CHINA-VIETNAM: TERRITORIAL AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
China-Vietnam:
Territorial and
Jurisdictional Disputes
Research for this report was completed
on 20 April 1979.
The authors of this paper arel
East Asia Branch, Geography Division, Office o
Geographic and Cartographic Research, and 0
Regional Branch, East Asia Division,
Office of Political Analysis, with special assistance
from the Office of Strategic Research. Comments
and queries are welcome and should be directed to
China.
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Strategic Research, the Office of Economic
Research, the National Intelligence Officer for
East Asia, and the National Intelligence Officer for
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Summary
China-Vietnam:
'Territorial and
Jurisdictional Disputes
1978-79 as bilateral relations deteriorated.
0
A wide variety of issues are likely to be discussed in Sino-Vietnamese peace
negotiations now under way in Hanoi. Conflicting national ambitions in
Southeast Asia, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and China's alarm over
Vietnam's growing ties with the Soviet Union were the root cause of the
recent fighting, and these same factors are going to determine the tone lnd
the course of the peace talks. However, Hanoi and Beijing also have a
number of real territorial and jurisdictional disputes that became public in
them will depend upon an improvement in their overall relations.
In lengthy Foreign Ministry memorandums published last March, Beijing
and Hanoi spelled out their respective positions on the three outstanding
territorial differences between them: the land border, the Gulf of Tonkin sea
boundary, and offshore islands. While summarizing their respective cia.ms.
the memorandums also served to highlight the differences in the Ch,, nest
and Vietnamese approaches to each dispute -underscoring the fact rha
some will be more easily settled than others but that resolution of any o!
domestic policy objectives will complicate the negotiations.
The land border should be the easiest of the disputes to resolve. There i~ no
basic disagreement over its correct alignment, although some minor
differences have arisen over the demarcation of the border on the ground.
I lowever, sizable troop deployments on both sides of the border and both
countries' use of the dispute for propaganda purposes to serve foreign and
provide the impetus to compromise.
The dispute over the Gulf of Tonkin sea boundary will prove to be very
difficult to resolve even under the best of political circumstances.
Diametrically opposed stands on the demarcation of the sea boundary
coupled with conflicting principles of international law guarantee that
negotiations will be long and arduous even if the political will exists Lo
resolve the issue. The desire of both countries to exploit oil in the Gult'will at
least initially intensify the dispute, although in the long run this factor may
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The dispute over the ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands will be
virtually impossible to resolve at the negotiating table. The Chinese control
the Paracels, and the Vietnamese occupy six of the Spratly Islands; both
countries are taking measures to strengthen their respective positions.
Because of their strategic location and offshore oil potential, neither side is
prepared to negotiate a change in the status quo nor renounce its territorial
claims to them.
Few expect the peace talks to resolve the territorial and jurisdictional
disputes, let alone the deeper political and strategic conflict. If an
accommodation cannot be reached on the broader political plane these
disputes could become the focal points for any future confrontation between
China and Vietnam.
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China-Vietnam:
Territorial and
Jurisdictional Disputes
Of the outstanding territorial and jurisdictional issues,
the land border dispute should be the least difficult to
solve, particularly if it can be kept separate from the
Gulf of Tonkin and offshore islands disputes and other
larger political problems. Both sides agree that the
border was delimited in the 1885 Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, and Commerce between the Qing Dynasty
and France, and in 1887 and 1895 boundary conven-
tions that followed the original treaty (see map 1,
foldout at end). Neither country has publicly ques-
tioned the legality of the treaties; and the correct
alignment is shown on maps published by the French
Government and by the Chinese. The border is
demarcated by widely spaced stone pillars and theo-
retically follows straight lines or prominent natural
features between markers.
Although there is basic agreement on the alignment of
the boundary, some minor, local disputes have arisen
over traditional transborder agricultural and other
practices, such as mining. Over the years, a few
movements of border markers and minor changes in
the actual boundary between markers have taken place
reflecting these patterns of local usage
In an exchange of letters by the Vietnamese and
Chinese Party Central Committees in 1957 and 1958,
the two countries agreed to respect the status quo
pending negotiations at the national level to resolve
local variations. Subsequent negotiations, however,
failed to resolve these differences. Border clashes
during the exodus of overseas Chinese in 1978 and the
worsening of their overall political relationship in
recent years led both countries to construct defensive
fortifications along the border in certain areas de-
limited on the map but not physically demarcated on
the ground. The fortifications focused attention on
areas where the existing border differed from that
prescribed by the 1887 treaty.
