ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (AS OF 30 JUNE 1957)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 3, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Final
3 September 1957
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(as of 30 June 1957)
Submitted by
Intelligence Advisory Committee
September 1957
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Summary . . . . 06.0.0.00000.0000 . . . 0
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . i
Evaluation and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
A. Soviet Bloc . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 0 . 0 . ii
B. Non-Bloc Areas 0. 0 000000.00060 iv
Collection o 0. 0... 6. 0 0 0.. . o. 0 0 0 0 o v
Report .
A. Warning of Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities . . . . . .
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC . . . . . . .
3. USAF Indications System. . . . . . . . . . . .
5. "Crisis Situation" Review by IAC . . . . . .
6. Taiwan Strait Coverage . . . . . . . . . . .
7. The Arab-Israeli Situation . . . . . . . . . .
B. Evaluation and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. National Intelligence Estimates . . . . . . . .
2. National Intelligence Surveys . . . . . . . . .
3. Military Intelligence . . . . . o . . . .
4. Political Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Economic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence
. . . . .
7. Geographic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . .
C. Collection . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . ? . . . . . .
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives . . .
2. The Foreign Service . . . . . . . ? . 0 . . . .
3. The Service Attache System . . , . , ? , . . .
4. Overseas Commands. . . . . . . . . . .
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CONTENTS, continued
5 0
6. Exchange Visits with the Soviet Bloc . . .
7. The Foreign Language Publications Program.
8. Geographic Intelligence Collection . . . o . .
9. International Communism . . . . o . . . o . .
10. Programs in Electronics . o o . o . o . o . .
11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts. . o
12. Foreign Materials and Equipment . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0.. o 0 0. o. o
14. Coordination of Information Processing . . .
15. Domestic Collection under NSCID No. 7 . . .
16. Clandestine Collection Programs . . . . o . .
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28
28
29
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Coordination . . . . 0 0 0 0 . o 0 0 . . o o . 33
1. Review of National Security Council
IntelligenceDirecti_ves4 Q . . . o . . . . . . 33
NSCIDBS Relevant to Activities Covered by
Annual Report . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . 0 o 0 . .
List of National Security Council Intelligence
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Final
3 September 1957
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
SUMMARY
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack
The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the
launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are
increasing. This is true particularly because the USSR's growing
strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles,
submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year
to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.
At present, as a rough estimate, a force up t
aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing
indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack.
Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications
would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no
basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indi-
cations would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the
number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great
the chances of -their producing warning indications would be consider-
ably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably
permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some
b
f
I
e
ore attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.
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Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces
stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week, de-
If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the
USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could
probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during
the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at
which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be
possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.
Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily
on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had
miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance
that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.
Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for
launching, advance warning of their use would be unlikely.
With respect to the warning problem, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information
to determine how fully and promptly present and potential collection
methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information
essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.
Evaluation and Estimates
A. Soviet Bloc
With respect to developments in the Soviet Bloc, the struggle
for dominance within the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death
resulted in an increasing exposure to intelligence of the inner
workings of the regime and of the issues which divide the leadership.
The public justifications made by the victorious factions in the suc
cessive crises since 1953 have enabled intelligence to check its
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information and thus to formulate its views on a sounder footing of
evidence. This does not mean that we are in a very much better
position to predict particular developments in the USSR, such as
the rise or fall of individual personalities, but it does mean that we
can delimit more confidently the range of possible developments on
the Soviet internal scene. Similarly, the relatively greater openness
of discussion in the USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet
personalities at all levels have given us a better insight into the
motivations and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. However, these gains
are more significant for short-term estimates than for long-term ones.
The Soviet leadership, for example, seems likely to be presented with
difficult choices of policy. Already it must reconsider its economic
policies at a time when military costs and the claims of consumption
are pressing ever harder on the traditional priority given to invest-
ment to sustain a high rate of economic growth. It must reconsider
the shape of its military programs during a period of revolutionary
change in weapons. Relations with the restive Satellites and Com-
munist China have evidently called for redefinition. There is
evidence that the regime has increasing difficulty in retaining the
loyalty of students and intellectuals and needs to provide more
nourishing ideological fare. Such fundamental problems affecting
future developments in the USSR are extremely complex, slow-
moving in their resolution, and do not lend themselves readily to
reliable estimating on the basis of the kinds of evidence ordinarily
available to intelligence.
In the field of military intelligence, valuable additional informa-
tion was obtained on the Soviet military establishment, including data
on those elements posing the most direct threat to U. S. security in-
terests. Military intelligence information on the Sino.Soviet Bloc is
adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of
the armed forces of those countries and to discern general trends in
their development. This information, however, remains inadequate
in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S. military
plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the
rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties
in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet
military capabilities. Extensive travel by U. S. Service attaches, as
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well as thorough exploitation of open source materials and defectors
from the Bloc, have resulted in gains in certain categories of military
information despite Bloc security measures. A continued expansion of
clandestine activities is being undertaken to intensify the collection of
military intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased attention is
also being given to the development of scientific and technical equip-
ment and methods for overcoming security measures in target areas.
