COUNTER-SPY: THE BULLETIN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 14, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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14 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Counter-Spy: The Bulletin of the Committee for
Action/Research on the Intelligence Community
1. The UPI press ticker on 14 May announced that a news
conference was to be held on that date by Tim Butz of the
Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community
(CARIC). The announced subject was: "Opposition to William
Colby to be CIA Director." CARIC is a new organization which
published its first monthly (?) Bulletin, entitled Counter-Spy,
in March 1973 and its second in May. It lists a Washington
post office box as its address and offers annual subscription
rates for Counter-Spy at $6.00 for individuals, $10.00 for insti-
tutions, and $75.00 for agencies of the government. Prisoners
and GI's may receive free copies.
2. CARIC's "current members" are listed in the first issue
of the Bulletin as Winslow Peck, K. Barton Osborn, Gary Thomas,
and Tim Butz. Those listed as "responsible" for the second issue
are Butz, Osborn, and Peck. Winslow Peck is a pseudonym for
Perry Fellwock. While serving in the Air Force, 1966-1969,
Fellowck was assigned to NSA type duties in Turkey and South
Viet Nam. It will be recalled that the August 1972 issue of
Ramparts Magazine carried an article entitled "U.S. Electronic
Espionage: A Memoir," which was an interview with Winslow Peck,
later identified as Fellwock, regarding NSA activities. Peck
has had relationships with the Peoples Coalition for Peace and
Justice and Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Little is known
regarding Peck's other associates in CARIC - Osborn, Thomas, and
Butz except that they have been noted as participants in the
New Left, the National Peace Action Coalition, Vietnam Veterans
Against the War, and Scientists and Engineers for Social and
Political Action.
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3. Virtually all of the second (May) 1973 issue of
Counter-Spy is devoted to a long article entitled "Pacification:
The 100 Year Flight of the Phoenix." On page 7, the authors
print a "partial list" of those responsible as Advisors/
Designers of the Pacification/Phoenix/F-6 programs including
General Lansdale and Ambassador Colby. They also list the CIA
Station Chieves [sic]/CAS Saigon as John Richardson, Peer
De Silva, Mr. Jorganson [sic], John Hart, Ted Shackley, and
Thomas Polgar.
4. The article touches on CIA's role with the PAT's and
the PRU's, but there is nothing new in their general charges.
A special section (page 24) is devoted to "We Demand William
E. Colby's Resignation." Noting that Ambassador Colby headed
the Phoenix Program, CARIC charges that "Under his direction,
Phoenix agents practiced some of their most brutal forms of
assassination and torture."
5. This section continues that, under oath before a House
Subcommittee,
"Ambassador Colby lied concerning the nature of
the Phoenix Program and misrepresented its cost
in both number of victims and amount of mis-used
public funds. As a reward for his having been
the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr. Colby has
recently been appointed the CIA's Deputy Director
of Operations . . . CARIC feels that a man who . . .
has had a career of directing assassination and
torture programs can play no legitimate part in
U.S. government. We encourage all citizens to
write their Congressional representative, the
White House, and the Central Intelligence Agency
to demand his resignation."
Presumably, Butz's press conference today will be more of the
same.
6. In its first (March 1973) issue, CARIC's Bulletin,
Counter-Spy, states in its introduction,that:
"Now former intelligence workers, Viet Nam Veterans,
and concerned citizens have formed the Committee
for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community
(CARIC), to serve as an independent 'watchdog' on
the government spy apparatus . to provide the
vital information an aware public needs to know
about government operations. The secrecy with which
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the government surrounds itself must stop. ...
CARIC will serve as an independent publicly
sponsored source of analysis and information
on the practices, organization, and objectives
of U.S. intelligence." (page 1)
7. In the first issue, the initial "Commentary" notes
the replacement of DCI Helms by Mr. Schlesinger as "an ominous
turn of events." Citing Helms as a "professional," the "Com-
mentary" notes the Agency's good performance as published in
the Pentagon Papers. The authors charge that Mr. Schlesinger
has had no previous experience in the intelligence Community
and did not come up through the ranks. They charge him with
being a "yes man" and his appointment "a dangerous step."
