25X1A
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WU.
MEMO A U 0 Chief LCD/CR
FROM Chief. /P/Ra
SUBJECT
60
CIA/R M 60-2. Overseas Chinese in
Souhea Asia, 22 77;;;WITZIZT-
REFE CES ?; (a) USIA Memorandum to OCR/CIA,
9 March 1960;
(b) LCD/CR Memorandum to St/P /RR
11 March 1960, same subject
1. Thi Officeas no objection the USIA torwardin stbect
ndum to USIA posts overseas providin its use is restricted
Government personnel.
2. Pie*s inform USIA. that a request of this kind need not be
de unless the document is restricted "No Dissemination Abroad.'
3. Attached are eleven copies requested by USIA.
Attachments;
Copies #1S2 162. GM 60-2
St /P /C
x-8622(21 Mar 60)
Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
- St /P /C
1 - Chrono
COP FrIPI
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D
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Analysis Branch, DD/CR
ATTENTION
FROM
JECT
23 qa 1980
DD/AB/SS 25X1A
Chief? Publications Staff, ORR
Mean of CIA/ER OM 60-2,
ConfideralaTfolEreign
10 it is requested that the attached coptes of subject report be
fo,rwarded as follows:
#51 #54
465
036
469
490 - 491
4124
4125
4126
25X1C
All ORR resoonsibilities as defined in the DDI memorandum of
13 August 1952, "Procedures for Dissemination of Finishel Intelligence
o Foreign Uovernments?" as applicable to this report, have been fulfilled.
25X1A
DOCUMERT NO
NO
-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; IS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
coy r
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IG7
Copy No
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM 60-2
22 January 1960
OVERSEAS CHINESE
IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: IS $ C
NEXT REVIEW DATE' -
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 01/04___ REVIEWER: 035377
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9
C.-64F DE 14 FA L
Background
The presence of the Overseas Chinese5 in every country of Southeast Asia
constitutes a minority problem that is common to the region as a whole. Although
the Overseas Chinese represent only about 6 percent of the total population of
the region, their influence is far greater than their numbers would imply. In
some countries the Chinese have a virtual monopoly over certain key commercial
enterprises, which could provide the Communists with a powerful economic tool
for subversive activities against the nations of Southeast Asia. Currently,
this potential for subversion is probably conditioned by the fact that the
Overseas Chinese are generally apolitical.
The presence of sizable Chinese communities, however, is in itself a visible
reminder to Southeast Asian leaders of geographic realities. To the north is
China with a population of about 675 million that is increasing at the rate of
15 million a year and straining against the food resources of the country.
Nearby lie large areas in Southeast Asia that are comparatively underpopulated
and largely undeveloped. The large expanses of uncleared land throughout
Southeast Asia and even the relatively densely populated delta areas of some
of the main rivers could support many additional millions of people at Asiatic
standards of living. The universal adoption of the Japanese method of rice
growing (distinguished by heavy fertilizing) would in itself greatly increase
the rice yields.
Historically, there has been a continuing flow of emigration from China into
Southeast Asia. Since neither ancestry nor citizenship is a realistic criterion
as to who is Chinese in the overseas context, it is difficult to give a completely
valid enumeration or picture of the distribution of Overseas Chinese throughout
the region. Of the estimated total population of 190 million in Southeast Asia,
some 11 to 12 million can be considered Chinese. Partially because the vast
majority emigrated by way of the sea, the Chinese live chiefly in the delta
areas -- the sites of the Southeast Asian ports and great comnercial centers.
Chinese are relatively sparse in the border areas, except for the refugees and
irregular KNIT soldiers in northeastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern
Laos. The accompanying map and table show the areas in which Chinese are
concentrated, the parts of China from which they came, the total number in each
country, and its linguistic composition.
The immigrants have come almost exclusively from southeastern China -- the
provinces of KWantung, Fukien, and Miangsi -- with small numbers from Hainan
Island and Vinnan. Five main language groups are represented: Cantonese,
Hokkien-Teochi, Hakka, Hainanese, and YUnnanese. Only the Hokkiens and Teochins
speak dialects of the same language; the others speak distinctive languages
that are not mutually intelligible. Within a Southeast Asian country, a specific
dialect group often virtually monopolizes certain occupations. For example,
most pepper planters and domestic servants in Cambodia are Hainanese, and the
Hakkas dominate the tin industry of Indonesia.
