WITNESS: THE HONORABLE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, US AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100290007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 24, 1963
• Content Type: TRANS

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The Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer,
United States Ambassador to Japan
Wednesday, Ju).y 2L., 1963
United States Senate
Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and
Operations, Committee on
Government Operations
Washington, D. C.
(This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made
public by the chairman of the committee.)
The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in Room 3112, New Senate
Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.
Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts,
chief consultant; Robert C. Fisk, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk;
and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.
Senator Jackson. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today our subcommittee continues its hearings on the role of United States
ambassadors and the missions they head in the conduct of our relations with
other nations.
This subject forms part of the subcommittee's broad nonpartisan study into
problems of national security administration.
We opened this phase of our hearings last month with testimony from two
recently retired career ambassadors -- the Honorable Ellis 0. Briggs and the
Honorable H. Freeman Matthews. Tray we hear from an outstanding non-career
ambassador.
We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Edwin 0. Reischauer, Ambassador of
the United States to Japan. Ambassador Reischauer did his undergraduate work at
Oberlin College and his graduate work at Harvard University. He has had a
distinguished career as a student and teacher of Far Eastern affairs, and was
called from his professorship at Harvard to his present post. Over the years the
government has frequently drawn upon his knowledge and experience for advice on
important matters.
He is the author of a number of books, including Japan, Past and Present
0o146)., ed 611- AG ( 1 9 5 7 T .
(195
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Ambassador Reischauer is a gifted linguist and a distinguished scholar,
qualities which have contributed greatly to his work in a country of very great
importance.
Ambassador Reischauer, we are all happy to have you with us today.
I believe you have a prepared statement, and if there is no objection on t.ho
part of the subcommittee, we shall include it at this point in the record.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWIN 0. REISCIIAUER,
AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN
I am very pleased to be here with the subcommittee today to discuss the
administration of national security with particular reference to the role of the
Embassy in Japan. Some idea of the amount of coordination required for the
administration of national security problems in Japan may be gained by noting
that there are twenty-one different departments and affiliated agencies of the
United States Government represented in Tokyo in addition to the State Department.
As a matter of convenience, I attach to this statement two organization charts,
the first giving the division of work in the Embassy itself, and the second giving
the .Embassy's relationship to affiliated United States Government agencies.
The important things to note in looking at these charts are first, that USIS
operates as an integral part of the Embassy, forming one of its five major sections,
and second, that with a few exceptions, which I will refer to at greater length
below, each one of the other affiliated agencies is administratively attached to
an operative section of the Embassy itself. Thus, for example, the Federal
Aviation Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the United States Trade Center,
the Maritime Administration, the United States Travel Service, the Office of
International Finance of the Treasury Department, the Bureau of Customs of the
Treasury Department, and the small remnant of AID left in Tokyo are assigned for
administrative purposes to the Economic Section. Similarly, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are assigned to
the Consular Section, the General Accounting Office to the Administrative Section,
and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, with its laboratories in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, to the Political Section.
Several offices are for administrative purposes assigned directly to my own,
which includes the Office of the Deputy Chief of Mission. This is the situation
with respect to the Scientific Attache, who coordinates closely with representa-
tives in Tokyo of the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation
and the National Institutes of Health. The same is true of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) and the Attaches of the three military services. All these
offices also coordinate very closely with the Political Section. With respect to
MAAG and the Service Attaches, a special branch of the Political Section, the
Politico-Military Branch, is constituted for the specific purpose of coordinating
matters within the military sector. Thus, the Politico Military Branch has
responsibility for day-to-day coordination of all matters coming under the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan,
the Security Consultative Committee, Military Aid Program, and so on. Again,
although the Scientific Attache and the Service Attaches are, as I say, attached
to my office, the latter also attend the staff meetings of the Political and
Economic Sections at least once a week, and a representative of the Scientific
Attache attends Political Section staff meetings daily. For purposes of even
closer coordination in the important scientific sector, the representative of the
Atomic ft@%NeO iF3@ ea Q@4 03irC l 6 =38ERUNf00 f002the
Economic Section staff meetings.
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You will have gathered even from these preliminary remarks that a good deal
of staffing is required for proper coordination of the manifold duties performed
by the Embassy and its affiliated agencies, and in order to permit representation
of the United States Government in Japan to be orchestrated so that they are in
harmony with each other as well as with over-all United States policy toward
Japan.
It might therefore be of interest to you if I proceeded to set forth in some-
what more detail the staff meeting schedule established in the Embassy for the
purpose of that orchestration to which I have referred. All the operative sections
of the Embassy as a general rule have morning staff meetings shortly after the
opening of business each day. One of the functions of these meetings is to sift
out important matters to be taken up at my own staff meeting, which is usually held
daily at 10:30 a.m. This is attended by the chiefs of the Political, Economic,
Consular, and Administrative Sections and by the Director of the United States
Information Service in Japan, as well as by the Deputy Chief of Mission, my special
assistant and staff aide, the Press Attache and such other officers as each regular
participant might consider as contributing usefully to any subject which may be
due for discussion on a particular day.
In addition, a Country Team meeting and a so-called "large staff meeting" are
held alternately each Thursday in place of my usual staff meeting. The "large
staff meeting" is attended by the representatives of all the sections in the
Embassy and of all. affiliated agencies in Tokyo. At this larger meeting, we
discuss matters which are of wide common concern, such as, for example, cotton
textile negotiations, or the basic elements of the problem created by the United
States Government's desire to have nuclear-powered submarines visit Japanese ports.
At this point, I should like to speak in more detail about the Country Team
and its place in the formulation and implementation of United States policy in
Japan. In my view, the execution of United States national policy and the
coordination of policy recommendation and guidance have been greatly facilitated
through the agency of the Country Team. Thus, the Country Team has provided an
excellent mechanism for continuous discussion and coordination of action relating
to such significant problems, for example, as the implementation of provisions of
the Security Treaty with respect to U.S. military forces in Japan, the military
assistance program, and the over-all review of situations in nearby troubled
areas as they apply to U.S. objectives in Japan. As these and other problems have
become more and more complex, and have required greater joint efforts by U.S.
Government officials and agencies in Japan, the system of fortnightly meetings of
the Country Team referred to earlier has evolved. By providing a forum more suit-
able for complex discussion than earlier informal luncheon meetings, which were
the means used to bring together what is now the Country Team prior to 1956, these
fortnightly meetings have increased the value and usefulness of the coordination
process.
A significant increase in the value of the Country Team concept has also
resulted from the participation of a wide range of U.S. officials in team meetings.
While the formal members of the Country Team include only myself, the Commander,
USFJ, and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, regular participants
in team meetings in Tokyo, and in the day-to-day work of the Team, include in
addition the Deputy Chief of Mission; the Minister for Economic Affairs; the
Minister for Cultural and Public Affairs (USIS); the Political Counselor; the Army,
Navy and Air Attaches; the Chief of the Internal Affairs Branch of the Political
Section; and the Chief of the roli.tiee.1 Military Branch of the Political Section.
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It will be noted that in addition to Chief, MAAG, the Commander, USFJ, is a
key member of the Country Team. This is essential. for the proper consideration of
the many vital policy problems which arise in Japan as a result of our Security
Treaty and the presence of some 45,000 U.S. military personnel (plus an additional
55,000 dependents) in the country. It will also be noted that unlike the situation
in many other countries, AID is not a constituent member of the Team. This is
because the economic assistance program in Japan has been eliminated and only a
residual AID office remains in Tokyo to supervise offshore procurement and third
country training in Japan.
