RHODESIA: SOME ETHNIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PITFALLS FOR A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100080008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Rhodesia: Some Ethnic and Demographic
Pitfalls for a Majority Govern~t
Confidential
GC 77-10001
January 1977
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Table of Contents
Page
Summary .......................................................... v
Chronology ........................................................ vi
Ethnic Factors ..................................................... 1
History of Settlement: A Tribal Crossroads ......................... 1
The Nationalist Movement: Shona Versus Ndebele .................. 2
Demographic Factors ............................................... 4
A Diminishing White Minority .................................... 5
A Growing Black Majority ........................................ 6
The Tribal Lands: Overcrowded and Deteriorating ................ 6
The Urban Townships: Crowded and Discontent .................. 7
The Labor Force: Rising Unemployment ......................... 7
Outlook ........................................................... 8
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Summary and Principal Conclusions
A majority government in Rhodesia will have its hands full coping
with the tribal antagonisms that, although currently overshadowed by
the black-white conflict, already badly divide the black nationalist
movement. The outlook for uniting the factions behind a single leader
is not promising. The success of a majority government will be further
challenged by instability caused by the combination of a rapidly
growing population, rising unemployment, and increasing black migra-
tion produced by the removal of urban and rural segregation barriers.
- Each of the two principal black nationalist movements, the
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe
African Nationalist Union (ZANU), has mustered majority
support from one of the two major tribal clusters, the Shona and
the Ndebele. The Shona dominate ZANU, the Ndebele
dominate ZAPU.
- Warfare between two Shona tribes, the Karanga and the
Manyika, has divided the ZANU ranks. The Karanga currently
control the party and hope to retain their power in a majority
government.
- The 23 to 1 ratio of blacks to whites will continue to widen as
the pace of the white exodus quickens. The economy will worsen
and unemployment will rise as the whites depart.
- Blacks already outnumber whites by at least 3 to 1 in all cities
and towns. The movement of blacks from the surrounding
townships, where they are presently confined, into the urban
cores will hasten white departures.
- Land will be reallocated by a majority government, but because
the economy is heavily dependent on commercial production
from white farms, the new government will be reluctant to turn
over large areas to black homesteaders. Population pressures in
the tribal areas, however, could trigger spontaneous migration
and speed the departure of white farmers.
- Rural to urban migration will continue under a majority
government even though new lands are open to black
settlement. Urban overcrowding, with all of its associated
problems, will persist.
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CHRONOLOGY
A. D. 1000 Shona tribes from central Africa begin to settle in Rhodesia.
Shona empires rule the region.
1820 Ndebele tribes enter Rhodesia from the south and begin to subjugate
Shona tribes.
1888 British South Africa Company granted mineral rights in Matabeleland.
1890 Whites begin to settle.
1897 White settlers suppress Ndebele and Shona rebellions.
1923 Rhodesia becomes aself-governing colony of the British
Commonwealth.
1961 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) is formed.
1962 ZAPU is outlawed.
1963 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is formed.
1964 ZANU is outlawed. Nationalist leaders are jailed.
1965 Rhodesia issues unilateral declaration of independence from the British
Commonwealth.
1971 African National Council (ANC) is formed.
1976 Rhodesian government agrees to majority rule by March 1978.
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RHODESIA: SOME ETHNIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PITFALLS
FOR A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT
Rhodesia's white minority government and the
black nationalist leaders that have challenged it have
agreed that the successor state of Zimbabwe will
attain independence under majority rule by 1 March
1978. If majority rule is in fact attained by this date,
the new government will have to contend with tribal-
based divisions that continue to fragment the nation-
alist movement. Alliances among nationalist leaders at
the Geneva negotiations belie serious differences.
There are significant conflicts not only between the
two major tribal clusters, the Shona and the Ndebele,
but among the six major Shona tribes. The nationalist
factions (which are closely related to tribal divisions)
have shown no signs of willingness to unite behind a
single leader, and no single faction has the numerical,
political, or military strength to assume the reins of
the government without challenge. Factionalism will
not disappear in the foreseeable future; a new
government must somehow placate tribal leaders in
order to ensure a stable regime.
