CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
4 April 1952
OCI No.
Copy Copy No.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage all
Comments represent the
or in the Office of Current
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. VATER
UUN51
SECRET
State Dept. review completed SECURITY INFORMATION
IN BOX
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SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS9 TITLE 189 USC9 SECS. 793 AND 7949 THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
Communist propaganda position on the eve of the World
Economic on erensce o r e am a ron an r. ange 9 the two
c e organizers o the World Economic Conference9 during
interviews in the Soviet capital on the eve of the conference9
made the first definite suggestions for trade possibilities
in specific commodities between the Orbit and the West --
between Communist China and France and Great Britain. These
remarks are in line with alleged Soviet interest in increased
East-West trade.
On the other handy the US Embassy in Moscow believes
that the real motivation behind the conference is revealed
in the following statement in the newspaper Trudo "The
foremost condition for the development of European trade
must be the cessation of economic discrimination against the
USSR and Eastern Europe which is being carried out by the
ruling circles of the US," Furthermore9 it is "well known
that" the US ban on export of strategic materials "is being
extended in fact to all types of goods and services
completely severing trade between the West and East."-
(C Moscow 15539 28 Mar; R Moscow 15569 28 Mar; Moscow 15839
2 Apr 52
2. Plan for expansion of Soviet trade agency activities in
India n?ep~ar e ?v a pans or a organ ~a on o .vie
cliann rode on a wider scale were reportedly discussed
durin the recent Inter ~na,tiona Industries Fair at Bombay.
25X1 branches of
the Soviet trade agency in a,lcut ta will e established in
Bombay9 Madras9 and Cawnpore. These will contact local
firms and grant them sole importing and distributing rights
for Soviet goods 9 including machinery and consumer products,
The USSR plans to sell goods at cheaper rates than Items US9 British and German manufacture. 25X1A
20 Mar 52)
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Comment: The reorganization of Vostokintorg in the
fall m 51 , the Soviet propaganda effort of recent months
to encourage Asian interest in trade with the USSR, and the
International Economic Conference in Moscow have pointed
up an emerging trend in Soviet policy towards the establish-
ment of enlarged trade channels in various susceptible areas.
This information provides additional evidence of
Moscow's desire to promote Asian trade relations, and may
actually lead to increased trade in low-priced commodities
despite the improbability of obtaining strategic goods in
return.
Such a program would not only supplement the active
Soviet cultural efforts to woo India, but would also serve
to counterbalance American economic aid and trade ties.
The USSR has at times been able to undercut Western prices
by selling inferior products, and such an effort could be
made in India with drugs, chemicals and small machinery.
25X1 3J
25X1
Comment: The uniformed militia are believed to number
some M_, WT, but the full strength of the Bulgarian People's
Militia is not known. Since ordinary civil police and
special security forces are probabl included in the larger
totals given in a security force strength
of 100,000 would not appear to e i mprobable o
Although an undetermined number of Yugoslavs and Greeks
are in the service of Bulgaria, there is no evidence to
indicate that they have been integrated into Bulgarian
Militia units.
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4. Bulgaria reported planning new economic and political
25X1 measures 11-remier
1ierveai ov recently visited Moscow in connection with a new
program for the "moral reinforcement" of the people and
party of Bulgaria. Allegedly, the new program calls for a
campaign to stress the importance of the party congress to be
held in May for the postponement of plans for a Bulgarian
currency reform, for an abatement of the propaganda campaigns
against Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, for stimulation of
economic cooperation with the West, and for a "renaissance
of Bulgarian national feeling." (S Athens 4327, 1 Apr 52)
Comment: Although it is probable that Chervenkov
visits .scow late in February, the balance of this report
25X1 has not been confirmed I and should be treated
with considerable reserve.
The last congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party was
held in December 1948. According to party statute, a
congress should be held every two years. There is no other
evidence that a congress might be held in May.
The Rumanian currency change in January caused rumors
concerning an impending Bulgarian reform. It is likely that
such a reform9 if planned, has been postponed.
There is no evidence that Bulgaria intends to alter
its hostile policy toward Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and
it is highly doubtful that Sofia will "act to stimulate
economic cooperation with the West."
