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ANALYSIS OF SENATOR EUGENE MCCARTHY'S ARTICLE IN THE 4 JANUARY 1964 ISSUE OF THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 31, 2003
Sequence Number: 
53
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 27, 1964
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8.pdf [3]175.68 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2004/01/16: CIA-RDP75-0014'x' MEMORANDUM 27 February 1964 SUBJECT: Analysis of Senator Eugene McCarthy's Article in the 4 January 1964 Issue of the SATURDAY EVENING POST 1. Senator McCarthy devotes his article to charging that the CIA "makes foreign policy." According to McCarthy, the only way to keep CIA within its "proper limits" is to establish a congressional watchdog committee. 2. His basic contention is that the CIA prepares and implements dangerous foreign policies without authorization, often in conflict with the State Department. He claims that the CIA has usurped the policy-making role of the President and Congress by overthrowing foreign governments, violating inter- national law, and wrecking the 1960 Summit Conference. McCarthy complains that Congress never gave CIA authority to depart from its role as an "information center," or authority to assume the roles of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Congress. He cites six specific instances of CIA usurpation (treated separately in the Appendix). 3. McCarthy's solution to the problems he outlines is to make the CIA accountable "not only to the President but also to Congress." The President, with the help of the Cabinet and the NSC, controls and directs the CIA "in theory" only. The President cannot keep fully informed on CIA's activities and CIA is thus not "fully" under Presidential control. McCarthy does not examine the relationship of, CIA to the President, the Cabinet, or the NSC or any other part of the executive branch, including the Clifford Committee. 4. While much of McCarthy's argument hinges on the implication that CIA is independent and unsupervised and untrustworthy, he states that the issue is not one of executive control or efficient administration but of "congressional responsibility." Congress, he asserts, has a right and a duty to participate in decisions regarding CIA's activities. Both the judgment and will of Congress should be reflected in the major decisions and activities of CIA. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 5. Present Congressional supervision is inadequate, he concludes, and CIA is unique among agencies and departments in that it decides how much or how little Congress will be told. A joint committee would provide the necessary safeguards against abuses of power by CIA, give Congress the information it needs to to evaluate intelligence activities, and insure that Congress shares in the making of vital decisions. It would also end conflicts between CIA and "other U. S. operations abroad,"-'and prevent inaccurate congressional state- ments on U.S. activities. 6. It should be noted that McCarthy attacks only the CIA, not the executive branch of government or the President. In his analysis, the CIA acts without Presidential control, arbitrarily and in contravention of established U.S. policy. Congressional supervision4 is a right, as well as a necessity, although most of the argument n terms of CIA as an "invisible /11 government, answering only to itself." 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 Specific Allegations of CIA Misconduct 1. McCarthy cites a total of six situations in which he claims CIA effectively made foreign policy, usurping the functions of the Department of State or Congress. Each of these is treated separately below. 2. Vietnam: McCarthy states that the CIA was funding the Vietnamese "special corps" used against the Buddhists although the US Government publicly deplored the raids. This activity raises "questions as to how CIA actions may critically affect U.S. foreign affairs." McCarthy leaves the implication that CIA was supporting a persecution of a religious group. 3. Laos: Citing former Ambassador Horace Smith, McCarthy claims that the CIA, with Pentagon backing, supported Phoumi Nosavan in conflict with "official and public policies of the State Department." The net result was that Laos nearly went communist, millions of dollars in aid was wasted, and much diplomatic maneuvering was required to restore stability under Souvanna Phouma. While admitting that Laos was "highly volatile" and the situation "hardly ideal", McCarthy charges that CIA was pursuing its own brand of foreign policy. 4. Iran: McCarthy is uncertain whether to give credit for the coup to CIA. CIA reportedly is responsible, although many authorities dispute this-- in any event the Agency's cloak of secrecy prevents its "claims" from being challenged. He then questions who, if anyone, authorized CIA to overthrow Mossadegh. 5. Guatemala: Although this coup, which the CIA, he says, "claims" to have masterminded, benefited the US, McCarthy questions whether the CIA is the "proper tool" t o overthrow foreign governments. He does not elaborate. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8 6. U-2 Shootdown in 1960: The development of the U-2 was "possibly the mightiest achievement of the CIA" and provided an enormous amount of information, according to McCarthy. He questions the CIA's "usage" of the U-2, however, and criticizes the CIA for not having a consistent "cover story" prepared. The flight on the eve of the summit conference jeopardized the foreign policy of the US and trespassed on the foreign policy perogatives of the President, State, and Congress. CIA "in effect made foreign policy" while Congress stood helplessly by because they were uninformed. 7. Bay of Pigs: CIA overstepped its "legitimate role" by encroaching on Congressional rights and responsibilities. Errors of planning are not as important as the fact that the CIA undertook to raise any army without both presidential and congressional approval and undertook an invasion which might be construed as an act of war. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8

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Links
[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8.pdf