Once in power, a majority government must also
deal with increasing population pressures. Blacks in
the overpopulated tribal lands will pressure the
government to open up white areas, both urban and
rural. But, because the commercial white farms are a
significant contributor to the agriculture-based econ-
omy, the government will be reluctant to permit large
numbers of black farmers to move into the areas
formerly denied to them. The flow of blacks from the
tribal lands to the cities is already surpassing the
capacity of the municipalities to provide jobs and
housing. Unemployment and housing shortages will
probably become more severe under a majority
government. Dissatisfaction among impoverished
farmers and unemployed and homeless urban dwellers
could be a destabilizing factor for the new govern-
ment.
Ethnic Factors
The Rhodesian black population is more homoge-
neous than those in most African countries. Although
anthropologists have identified more than 40 tribes,
principal divisions are only two-the Shona (also
called Mashona) and the Ndebele (pronounced en-da-
bee-lee, commonly called Matabele).* These two
tribal clusters dominate the nationalist movement.
Shona comprise more than 70 percent of the black
population. Although they live in all parts of the
country, their numerical strength is in the east.
Ndebele account for only about 16 percent and are
concentrated in the west. Small tribes-the Tonga,
Sena, Hlengwe, Venda, Sotho, and others-live in
peripheral areas and have played only minor roles in
black nationalist politics. Non-indigenous black work-
ers from Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique are
scattered throughout the country. They area dimin-
ishing element and not involved in nationalist politics.
The population inset map following the text shows the
distribution of the principal tribes. Tribal composi-
tion, according to language, is shown in Table 1.
History of Settlement: A Tribal Crossroads
The Shona were among the waves of Bantu tribes
that migrated from central to southern Africa several
centuries ago. A series of Shona empires controlled
much of Rhodesia before the Ndebele and white
colonists arrived in the 19th century. Although the
Shona tribes have both linguistic and cultural
affinities, they have remained distinct and have never
integrated into a single nation. Anthropologists
usually divide them into six major tribes-the
Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru, Korekore, Ndau, and
Kalanga. There are a number of sub-tribes within
25X1A
NOTE: This paper was produced by the Office of Geographic
and Cartographic Research and coordinated within the Directorate
of Intelligence. Comments and questions may be directed to
* Shona is a derogatory term, meaning unknown, applied to
them by the Ndebele. Ndebele is a term, believed to mean "naked
people with shields," applied to them by the Sotho tribe. Many
white Rhodesians identify themselves as "white Shona" or "white
Ndebele," depending on their place of birth.
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TABLE 1
Mid-1976 Tribal Composition
Tribal Group Number of Persons
Shona ** 1,617,000
Karanga 964,000
Zezuru 833,000
Manyika 448,000
Ndau 230,000
Korekore 187,000
Kalanga 112,000
Other 13,000
Zansi 147, 000
Enhla 246,000
Holi (Lozwi) 590,000
Other (includes Sena, Tonga, Venda,
Sotho, Hlengwe, and aliens
from Malawi, Mozambique,
and Zambia)
that granted all mineral rights in Matabeleland to the
company. White prospecting, mining, and farming
extended farther and farther into the Shona and
Ndebele tribal lands in the 1890s, leading to clashes
between the frontiersmen and the tribesmen. Shona
and Ndebele rebellions were suppressed and white
rule was absolute by 1897. Since the colonists
considered the Ndebele to be the more intelligent and
diligent of the two groups, they were more quickly
educated and drawn into the labor force.
The Ndebele are more united than the Shona even
though many of the Ndebele are descendents of
subjugated tribes that were absorbed into Ndebele
society. The Ndebele are divided into three "castes."
Members of the highest caste (Zansi) are descendents
of the original conquerors from South Africa. They are
considered the "real" Ndebele, undiluted by inter-
marriage. They comprise about 15 percent of all
Ndebele. Members of the Enhla caste are descendents
of Sotho stock absorbed by the Ndebele during their
l9th century northward migration. They form an
estimated 25 percent of all Ndebele. The lowest 60
percent-called Holi or Lozwi-are derived from
Shona and other tribes subjugated by the Ndebele
after they arrived in Rhodesia. They became serfs and
were denied full tribal membership by the other two
castes. Distinctions among the castes, although
blurred over the years, remain a significant element in
Ndebele society and have created dissension within
Ndebele-dominated nationalist groups. The critical
distinction is between the Zansi and the other two
castes.