Coordinating Country Team operations, staffing for position papers, recording
and distributing the minutes and preparing agenda for Country Team meetings are
responsibilities of the Embassy's Political-Military Branch. Happily, in spite of
the relatively great distances physically separating the basic elements of the
Country Team -- USFJ, for example, is over an hour's drive from the Embassy --
coordination has been accomplished without serious difficulty.
It may not be inappropriate at this point to note that successful coordina-
tion is at least partly a result of the excellent personal relations existing
among Country Team participants. These relations allow the group truly to function
as a team and not merely as an assembly of representatives of different government
agencies.
The fortnightly meetings are held in the Embassy Conference Room. Complete
flexibility in scheduling meetings is maintained, however, and ad hoc meetings are
held as necessary. Similarly, regular meetings are cancelled if none of the
members has sufficiently important business to justify holding them.
Basic procedure for preparing the agenda for these meetings is well
established. At the beginning of the week in which a meeting is scheduled, the
Chief of the Embassy's Political-Military Branch communicates with (1) the
Secretary, Joint Staff, Headquarters, Commander USFJ and (2) the Office of Chief,
MAAG, Japan, in order to ascertain what items those components of the Team wish to
propose for inclusion in the agenda. This information, along with any agenda items
the various sections of the Embassy may wish discussed at the meeting, is then
passed to the Counselor for Political Affairs, who outlines the proposed agenda to
me at my daily staff meeting. On the basis of the proposed agenda, and after such
consultation with other U.S. officials as may be required, I decide whether or not
to hold the regular meeting.
While the activities of the Country Team are most clearly focused in fort-
nightly meetings, they are not limited to them, for by necessity, much work
requiring sustained attention and effort must be dealt with on a continuous basis
outside the structure of actual meetings. Indeed, matters which may require
Country Team approval are most often staffed through the Country Team mechanism
without there being any need to convoke a formal meeting. Further, it would be
rare for any item on the agenda of a given meeting not to have been fully staffed
at the working level before becoming a subject of Country Team discussion. To a
great extent, therefore, the Country Team's work involves reviewing recommenda-
tions worked out at the staff level and arriving at an agreed position or course
of action.
Thus, by means of a system of fortnightly meetings and extensive staff work
outside these meetings, the work of the Country Team in Japan is coordinated, and
discussion and implementation of U.S. policy on a broad front are facilitated. It
is my belief that the system which has been evolved is well suited to assist in
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I would imagine that this brief statement of the organization of the Embassy
and of its role in the administration of national security has raised some questions
in your minds. My hope is that what I have said will serve as a basis for a more
detailed discussion of this subject and I welcome any questions you might have.
(The two organizational charts referred to in Ambassador Reischauer's
statement -- The American Enbass To1~,yo, Ju, 196 and The American
Embassy andAffiliated Agencies Tokyo Japan,_ Jul 1 Z63 -- appear at the
conclusion of the hearing.
Senator Jackson. We are very happy to have your statement, Ambassador
Reischauer. We will proceed now to ask questions.
Do you have any additional comments that you wish to make prior to our
questions?
Ambassador Reischauer. I might just add a few remarks.
First of all, I am testifying from a very different point of view from your
previous witnesses. Not having had a career in the Foreign Service, all I can
possibly add is a freshness of point of view of an outsider who has been in it
only a little over two years.
Some of the problems that have come up have been problems of whether or not
the overall diplomatic establishment was too large for adequate policy coordina-
tion, whether or not the flood of messages back and forth between the embassies
and Washington was so great that policy was somewhat lost sight of in this great
flow of words.
My own feeling, after two and a quarter years' experience in Japan, is that
neither of these worries is really well founded.
We have in Japan a fairly large diplomatic establishment.
I have seen no problem of policy coordination, no problem of organization.
These certainly are not too large to handle, by any means. It does take a certain
amount of organization, perhaps, to see that different diverse branches do not get
in each other's way, but I have not seen any serious problem of that sort at all
in Japan.
And while we do have a tremendous exchange of materials between ourselves and
Washington, it has always seemed to me valuable. You need this exchange at all
sorts of different levels, and I think there is a pragmatically efficient way, a
very sensitive way, of sorting out the important things for the right sort of
attention.
There are perhaps ways in which this can be further perfected, but the whole
mechanism seems to me to work very well.
Senator Jackson. You do not find any problems of excessive reporting?
Amb 20}~1C1/~58030~7 eel that way.
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Senator Jackson. I mean, from your end.
Ambass"),dor Reischauer. No, not from our end. Not from our end at all.
There is this flood of paper, and one wonders whether it is all necessary,
but I think one finds that there are ways in which one can keep on top of it, and
then it all proves valuable.
In fact, we are always asking for more information on certain things; and
Washington :L s, too, the other way around. If there is any danger, it is sometimes
that we do not get the details back and forth to each other fast enough.
Senator Jackson. What methods have you used to better utilize the information
that flows in? You ho;e a good, competent staff, I take it. And are you able to
delegate your work sufficiently?
Ambassador Reischauer.. Yes, I think so. I mean that is the whole point in
having an organization of this sort, to be sure that the important thing comes to
the top, and that the people at the top do not get flooded by it.
I should say there is one problem in messages going back and forth: at what
]level do you need clearance? This is a problem you always have to keep watching,
because every now and then people down the line will send out a message rssing
the view of the embassy, and I think if we express a view on something rather
just reporting, you need fairly high clearance. There are problems of this sort.
Going the other way, I think there is sometimes difficulty in knowing who is
actually speaking to you in a message. They are all signed "Rusk", let us say, but
sometimes you know it did not come within several ranks of the Secretary.
Senator Jackson. There needs to be a code within a code.
Ambassador Reischauer. And you can tell by the code this was only cleared at
a relatively low level, and therefore you should understand it in that way, and
that this is not necessarily the personal opinion of an Under Secretary or the
Secretary.
I think that maybe some codes within a code would be useful, as you say.
Senator Miller. Could I ask a question?
How much of the time of your staff would you say is dedicated to reporting?
Ambassador Reischauer. It probably would vary with the different types of
people.
You mean reporting in the sense of just getting information back that might
be useful in Washington?
Senator Miller. Preparation of a report to be sent back to Washington.
Ambassador Reischauer. Telegrams and reports, and so on?
Senator Miller. Yes; to meet the requirements of reporting on the State
Department end.
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Ambassador Reischauer. It would be very hard to say. Between a quarter and
a half of the tame, perhaps.
But, you see, much of this reporting is really their own research work in
keeping up with the field that they are following.
You take the man that is our contact man with the Government Party. He is
constantly trying to learn as much as he can about the leaders of this Government
Party, what they are thinking. He is talking with them all the time. And every
once in a while, when he thinks he has enough information to be of value to
Washington, he writes it up as a report.
But he has done this basically for his own knowledge.
Senator Miller. Yes. Well, I would want to distinguish between what one does
for his own knowledge and his own competence in carrying on his assigned duties
there and the work that goes into getting that information back to Washington.
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, there is a third category. There are, you know,
these routine requests for reporting on certain types of things, that you do fairly
routinely. I should say in the economic field there is more of that than there
would be in the political field.