Vietnam claims that Chinese troops have occupiec
some 10 or 12 positions that Hanoi held prior to the
Chinese invasion. China has consolidated its military
position along the border and Vietnam is deploying; a
large number of troops there
The March memorandums give some indication of the
approaches Hanoi and Beijing are likely to take in
substantive border talks. Both sides reaffirm the (Ong
Dynasty-French Treaty as the basis for the border
negotiations. In the original 19th century treaty
negotiations, the French were able to obtain a bound-
ary line that provided them with a good position to
counter the activities of Chinese brigands. Not surpris-
ingly, Hanoi argues for the maintenance of the
borderline as it was officially delineated in the original
treaty and as it should theoretically be demarcated on
the ground. A return to the original boundary line
would have the double advantage of improving Viet-
nam's tactical situation and forcing Chinese troops to
pull back from their present positions.
The Chinese memorandum stresses the maintenance of
the status quo as it exists on the ground--as agreed to
in the exchange of letters in 1957 and 1958 by the
Party Central Committees-pending the outcome of
negotiations at the national level. The Chinese bl.me
Hanoi's local authorities for unilaterally attempting to
make changes in the status quo boundary when these
problems should have been negotiated by the respec-
tive central governments. Beijing does not specifi,;ally
make a case for adjusting the boundary to fit the minor
changes that have occurred as a result oflocal usage,
but the memorandum's emphasis on the statue: quo and
insistence that the local variations be negotiated by the
national governments suggest that Beijing may press
for some minor boundary adjustments during future
substantive negotiations.
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`lino-Vietnamese land border differences are over
insignificant chunks of real estate. The Gulf of Tonkin
dispute is a much more serious matter, with jurisdic-
tion over thousands of square kilometers of the Gulf at
stake. Vietnam's Foreign Ministry memorandum
wade public for the first time its extensive claims in the
(,ulf. These claims, also, are based on the 1887 Sino-
French boundary convention, which Hanoi maintains
established Greenwich Meridian 108?03'18" east as
tiie offshore boundary (map 2). Hanoi'; memorandum
concludes that the extension of this meridian boundary
from the southern part of the Gulf into the South
(china Sea is all that needs to be done.
island of Gotho and other islands west of this
meridian belong to Annam." Although the wording is
imprecise, it appears that the 108'03'18" meridian was
intended not to divide the entire Tonkin Gulf but to
serve as a cartographic device for awarding control
over offshore islands. The concept of extending mari-
time boundaries great distances from the coast did not
even exist in the 19th century, and Vietnam's conten-
tion that a mutually acceptable offshore boundary has
been in existence since that time is obviously flawed.
The Gulf's oil potential seems to be the real stimulus
for the dispute. China has already conducted seismic
surveys and drilled several test wells, reportedly
discovering oil at two locations near Vietnam's claimed
meridian boundary line. When China attacked Viet-
nam, however, it withdrew its drilling rigs to safer but
presumably less promising waters near Hainan Island.
Underscoring its intention to proceed with its develop-
ment plans, China recently initialed contracts with
four US companies to conduct further seismic studies
Beijing's memorandum refuted the Vietnamese claim
that the Gulf has already been divided, but in contrast
to Vietnam's specific treatment of the dispute, gave no
countering documentation or specific claims. China
merely stated that negotiations were needed to settle
the issue on an equitable basis.
I lanoi's Foreign Ministry memorandum clearly tries
to put the onus for the Tonkin dispute on China.
Vietnam maintains that the dispute started in 1973,
when Hanoi informed China of its intention to prospect
for oil and proposed negotiations to delineate officially
the offshore boundary. China evidently agreed but
insisted that until an agreement was reached third
countries be prohibited from conductine exploration
activities and no prospecting be conducted by either
China or Vietnam in a large area of the central Gulf,
effectively preventing any meaningful Vietnamese
attempt to exploit oil resources. Vietnam maintains
that these negotiations and another round of talks in
1977 both failed because of China's refusal to discuss
seriously the offshore boundary question.
In fact, the culpability for the Tonkin impasse lies
more with Vietnam than with China. A reading of the
1887 treaty shows that Vietnam's claim that the treaty
divided the Gulf is an exaggeration. The treaty text
states that "the islands which are east ofthe Paris
meridian of 105?43' east (108?03' 18" east of Green-
wich), that is to say the north-south line passing
through the eastern point of the island of Tra-co, which
forms the boundary, are also allocated to China. The
of the Gulf west of Hainan.