* Figures extrapolated from 1969 census data.
** Persons identifying as Shona in the 1969 census rather than
one of the Shona tribes.
each. There is not, however, full agreement on these
tribal and sub-tribal groupings. For example, the
Kalanga are considered by some to be an independent
tribe with closer links to the Ndebele than to the
Shona; some authorities think the Tonga comprise a
distinctive tribe, while others believe they belong to
the Shona cluster.
Pressed by the military might of Zulu warriors and
Boer frontiersmen in South Africa, the Ndebele first
entered Shona territory in the 1820s. They were
stronger than the larger but scattered and weak Shona
tribes and subjugated or absorbed most of them
during the middle decades of the century. Today's
Ndebele-Shona antipathy was born. The formidable
military power of the Ndebele has been reduced to
legend by more than three-quarters of a century of
white rule.
Whites first appeared in Rhodesia in large numbers
after 1888 when Cecil Rhodes' British South African
Company signed an agreement with the Ndebele king
The Nationalist Movement:
Shona Versus Ndebele
Black leaders claim that Rhodesian whites exagger-
ate differences between the Shona and Ndebele,
among the Shona tribes, and among the Ndebele
castes. Although tribal biases do indeed fragment the
nationalist movement, more than 75 years of white
rule have reduced tribal distinctions. Intertribal
marriages have been common and tribal hybrids may
be the rule rather than the exception. Some nationalist
leaders are products of mixed marriages. Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole, founder of the Zimbabwe African
Nationalist Union, is the son of an Ndebele father and
a mixed Shona (Ndau)-Ndebele mother. Although he
identifies primarily as an Ndau, he speaks both
languages and is comfortable in either culture.
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According to black leaders, factional disagreements
among the nationalist groups are caused less by tribal
differences than by personality differences among the
leaders. The blacks charge that the white government
has encouraged the view that only the presence of
whites has suppressed tribal bloodshed. They argue
that geography, economics, education, and religion
divide the black community more than tribal affili-
ations and that tribal divisions will not prevent the
establishment of a viable majority government.
Despite the claims of the black leaders, no single
nationalist organization has been able to transcend
tribal rivalries. The principal factional divisions are
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).
ZAPU was formed in 1961 by Joshua Nkomo, a
Kalanga who is associated closely with the Ndebele.
Reverend Sithole created ZANU in 1963. Both
movements were banned and their leaders imprisoned
from 1964 to 1974. The ZAPU-ZANU split, originally
based more on personality and political differences
than on tribal ones, has developed increasingly along
tribal lines over the years. The Shona dominate both
the leadership and the rank and file of ZANU. ZAPU
is less parochial: most of the officers are Ndebele, but
several of Nkomo's top aides and many of the
members are Shona.
Shona divisiveness within ZANU currently over-
shadows Shona-Ndebele differences in the overall
nationalist movement. The Karanga, largest and most
militant of the Shona tribes, have defeated the
Manyika in a struggle for ZANU leadership in the
past 2 years. They are now the dominant element in
ZANU and in the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA,
also called the "Third Force"), which has become its
guerrilla arm.* The Manyika had held most key
positions on the ZANU Central Committee until 1975
' The Karanga also provide about one-third of the blacks in the
civil service and most of the black forces in the army and in the
police. (Blacks outnumber whites by 2 to 1 in the army and 4 to 1 in
the police.) The loyalty of the black counterinsurgent forces has
been questioned. They may become increasingly reluctant to fight
other blacks for fear of reprisals under a majority government and
would probably be particularly hesitant to fight other Karanga in a
confrontation with ZIPA forces. Some have already defected to the
guerrillas.
ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION (ZAPU)
Founded in 1961 by Joshua Nkomo; banned in 1962.