I think the very fact of drafting it up into a message is itself a valuable
exercise for the reporting officer, because sometimes a person can have a rather
vague impression of the whole thing, but until he is forced to put it in good
format, he has not thought it through himself.
Senator Miller. You do not think a certain amount of that crystallization of
his thinking could have already been gone through in the course of the staff meet-
ings that are held? I would imagine that at one of his staff meetings or your own
staff meetings, for this thing to be articulated properly, it would require some
thinking through.
I would hope by the time it got around to a staff meeting with you he would
have thought it through pretty well, and that anything beyond that for the purposes
of Washington would not be required.
I am trying to come up with your idea on how this can be improved, because
those of us who have served in the military at both the headquarters level and at
the field level know that this thing can get out of hand.
And there have been time checks and all kinds of efficiency systems evolved
to try to cope with this problem. But I must say that I was shocked when I first
came across the information regarding the flood of paper that descends on
Washington.
That means somebody out in the field has to do something. And I can see where
you can even get bogged down. Sometimes these things can be eliminated, and some-
times they can be streamlined and sometimes there can be summaries, rather than
full reports.
There are a lot of those things that we have found in the military that can
be eliminated. Somebody back here has to shuffle them around. And when you
eliminate just one, there can be a chain reaction which can cut down a lot of
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I just wonder if you have had occasion to review some of the reporting
required of you and your staff. Have you tried to eliminate some of it, or
streamline it?
Ambassador Reischauer. I am not aware of any large bulk of material that is
not of value to ourselves in the drafting process. Of course, the staff meeting
tends to be a fairly informal thing, with us. I try to get people to express their
views and discuss them back and forth, rather than having canned reports, and so it
serves a somewhat different function. It is an exchange of views, primarily.
I find, myself, the more routine reports of my staff are very useful. to me.
I keep them on my desk, and when I have a little time, I catch up on them and read
them, because there are lots of things I cannot follow in as much detail as they
are following.
They are often eager to write these, actually, because it is their way of
presenting the thing that they have discovered to the rest of us there, as well as
back in Washington.
In almost every case where there has been a real attempt to cut down on this
flow, there is somebody back in Washington that screams in agony when it does not
come in any more.
Now, mighty often these are people down at the research level, who are doing
the day-to-day work. I think it is very valuable to have a research back-up in
Washington as well as with us, where the papers are pretty well in detail.
Senator Miller. In reporting to you, do you have them summarize their topics?
Ambassador Reischauer. Almost all of our longer reports come in with a
summary statement at the beginning, and you can glance at that and decide whether
you want to read the rest of the report.
With my time as tight as it is, I must admit I often let the thing go by with
just the reading of the summary.
Senator Miller. Would it be feasible, in lieu of some of these reports that
go back to Washington, to merely indicate a summary, let's say, of a few points of
what is contained in some of these studies, so that the people back here could then
determine whether to ask you to send the whole report on or forget about it?
Ambassador Reischauer. Actually, as long as you have a pouch going back and
forth all the time, it in itself is not a real problem. It is a problem of who is
going to read it when it gets to this side.
And I suspect what happens here is what happens with us. The busier people
will glance at summaries and put it aside, whereas the people who have the back-up
research function are the ones who are going to read it and appreciate it.
So I doubt very much if this does cut into your time very seriously, on this
side, any more than it does with me there.
That is what I mean. It is a pragmatically worked out system, but I do not
think we waste much time reading things that are not necessary to be read.
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Senator Miller. That certainly is one of our problems here, to figure out
what to read. And I know that commanders have a time problem.
And granted that staff people love to write reports, because this is a good
way of impressing the commander with your knowledge on something, I would hope they
would save their time by writing summaries.
If you want to dig in, you can get them to give you the details. A nutshell
approach saves time.
Ambassador :fteischauer. We always have a summary on the front of a report
there. In fact, in some cases the title is enough for you. You know you will not
want to read the rest of it.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Engberg?
Professor En ;bEu;. I was much interested in your formal statement, about how
you prepare for these staff meetings. I recalled after reading that, an article
Ambassador Matthews had put in the Foreign Service Journal about coordination, and
I was wondering what you might give us as to your procedure.
Ambassador Matthews pointed out that there is serious danger in consulting
with the top agencies, that you may not have coordination throughout the lower
areas. And he suggested that the ambassador's task was finding out what was
happening on all the lower levels, and coordinating. This gets into the area
that we talked about once before -- the danger of each agency giving its own view
only.
What is your thinking as to the lower level type of coordination, so that you
get the true picture when you have your top staff meeting?
Ambassador 1eischauer. Yes. Of course, through the meetings of the sections,
which bring together all these agencies that might have a somewhat related interest,
we do have coordination at that level, and some of these agencies go to more than
one of the staff meetings, as you can see in this paper.
So the problem is: How can I keep in touch with all of this, and it is a
problem I felt very much.
When I first went there, I found that there was such a tendency for all
authority to stem from the top down that if the ambassador spoke, then no one else
would speak. And this went away on down the line.
If I got the political counselor's views, I did not find out the view of the
man who had argued with him at a lower level.
I have done my best to make everything go the other way around. In my own
staff meetings, I never speak first. I always start with them, to bring up all
the problems they want, and get them all talking, and I keep the Deputy Chief of
Mission and myself to the very end, to pick up the points that have not been
brought up.
This is just exactly a reversal of the procedure that I had found there. And
I insisted I wanted to get the divergent views and not just the view of the
economic or political section as decided at the very top. I wanted hto have some-
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This does not assure me that it always does come through, and I still have
a feeling that I wish I had closer contact with the people down the line. But I
think this is a problem, and would be a problem, in any large organization.
Senator Jackson. I wanted to turn, if I might, to the matter of long-range
planning in the embassies.
We have found that for one reason or another, generally speaking, the
embassies have not been able to do this. Do you have the staff for this purpose?
First of all, do you see a need for a planning staff or planning group
within the embassy?
A.mbassadorReisch;',uer. I am not sure that I see a use for a separate planning
staff there. I feel very strongly that the ambassador and the top officers should
themselves be thinking in long-range terms.
I just do not see how you could do a job of this sort if you do not have a
sort of philosophy of history, of where this all fits in. You have to think in
those terms, or you do not make any sense out of what you. are doing from day to day.
I do not see how you can give this to another group who are going to be
your philosophers, while you are the do-ers.
Senator Jackson. You feel the operators should be the planners?
Ambassador Reischauer. I feel that way, and that is the reason I am very
happy when I find some of our best officers writing long-term think-pieces. What
is happening in Japanese politics? We have had some very good papers of that sort.
Some of these may seem awfully far away from immediate administration. But I
believe thinking of this sort is important. I did a paper last summer myself,
trying to think through the whole thing, what we were really dealing with in
roughly a ten-year period.
And one of our chief political officers did an extremely good analytical piece
on the nature of the development of the Japanese parties, as to what was happening
there long-term, and so what we were going to have to deal with in the future.
The men who have the chief responsibility and the chief contact are the ones
that are best able to do this, and I think we just have to reserve our own time to
do this thing, as well as do the day-to-day work.
Senator Jackson. Do you have the back-up staff you need to help you in
formulating long-term policies as you see them develop in your day-to-day operating
experience?
In other words, you are at the top of the embassy with your key people, and
you sit around, and you are confronted daily with the host of problems that you
have to meet.