In 1973, Vietnam expressed interest in exploring for oil
in the Gulf, but fear of an adverse Chinese reaction
and an inability to reach agreement with foreign
companies thwarted its plans. The Vietnamese are
reportedly again planning to initiate seismic operations
in the Gulf in the near future.
As the search for offshore oil intensifies, the chance of
a military encounter increases. China already enjoys
naval superiorit in the Gulf and continues to build up
its forces there.
Vietnam would be hard pressed to defend militarily its
extensive claims in the Gulf. Despite recent acquisi-
tions from the USSR, the Vietnamese Navy is no
match for the Chinese forces. The continuing presence
of Soviet naval vessels in the South China Sea,
however, would restrict China's freedom of action
against Vietnam.
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Gulf of Tonkin: Sea Boundary Dispute Map 2
V
/00
/J`
A
C h i n a
Hainan Dao
Vietnamese proposed
meridian boundary line
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The Gulf's oil potential, while providing the impetus
for the sea boundary dispute, may yet motivate Hanoi
and Beijing to ignore their larger political differences
and start substantive talks. It will be difficult for either
country to exploit offshore oil fully unless some kind of
modus vivendi is reached. For negotiations to have
even a minimal chance of success, however, the
Vietnamese will have to drop their insistence that the
meridian boundary line be the basis of negotiations
because it would award Vietnam jurisdiction over a
large area west of Hainan Island that is coveted by
China for its oil potential.
Even if Vietnam abandons its adherence to the
meridian boundary line, a division of the Gulf would
still require long, arduous negotiations. The area
should theoretically be divided on the basis of equitable
principles. This is frequently accomplished by drawing
an equidistant line, but two problems complicate the
use of that method in the Gulf. A Vietnamese island,
Dao-Bach Long Vi, lies in the middle of the Gulf, and
the two countries undoubtedly will disagree over how
this island affects the boundary. China will demand
that the island be ignored; Vietnam will insist that the
island be given full effect in determining the bound-
ary-thus giving Hanoi jurisdiction over a much larger
sector of the Gulf between Dao-Bach Long Vi and
Hainan Island. A second problem is that China has
been opposing the use of the equidistant method to
determine the boundary with Japan and South Korea
in the East China and Yellow Seas, and would be loath
to set a precedent by using this method to divide the
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Beijing and Hanoi probably disputed in private the
ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as
the Tonkin Gulf sea boundary in 1973 but it was not
until 1978, when bilateral relations were sharply
deteriorating, that their public airing of the dispute
began. Between 1976 and 1978, however, both sides
explicitly claimed the South China Sea islands as
forming part of their respective territories (map 3).
Paracels
China and South Vietnam each claimed sovereignty
over the Paracels in the early 1950s, citing historical
documents and dynastic practices as evidence of their
rights to jurisdiction over them. In 1956, after the
South Vietnamese replaced French troops on several of
the Paracels, Beijing established a naval base on one
island and garrisoned some 200 soldiers on two others.
After South Vietnam occupied additional islands in
late 1973, China launched a successful naval and air
attack in early 1974 against South Vietnamese troops,
and secured control over the entire archipelago.
At the time, Hanoi did not publicly object to China's
takeover of the Paracels. But in 1976, it published
maps that showed the Paracels and some other islands
as Vietnamese territory, and in 1977 referred to them
in its declaration of the limits of Vietnam's territorial
sea. Only in 1978 did Hanoi begin to assert publicly
Vietnamese territorial claims vis-a-vis China and to
denounce Chinese occupation of the Paracels. Vietnam
formally claimed the Paracels in a December 1978
Foreign Ministry statement, citing the same historical
arguments as the Saigon government. The Foreign
Ministry memorandum published in March repeated
Hanoi's historical justifications, and again denounced
Beijing's 1974 takeover.
The Chinese March memorandum refuted Vietnam's
claims, arguing that Hanoi had recognized China's
claims to the Paracels and other South China Sea
islands on a number of occasions in the past. Beijing
further asserted that Vietnamese Premier Pham Van
Dong had accepted Chinese dominion over the islands
when he wrote to Zhou Enlai that "the Government of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and
supports the declaration of the PRC on China's
territorial sea made on 4 September 1958." * Hanoi
has since argued that they did this under the duress of
the war with South Vietnam and the United States.