Key Figure: Joshua Nkomo (Kalanga-Ndebele), president.
Tribal Composition: Total support of Zansi ("true") Ndebele; partial support from other
Ndebele; support of most Kalanga; scattered support from other
Shona tribes.
ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZANU)
Founded in 1963 as a more militant offshoot of ZAPU by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole;
banned in 1964.
Key Figures: Ndabaningi Sithole (Ndebele-Ndau), President; Robert Mugabe (Zezuru),
Secretary General; Josiah Tongora (Karanga), Defense Chief.
Tribal Composition: Karanga currently control the party; Zezuru and a few Ndebele
provide much of the rank-and-file; Manyika are not currently a
significant element.
The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA, also called the "Third Force")was initially formed as a
combined ZANU-ZAPU guerrilla army; it has since become the fighting arm of ZANU.
AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (ANC)
Formed in 1971 as a legal, non-insurgent, nationalist group. ZAPU and ZANU were brought
together under the ANC umbrella in 1974. The ANC split into two wings in 1975.
Key Figtares: Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Manyika) heads one wing; Joshua Nkomo heads the
other.
Tribal Composition: The Muzorewa wing has fragmented into Manyika and Zezuru
elements. The Karanga are not well represented. Leadership and
membership of the Nkomo wing is essentially the same as ZAPU.
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when clashes between Karanga and Manyika exiles in
Zambia left Manyika leader Herbert Chitepo and
more than 200 tribesmen dead and the Karanga in
control of the party. A number of Karanga leaders
were subsequently imprisoned in Zambia. ZANU
Secretary General Robert Mugabe, a Zezuru who gets
along well with the Karanga, has challenged Rever-
end Sithole for the leadership of the party; the real
ZANU power may rest with the Karanga leaders
recently released from prison in Zambia, principally
with Josiah Tongogara, Defense Chief and leader of
its most militant faction.
ZANU leaders have claimed that the 1975 clashes
were politically motivated and had nothing to do with
tribal differences. Others, including representatives of
ZAPU, believe that there is little chance for a
Karanga-Manyika reconciliation in ZANU. ZAPU
members also believe that, if Karanga kill other
Shonas within ZANU, there is little doubt that they
would be willing to kill Ndebeles in ZAPU. It is the
hope of Ndebele members of ZAPU that many
members of Shona tribes that have lost power to the
Karanga in ZANU-especially the Manyika-might
be willing to switch their allegiance to ZAPU.
Intertribal squabbles within ZAPU have been
neither as divisive nor as bloody as those within
ZANU. Tribal-based differences do, however, exist-
particularly between Ndebele officers and Shona
subordinates. Support for ZAPU among the Ndebele
reflects "caste" divisions: "true" Ndebele are strong
supporters while many members of the lower two
castes support ZANU.
Efforts to unify ZAPU and ZANU under a broad
nationalist umbrella have also succumbed to tribal
factionalism. The African National Council (ANC)
was formed in 1971 as a legal black nationalist
movement under the leadership of Bishop Abel
Muzorewa, a Manyika. ZAPU and ZANU were
brought together in a tenuous alliance under the ANC
in 1974 but the union was short-lived. Joshua
Nkomo's moderate wing and Bishop Muzorewa's
more militant wing emerged in mid-1975. Member-
ship of the Nkomo wing is essentially the same as
ZAPU. The Muzorewa wing is distinct from ZANU
but, like ZANtT, is divided into tribal factions. The
Manyika and the Zezuru are the main contestants for
power; relatively few Karanga support the ANC.