Do you find the time to really sit down as a planning staff, as a planning
group, with your key people?
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Ambassador Reischauer. To get it on paper, you have to find some special time.
I did a big piece last summer, when I took myself a little vacation. I went
away for about ten days, and I sat down and did this. It was the only way you
could do a job of that kind -- come up with a long paper.
But actually I think we use our staff meeting very much for that purpose,
because quite often we get away from the immediate issue to talk about the long-
range implications of it and where we are going, and so I think there is a sort
of oral tradition of this sort.
Here we are talking about this big problem, and where we stand in it, and our
staff meeting does not therefore just stick to, "Well, here is a document, and how
do we answer it?" I am very happy to get away from that and talk about the bigger
issues.
Senator Miller. What happens to that report when it comes back here? How
long are the think-pieces?
Ambassador Reischauer. We get very interesting reactions here.
Senator Miller. Where does it go? Does it go to a long-range planning staff?
Ambassador Reischauer. I presume the long-range planning staff looks at that.
I am very much interested to see that all up and down the line the officers
over here will have read it, if it is something of real interest. It goes around
to CINCPAC. People like that come back and say, "That was interesting. We think
this is fine." And so on.
Senator Jackson. I think we ought to point out that Ambassador Reischauer is
rather unique. He is a scholar on all matters relating to the Far East, and Japan
in particular.
Ambassador Reischauer. I come with a long-range interest in this particular
area and problem, and therefore look at it in those terns.
Senator Miller. But is there a long-range planning officer over here at State
that would take something from someone in the Philippines and Southwest Asia?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. The State Department's policy planning staff
does that. There is a tendency for the policy planning staff to perhaps work more
on crisis problems rather than non-crisis areas such as Japan.
Senator Miller. How about long-range? Do they not have long-range planning?
Ambassador Reischauer. As I think back over the State Department's history,
they are always setting up groups that are going to think in terms of the long-
range, and they are always being brought closer and closer to the immediate present.
This has happened with various staffs I have watched over there. There is
this danger.
Senator Miller. But the State Department's policy planning staff is the one
that has this function?
Senator Jackson. They have the responsibility. The staff is headed by
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Ambassador Reischauer. Right.
Senator Jackson. Now, when you are able to get in a good paper on what you
see the situation to be at present, and the direction it is going, and so on, do
you find that a document of that importance gets to the Secretary of State and
to the President?
Ambassador Reischauer: I am not aware that either of them has read these
particular ones I had in my mind. I dare say if they did not see it, much of the
thinking of it was transmitted to them in terms of conversation with other people
at the top, who have read it. It certainly gets up to the Assistant Secretary
level -- things of that sort.
Senator Jackson. Well., it seems to me when we have a good ambassador and a
good embassy staff, they can be a very vital part of our policy planning. When an
ambassador is in a country as important as Japan, he has an opportunity right on
the scene to translate his day-to-day experience into what the direction should be
for the future.
And the operator can be the best planner. I think this is something we need
to really capitalize on.
Do we have a pre-approved policy plan towards Japan that you follow?
Ambassador Rej.schau.er. Yes, we have a paper. I forget whether it is revised
every two years, or something of that sort. I remember when I first came in, a
little over two years ago, they were in the process of just finishing one up, and
they gave me a chance to read it and make some suggestions on it.
We are just going through another process of that sort now, I think primarily
from the policy planning group back here in Washington. It has been over several
months' time that they have been putting together something of this sort.
Senator Jackson. Well, is this paper worked out in conjunction with you and
your people? Ambassador Reischauer. It goes back and forth between the desk officer in
State and us, and they rewrite it and so on.
Senator Jackson. What is the genesis of it? Do you start it?
Ambassador Reischauer. This past one as I remember was written up at the
desk level here, originally.
I happened to be back here in November-December for a couple of weeks, and in
between all the other things I was doing then, I read it and made quite extensive
changes in it at white-hot speed at that moment. They did some further work, and
than it came to us in Japan, and has been very much rewritten in our different
sections. Then it has gone back here, and they are doing some further rewrite
on what we did.
Senator Jackson. Do you have a substantial influence in the final version
in the embassy staff?
Ambassador Reischauer. Oh, yes.
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Senator Jackson. And then when that process was completed., did the Secretary
of State approve it, and did the President approve it?
Ambassador Reischauer. I am not sure at what level it gets final approval.
Senator Jackson. But it is national policy?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. And what it turns out to be, then, is pretty
well descriptive of what people think the situation is, and the thinking is at that
moment.
It really does not plan too far into the future. But it is awfully useful for
anybody coming in new to the situation to see a statement of what the thinking was
as of that time.
Senator Jackson. Do you find it adequate?
Ambassador Reischauer. I think it is fairly adequate, yes.
Actually, once you have done it, the people who have taken part in it find
their minds going on, and they go beyond it fairly soon. So I do not find myself
going back to, "What does it tell us to do," because we have helped draft it up,
and we should go beyond it as events unfold.
But I think it is very useful for the person who is only peripherally
involved in the Japan picture, and therefore needs this for reference, or the man
coming newly into the Japan scene.
Senator Miller. How far in the future does it go?
Ambassador Reischauer. It does talk about the general future. I do not mean
it does not go into the future, but as we move into the future ourselves, we begin
revising it.
Senator Miller. There are not two papers, one devoted to short-range and
the other to long-range?
Ambassador Reischai r. No. And it is based on a fundamental assumption of
what may happen over a ten year period, just on the kinds of things we have been
thinking through in these specific papers.
Professor Tufts. When Miss Fosdick and I were in Japan last fall, we were
told, if I remember correctly, that there was a planning paper for USIS, which
neither the present USIS group nor its predecessor had had an adequate opportunity
to participate in drafting. There was some feeling that more consultation with
the embassy, the USIS group in Tokyo, would have been helpful.
I take it this is not the situation in your relations with State.
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, they are now just in the process of revising
the USIS paper, "Country Plan," I think they call it. Our USIS man sent back one
which he has written largely himself, I think, so they may feel a little differently
right now. This was some months ago that you were there. Perhaps they had
reference to the fact that certain elements in it, some overall statements of
objectives and so on, were dictated from Washington as of some time ago, and people
in the Meldpprov o e e s wed Fd ~p e ajseW f2/~` I'6Fi ,ftA5 *MbddTt00290007-5
 -3-4-
Approved Imemr then Unite2004/02/03 orce-Rn 4apBan03a8t3Ro0e0tQme90o ented, "Can't
you say this better? and that turned out to be the part that was from Washington,
that we could not change. So maybe they were having reference to the fact that
some of it was already set.
Professor En berg. I was wondering if the Ambassador had any information on
whether the Department of State gives the same consideration to other ambassadors.
Ambassador Reischauer is an expert in his field, and I can well see where
they might seriously consider his recommendation on all these long-term programs.
Do you know at all from your acquaintanceship with other ambassadors and
your various contacts whether or not the other embassies are given the same
consideration on planning papers that your office is given?
Ambassador Reischauer. I had the impression they were, but not having had
that extensive experience in the Foreign Service, I could not say.
Senator Jackson. Returning to the issues of reporting and planning, when you
have an important point to make, an important suggestion that you feel is very
vital in our relations with Japan and therefore with the Far East, do you have any
trouble getting that information to the highest levels that are necessary in order
to take effective action?