(pp. 2-3) The rest of the first issue is given over largely
to the FBI's domestic surveillance role and a reprint of what
is alleged to be the Domestic Intelligence section of the FBI's
annual report. This issue also contains a form for the reader
to fill out (page 13), listing the intelligence agencies of
which he has been a member, presumably in an attempt to secure
sources. This form is known as the "Questionnaire for the
Winter Soldier Investigation into,U.S. Intelligence."
8. Copies of the first two issues of Counter-Spy are
attached. Like many "bulletins" of this type, it w 1'1 probably
run its course-over a few issues and collapse for lack of funds.
Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - DDCI
1 - Exec.Sec. Mgmt. Comm.
1 - Asst. to the DCI, Mr. Thuermer
1 - Director of Security
i 1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - General Counsel
2 - HIC
 THE BULLETIN OF:
THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH
ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
MAY, 1973
VOL. 1
NO. 2
75C
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 ports but ignored by a vast segment of
the US press.
By 1959 only twenty-three agrovilles
had been constructed when the program was
abandened by the Saigon government. The
agrovilles had been operated by the GVN
under several naive assumptions. First
the GVN anticipated that the peasants
would have a spontaneous enthusiasm for
the program, their enthusiasm being
sparked by bribes and rewards. This did
not happen because the peasants would
more often be beaten by the governments
agents who kept the rewards for them-
selves.
The second naive assu,nption was
the belief that competent cadres for
administrative posts would emerge from
the rural population. Instead, corrup-
tion became instilled in the GVN. For
the most part the agroville effort tried
to instill pacification by fear and ter-
ror. The NLF did the exact opposite and
won the confidence of the rural popul-
ation. As the NLF's strength in the
countryside increased, Diem lost more
and more control of the population and
by 1961 the Agroville Program had
failed.
To meet the increasing presence of
the NLF, the Saigon government initiated
the first of the truly massive pacifica-
tion efforts - Ap Chien Luoc or Strateg-
ic Hamlets. The program was officially
insituted in March,1962 with both US Mis-
sion and Diem's brother Ngu being the
chief proponents. The Saigon government
created the Inter-Ministerial Committee
for Strategic Hamlets which assumed all
responsibility for the program.
The purpose of the program was to
achieve the widest possible contol over
the population by the Saigon government.
The immediate security objectives of the
program were two-fold; first, to sever
the communication and control lines of
the NLF to the rural population and thus
deny the "fish" from the "sea." Second,
to promote a nation-wide self-defense
effort. In addition to these immediate
objectives, the Strategic Hamlet program
was designed to have important implications
for the long-range devlopment of the GVN.
It was hoped by Diem and his US advisors
that the program would create a social,
economic and political infrastructure in
the countryside which would uproot the
ancestral ties of the peasants and thus
their loyalty to the community-based NLF
and implant a lasting political administr-
ation at the local level loyal to Saigon.
The hamlet is the smallest organised
community in rural Vietnam. Several haml-
ets make up a village, however under the
Strategic Hamlet program both hamlets and
villaqes were fortified.
PARTIAL LIST OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR
PACIFICATION/PHOENIX/F-6
ADVISORS/DESIG HERS
E.G. Lansdale, Major Gen.,USAF(ret.)
Sir Robert G.K. Thompson
Dep. Amb. William J. Porter
Amb. Robert Komer
Amb. William E. Colby
Amb. Norman L. Sweat
FSR George D. Jacobson, SAAFFO
AMBASSADORS
Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
Amb. Maxwell D. Taylor, Gen. ARMY(ret.)