Demographic Factors
The population of Rhodesia in mid-1976 was,
according to official Rhodesian estimates, 6,528,500-
6,220,000 Africans (blacks), 277,000 Europeans
Populations of Principal Cities and Towns
Towns
(including suburbs)
Blacks
Whites
Asians Col
oreds
Total
Bindura
15,000
1,200
**
**
16,000
Bulawayo
270,000
59,700
2,700
7,800
340,000
Fort Victoria
16,000
2,900
200
300
19,000
Gatooma
30,000
2,700
200
300
33,000
Gwelo
53,000
9,400
400
900
64,000
Hartley
11,000
700
**
**
12,000
Marandellas
17,000
2,400
**
**
19,000
Que Que
44,000
4,100
300
300
49,000
Redcliff
14,000
2,000
**
'*
16,000
Salisbury
430,000
127,000
4,500
7,100
569,000
Shabani
15,000
1,900
**
100
17,000
Sinoia
18,000
2,000
200
**
20,000
Umtali
51,000
9,800
600
600
62,000
Wankie
25,000
2,800
**
100
28,000
Total
1,009,000
228,600
9,100 1
7,500 1,
264,000
* Estimates as of 31 December 1975.
** Fewer than 50 persons.
Source: Rhodesian Central Statistical Office
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A Diminishing White Minority
The blacks outnumber the whites by a ratio of 23 to
1 and the gap is widening. Despite government efforts
to boost the slow-growing white population, the
country has failed to sustain the large-scale white
immigration that prevailed for more than a decade
after World War II. Net immigration has waxed and
waned, depending on political and economic condi-
tions, over the past 20 years (Table 3). The
immigration surge in 1975 was caused by an exodus of
whites from newly independent Mozambique and
Angola into Rhodesia. The country registered a net
loss of more than 5,000 whites during the first ten
months of 1976 compared to a net gain of 1,930 in all
of 1975. The 1,520 departures in August (910 net) was
the largest monthly loss since 1966; the 480 immi-
grants in October were the fewest since 1965.
Faced with a heightened threat to their dominant
social, economic, and political positions and an
uncertain future under a majority government, the
whites will undoubtedly leave at a mounting rate.
(Kenya, a white settler colony that enjoyed a smooth
transition to majority rule, experienced a surge of
white departures during the years before and after
independence. About 8,000 whites, out of a total
population of 61,000, emigrated during the three-year
period prior to independence in December 1963. Four
thousand left in 1964, 7,000 in 1965). Many white
Rhodesians in both urban and rural areas are making
preparations to ease eventual emigration.
Social and economic constraints, however, will
discourage a massive exodus. More than 40 percent of
Rhodesia's whites were born there. Even most of the
immigrants hold Rhodesian citizenship and consider
* Neither the coloreds nor Asians will be a significant force in a
majority government. Most are Rhodesian-born and are citizens but
retain and value their cultural identities. Despite their roots in the
country, the Asians are frequently regarded as aliens by both blacks
and whites. Their situation may be difficult under a black
government.
White Immigration and Emigration, 1955-1975
Rhodesia to be their home. The whites are reluctant to
forsake their high standard of living and want
assurances of a commensurate living standard in their
new homes. Businessmen and farmers are especially
reluctant to abandon their economic stakes. Stringent
controls that limit the transfer of funds abroad
presently discourage a hasty departure.
Under normal circumstances, most whites would
choose to resettle in South Africa. Pretoria's annual
goal of 30,000 white immigrants has not been met in
most recent years, and South Africa would welcome a
well paced immigration from its northern neighbor.
Its terrain, climate, social customs, and standard of
living are similar and ties are strong. About 20 percent
of Rhodesian whites were born in South Africa, and
many retain South African citizenship. Nearly half of
the more than 70,000 whites who have left Rhodesia
in the past 10 years have emigrated there.
Rhodesian whites, however, will be increasingly
reluctant to resettle in South Africa, where a
worsening racial situation might force them to resettle
again. Many have already resettled in Rhodesia from
other African countries that have adopted majority
rule. Other likely targets for emigration-where
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language, customs, and living standards are similar-
include the United Kingdom, the United States,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Australia
appears to be a particularly attractive target, espe-
cially for farmers. Australian authorities are anxious to
settle underpopulated parts of the outback, and the
Prime Minister has indicated that his country will
welcome Rhodesian immigrants.
The annual white population growth rate averaged
less than 21/s percent from 1966 to 1976-1 percent
from natural increase, less than 11/s percent from
immigration. The natural rate has dropped dramati-
cally from an annual 2 percent in the 1950s. (Today's
1-percent rate is comparable to that in the United
States.) Although the economy has fared well in the
past decade despite the UN economic sanctions, the
slow population growth rate of the whites has
restricted economic development and thus limited the
market for semiskilled and unskilled black workers.
