D. GARETH PORTER'S 20 JULY LETTER TO RAY CLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800110005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 16, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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16 August 1973
Chief, Vietnam Operations
SUBJECT : D. Gareth Porter's 20 July Letter to
Ray Cline
1.1 1 asked me some time ago to take a look
at Gareth Porter's 20 July letter to Ray Cline. As you probably
know, Porter is a very ardent "revisionist" wedded, to the theory
that the North Vietnamese are incapable of error and the South
Vietnamese of good.. He has published a fair bit of material
in this vein, particularly a strident defense of the Lao Dong's
land reform programs of 1953-1956 incorporating a vicious. attack
on Hoang Van Chi and the latter's excellent book on this subject
entitled "From Colonialism to Communism."
2. As for Porter's actual letter, I have no way of knowing
whether Dr. Tuyen has in fact admitted that a document published
on page 57 of State's February 1965 White Paper is a fabrication.
I certainly have no personal recollection of admitting to anyone
that it was a fabrication (which it may well have been) and indeed
have no recollection of discussing this particular document with
anyone.
3. It would seem to me that Cline's reply ought not to
be pitched to defending that particular document or to retracting
the argument of the 1965 paper if that document should indeed
be a fabrication. Porter is turning a disingenuously blind eye
to the fact that the case for the thesis that the Lao Dong Party
controls the PRP -- and, indeed, that the latter is simply the
former's southern branch or the name the Lao Dong uses south
of the 17th Parallel -- does not rest on one document of debatable
authenticity.
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4. The case for the above analysis of the relationship
between the Lao Dong and the PRP rests, instead, on a solid and
well nigh overwhelming base of evidence it would be hard for
any open-minded scholar to assail: captured documents, prisoner/
rallier/agent testimony, radio communications patterns and even
published Vietnamese Communist statements. Appended hereto
is an illustrative sampling of this body of evidence, pulled
together by my colleague
5. I hope the above and this attachment helps you answer
Cline and apologize for taking such a long time to respond to your
request.
O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - GAC Chrono w/att
1 - VAS Chrono w/att
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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SAMPLING OF STATEMENTS INDICATING THAT THE LAO DONG
PARTY IS THE SOLE COMMUNIST PARTY IN VIETNAM, THUS
IMPLYING THAT THE PRP IS THE SOUTHERN BRANCH OF THAT
PARTY
1. NOTEWORTHY PUBLIC STATEMENTS
1. The FBIS Asia and Pacific Daily Reports of 11 March 1970
(p 1-4) and 24 March (p L 10) contain a monitored Liberation Radio
broadcast of a speech delivered by an unidentified official of the
PRP Central Committee who said the following:
"Dear Comrades, the success of the South Vietnamese
revolution has been the success of the Party's correct .
line under the leadership of the Party Central Committee
headed by Chairman Ho. "
2. Another equally as candid remark was made by Truong
Chinh in a 28 September 1967 interview with an Akahata correspondent.
Truong Chinh told the correspondent:
"All the Vietnamese people are strongly united and
firmly organized into national united fronts -- the
Fatherland Front in North Vietnam and the NFLSV in
South Vietnam. These two fronts are based upon the alliance
of workers and farmers and are led by the Party of
Marxism-Leninism." (See Akahata, 5 October 1967, p 3,
cited in FBIS Asia and Pacific Daily Report of 9 October
1967, pp jjj 6-7.)
II. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
1. Two months before the formal surfacing of the PRP in
December 1961, a draft resolution of the first COSVN conference in
October 1961 noted the following:
"A significant characteristic of the South Vietnam revolution
is that it is under the leadership of our Party, a Marxist-Leninist
par , which has undergone trials throughout a long, severe and
fierce struggle against imperialism and feudalism that has been waged
politically and militarily, legally and illegally. It has gained many
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experiences and has installations everywhere along with an army
of cadres who have matured throughout the many movements.
Moreover, the Party is the unique symbol of leadership and has
absolute prestige among the population."