Distribution
Burma:.. About 60 percent of the Chinese in Burma are concentrated in Rangoon
and the surrounding Irrawaddy Delta area and south into Tenasserim. Another
30 percent or more is found in the Kachin and Shan States. Most of the Chinese
are engaged in commerce and artisan work -- metal and leather working and
carpentry -- but some are employed in fishing and mining.
Thailand: Approximately 50 percent of the Chinese in Thailand live in the
Bangkok-Chao Phraya Delta region, with a second major concentration in the
Kra Isthmus, the center of Thailand's tin and rubber industries. Elsewhere,
they tend to live in towns along transportation arteries, such as the railroads
in the northeast. Chinese are dominant in finance and industry, operating 80
percent of the rice mills and owning and operating most of the banking, insurance,
and export-import firms. Most of the labor force in the rubber and tin industries
is also Chinese.
o Overseas Chinese may be defined as the China-born Chinese population residing
in a foreign country, together with their patrilineal descendants who still regard
themselves personally and socially as Chinese.
.0 For details of the number and distribution of Overseas Chinese by specific
countries, see the map and tables on the reverse side. The figures given for
internal administrative units are the latest available, generally from the most
recent census, and may be less up to date than the estimates of the total number
of Overseas Chinese given in the textual table.
CCILIEIDE-14T+Ar
CQUERIENILAt
Approved For
:5eledbe 20 i 0/ ?
CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
Areas of Origin and
Overseas Concentrations
CHINA
SEA 0
KO A JAPAN
511
Pl."14NE
SEA
n4
PHILIPPINES
INDIAN OCEAN
AREAS OF ORIGIN
(BY TRIBE)
Yunnaruse Nadia
M Cantonese Eg Hainenese
Hada CYM1er
Teochtu-HoliNien
OVERSEAS CONCENTRATIONS
NE Mcaoir?Centration070'C'grcentration
cocos M.
.INDO
..ristryas
PALAU
; Heleruheu
SIA
8,
NEW GUINEA
PAPLIA
AUSTRALIA
28586 160
CONMENTTAl.
Laos. The Chinese in Laos live chiefly in the larger towns and are predominantly
: CIA-RDP7%0100finKftlecalltegatraroertch-imint_ancondttoileedsa.le firms.
OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA a/
Country
British Borneo
North Borneo
Erunei
Sarawak
Philippines
Total Population
Number
(thousands) Year
19,045 1953
22,800 1957
2,000 1959
4,740 1958
13,797 1958
12,366 1956
6,279 1957
1,515 1950
84,982 1956
1,107
1401 1957
75 1957
631 1956
24,718 1959
Chinese Population
Major Dialect Groups hi
Number (Percent of Total
(thousands) Year Percent Chinese Population)
335 1953 2
3,000 1955 13
30 1958
218 1958
15 0954
703 1956
2,332 1957
1,142 1958
2,500 1955
302
97 1957
15 1957
190 1956
363 1956 2 00 70, 020
HN 40, 0 25, Y 20, 0 8, HA 3
T 60, HA 12, H 12, C 10
2 T 60, HA 20, some C, H, and Y
5 T 60, C 20, HN 7, HA 4, H 4
negl. Mostly Cantonese
C 45, T 20, HA 10, BE 8, H 4
ON 29, C 25, HA 21, T 11, H 6
HN 40, C 22, T 22, H 7, HA 5
HN 47, HA 21, C 12, T 8, H 3
6
37
75
3
25
24
20
30
HA 56, C 26, EN 7, T 5, 03
HA 31, 000 28
HN 15, c 10, 1 8, H 3
a. Most of the statistics are from official sources within the countries.
b. The percentage estimates of dialect composition are from Skinner's Report on the Chinese in
Southeast Asia, 1951 (C-Cantonese, H-Hainanese, HA-Hakka, HN-Hokkien, T-Teoehins, Y-Yunnanese,
and HOK-Hokchin).
c. This figure does not take full account of Chinese immigrants in recent years who have settled
in the Shan and Ensile States. The number of Chinese immigrants who have entered these states
since 1940 has been estimated at 250,000.