Ambassador Reischauer. No. That is what I mean by a fairly pragmatically
worked out system. Theoretically, the telegrams are all the same. Sometimes
limited distribution will get it higher. But you use that usually for security
reasons.
But you use the first person. If you say, "I did this," you see, this almost
automatically brings it up to higher attention. So there are ways of drafting it.
I do not know if there is any rule book that describes this, but I have
found in practice there are ways of getting higher attention, by the phrasing.
Senator Jackson. Then, I expect, there are certain situations in which you
feel the issues involved are such that it would be better to come to Washington?
Ambassador Reischauer. I have never had to do that.
Senator Jackson. You have never had to do it. You have been able to handle
matters through written communications for the most part?
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, there are many cases where you probably feel
as though you could have done a better job if you came back here and talked
directly with people.
Actually, this week I find myself having turned up quite by accident at a
very opportune moment on a very important problem that I probably could not have
handled as well in Tokyo as by being here.
Senator Jackson. Under Secretary of State Harriman indicated, in his
testimony to this committee, that if our ambassadors could come in more often,
this at least would help the reporting problem, and it would be more useful both
to the Department of State and to the ambassadors themselves.
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Ambassador Reischauer. I have come back on an average of between six months
and a year. I have found it very useful to come back. I am not sure it would be
more useful to come back more often than that, because I think these messages on
the whole are very adequate.
I am always very much impressed by how much aware they are of, you know, that
message you sent, if you sent it in the right form. And I think it is just about
as good as if you were on the spot.
Senator Miller. What about the key members of the staff coming back? Do they
do that?
Ambassador Reischauer. Very little.
Senator Miller. What about the comments from the headquarters here, or the
State Department's policy planning staff going out there?
Ambassador. Reischauer. We do not see too much of the policy planning staff,
that I am aware of. I think I would like to see them more often.
Senator Miller. Do you think it would be helpful to have the policy planning
staff come out to the field once in a while?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. For instance, I have not been able to persuade
Mr. Rostow to come out. He promised me one time, and was not able to do it
because other crisis areas absorbed his time.
Senator Miller. But how about one or two of his right-hand men coming out?
Ambassador Reischauer. I think it would be very good.
I do not remember cases of top people in policy planning coming out. It may
be just a slip in my memory. We do see a great number of other people. I am very
happy to see them. I think it is very useful.
We have a constant flow of Government officials through Tokyo, State Depart-
ment people and others who are involved in foreign policy.
Senator Miller. Probably too many.
Ambassador Reischauer. One could think that way, but I do not think it can
be too many.
Senator Jackson. Depending on the quality.
Senator Miller.
office?
But you would like to see somebody from the policy planning
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, that would be useful, I am sure.
Senator Jackson. To return for a moment to the policy guidance that you get,
do you find that it is clear and unequivocal, so that you can pretty well carry
out your duties and responsibilities as ambassador? Or is there a lot of improvis-
ing and are there ad hoc arrangements that do not always leave you with clear-cut
guidance as to the course you should pursue?
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Ambassador Reischauer. It is usually clear-cut, I think. Sometimes it is
slow in arriving, because so many of our important problems in Japan are inter-
departmental problems -- economic ones involving Commerce, Agriculture, Fisheries,
things like that, and then the military.
Senator Jackson. On the fundamental questions? I realize an issue will
come up in a specific area that does not actually change your broad general
directive. Do you find that you are pretty clear in your own mind as to the
course you should pursue, based on the written policy statement?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, I think so. But that may be simply because I
have a clear idea in my own mind. I think our general statement is quite clear,
our overall policies, and so on.
Senator Jackson. This is one of the things that has concerned us. For a
while I think the government tended to be too precise and formal on these things,
and now -there may be a tendency to go the other way, to improvise and to be a
little too flexible.
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, perhaps we have a somewhat different situation
in Japan from what you have in many countries of the world. We do not have a
rapidly changing situation there. You have to have an overall interpretation of
where things are likely to go over a certain period of time, and I do not think
in Washington or Tokyo there has been any fundamental revision of that general
attitude.
This does allow, then, an ambassador within that general framework to have
his own fairly clear-cut ideas of just how it should be played.
We do not have a change from year to year because of some revolution or change
of leadership in the country. So I do not think this would be a typical case,
at all.
I think you would have much more serious problems, let's say, in the
countries of Southeast Asia, where you might have to have a fairly rapid change
because of a great upheaval.
Senator Miller. Could I pursue that one idea you have had?
You have indicated you would like to see more of the policy planning staff
people come out in the field. What about their counterparts in some of the other
agencies? For example, from Commerce, coming out. Do they do that?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, we get people like that all the time.
Senator Miller. So the liaison on a visitation basis is pretty good except
when. it comes to the policy planning office in the State Department?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. Specifically, I do not remember those people
coming out very much. We do have a large number of people from Defense, Commerce,
all of the departments that would be involved in things of this sort.
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S na'or. J'acl-,son. Turning to the Defense area, which must tie in so closely
with our foreign policy objectives and operations, what is your relationship
with the military, and how do you in general get along? Do you have any comments
on that?
Ambassador Reischauer. This is the most important coordination problem we
have in Japan, without a shadow of a doubt. We have 45,000 men in uniform there,
which gives you a population of over a hundred thousand on the military side in
Japan.
And the most difficult and crucial. aspect of our relations with Japan is with
defense, because this is the controversial issue of Japanese politics, making this
our most difficult problem. And so liaison between the embassy and the United
States forces in Japan is absolutely essential.
Actually, we have an extremely close relationship. We have a country team
which formalizes this relationship, but the essence of it is the fact that the
commander of the United States forces in Japan -- up through this month it is Jake
Smart, an extremely fine man -- he and I are in very close contact.
It is like the traditional school, one person at each end of a log. We are
two people at each end of a sofa, and we get together all of the time and talk
over each of our problems, and when we have staff work, we have a country team
meeting that comes every two weeks.
But we never dream of doing anything that involves the other without consulta-
tion. He gives me his speeches, if he is going to make a speech, or anything like
that. He comes and tells me his problems, and I discuss mine with him.
Senator Jackson. And this runs pretty well down through all the levels?
Ambassador Reischauer. Down through the levels, the same kind of very close
relationship exists. We draft an important message to go to Washington, sent
ostensibly from the embassy. Just the day I left there was a very important
message coming out. It did not say "country team," or anything like that. There
were two colonels and a Navy captain backstopping me on this, coming over from the
headquarters of the United States forces in Japan, because it deeply involved
them. This is the kind of relationship we have.
Senator Jackson. I am certainly glad to hear that, because we have had some
experiences where Defense and State get rather out of touch -- take for example
the Skybolt problem. And certainly in Japan, you have a whole series of sensitive
areas, in which the military are involved on a day-to-day basis, and that have
of necessity to be closely coordinated with the job you are doing.
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. We have a third element in that, and that is
our MAAG, of course, the Military Aid Assistance Group, which is, according to
the charts, part of the embassy. But it has to have very close relationships with
the United States forces in Japan.
And so there is a three-way coordination. But the kind of thing they are in
on tends to be more of a technical nature, weapons and that sort of thing. There
is very, very close staff coordination, but it is not as crucial as the coordina-
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Senator Jackson. You find it is the quality of the people as much as anything
that makes the difference?
Ambassador Reischauer. This is the basic thing, of course. You cannot have
a fine organization if you do not have the right people, and if you have the right
people, you do not really need such a detailed organization.
