REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO FLY SR-71 PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300010023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 19, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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March 19, 1973
M MJPND1SM FOR:
Mr. William P... Clements,
Department of Defense
Mr.. William J. Porter.
Department of State
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Department of. Defense
Request for Authorization to Fly SR-71 Photographic
Reconnaissance Missions over North Vietnam
The Chairman asks that l obtain the vote of 40 Committee principals on
the attached paper.
I understand that this subject was discussed at a WSAG meeting and this
paper prepared as a result, and that subsequently the IDEALIST mission
referred to in paragraph 4.b. .(and 6.b.) was approved f'or implementation
upon the weather, but the Chairman is not considering implementation
As this paper points out, specific timing for any mission would depend
after 28 March.
prior to 28 March 1973..
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Executive Secretary
The 40 Committee
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i.IEMORANDUMM1 FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for. National. Security Affairs
SUBJECT Transmittal of Requested Request
1. Attached'is the request fore authorization
SR-71 overflights of. North Vietnam..which you asked
have prepared. at the 13 March WSAG meeting..
2. This paper has four sections:
I The Need. . .
III Timing
IV Specific Targets
II The Actual Request
3. What we are actually requesting, for reasons set
forth in the paper, is authorization to:
a. Obtain the take of two complete
mission equivalents, which may mean flying
up to five missions against the-total target
mix described.
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two weeks after.the first package is completed.,
behavior trends): to be flown approximately
b. A repeat package (to establish current
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 C > TRAL INTELLIGENCE AG-11-11W,
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. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
15 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT Request for Authorization to Fly SR-71
Photographic Reconnaissance Missions
over- North Vietnam
I. THE NEED
1. As you are aware, the current restrictions on overflights
of North Vietnam have precluded the collection of direct evidence --
aerial photography -- on military deliveries to North Vietnam from
the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The need for photographic
coverage of major military areas of North Vietnam is critical if the
intelligence community is to meet its responsibility for monitoring
North Vietnam's military intentions as reflected by its materiel
capabilities. The argument for aerial reconnaissance. has recently
been heightened by the fact that our COMINT collection is showing
some signs of degradation both in terms of quality and quantity --
in a non-tactical environment, the Communists may be moving to
more secure modes of communication, i.e.,- landlines and/or more
sophisticated cryptologic systems.
capabilities has been sharply curtailed. We have drawn certain
presumptive conclusions based on past experience and observations
of trends of logistics movements out of North Vietnam through Laos
2. Given the above, the intelligence community's ability
to provide documented analyses of North Vietnam's logistics
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and Cambodia. Traditionally, Hanoi has practiced a very conservative
materiel policy, both in the north and the south, and has maintained
very large stockpiles in rear areas. As large amounts of supplies
have continued to move out of North Vietnam during the recent past,
one can reasonably infer that these supplies have, at a minimum,
been replaced in kind by Hanoi's prime suppliers. It is not
currently possible, however, to quantify this resupply effort in
any meaningful terms. Nor can we guarantee that our inferential
analysis -- no matter how impeccable its internal logic -- squares
with the facts of current North Vietnamese behavior in the logistic
area.
3 Our only practical way of detecting and. assessing military
aid shipments crossing the North Vietnamese border from China is
from aerial reconnaissance. The past seven, years have demonstrated
beyond argument that no other source as reliable exists. Photographic
coverage of major lines of communication and associated storage
depots leading from the northeastern North Vietnamese border into
Hanoi and from Vinh south to the DMZ would provide clues to
current levels of military transport and stockpiling activity
directed toward South Vietnam and Laos. It would also offer the
opportunity of detecting military. equipment which may have already
been shipped across the Chinese border since late January.
Without the fruits of such reconnaissance, we are operating very
much in the dark,. since no imagery of any value has been collected
over North Vietnam for nearly two months (i.e. ,.since 23 January)
II . 'THE REQUEST
4. The GIANT SCALE (SR-71) reconnaissance system is the
only airborne platform that can penetrate North Vietnamese airspace
to cover the required territory with reasonable safety, though
its passage would of course be detected by the. North Vietnamese.
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b. The IDEALIST mission we have requested
would. supplement an SR-71 overflight product but
could not substitute for it. As you know, the
IDEALIST proposal involves one mission flown
exclusively in the Gulf of Tonkin by a U-2
5. Given the above, overhead flights with. SR-71 aircraft. are
necessary to provide the early evidence the intelligence community
needs to meet the President's requirements. More specifically:
a. To cover the essential targets (outlined in
paragraph 9 below) would require two "complete"
SR-71 missions. "Complete" in this.context means
a mission which covers all of the targets on its
track without any significant proportion of these
targets being masked by cloud cover.