Amb. Ellsworth Bunker
Amb. Graham Martin
COMUSMACV
Gen. William C. Westmoreland
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams
Gen. Fredrick Weyland
CIA Station Chieves/CAS SAIGON
John Richardson
Peer De Silva
Mr. Jorganson
John Hart
Ted Shackley
Thomas Polgar
PRESIDE M'S
Dwight David Eisenhower
John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lyndon Baines Johnson
Richard Milhaus Nixon
The primary security force created in
the Strategic Hamlet period of pacification
was the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF). The largest component of the
RVNAF, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) was created at the end of the war
by decree of Bao Dai, and many of the
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 A
program aimed at eliminating a prac-
tical problem -- the VC infrastruc-
ture. When questioned concerning the
unaccounted-for 1.7billion dollars
which had financed much of the covert
aspect of Phoenix (agent payments,
PRU equipment, etc.), Ambassador Colby
assured the committee that, while Phoenix
was less than well-controlled at its "ear-
ly stages" (referring to the pre-computer
days), all the main problems had been re-
solved and that the Congress could rest
assured that aberrations of brutality
would remain at a minimum. No, he did
not know how many innocent victims the
program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe
more. No, he did not have the authority
to discuss the reasons why the Congress
could not audit 1.7 billion dollars'
worth of taxpayers funds which went to
CORDS. This is as close to the truth as
.the Congress has ever come. (see insert)
The significance of the above testi-
mony, however, is not that a high-ranking
official has misled Congress. Rather the
fact that the laws, directives and prac-
tices of what was until 1971 actively
known as the Phoenix Program have not
been repealed. In fact, the only change
which has been made in the continuing
policy of VCI neutralization is, like all
other covert operations, that its cover
name has been changed. The program has
been re-designated, and now takes its
name from the rating given to the least
verifiable type of intelligence infor-
mation which justifies VCI neutralization.
The name of the program is now "F-6". In
an attempt to call attention to the fact
that, among other crimes, Phoenix and F-6
have now generated close to 300,000 politicl
tical prisoners in the South Vietnamese
prisons, a member of the GVN House of
Deputies, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, wrote in a Jan.
18, 1973 article that:
"A new program, with only the name of
F-6, is being secretly installed to replace
the (US) CIA--organized Phoenix program, dis-
continued recently. Like its predecessor,
the new program is aimed at "neutralizing"
suspected Viet Cong cadre and sympathizers.
"Suspects, under F-6, can now be arrested
for an immense range of reasons, and the
accusation of one person is enough for
capture. Individuals and families who might,
in the past, have had some contact with "the
other side", perhaps only a relative in the rest procedure which allows such people
Abrth or in the NLF, are now under suspicion. 24 as the above Frenchmen to be included in
There is hardly a family
in
the South
free
from "taint", including
the
highest
ranking
government officials. Even
Thieu's
own peo-
ple are complaining privately about
F-6
which hangs over everyone's head like a
guillotine."
Two first-hand accounts of torture
and brutality have recently been published
by Jean-Pierre Debris and Andre Menras,
two French schoolteachers who had been
arrested and imprisoned under Phoenix/
F-6 authority in July of 1970. Tortured
and kept at Chi Hoa prison for two and
a half years, Debris and Menras were fin-
WE DEMAND WILLIAM E. COLBY'S RESIGNATION
Ambassador William E. Colby, in his
role as Director of the US Cords mission
in Vietnam, headed the Phoenix Program
at the height of US ground troop involve-
ment. Under his direction, Phoenix agents
practiced some of their most brutal forms
of assassination and torture.
Under oath before the House Subcommit-
tee on Foreign Operations and Government
Information, Ambassador Colby lied con-
cerning the nature of the Phoenix Pro-
gram and misrepresented its cost in both
number of victims and amount of mis-used
public funds. As a reward for his having
been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr.
Colby has recently been appointed the
CIA's Deputy Director of operations (clan-
destine services -- an office which con-
stitutes 600 of the CIA's total operations).
CARIC feels that a man who, like the
fabled old Man of the Mountain, has had
a career of directing assassination and
torture programs can play no legitimate
part in US government. We encourage all
citizens to write their Congressional
representative, the White House and the
Central Intelligence Agency to demand
his resignation.
ally released in late December of 1972,
after their plight was brought to the
attention of the French people
who in turn put the pressure of public
oitrage on the French government and
obtained the two's release. Their
view if "F-6" is that:
"the idea that F-6 will yield less than
the hundreds of thousands of victim which
Phoenix did is naive, and probably very
underestimated..."
It is important to examine the ar-
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone: [phone] (Code 143-6121)
15 May 1973
Mr. Guy McConnell
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
6.68 PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
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`
Mr. Pfcalled, said in connection with the
memo he handed you last night that one of
the editors of that publication was on TV
last night and said they gave documentation
to the Senate Armed Services Committee in
an attempt to block Colby's nomination.
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