Senator Miller. I hate to have to leave. It has been nice to get acquainted
with you.
(At this point Senator Miller withdrew from the hearing room.)
Ambassador Reischsuer. We have the danger of general Smart and myself getting
together without sufficient staff behind us, so we had to go back to a more formal
type of meeting so that it could be properly recorded.
Professor Tufts. In terms of developing our relations with Japan, what are
the most important tools with which you have to work? I suppose they are economic
t
t
en
.
to some extent, and military to some extent, and informational to some ex
Do you feel, as you have watched this over the past couple of years, that we are
making effective use of these tools?
What I am leading to is: What if anything do you see as the problems in
making better use of these instruments for influencing relations?
Ambassador Reischauer. I think the policy is just as with any complicated
problem, to subordinate the minor to the major.
We have loads of, let's say, minor economic problems, that help to roil things
up, and therefore make major political relationships more difficult. You have got
to keep them in perspective. It is awfully hard to do, because each one of these
belongs to somebody's particular area of administrative control overhere, or
political concern, and so on.
Just the coordination of these things is a very difficult thing, if you are
thinking in terms of specific instrumentalities for improving the relationship.
And of course, economic problems are very much involved. For instance,
cotton textiles is a very good case in point. This can cause a great deal of ill
will -- this of course goes both ways -- over what turns out to be a very small
item in the huge overall trade.
On the military side, the relationship of our military to the Japanese public
is a vitally important thing. Very fortunately, our military is very much aware of
that. If we had military men who were not aware of this public relations problem,
we could have endless trouble. But we are very fortunate in having from the top
on down in our military in Japan people who seem to be extremely well aware of
this, and work awfully hard at it.
Perhaps the most important instrumentality is the information side, or
cultural exchange, or whatever you want to call it, or intellectual contact.
People do not like to use the word "intellectual," but this is perhaps the
most important aspect of it there, the USIS and all the aspects of its activity.
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have an
overall influence. And I should say our whole embassy is really doing a sort of
USIS job. `i:iiere are ways in which we could make it more effective, but as long
as we all realize this is important --
Senator Jackson. The military insofar as their base commanders are concerned
-- are they fully indoctrinated before they come, and then after they get over
there, on rather a continuous basis, to know what the problem is in their
community, what approach they should take towards the local citizens, and so on,
this being one of the troublesome problems that you have to face?
Ambassador Reischauer. I dare say there is good indoctrination before they
come. I am not sure on that point. I think perhaps the main thing is the leader-
ship of t1B commanding general. He understands it and helps indoctrinate people
on down the line.
Of course, t11 chief men in every service are very important, and we are very
fortunate in that. And people down the line begin to take the lead from those
above them.
Professor Tufts. I remember that you attached a great deal of importance to
the point of communications in your book, in 1955, Wanted: An Asian Policy. And
in that book you made a strong case for the importance of having people not only
speak the language but understand the culture enough to be able to express what
they have to say in a way which would make it understandable to the people they
are talking to.
To what extent do you think your staff meets these requirements now, in the
USIS staff and other staffs that are involved in this?
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, you probably never achieve perfection in this.
But we have made a lot of advances. The embassy has a fairly high degree of
linguistic skills. We have built that side up quite considerably.
You cannot go too far. You want a balance of people who are not deeply in
the Japanese scene, too, in key places, also. I think you have to have that
balance.
So the embassy itself I think is fairly well balanced that way. Perhaps USIS
could use a great deal more linguistic skills. They just are not available as
yet. We have a pretty good training program for the young men, in rather large
numbers.
Professor Tuft. That was the next point I wanted to raise. This committee
has been quite interested in training problems.
You say you have a training program. Do you think it is a good one? Or
could it be improved in some ways?
I wanted to ask what sort of a training program would in your judgment best
prepare the young officers for their work?
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Ambassador Reischauer. There has been a lot of experience behind this. The
one problem is the problem of weeding people out of this kind of work who do not
have the real talents for it. And we keep setting up a system.
Recently we started a system whereby a person would have a trial period there,
and a trial period in the field, to see if he is really suited for work in Japan
and has linguistic skills worth developing.
After he has proved both of them, you give him a full course. The only
danger is the one of human frailty, where everybody wants to be so kind to every-
body else that it is awfully hard to bust a person out of the system. There may be
sort of a black spot on his record. But it is not a kindness to him to keep him in
if he does not have the talents for it.
Professor Tufts. In this same book of yours, you said that: "The specialist
who learns the native language and becomes an expert in the native culture and
psychology is likely to find his accomplishments hindrances rather than aids to
his promotion."
"Our foreign service," you said there, "is geared to produce fine mixers with
other Americans rather than to produce the all-important contact men with Asians."
AmbassadorReischauer. When I wrote that, I think it was descriptive of the
system. I trust this is being changed. But there is always this prejudice. It
is a problem.
Professor Tufts. What does this suggest to you about tours of duty and about
the need for opportunities for people who do want to specialize in a particular
language and culture and so on? Do you think we need people in the Foreign Service
who will spend a large part of their lives working on Japanese matters?
Ambassador Reischauer. There are certain areas where I think it is necessary,
absolutely necessary. Japan is probably an outstanding example. Korea is a place
where if we had more of that, we probably would be in a much sounder position than
we are today.
The China area -- of course, we do not have much of a China area to deal
with -- has always been in the same position exactly. That is, these are
countries that have very different languages from ours, and really utilize them
as a medium of communication.
India, after all, uses English. Africa still is using western languages.
And you do not have quite the same problem that you do in the Far East.
There used to be a special Japan and China Service, back before the war. It
was necessary in those days. I think it will be necessary for a long time in the
future. That means people who are expected to spend a much higher percentage of
their career in one area than is true of the Service as a whole.
Professor Tufts. Do you have such men on your staff there?
Ambassador Reischauer. Oh, yes, we have lots of them. And we are training
men all the time. I get the impression that half of their foreign service would
be spent in contact with the country of their special interest.
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Professor Tufts. And do you find that they are getting promotions adequately?
Ambassador Reischauer. I think so, yes. The really able ones are, yes.
I think there has been a change in that regard.
Senator Jackson. Senator Pell?
Senator Pell. Thank you. Excuse me for being late. I had another meeting.
In connection with your table of organization, I notice that you have the
military attaches reporting directly to you, not to MAAG and then to you. Some
thought is being given to the idea that the MAAG commander's office should be
combined with the position of Defense attache? What is your view on that?
Ambassador Reischauer. MAAG is a very specialized job with us, a highly
technical job, and their problem of relationship there is between them and the
United States Forces, Japan.
We have a large military there. They have a very close working relationship.
In the chart they come under us, but the three of us work very closely together.
Among the various service attaches in a country like Japan, where you have
the large military establishment a2 ready there, you have a somewhat anomalous
position. They tend to be just liaison officers, to help liaison between these
various elements.
Senator Pell. Who serves as the liaison?
Ambassador Reis chauer. The service attaches.
Actually, I think someone should look into the whole problem of what the
function of a service attache is in an embassy in a country where there is a large
American military establishment that quite overshadows the service attaches.
I think the military itself are beginning to think about this problem, because
obviously United States Forces, Japan, has taken over a large part of the function
that would normally be in the hands of a service attache.