During the past year Bulgaria has undergone a rigorous
program of consolidation and integration into the Soviet
sphere Q and national feeling has been deliberately played
down. It can be assumed that any "renaissance of Bulgarian
nationalism" must necessarily take place within this
established Satellite framework,
5. Czechoslovak Deputy Ministers of National Security re-
ommun I
placed: u e ra.vo 9 o c al orgaaa o t o Czech
PartyreceIIfed Jindrich Kostal and Jorman as Deputy
Ministers of National Security, replacing Stanislav Baudys
and Antonin Binae (Ft FBIS Parise 2 Apr 52)
Comment., This confirms information that Baudys,
formerly Chief of the Czech Secret Security Police, has been
removed from his post. He was earlier reported to have been
arrested in January.
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Antonin Bina, previously reported to be personal
representative of Minister of Information Vaclav Kopecky,
was discharged early in December 19510
64 Hungarian groups swamp US Legation with BW protests:
The U ega ion in u apes recen y as received an over-
whelming number of telephone calls, telegrams and petitions
protesting the alleged germ warfare in Korea. A wide range
of groups including district councils, several factories,
peace committees and government offices have participated.
The protests generally follow the current propaganda line
against the alleged violations of the international rules
of warfare by American troops. ( S Budapest 748, 29 Mar 52;
752, 31 Mar 52)
Comment: Heretofore the campaign has been confined
to the press, radio and mass meetings.
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25X1
from Mao Tse-tung to Liu ao-c i as been
it
t
y
or
o au
25X1 completed." Mao's actions as nominal
head of the government are subject to Liu'' and that Mao veto cannot stage a coup to regain his power. 25X1A
Comment: There has never been evidence to support per-
sistent rumors that Mao and Liu head opposing factions in
the Chinese Communist party and governments While reliable
information on the private views of CCP leaders is lacking,
the public pronouncements of Mao and Liu have been complemen-
tary. Official Chinese Communist releases strongly suggest
that Mao dominates the CCP and that Liu is his trusted
subordinate,
7. Transfer of authority from Mao Tse-tung to Liu Shao-ch'i
8. Chinese Communists reportedly invite Soviet advisers to
Tibet: a inese ommunasts ave invite ov a tec nicians
tbet to set up industrial projects, supervise road-building
and exploit Tibetan mineral resources, according to the Indian
press. (U New Delhi 3579, 2 Apr.52)
Comment: This is the first specific report that Soviet
techncl i.a Behave been asked to enter Tibeto Although it is
unconfirmed, the Peiping regime could be expected to lean on
Soviet technical assistance in Tibet as in the rest of
"liberated" China
Recurrent reports in recent months relate the Chinese
Communist effort to accelerate modernization of Tibet. The
Communists must ensure their line of supplies and must improve
transportation and communication facilities to effect the
political and military integration of Tibet into China proper,
High French official questions wisdom of Letourneau's
appointment In n oc nnio T e- Director o tics A a rs
, ~_rr
rn ranee -Mnl~st-y---o-f-Associated States has expressed some
personal doubts as to the wisdom of having Minister of the
Associated States Letourneau act also as Minister Resident in
Indochina. The Director fears that since the Minister will
spend much of his time in Saigon, the Ministry of Associated
States will lose importance. Furthermore, France's Indochina
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policy, which is formulated in Paris, will be affected by
Letourneau's absence.
Whenever Letourneau is absent from Paris, his position
there will probably be filled by a secretary of state without
full responsibility. (C Paris 6029, 1 Apr 52)
Comment- Letourneau has been one of the strongest French
supporters of his country's position in Indochina. This selec-
tion of a cabinet member to be Minister Resident in Saigon is
an indication that the French Government is determined to end
the rumors that it was contemplating a withdrawal,
10. Burmese attempt to capture Chinese Nationalist airfield
reports - 25X1
t ax t_tt'F army has asked the Union o Burma Airways to transport
1400 troops from Rangoon to the town of Kengtung in north-
eastern Burma over a ten-day period beginning 27 March.
An American official was privately informed that the ob-
jective of this operation is the capture of the Chinese Nation-
alist airfield at Mong Hsat, 60 miles southwest of Kengtungo
25X1A
Comment- Previous Burmese military operations against
the Ciin'~esemNationalists have been unsuccessful,
Latest reports indicate that the Nationalists around Mong
Hsat are well-equipped and far outnumber the Burmese force
being flown to Kengtung.,
Karens in southeastern Burma planning attack on Moulmein:
Karen orces n sout easternurma are reported to 15e _p anning
a 13 April attack on Moulmein, Burma's third largest port.