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b. The current time frame (mid-March-mid-
April) is a period in North Vietnam characterized
by persistent overcast with fog and few sunny
days, i. e.. , a bad period for aerial reconnaissance
over North Vietnam. Furthermore, weather apart,
there is no guarantee that all the photography
taken on a given single mission will be of
uniform quality. Here again, experience suggests
that on any given mission, some of the coverage.
(for technical reasons) will probably be of
minimal utility.
c. Given the above, though the essential
targets could all be covered (once) in two
"complete" missions, the odds are that -- given
weather and technical problems -- it would
take up to five missions to get complete,
useable results from the equivalent of two.
d. Finally, one time coverage (i.e., complete
coverage of each target once) would, at-best,
give us a freeze "snapshot" of the situation at
one given (somewhat arbitrary) moment in time..
It would. help develop a now missing baseline
of current behavior which could then be
compared to observed patterns of pre-23 January:
behavior.. It would not show much on current
.
trends.
6. Actual Request. In light of the above, we are requesting
authorization for the following:
a. A package of up to five SR-71
reconnaissance overflights of North Vietnam
with the understanding that no more than the
flights required to produce two "complete"
missions will actually be flown.
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b. Permission to fly a similar package (of
up to five flights) approximately two weeks
after the first package is flown, with the
targets and tracks of the second package to be
developed after we have assessed the results
of the first SR-71 package, the IDEALIST
III. TIMING
7. From the analysts' and intelligence community's parochial
point of view, obviously the sooner the needed GIANT SCALE missions
are flown the better. The final decision on timing, however, clearly
involves matters going beyond our parochial concerns. Until such
flights are flown, we will lack hard evidence on current patterns
of logistic behavior within North Vietnam, particularly evidence
related to the current state of overland military imports. You are
in a better position than we to calculate the urgency of the President's
need for answers to his, and your, detailed questions in this area.
On timing, however, at least two considerations are relevent in
light of the fact that any SR-71 overflights of North Vietnam will be
tracked by North Vietnamese radar and will produce sonic booms
that at least some people on the ground will hear:
a. If the North Vietnamese are casting about
for a reason to delay the return of the final
group of prisoners scheduled to be released by
28 March, a.GIANT SCALE overflight before
that date would give the DRV a "provocation" or
"violation" to protest.
b. Conversely, if the President is looking
for signals -through which he can emphasize his
mounting irritation at Hanoi's overall behavior
pattern since 28 January, a GIANT SCALE
overflight could be employed as such a signal.
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In sum, if this overflight request is approved in principle,
8,
` the
that day
mission flown on the first feasible weather day
were to come prior to 28 March -- or on the first feasible weather
day after 28 March.
IV. SPECIFIC TARGETS
9. If this request is approved, we would plan to cover the
order of priority:
di
ng
following key targets, in descen
a. The Dong Dang - Ping-hsiang Railyards the principal staging areas for military supplies
entering North Vietnam.
b. The rail line and Highway Routes IA.,
15/101 between T lstorage depots major used
LOCs and associated large ,
for transport of troops and military supplies to
South Vietnam. A track covering these would
also provide coverage of coastal port activity
at Vinh, Quang Khe and Dong Hai, and lastly,
coverage of several key airfields. .
. The Hanoi-Dong Dang Rail Line -- past
c
missions revealed levels of activity and, on one
occasion, initial evidence of the SA-3's deployment.
into North Vietnam.
d. The Kep-Thai Nguyen-Hanoi Rail Line --
this line presumably has carried the bulk of
military equipment from the Kep junction rather
than the Iiep-Hanoi segment. The
the K TN d
large military depots associated
Il line have shown significant military stockpiling.
e. The Hanoi-Thank Hoa Rail Line --
principal supply route for supplies moving
south of Hanoi into panhandle.
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 the panhandle, would require additional. passes on the same or
the chances of effective coverage of fang Dang/Ping-hsiang .
Other critical: targets, including railroads northeast of Hanoi and
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10. Since the activity at Dona Dang and Ping-hsiang is the'
most important question. at this time, any SR-71 mission would be
programmed to optimize coverage of this area even to the point of
sacrificing possible coverage of other nearby targets. Based an past
experience, inclusion of other targets within the same pass reduces
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