Senator Pell. This is a question I had hoped to lead into, because I had
been of the view that the commanding officer at MAAG should also be the Defense
Department attache as well, and when this would happen, there would be happier
relationships with both the Embassy staff and perhaps some of the other people.
Ambassador Reis chauer. It is a perfectly conceivable concept, except that
we have o mebody even more important, and that is the commander of the United
States Forces in Japan, who is really the Defense Department representative there.
And for anything of a military nature, and as I was pointing out earlier, the
most difficult problems we have are of a military nature, since this is a crucial
area,, in Japan .._ on things of this sort my relationship with the commander of
United States Forces in Japan is the important thing.
Senator Pell. Which is the senior Defense attache?
Ambassador Reischauer. We do not have one. The Naval attache is responsible
for the maintenance of all the facilities for the rest of them? but he is not over
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eSer.to,4? dell, When you get into the other islands around Japan, the
Ryukyus and others,, do they come under you?
Ambassador Reischauer. The Ryukyu Islands are a great problem for us, but
they do not come under us. That is probably where the problem exists.
It is a Department of the Army area, and the commanding general is directly
under the Army, the High Commissioner. And yet the great political problem is the
fact that there are 900,000 Japanese speaking people who regard themselves as
Japanese, and therefore this is a built-in major problem between us and Japan.
So the Japanese and we have a very special relationship over the Ryukyu
Islands. But we have a rather curious three-cornered situation as a result,
because the High Commisioner has his channel back to Army and not, of course, to
State.
Ser,tor Pell. What is the general view in Japan with regard to the develop-
ment of the natural normal trading relationship between the industrial area of
Japan and the agrarian area of China?
Ambassador Reischauer. Japan has an emotional feeling about, "Here is this
great mass of people next door, and it is only natural to have them as customers
of ours," and so on.
The general public has leaned in that direction, and there is a great tendency
and desire for not only trade relations but diplomatic relations. This is a great
embarrassment to the Government there, because they try to cooperate with us in
the general free world stand. They have therefore taken what they call a forward-
looking attitude towards trade with China.
Actually, the people who know much about it do not expect any great trade to
develop, because the Chinese have not developed an economy that can trade with
Japan very much. They could absorb endless Japanese things, but they do not have
anything to pay with, either in the way of foreign exchange or goods.
I think the Japanese Government feels that the best way to educate the
Japanese public on this situation -- that there is not very much in China trade --
is to give enough rope, so that they can find out through experience.
Senator Pell. Who do the Japanese people consider their natural enemy?
Ambassador Reischauer. Russia. This is normal, sort of emotionally built
into them. They have felt that way about the Russians for a long time.
Senator Pell. Like we used to consider the British Empire in our first
century?
Ambassador Reischauer. Even a more hostile feeling.
Senator Pell. But they are more hostile to the Soviets than to the Chinese?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, it is a traditional thing that actually goes
back about 150 years, this attitude toward Russia. And the end of the war
experience was a very unpleasant one, where the Russians came in just to take
advantage of our victory.
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Senator Pell. But the feeling toward the Chinese is one of -- What?
Ambassador Reischauer. Well, it is a very complicated one. I used to say
there is a guilt complex^in it. China is their Greece and Rome, you know, source
of ancient civilization, and they have a sort of sentimental feeling about it.
On top of that, they have a sort of guilt complex about having ruined China The
in modern years. Unquestionably there is a certain race element involvved. them.
Chinese seem more like natural people and they share a lot culturally
They have a strong emotional bias in their favor. At the same time, they have
underneath it all a sort of contempt.
Senator Pell. And what is the view with regard to Formosa China with its
10 million people and Mainland China with its 750 million people?
Ambassador tei Schauer. For a long time the Japanese disregarded the
Formosans completely. More recently, they have developed a much more healthy
awareness of Formosa, and the fact is that their trade with Formosa has tended to
be larger than their trade with the continent.
And now they are developing a real pride in the fact that their great advance
is largely a result of Japan's investment in Formosa in the colonial ande
they have a pride in that the Formosan population is very definitely per paa ,
one of the few colonial populations that have come out, with a nostalgic love for
their former rulers.
Senator Pell. I remember going to Columbia University -- we had a course for
Naval officers, and we used Formosa as our case study for military government.
We were taught while they did not like the Japanese too much, they accepted them.
If there were any people they disliked more, it was the Mainland Chinese. This
was Navy doctrine in 1911-1.
Ambassador Rei.schauer. A lot of this has been a sort of subtle way of showing
disapproval of the existing governments. I do not think they love the Japanese
that much.
Senator Pell. One final question is in connection with the proposed Foreign
Service Academy. I was wondering if you had any views one way or the other.
Ambassador Reischauer. I just cannot see any point to it, myself, because I
do not think it is that technical a subject that should be boiled down and cut off
from the rest of the thing.
In fact, I thought the whole effort of the Foreign Service was to draw people
into it with as broad experience as possible. A few years ago, it was standard
policy to not encourage persons to come directly out of college into the Foreign
Service. They wanted people to have a broader experience than that.
Senator Pell. They wanted the boys from the East to go West, and the boys
from the West to go East?
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Ambassador Reischauer. And some other kinds of contacts, more than just the
academic one, before you went into Foreign Service work.
I think that is all very sound. Certainly you do not want the academic
experience of a specialized kind of academy that cuts them off from the rest.
I just cannot see it in those terms, unless it means an in-service training
for people after they have gone in.
Senator Pell. Have you any views as to the consensus of people within the
career service with regard, to the Foreign Service Academy?
Ambassador Reisohauer. I can give you a guess as to this from my personal
friends. I think it would be disapproving.
Senator Pell. I would agree with you.
Senator Jackson. For c:Larification, when we talk about the academy, the
initial proposal was for an undergraduate academy, and now there is the proposal
for a graduate academy.
Senator Pell. Yes. I am talking about the graduate academy.
Ambassador Reischauer. I would have a rather negative view toward this
concept.
Senator Jackson. The truth of the matter is that this type of post-graduate
work is available in our existing institutions of higher learning, or can be
initiated there, and then you have the opportunity of going to the various centers
throughout the country.
Ambassador Reischauer. If I had the problem of training people for it, I
would want to get them scattered widely and then bring them into the Foreign
Service.
Senator Pell. I think one thing that would be really beneficial to them
after spending 15 years in the Foreign Service would be to get them sent out to
St. Louis.
Ambassador Reischauer. I think it would be very good to give them
sabbatical leave from the Foreign Service in something of this sort, but not in
a Foreign Service Academy.
I think Mr. Engberg had a question or two.
Professor EpZ er;. I have been interested over quite a period of time in
this matter of personality in the ambassador's office and this matter of legal
control. There is a sort of contrasting type of thing, here.
We run into situations such as the Ambassador talks about in Japan, where
they have the same legal situations as in other embassies so far as responsibility
to State and to Washington, and then we run into other areas where some of our
other testimony has indicated that things have not worked nearly as smoothly.
So I have a couple of questions I would like to have yoou~consider. I am not
at all s4or&09l e ' s ' ~0 /~ ~~I P 038toMdl0'~0(T290007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/02/03 CIA-RDP65B00383 0001002~0$~-eople
Do the different agencies here in Washington, when they sen
throughout all this great listing of folks that you have on your country team --
do they make ary attempt to deliberately select individuals who are not only
trained as persons but trained technically to fit that particular country?
