall be the policy of the
Agency that:
mens at his com:asnd includini' vsei, o-coopemU (as defined
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fare of other U.S. gjg&jMo
9. The Agency has the responsibility for equipping all employees
entering risk-of-capture areas with adequate knowledge and skills to
minimize possibility of capture and maximize their defenses against the
rigors of captivity. Returned captives have repeatedly given evidence
that knowledge of what to expect in captivity would in itself have a strong
passive defense. Much is now known concerning the end?s practices and
policies vie-a-vis captives and some active defensive measures have been
developed. It is not feasible to train all persons to the same degree in
these respects, but minims] standards should be established for all
persons entering risk-of-capture areas. The training should be made pro-
gressively intensive as the individual's knowledge of Agency?s Operations
and his risk of capture increases. Therefore, it shalt be the policy of
the Agency:
methods 12 evade o nture and t2af i j errogation. Those
and demonstrate theiruroficiencv in use of defenses against
re'ea" ossified information.
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AVERM
1. The policy statements proposed in the foregoing report will be
ineffective, if adopted,unleas supported by a number of interlocking con-
crete measures. Training to avoid capture and counteract interrogation arid
indoctrination is the most obvious need. The working committee, however,
believed that anumber of less obvious needs also exist of which the follow-
ing are suggestive but not exhaustive.
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persuasion methods,
after reviewing existing interrogation and
concluded in 1953 "tbat the 2ggt ..meat feature of
?9 gang j.gh morale and firan
h e at a of human nature thatma4._when
ee . be exuloited by the enemsr." This statement makes clear that defensive
measures must begin early in a personea Agency career. Furthermore, all
efforts, or the lack thereof, to build esprit de corps will have direct
repercussions on the Agency?s capabilities to protect itself and its informa-
tion. Basic to the effectiveness of any principles of conduct is a strong
morale focussed upon CIA and its mission. This means that every member
should be indissolubly identified with the group and its value systems. Such
strong morale can best be created where traditions, pride of service, internal
prestige, and group loyalties are integral parts of an Agency career. The
Agency should periodically r?=examine itself to ascertain whether these
ingredients are inherent in its organization.
3. Because of the nature of intelligence vrork, public acclaim or wide
spread public notice cannot be accorded outstanding performances. This limita-
tion makes it all the more appropriate to give special recognition within the
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confines of Agency security. One concrete suggestion to this end is to
establish a Court or Hall of Honor containing memorials or plaques to CIA
employees who have died, been killed. and/or decorated in line of duty. Such
a place could aid in establishing a sense of duty and responsibility by being
used for swearing in new employees, decoration ceremonies and other honorific
occasions.
4. One of the significant conclusions from debr:i v?ings or returned
prisoners is the sense of moral and psychological isolation engendered by
the opposition to undermine a men's resistance. The Agency must develop and
exploit all possible means for communicating with prisoners to counteract
the feeling of helplessness. The Agency should continue its efforts to
inform personnel of the benefits to themselves and their families that will
accrue in the event of 'capture or death.
5. A vigorous training program needs to be developed not merely on the
technique level but on the level of the opposition's basic attitude toward
prisoners of war and war criminals. This Agency possesses much intelligence
regarding the co2mmist purposes in gaining "oonfessions," their concepts of
legality, and the cultural differences in attitudes toward prisoners.
However, this intelligence is incomplete and only partially integrated. It
is the feeling of this working group that an essential first step prior to
establishing a training program on the ideational level is the codification
and integration of such intelligence.
6. One feature of Communist legs], systems is the requirement that a
signed deposition be obtained from the prisoner describing his "crimes." The
prisoner'a case is considered incomplete unless such a deposition is obtained.
A protest of innocence is not acceptable because Communist secret police do
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not arrest persona unless they consider them to be a threat to the state or
the party and, therefore, by Commauiiat definition, criminals. "Confessions
of crimes" obtained by the Communist police may be used publicly. Although
such confessions have both internal and external propaganda value, the U.S.
government at large can more effectively negate that propaganda than can the
individual. On the other hand, the intelligence contained in confessions may
be damaging to U.S. interests. Therefore, it is essential that ideational
training emphasize the motivation for wctracting confessions as viewed from
the captorsa vantage point so the prisoner can manipulate the situation more
intelligently to protect the classified information he possesses and the
welfare of his fellow prisoners.
7. The training program clearly should embrace familiarization with
various specific commiuiiat interrogation techniques, the stages through which
they progress, and the most probable short-range objective each technique is
designed to achieve. Although the fundamental thesis of these recommendations
is that every person must "talk" to some extent, and therefore reveal some
information, it is also the thesis that this information need not be classi-
fied, and that the interrogation process can be successfully prolonged, and
can even be defeated. The possibilities of delay are enhanced if the captive
knows in advance what to expect and what kinds of behavior may legitimately
be expected of persons in his status so he can fortify himself and act
accordingly. The prospect of the unknown and the feeling of uncertainty is
often more fearsome than the actual experience.
8. Proper training can develop skill in confounding interrogation. It
is the belief of the working group that such training will be most effective
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if it emphasizes high loyalty standards, ingenuity, and artful dodges rather
than physical stamina and torture tolerance. Those persons who may be charged
with direct responsibility for planning and executing such courses will find
many helpful suggestions to this end in the Documentation of the Secretary of
Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (July 1955).
9. Nothing in these statements should be construed as supplanting
current training in escape and evasion, or interrogation methods. Integration
of what is suggested herein with present courses may prove desirable.
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