2. A situation report on the status of the revolutionary movement
in South Vietnam for 1954 to 1963 noted:
"During the past nine years, under the enlightened leadership
of the Party Central Committee, the people and Party apparatus of
South Vietnam have experienced many phases along the difficult and
complicated path of struggle but they have also gained many victories
and experiences while pushing the South Vietnam liberation revolution
and creating the conditions for peaceful reunification of the country."
3. A COSVN Standing Committee directive discussing the tasks in the
south for the last six months of 1963 said:
"The meeting of the Central Office Standing Committee during
the last few days of July and the first part of August 1963 assessed,
on the basis of the Political Bureau's resolution of December 1962, the
situation between the enemy and ourselves during the months since
the first part of this year and set forth a number of tasks during
the coming months in order to achieve the missions of the Political
Bureau's resolution."
4. The Political Bureau of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee
in a resolution of early November 1963 said the following:
"The resolution of the 15th Central Committee conference
clearly outlined the revolutionary road of South Vietnam and the
methods of struggle to attain victory. The 1961 and 1962 Political
Bureau resolutions outlined the struggle courses and specific
policies aimed at resisting the effectiveness of the U.S.
imperialist aggression since it became a "special" war.
Resolutions of the Central Office of South Vietnam have
substantiated and developed the resolution of the 15th Central
Committee conference and the victories of the South Vietnamese
compatriots have proven that the above resolutions of the
Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central
Office are completely correct."
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"Through struggling against imperialism and especially U.S.
imperialists in the world arena and in South Vietnam at the
present time, we more clearly recognize the disciplined nature
of the enemy's policy aims. This assists us in more clearly recognizing
the scientific basis of our policies and aims against the enemy and
increases our confidence in the accuracy of these policies and
aims. Therefore, based on the resolution of the 15th Central
conference, the resolutions of the Political Bureau in 1961 and
1962, the development of the world and national situation, and
the development of the South Vietnamese people's struggle during
the past few years, especially during the last two years, this
resolution of the Political Bureau clearly states additional basic
decisions concerning the expectations of the South Vietnam
revolutionary movement and our struggle aims and outlines a
course and mission for advancing to new greater victories in the
near future."
5. The Lao Dong Party Central Committee in its 9th plenum
resolution of December 1963 said:
"The resolution of the 15th Central Committee conference
(January 1959) and afterwards the resolution of the Third National
Party Congress clearly outlined the road of South Vietnam
resolution and the struggle course to attain victory. The
resolutions of the Political Bureau in 1961 and 1962 clearly
outlined the struggle guidelines and specific policies aimed
at effectively resisting the U.S. armed aggression. The resolutions
of the Central Office of South Vietnam have substantiated and
developed the overall resolutions of the Party on the South Vietnam
revolution. The victories of the South Vietnamese compatriots
during the past few years prove that these resolutions of the
Party have been entirely correct."
6. COSVN Resolution 2 of late 1963 or early 1964 noted the
following :
"Experiences gained in these hard-fought achievements also
helped the South Vietnam Party organization mature quickly in
every respect. Under the Central Committee's leadership, the
first COSVN conference in October 1961 set forth correct policy
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guidelines and recapitulated all experiences in order to provide
guidance for the future."
7. A COSVN Standing Committee account of the situation in
South Vietnam from the end of 1961 to the beginning of 1964 said:
"The South Vietnam revolutionary movement still had many
shortcomings until the end of 1961, but with the correct line of
the Party Central Committee and the resolute struggle spirit of
the army, people, cadres and Party members in South Vietnam,
we have waged a protracted and total patriotic war of all
the people."
"We must clearly recognize the enemy's new schemes and our
shortcomings, strive to highly develop our strong points and
victories, not become complacent or satisfied and also not become
timid and afraid of difficulties and hardships, wholeheartedly
oppose rightism and passivism, strive to rapidly build and
strengthen the revolutionary forces, thoroughly develop the
position of continuously attacking, and fully carry out the missions
set forth by the Party Central Committee."
8. General Nguyen Chi Thanh in a 20 November 1964 speech said
the following:
"The revolution in South Vietnam .over the past several years has
developed very well under the leadership of the Party Central
Committee headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh and by the Central Office.