-C-GINFIDEIZIAL
Cambodia: The majority of the Chinese in Cambodia also are concentrated in
urban centers. Of Phnom Penh's total population of 363,800, approximately
110,000 are Chinese. They own over 50 percent of the rice mills, almost
monopolize the fish industry and bus transport service, and are active in
import-export trade and banking.
South Vietnam: About 555,000 of South Vietnam's Chinese population of 700,000
live in the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon -- most of them in Cholon. In Southeast
Asia, only Singapore has a larger Chinese urban population than Cholon. The rice
trade and most of South Vietnam's other retail and wholesale trade are dominated
by the Chinese.
North Vietnam: The number of Chinese in North Vietnam is uncertain. In 1954
the total for North Vietnam was estimated at 50,000; nearly half of this number
reportedly fled to South Vietnam. The 20,000 to 25,000 remaining are probably
concentrated chiefly in Hanoi and Haiphong.
Federation of Malaya: In Malaya the Chinese have settled largely in the states
along the west coast. The 1957 census indicates that 75 percent of the total
Chinese population of 2.3 million is concentrated in the four states of Johore,
Selangor, Perak, and Penang. In Penang, over 57 percent of the total population
is Chinese and in Selangor and Perak, 45 percent or more. Throughout the
Malayan states the Chinese are largely urban. In the three largest cities --
Kuala Lumpur, Georgetown, and Ipoh -- they constitute 62 percent, 73 percent,
and 67 percent of the population, respectively. Chinese own and operate most
non-British commercial enterprises, rank second to the British in the volume
of capital investment, are the chief middlemen and shopkeepers, and generally
dominate service industries. They control over 40 percent of the tin production
and own many small rubber holdings. The possibility of a future union of
Malaya and Singapore presents the Malayan Government with the prospect of a
combined Chinese population slightly larger than the total Malay population
and much more economically powerful.
Singapore: According to the 1957 census, the total population of the Colony
of Singapore had increased 54 percent since 1947, the date of the last previous
census. During the intercensal decade the Chinese population increased 49.5
percent, but the Malay increased 64 percent. In 1947 the Chinese comprised
77.7 percent of the population and the Malaysians 12.1 percent; 10 years later
the corresponding figures were 75.4 and 13.6 percent. In almost every line
of commercial and business endeavor, Chinese predominate. Of significance is
the fact that half of Singapore's population is under 19 years of age.
British Borneo: Although the Chinese in British Borneo live chiefly in urban
centers, a substantial number are small farmers. In North Borneo the greatest
number are located in the East Coast Residency, where they comprise about 36
percent of the population. In Brunei the concentration of Chinese, by both
number and percentage, is greatest in Belait District. In Sarawak the First
and Third Divisions have the major Chinese concentrations. The rubber industry,
connerce, banking, and bus and taxi services throughout British Borneo are
dominated by Chinese.
Philippines: As in other parts of Southeast Asia, the vast majority of the
Chinese in the Philippines are urban dwellers. It is estimated that 90,000
live in Manila, comprising 7.2 percent of the city's population. Another
30,000, or 18 percent of the total population of Cebu, live within that city
and its environs. Only three of the provinces -- Cebu, Cotabato, and Davao --
have Chinese alien registrations amounting to as much as 1 percent of the
provincial total. Despite these relatively law percentages for the Philippines
as a whole, it is estimated that Chinese conduct over 50 percent of the retail
trade and control the rice business. In industry, they rank second only to
Americans.
Indonesia: The passage of time has largely invalidated the results of the
last official census of Indonesia, which was taken in 1930. Current estimates
indicate, however, that the Chinese population is probably distributed as
follows: 49 percent in Java and Madura, 38 percent in Sumatra, 8 percent
in Borneo, 3 percent in Celebes, and 2 percent in the other islands. The
Chinese control a large part of the wholesale and retail trade and are active
in the export-import trade, industry, and estate agriculture. Recent official
Indonesian statistics, which are probably based on a. reported register of
EetIMENTTA L
25X6
GENIMEMITAL
alien businesses, indicate that 84,000 of the 86,000 foreign retailers in
the nation (excluding certain dissident areas) are Chinese. Of the Chinese
retailers, some 26,000 are in East Java, 15,000 in East Sumatra, and 14,000
in Greater Djakarta. It is not known how many of these are rural traders;
and the register, itself, may well be incomplete. On the other hand, Indonesian
Chinese estimate the number of Chinese rural retailers at 60,000 on the basis
of one to each of Indonesia's 60,000 villages.