Ambassador Reischauer. Some of them do, very definitely.
We had a new attache recently who came in very well prepared, I thought, who
had been working on these problems back in Treasury here, and was well grounded
in what he was going to run into in Tokyo.
Professor Ember . Is he well grounded in the area of his work so far as
Japan is concerned?
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. That is what I mean. He is quite familiar with
these thix ;s. I would not say this is true in all cases, but I think quite a few
of the people who have come are very well grounded.
Professor Sn er?. Another question along that same line: So many of these
agencies that are set up by statutory authority send out people that you work
with in your country team. Then you take over your position and, to use the terms
of the President, you are supposed to be in complete coordination and supervision"
of that program.
And I think Mr. Herter at one time used the terra "vehicle of decision." I
took. that directly from an article that Mr. Herter wrote.
Your control over your country team, then, is much more of personal relations
than it is of legal control?
Ambassador Reischauer. This is not really a country team, what we have here.
This is all built in as some things attached to the embassy. So I think we have
a considerable amount of even legal control, because these things have to go out
through the embassy channels of communication.
Senator Jackson. You operate under President Kennedy's letter, too.
Professor Engberg. The point I was getting at, Senator Jackson, is that the
Congress has established a lot of these areas. Some of these areas are really not
directly under the President. They become the Ambassador's domain when they end
up in Japan.
Senator Jackson. I think the real problem here is that while these people -
like a Treasury attache - are attached to the embassy, you do not have the control
over their efficiency reports, their promotions, and so on. Therefore you confront
the very human problem: where does the particular employee look? Does he look
to our ambassador? Does he look to his superior in the States?
Is this not part of the problem?
I assume, on the other hand, that if a given employee or representative of
Treasury or Commerce or any of the other departments fails to measure up, a letter
from the ambassador indicating that he just has not conducted himself properly
over here, has not done a real good job, is not going to help him within his own
department.
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 But ogrpv ~eF$~1".ge 44J0~ a j&cRiperai0 . 9091082294@1--Iolicy con-
f.lict with those of the State Department,, so the tendency of the employee or
representative, I would think, would be to follow the lead of his own department
or agency.
In that particular situation this makes your problem a difficult one in
exercising proper managerial control.
Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. I see the problem in theory. But I can only
say in theory, because I cannot remember any example of anything like that. You
are assuming that one of these boxes represents a group in Washington that now has
a very different policy.
Senator Jackson. I think what it gets down to is that Ambassador Reischauer's
leadership has been such, and his attitude toward his people has been such, that
the ar dinary or normal technical and legal problems that might appear have not
appeared because of the way he has handled things.
Professor Fngberg. That is exactly the point, Senator Jackson.
Ambassador Reischauer. I have never felt any distinction between the people
that belong in these boxes and the people that belong in our own boxes here.
Senator Jackson. That is perhaps just the reason why it works.
Professor Rn berg,. We have been talking about staffing, and here is an
almost perfect example of what we would have State set up in areas in terms of
personality and control and getting results.
And when you start looking at the boxes and the legal type of thing,you say,
"Well, the ambassador doesn't have any real control over this, but it works
because of the type of staffing that has been done."
That is the point I was interested in bringing out.
Senator Jackson. I think it is a very good point.
AmbassadorReischauer. Of course, we could have a much more serious problem
with the United States Forces in Japan, where there is no even theoretical sub-
ordination there. If we had a real divergence of opinion there, I think we would
be in real trouble.
We have avoided any feuds, and we have fortunately seen things the same way.
In getting a new man, if it turns out he has very divergent views from myself,
then I think we would have a real problem of coordination there, at which point
I think the only possible solution is a reference back to Washington, and
Washington would have to decide to change one or the other in that case.
Senator Jackson. Yes.
Incidentally, is there any interchange on appointments of that importance,
which involve not just the ordinary military command requirement? Are there
consultations with State in this respect?
Ambassador Reischauer. Not that I am aware of in this regard. I just hear
of the fact that General Preston has taken General Smart's place.
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127-
Senator Jackson. As you may know, under the stimulus of hearings before the
predecessor to this Subcommittee, a State-Defense exchange program was started.
We encouraged this several years ago -- a program between State and Defense,
'wherein officers from DOD go over to work in State, and vice versa. And we have
tried to impress upon both departments the importance of this and other coordinat-
ing efforts.
I just wondered: In a case like this, it seems to me that the primary job of
an officer going out there is to have a full comprehension of diplomatic and
political problems.
Ambassador Reischauer. They have tried to cooperate in the following way.
I think they have chosen the man without consultation with us, but General LeMay
was out when this was announced, and I said to him, "Can't you get your new man
here in plenty of time for this overlap with General Smart?"
Senator Jackson. Is this an Air Force job?
Arrb assador Reischauer. It is an Air Force job, because the chief job there
is Air Force. The commander of the Fifth Force is concurrently commander of the
United States Forces in Japan.
Senator Jackson. They have a large Naval establishment?
Ambassador Rei_schauer. It is, but it has somehow been made an Air Force thing.
I said to LeMay, "Cant we have a big overlap there?" And he said, "Yes, we
will see Gene rat. Preston comes out there.," because I wanted him to observe Smart
and the attitudes he has taken and the contacts he has made. I thought it would
be very helpful to him to get the thing off in the right way.
Senator Jackson. We :night close on this question: In your fine book,
Wanted: An Asian Po1ic , you state: "Why surrender the offensive to communism?
The defensive can never win in Asia; only the offensive can, and, by all that we
believe in, it rightly belongs to us."
Do you think that we are making any progress in this direction?
Ambassador Reischauer. I think we could be more on the offensive than we
are in many places. I certainly have tried to take the offensive in Japan.
I spend most of my time y-- it is a strange attack I am making, but I am
making an attack on clatisical. Marxism. That is our real enemy there. And I never
miss an opportunity to take a dig at it, although the word is never mentioned.
But it is, "Let's talk of a new view of history."
The whole thing is, "You know, these are the guys that are really out of
date, and we are the wave of the future," and this kind of thing.
So I am continually on the offensive, and they recognize it as such. They
always refer to it as the "Kennedy-Reischa.uer offensive." I am very flattered
to be hyphenated there.
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Professor Tufts. What about in Asia generally?
Ambassador Beischaiu^:c. Well, I still think in many places we too much give
ourselves the image of defense rather than the offense in the sense of establish-
ing prosperity, freedom for people, and eventually democracy, rather than just
sitting back and trying to hold off the other people, who are on the offensive.
It is more a frame of mind for yourself, often, but I think the whole country
sometimes has this difficulty.
When you look at America from abroad, you keep wondering why Americans are so
worried and pessimistic. Ask any Japanese what has happened in the last few years,
and they will say, "We are making terrific progress as opposed to the other side."
Senator Pell.. Along the lines of that same thought, I was wondering what
the Ambassador's reaction is to the term "counter-insurgency," which to me is an
unfortunate team, because our nation was born in insurgency, and we encourage
insurgancy of the right kind.
Ambassador Reischauer. I have not thought in terms of that particular thing,
but that is a good example of the way we approach this problem.
Senator Jackson. On behalf of the committee, Mr. Ambassador, I certainly
wart to express to you our appreciation for your fine statement, and the helpful
counsel and adv is e you have given us. We are very grateful.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of
the Chair.)
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 Approved 6005 00100290007-5
July 1, 1963
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