* The Chinese declaration said that the territory of the PRC includes
the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands as well as Taiwan and
its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands (Pescadores), Dongsha
Islands (Pratas Islands), Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands), the
Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) the Nansha Islands (Spratly
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South China Sea: Disputed Islands
;=(liJ1 H
C H INA.
SLA
Spratly Islands
(Nansha Qundao)
(Dao Truong Sa)
Map 3
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0
China has also shown interest in the offshore oil
potential of the South China Sea. In 1974, in fact,
China drilled a well on one of the Paracel Islands.
0
Vietnam also recognizes the strategic advantages that
the islands afford as well as their potentially valuable
offshore oil resources but would be unable to challenge
the Chinese control of them. Vietnam's naval forces
are so inferior to those of China that it would have no
chance of evicting the Chinese.
The de facto situation on the islands makes it unlikely
that their ownership will be included in any negotia-
tion. Both sides will, however, continue to refute each
other's claims to the islands.
The Spratly Islands
China, Vietnam, the government on Taiwan, and the
Philippines each claim sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands --an archipelago of more than 100 islands,
banks, and reefs scattered over 100,000 square
kilometers in the South China Sea- and all but China
have some form of military presence in the area. China
officially claimed the Spratlys in its 1958 Territorial
Sea Declaration. In the early 1970s, when speculation
about the oil potential of East Asian waters was
running high, China reiterated its claims, warning that
any exploratory or developmental activities in the
islands constituted encroachments on Chinese terri-
torial sovereignty.
Beijing disputed the ownership of the Spratlys with the
Saigon government between 1950 and 1975, but China
was conspicuously quiet about Hanoi's activities on the
islands. Although Hanoi took over South Vietnamese-
held islands in 1975, published maps showing the
islands as Vietnamese, and explicitly claimed the
islands in 1976, China avoided initiating a public
dispute until relations deteriorated in 1978
A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement last December
laid claim to the Spratlys and denounced the Vietnam-
ese occupation. Hanoi responded by issuing a state-
ment that the Spratlys were "sacred Vietnamese
territory," citing historical records and practices as
justification of the Vietnamese claim. In their March
While Beijing views the contest for the Spratlys as a
part of its conflict with Hanoi, it also sees the waters
surrounding the Spratlys as potentially rich oil-
producing areas. The beginning of commercial produc-
tion from wells 43 kilometers off the coast of Palawan
by the Philippines-expected to reach 40,000 barrels
per day by August 1979-plus the planned resumption
of oil drilling operations by Manila in the area have
revived speculation that the area is rich in oil and
natural gas.
Furthermore, naval and air bases on the islands, which
are strategically located in the middle of major
commercial and military transit routes, would improve
somewhat China's ability to operate in the area. But
Beijing would find it difficult to take the Spratlys from
Hanoi because of the weakness of the Chinese Navy
and the distance of the Spratlys from the Chinese
mainland. The Chinese Navy demonstrated that it
could project military power to the Paracel Islands in
1974 (200 to 250 nautical miles from China's shores),
but it would be much more difficult to project this type
of force in the Spratlys, which are twice as far away
from Chinese shores as the Paracels. The continued
growth and modernization of the Chinese Navy will,
however, enhance China's ability to act in the Spratlys
in the long run.
Vietnam's aspirations to be a regional power is the
major factor behind Hanoi's claims to the Spratlys.
However, the potentially valuable oil and natural gas
resources in the area and Vietnam's growing need for
oil-all of which is now imported-are other signifi-
cant motivations for Hanoi's strong commitment to
defending its claims to the islands. Hanoi's intentions
to develop offshore oil resources in the South China
Sea have been set back somewhat by the preoccupation
with the war with Kampuchea and China, by a
Canadian firm's unsuccessful drilling earlier this year,
and by contract and logistic problems with firms from
West Germany, Ital and Norway who have not yet
begun exploration.
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Facilities on the Spratlys have already improved the
capabilities of the Vietnamese Navy. Since 1975
Vietnam has taken a. variety of measures to fortify the
six islands that it occupies. In addition, recent acquisi-
tions from the USSR will further enhance Vietnam's
ability to defend the islands that it currently occupies.
The chances that the Spratly Islands dispute will be
discussed seriously during the negotiations are slim.
Since the dispute also involves the Philippines and the
government on Taiwan, it would be difficult for China
and Vietnam to treat the issue at this time. Maintain-
ing good relations with Manila and avoiding direct
confrontation with Taipei will inhibit China, and
Vietnam would probably not want to risk a military
contest with either Manila or Taipei.
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