Rhodesian blacks have been better trained to step into
management positions than those in other Black
African countries that have gained independence
under majority rule, but increased white emigration
will nonetheless further retard economic growth and
increase the black unemployment rate.
A Growing Black Majority
The black population is growing at an annual rate
of 3.6 percent, almost entirely from natural increase.
Immigration of workers from neighboring countries is
not a significant factor. This rate, comparable to those
in several other African nations and among the
highest in the world, has prevailed for several decades.
Despite the introduction of a family planning
program, it is not likely to abate in the foreseeable
future. If it continues, the black population will
double every two decades. Black couples in Rhodesia
desire many children and see no advantage in limiting
family size. They charge that it is unfair for the
government to ask them to limit family size when it
has encouraged whites to immigrate to fill skilled
positions denied to black workers.
The Tribal Lands: Overcrowded and
Deteriorating
Despite a rural black-to-white majority of more
than 100 to 1, land reserved for whites is equal in area
(about 18 million hectares) to that reserved for blacks.
The inequity of the present division is one of the most
contentious issues between the two races. Nationalist
parties have announced that a reallocation of land
will have top priority in a majority administration, a
result assured in any event by population pressures in
the tribal areas. Of the more than 5 million blacks
who live in rural areas, four-fifths are in the Tribal
Trust Lands, where land is managed communally by
the village, and in the Native Purchase Areas, where
farmers may own individual plots. (See inset map
following text.) The rest live in the white areas, where
most work on the commercial farms or in the mines.
The few blacks who have been permitted to settle in
the white areas have no legal claim to the land.
Present land allocations have their roots in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. White farmers home-
steaded along the roads and railroads that linked Fort
Salisbury with South Africa. Blacks were forced into
peripheral areas, where reserves were established for
them without regard for the quality or location of the
land. By the time Rhodesia had attained colonial
status in 1923, about 81/s million hectares of land in
small parcels had been set aside for exclusive black
use. The 1931 Land Apportionment Act increased this
figure, and the 1969 Land Tenure Act divided the
lands as they are today.
The expansion of the tribal reserves has not been
commensurate with the growth of the black popula-
tion. Blacks charge that they have been shortchanged
in both quantity and quality of land. The government
responds that the reserves would normally be ade-
quate to handle the tribal population but that
explosive population growth and wasteful farming
techniques have combined to create the current
pressures.
Soils in the tribal lands are generally of poorer
quality than those in the white lands. The whites
argue that the tribal soils, mostly light and sandy, are
better suited to the cultivation of subsistence crops by
animal-drawn plows than the heavy soils in the white
areas, which are productive only with the use of
machinery.
The Rhodesian peasants formerly practiced shifting
cultivation, permitting large tracts to be fallowed for
several years. As population pressures grew, fallowing
had to be abandoned and sedentary cultivation
adopted. Perpetual. crop cultivation and cattle grazing
on sandy soils that are subjected to periodic droughts
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(yearly rainfall averages less than 28 inches) has
caused serious erosion in many areas. Unless improved
agricultural techniques-including the use of fertil-
izers, irrigation, good soil management, and mechani-
zation-are introduced or population pressures are
reduced by opening new lands to black farmers,
accelerated soil deterioration will make it impossible
for the tribal lands to support a growing population.
The introduction of improved farming methods
would require large capital inputs and would have to
overcome the conservatism of the peasant farmers.
Opening up white lands to black homesteaders offers
far more immediate promise for alleviating the
population pressures in tribal areas. The existing
compulsory division of land by race is certain to be
revised or abolished under a majority government,
and the movement of blacks into formerly denied land
will begin.
Rhodesia's economy is heavily dependent on
production from the white farms. (Tobacco, grains,
cotton, coffee, tea, soya beans, and sugar cane are the
chief crops.) A majority government, reluctant to
disrupt commercial production, will strive to control
black homesteaders. Because the white farmers prac-
tice crop rotation and fallow much of the land, their
farms appear to the peasants to be underused;
population pressures in the tribal lands could lead to
uncontrolled migrations to these "idle" areas. Such
migrations without compensation from the govern-
ment would speed the exodus of white farmers from
the country and could also create intertribal disputes
over newly acquired land.