Gains in economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc have re-
sulted from a growing return on our effort in research and analysis
over several years and from a continuing increase in published data
within the Bloc, particularly the USSR. Serious deficiencies remains
however, particularly as related to the extent, cost, and economic
burden of Bloc military programs. To reduce this deficiency indirect
research techniques have been developed.
There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence
on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, both through research and through information
gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. During the past
year, significant information has been obtained on Soviet nuclear
weapons testing, but there is inadequate information on Soviet pro-
duction of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Although there
has been a continued improvement in the quality of our guided missile
intelligence information, it is still inadequate to meet our minimum
intelligence requirements. Highest priority continues to be given to
this problem, with special emphasis being placed on technical col-
lection methods.
The periodic preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and
Special National Intelligence Estimates on Non-Bloc areas, con-
stituting a substantial proportion of all estimates published during the
period, has been directed towards providing a meaningful measure of
probable political, economic, and military developments bearing upon
U. S. security interests. As a result of its continuing program of
current intelligence research and analysis of political, economic, and
military affairs throughout the world the IAC has also been able to
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provide advance intelligence support to policy-makers at all levels
of the government regarding significant .trends and events. Support
in depth of both policy-making and policy-executing arms of the
government has continued through the production of basic intelligence
studies including the NIS series.
Collection
The list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again
revised and continued to emphasize SinomSoviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. There was intensive exploitation of new
collection opportunities including increased travel in some areas, more
open discussions in the USSR and Satellites, greater availability of
certain types of Soviet Bloc publications, access to Hungarian refugees
and the general stimulation to collection activities arising from the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises Intelligence gains also
resulted from better technical collection techniques and from a general
improvement of collection capabilities, both overt and clandestine.
Despite these gains, deficiencies continue`to exist in many
fields, particularly with respect to our collection activities directed
against the SinomSoviet Bloc. Increased opportunities for travel in
presently restricted areas, freer access to Bloc personalities or
publications and a general improvement in existing collection and
processing facilities show promise of reducing political and economic
intelligence deficiencies. Further development of our technical col-
lection techniques and expanded clandestine efforts will be necessary
to reduce significantly critical deficiencies in the military and scientific
and technical fields. In any event, factors such as security re=
strictions and rapidly advancing technology will continue to limit our
ability to achieve a significant reduction in our most critical intelli-
gence deficiencies by an early date.
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regular exchange of views, at the highest level in the intelligence
community, on matters of both immediate and long-range intelligence
interest. The new procedure has also assisted in scheduling esti-
mates, and has provided a mechanism for inspiring suggestions and
crystallizing the community viewpoint with respect to matters on which
the Director of Intelligence may brief the National Security Council,
. 6, Taiwan Strait Coverage
The Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait
Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response to the
President's desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of this area,
continues to meet regularly, at least once a month. Since early
December 1956 its reports have been prepared on a monthly basis,
except during June 1957 when two reports were issued because of
unusual military activity in the area, The Group also prepared a
special assessment of intelligence related to Chinese Nationalist
intentions in February 1957,
7, The Arab-Israeli Situation
The Ad Hoc IAC Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation,
which was set up in March 1956, assisted in meeting the increased
intelligence requirements arising from the Middle Eastern crisis,
The Group, whose work supplemented that of the Watch Committee
and the individual IAC agencies, issued four complete revisions of
its basic report during the past year,
B. Evaluation and Estimates
1, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)
a, Production of NIE's continued to be guided largely by the
needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 57 NIE's published
during the last year, 35 were related to specific NSC papers or
policy actions,
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2. National Intelligence Surveys (N1S)
a. During the year NIS production essentially fulfilled the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annual production requirement, and brought the
total of the NIS production thus far to over 3, 700 sections. This re-
presents more than 65 percent of the total world coverage, and on the
JCS high priority areas coverage is now over 90 percent complete.
Nearly one-third of the production effort during the year was directed
towards maintenance revision of published NIS sections.
b. A major accomplishment this year has been the comprehensive
revision of the NIS Standard Instructions, and the development of the
NIS Reference Guide to provide for a better understanding and more
effective use of the NIS among the growing body of NIS recipients.
Other noteworthy activities during the year included the production
of the NIS on the Arctic two years ahead of schedule, the attainment
of world-wide NIS Gazetteer coverage on all foreign areas, and the
development by the Defense agencies of formal NIS Control and
Coordination Directives.
c. 'In summary, this has been a year of solid accomplishment,
characterized by excellent interagency support and coordination, and
reflecting a gradual improvement in collection guidance and acquisition,
better administrative controls, and more efficient interagency pro-
cedures.
d. If present production capabilities are maintained the NIS
program will meet the JCS annual requirement for the next three
years. This would result in 85 percent to 90 percent coverage of
world areas by 30 June 1960, and the revision of one-third of all
published NIS under the maintenance program.