9. COSVN Resolution 3 of January 1965 noted:
"Under the clearsighted leadership of the Party Central
Committee headed by Comrade X (Ho Chi Minh-), and under the
guidance of the Central Office and the various echelons, we are
determined to mobilize and organize truly well all revolutionary
forces in South Vietnam in order to brilliantly achieve all the
urgent tasks which have been stated in the resolution of this
conference of the Central Office. "
10. A draft report on the situation in rural South Vietnam was
presented at the third COSVN conference in January 1965 noting:
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"During the past ten years, due to the correct leadership of the
Central Committee and the Central Office, and due to the efforts
of all Party organization echelons, cadres and Party members, and
especially due to the indomitable struggle spirit of the working
peasants in South Vietnam in resolutely and unceasingly resisting
the U.S. imperialists, the. feudal landlord puppet administration
and the lackey reactionary comprador bourgeoisie to win back their
lands and protect the Party, great victories have been won in the
land revolution. "
11. COSVN Resolution 4 of March. 1966 noted:
"The realities of our recent victories increasingly illuminate the
factors deciding our final victory. We have the correct domestic
and foreign policies of a Marxist-Leninist party and an enlightened
Party Central Committee strong both in revolutionary theory and
experience, and which is led by Chairman Ho."
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 REMARKS:
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WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 DATE
.7/25/73
Organ. Initial
Symbol Room No. Bldg.
Mr. Theodore G..Shackley CIA 5D3107
initial for Clearance
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING
Si7EJECP: Letter from D. Gareth Porter
We are now trying to frame a reply to this
letter concerning an allegedly forged document
which appeared in the Department's February 1965
White Paper.
Do you have any interest which will require
71
protection? Even if you do not, I would appreciate
your views on the matter
'CONFIDENTIAL
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4/O7/O$ CIA-R!30004'
DEPARTIVIENT_OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP
25X1
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K
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From the Desk of Ray S. Cline
(q7 3
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 UNIVERSITY
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PROJECT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA
July 2G. 1973
14rx4 '16jo,,~ rc~rf
2033 F Street, N.il
Washington. D. C.
Mr. Ray Cline
Director of Intelligence and Research
Dep4rtrnent of State
Washington. D. C.
I am writing to you about the question of the authenticity
of one of docyrnents cited by the Department of State in Its
February 1965 White Paper "Aggression from the North". which
is now said by a Former high Saigon government official. t'a
be a fake. I an referring to docur,r,nt on pays 57 of that
publication, under the title The People's Revolutionary Party
(South) and the Lao Deng Party (`orth) are One Communist Party",
as Appendix G to the White Paper. This is a document allegedly
captured in May 1962 by GVN troops in Ba Xuye?n province and
then allegedly turned over to the International Control Commission.
I am informed by an acquaintance who has into-rvieaved Dr.
Iran Kim Tuyen, who was then in charge of the Saigon secret
police ane cruntLrinte1ligc!n, e se.'rvic"s, that Dr. ?auyen has
now admitted r:h,t this was :a fake docuzented. written in his
vwvn off ices--and not a very good one at that. The lannuaa.e of
Ln-A UoGUmrnt 1tSolt certainly Supports such a conclusion, and
the document has long been suspect in the eyes of some Vietnamese
specialists. I am further informed that Mr. Goorge Carver also
now admits privately that this was indeed a fake.
Since I atn now writing a stud., on "captured Crommuniet dncnrnents"
and toe probl-;.i of authentication, I would like to have official -
confirmation of this apparent forgery. If in fact the U.S. government
now knows that one of the dncuoents it has put forward as historical
,evidence is false, pit has the responsibility for :ad,,i-ttinq the original
mistake publicly, so that scholars are not misl'd .any longer on the
ra4'tter. I would eappreciate, therefore. a reply at your earliest
convenience.
Sinc Te'l.y yours.
tld.?tarl~ D. Gjrcth P~~rto
R os'ea-arch I s ocir e
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