The Urban Townships: Crowded and
Discontent
The flow of blacks to the towns and cities has
increased as rural population pressures have mounted.
Blacks outnumber whites in all urban areas-in
Salisbury by more than 3 to 1, in Bulawayo by 4.5 to
1, in Umtali by more than 5 to 1, and in Gwelo by 5.6
to 1 (Table 2). Ratios are higher in the smaller towns.
Censuses probably underestimate the black popula-
tion. Many migrants arrive in the city and return to
the homeland without registering on any census
estimate; some black men migrate to the cities several
times during their lifetime. At the same time, an
increasing number of black urban dwellers have
severed their strong tribal ties and have become
permanent residents.
Most urban blacks live in the townships that
encircle the cities; relatively few, most of them
domestic servants, are permitted to live in the urban
cores. Township residents must return home each
evening unless they have exemption permits. The
townships are governed by the municipalities but are
otherwise self-contained units with their own stores
and services. Housing varies from rows of pleasant
bungalows with well kept plots to sprawling blocks of
crowded shanties along narrow alleys.
The municipal housing authorities have not kept up
with the flood of migrants from the countryside, and
inadequate housing is the rule rather than the
exception. The overcrowded shantytowns have spilled
over onto non-township land. Salisbury officials
launched efforts in October 1976 to disperse more
than 18,000 illegal squatters from white-owned land
outside the city. According to government sources, the
squatters had been told by black nationalists that they
would be given the whites' homes with the advent of
majority rule.
The townships have been quiet since the mid-
1960s; urban tensions that have erupted in South
Africa have not yet afflicted Rhodesia. They nonethe-
less remain centers of discontent and potential unrest.
Even after a majority government lifts urban segrega-
tion barriers and diminishes other black grievances,
severe urban problems will persist.
The Labor Force: Rising Unemployment
A climbing black unemployment rate, already a
problem, is likely to worsen under a majority regime.
The growth of the black labor force is outstripping the
rate at which new jobs are created. From 1967 to 1974
new jobs for blacks were created at a rate of about
40,000 yearly; demographers estimate that 45,000 to
50,000 black males are entering the job market each
year. A majority government will open up jobs
previously denied to blacks, but this imbalance is
almost certain to continue.
Rhodesian blacks have long preferred to migrate to
the cities, even though housing and jobs are scarce,
than to work for low wages on the plantations or in
the mines. Alien workers from Malawi, Mozambique,
or Zambia, more willing to accept the meager pay,
were formerly recruited to fill most farm and mine
7
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/29 :CIA-RDP81600401 8002100080008-6
jobs. In recent years, Rhodesians have become less
reluctant to take these jobs as urban unemployment
has grown. Annual immigration and emigration of
alien workers has dropped from more than 100,000 in
the 1950s to only a few thousand today. About
214,000 aliens still remain in the black labor force, 23
percent of the total. Their numbers will continue to
diminish under majority rule.
Outlook
Rivalries in the black nationalist movement, largely
tribal-based, may grow stronger before the deadline
for independence under majority rule is reached in
March 1978. Tribal differences, although probably
magnified by Rhodesian whites, are certain to be a
critical factor in the stability of a majority govern-
ment.
Although population pressures in Rhodesia are not
as great as those in many African countries, they
probably will be sufficient to spur migration from the
tribal lands into the commercial farming areas
currently reserved for whites. A new government is
likely to be cautious in the reallocation of the white
farmlands in order to ensure continued output from
the white-run plantations. Some uncontrolled migra-
tion can be expected, however, and it will hasten the
departure of white farmers and reduce agricultural
production.
Migration to the cities-a worldwide phenomena-
will continue under a majority government and urban
problems will mount. Such problems are containable,
however, and are not likely to pose an immediate
threat to the new government.
8
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/29 :CIA-RDP81 B00401.R002100080008-6
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