During the last decade or more, there has been a pronounced movement of
Chinese from rural areas to large cities, particularly in Java. As of 1958,
about 10 percent of Djakarta's estimated population of 2 million was Chinese.
Recent restrictions closing Djakarta, Bandung, and Medan to further influx
of any aliens will stem this urban trend. However, related government decrees
forcing the movement of Chinese aliens from rural areas to smaller towns will
increase the concentration of Chinese in these secondary centers.
Conflicts
Throughout Southeast Asia. the Overseas Chinese have maintained close ties
with the homeland, accompanied by a definite ethnocentric or Chinese national
consciousness. Cash remittances amounting to large sums have been sent to
the mainland annually for investment. Thousands of students have gone to China
for their education, and adults in large numbers have returned to China for
visits. In all the host countries the Chinese have resisted assimilation, but
to varying degrees. Wherever permitted, they have maintained their own schools,
in which Chinese is commonly the medium of instruction, and their own associations
for social and business purposes.
Both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments have deliberately
encouraged this national consciousness, basing their claim to the allegiance
of Chinese expatriates on the concept of jus sanguinis. In the implementation
of this policy the Communists have made use of such overt organizations as the
Bank of China. Some attempts have been made in recent years to soften the
policy in the interest of Southeast Asian good will. Overseas Chinese have
been encouraged to acquiesce in the national aims of their host countries.
Communist Chins has even discouraged Overseas Chinese students from attending
mainland schools. To some extent, Nationalist China followed suit in the fall
of 1958, when it suggested that Overseas Chinese should become citizens of the
countries in which they reside. The basic attitude, however, seems to have
remained unchanged. In 1957, after advocating that Overseas Chinese should
become good citizens of their host countries and after agreeing (as in the case
of Indonesia) that resident Chinese should opt for local or Chinese citizenship,
Chou En-Lai stated, "Their racial relations and cultural relations will, of
course, remain unchanged." The unchanged attitude is moat recently demonstrated
by Communist China's protests over restrictions being felt by Chinese in Indonesia.
Anti-Sinicism has increased with the growth of nationalism in Southeast
Asia and the corollary desire to place limits on the position of the Overseas
Chinese in the national economies. Undoubtedly the fear that Chinese Communism
might exploit the latent power of the Overseas Chinese has also contributed to 25X6
anti-Chinese feeling. Southeast Asian governments have imposed economic
sanctions on the Chinese and have taken steps to force their increased assim-
ilation and the assumption of greater responsibility toward the host government.
Many of the restrictions have beet minimized by the Chinese
Except
for the current governmen restrictions on the inese in n.onesia, the most
stringent measures have been taken in Thailand, South Vietnam, and the
Philippines, all of which are countries that recognize the Nationalist
Government on Taiwan and in which large proportions of the Chinese population
are, at least nominally, pro-Nationalist. The situation in these countries
probably reflects the protective cover of SEATO agreements and the weakness
of the Taiwan Government.
The advent of the communes in China and the concomitant breakdown of the
Chinese traditions of family and home undoubtedly have introduced another factor
that has tempered the sentiments of the Overseas Chinese toward their homeland
under its present government. Cash remittances, for example, have declined
greatly in recent years. Nevertheless, pride in the successes of Communist
China, combined with its emergence as a potentially powerful protector vis a vis
the governments of Southeast Asia, will continue to have a definite appeal to
many Overseas Chinese. Among this group, large numbers may be more pro-China
than pro-Communist. In any case, factors such as self-interest and fear of
retaliation by either Communist China or their host country are likely to be
the ultimate criteria in determining the allegiance of the pragmatic Chinese
businessmen.
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