3. Military Intelligence
a, Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc
is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities
of the Armed Forces of those countries and to discern general trends
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b, Political intelligence on the USSR and the Satellites has
continued to show some improvement, principally due to factors
such as revelations incident to factional struggles in the USSR, the
appearance of opposition forces in the Satellites and the greater
freedom of diplomatic and other forms of contact which have developed
in the post-Stalin period. With respect to Communist China, political
intelligence remains a major problem and is still highly inadequate for
an assessment of Communist China?s motives and possible future
actions.
c. Political intelligence during the past year was characterized
particularly by the unusual demands on resources generated by the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. More active Soviet
participation in affairs of the Middle East and the expanding Soviet
"economic offensive" have created continuing burdens. Despite these
growing responsibilities, high-level governmental requests and es-
sential requirements of the intelligence community for political
intelligence have generally been met.
5. Economic Intelligence
a. Economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved
as a result of exploitation of the greater volume of economic data
published by a number of Bloc countries during the year. This has
permitted the filling of important gaps in intelligence, and has pro-
vided a firmer basis for estimates of future economic activity. For
example, one important result'has been a downward revision in
estimates of the Soviet population and labor force available to carry
out ambitious economic plans.
b. Serious deficiencies still remain, however, in the avail-
ability of information on some Bloc economic activities, particularly
those related to military production and programs. This latter de-
ficiency has led to the development of indirect research techniques
for estimating the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military
programs. The economic estimates so obtained, while subject to a
substantial margin of error, do provide an independent check on
military estimates derived by conventional means. These economic
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estimates were helpful in arriving at estimates of the size and com-
position of the guided missile, air defense and heavy bomber weapons
systems. Similar techniques are being applied to the economic analysis
of the Soviet nuclear energy program.
c. An increasing volume of reports has been published on
current economic developments in the Bloc, including special evalua-
tions of developments in Poland and Hungary, and appraisals of the
reorganization of the Soviet economy and its effect on economic capa-
bilities. Economic intelligence has also provided support to the
London disarmament negotiations, the Paris negotiations relating to
controls on trade with Communist China, the Washington talks on
US-Polish trade and assistance, and consideration of US-Bloc exchange
visits.
d. Interagency coordination of economic research through the
Economic Intelligence Committee of the IAC has continued. Coor-
dinated reports have been issued on Communist China?s trade and
transport, Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped
areas, and other subjects. The current status of economic intelligence
has been reviewed as a guide for programming by the individual agencies.
The EIC prepared a revised statement of "Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives"' for guidance in economic intelligence col-
lection and production. CIA has arranged to provide annual production
data for certain Soviet industries in support of Air Force targeting
studies, thereby obtaining more efficient utilization of community
resources in this field of research,
e. With respect to economic intelligence on Free World areas,
important shifts in emphasis have occurred. The prolonged crisis in
the Middle East, for example, resulted in greatly increased demands
on intelligence agencies for research on the economic affairs of that
area. As a result of the closing of Suez and the threat to pipelines,
additional research was directed to world-wide petroleum problems.
Special attention has been given to the economic problems of
countries susceptible to Sino=Soviet Bloc economic penetration and
to the inter-relations between economic development and political
factors in these countries.
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will review, at a working level, significant electronics intelligence
developments occurring since the last conference in April 1956.
7. Geographic Intelligence
a. A new interagency program has been initiated in support of
unconventional warfare planning. Geographic intelligence is con-
tributing to this program by the selection and analysis of areas within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc that fulfill multi-purpose unconventional warfare
requirements,
b. As a consequence of Soviet activities in Antarctica, conducted
in association with the International Geophysical Year Program, at-
tention has been directed to the appraisal of advantages that might be
gained by the USSR from its Antarctic operations, particularly with
respect to its possible territorial aspirations and bipolar geodetic
research as an aid to its long-range guided missile program.
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives
In accordance with NSCID No. 4 the list of Priority National
Intelligence Objectives was again revised (DCID 4/6). First Priority
Objectives continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. These priority objectives provide the
basic guidance for reappraising collection requirements and planning
intelligence production throughout the intelligence community. They
have also furnished a stimulus and framework for the development
of more refined priority objectives in the economic and scientific
and technical fields, as well as in the sphere of international communism.
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9. International Communism
The Committee on International Communism, established by the
IAC in January 1956, completed its examination of intelligence pro-
duction and collection in the field of international communism. It
concluded that while both fall far short of the ideal, both are reasonably
close to attainable limits at the present time. The Committee has for-
mulated a system of priorities designed to facilitate collection of
needed intelligence information. It has also agreed upon a new pro-
cedure for the development of coordinated clandestine collection re-
quirements to help fill existing gaps in intelligence on international
communism.
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