These troops, numbering about 9,000 well-equipped men, recently
received two air-drops of arms. They believe that their arms,
which have been obtained in Thailand in exchange for tungsten
ore, originated from American sources and their morale is
high. ( ) 25X1A
Comment- Information from other sources indicates that
this report exaggerates the size of Karen armed forces in
southeastern Burma. There is no evidence of air-drops in the
area, and although the trading of tungsten ore for arms by the
Karens has been reported on a number of occasions, the source
of these arms has never been determined,
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The Karens have been more aggressive in southeastern
Burma recently, but there is no reliable evidence that they
are prepared to attack the comparatively large garrison at
Moulmein.
12. Comment on new Indonesian Cabinet: Although led by an
unimpressive prime im nis erg lie new Indonesian cabinet appears
to be slightly stronger than the former government, With the
exception of two ministries -- Foreign Affairs and Economic
Affairs -_ the various portfolios are held by fairly able and
experienced men. This is particularly true of the Defense
Minister (the Sultan of Jogjakarta) and the Minister of Home
Affairs (Mohammed Ruin), the latter a leader of the Masjumi
liberal wing. The appointment of the Sultan, one of the most
capable and popular men in Indonesia, promises improved treat-
ment of the country's outstanding problem -- the lack of
internal security. Mohammed Rum should be able to provide the
Sultan with necessary cooperation from the Home Affairs
Ministry,
The cabinet's foundation on a coalition of Indonesia's
two largest parties, together with inclusion of representatives
of the small but influential Socialist Party, appears to pro-
vide it with the necessary parliamentary support to work
effectively toward accomplishment. of its program, particularly
in regard to attempts to solve the country's widespread inse-
curity. Unfortunately, however, Indonesian governments are
frequently threatened as much from internal dissension as from
public and parliamentary opposition. The former cabinet fell
largely as a result of internal political rivalry; it is
almost inevitable that similar rivalries will appear in the
present government. (Factual data based on R Djakarta 1447
and 1451, 2 and 3 Apr 52)
13. Spain's Moroccan policy outlined.- Current Spanish policy
legal status for the Moroccan nationalist Islah Party and close
relations with its local leader, Torres; amnesty for nationalist
exiles from the Spanish Zone, despite any connections they may
have with the Rif leader, Abd-el-Krim; improved economic con-
ditions; provisions for increasing native participation in the
Khalifian government; and opposition to France's Moroccan
policy. To attain these objectives, special security measures
in Spanish Morocco is reported o ave the following objectives:
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will be taken and efforts made to obtain the active support
of "well-disposed" Moroccans, especially the upper class.
Torres is reportedly receiving personal favors and finan-
cial aid from the Spanish Government, which hopes to use him
in lannin and promoting an Arab-Spanish bloc. 25X1
Comment: Spain expects its current conciliatory policy
towar t e oroccan nationalists to enhance its prestige and
influence throughout the Arab world, and indirectly to
strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis France, Britain,
and the United States. The reported plan for increased
security precautions indicates that Spain intends to control
the course of developments in its zone.
The formation of political parties was authorized by a
Spanish decree on 12 March. Moroccan nationalists, however,
feel that, because of the many restrictions included, any
real political activity will be dependent on the good will
of the Spanish High Commissioner. Moreover, Islah leaders
are alarmed over reports that a rival nationalist party will
be sponsored by the Spaniards.
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WESTERN EUROPE
14. East Germans assert Oder?Neisse line is permanent: The
I4ationat Council of the East German National ront and the
German-Polish Friendship Society stated recently that it is a
national task to defend the Oder?Neisse frontiers They asserted
that the fixing of the Oder'Neisse frontier was annimportanhoever
step toward developing German-Polish friendships
encroaches upon the "frontier of peace" wants war. (R FBIS
Berlin, 29 Mar 52)
Comment- While this line is not new, it indicates that the
Soviet Unioii wants to reassure the Poles that the present boundary
is permanent, and suggests that the Soviet Union is not now
planning to compromise on this important German and Polish
question as a "last trump" appeal to German sentiment,
15o East Germans prepare white book against Bonn government: Early ix- Marc. the East German government was reportedly planning
to withhold issuance of a new white book entitled "Bonn Public
Administration Prepares for War," The book aisonowhsaidttonhhave
been given to Vincenz Mueller, Deputy Nal
Democratic Party, for review, (S Frankfurt Sitreps 9 and 11, B-2,
18 Mar and 2 Apr 52)
16. Soviet-supported demonstrations disclose weaknesses in
Austrian aecurity- The ustr an Government as informed Western
o xcia` s -t t3 the invasion of the Greek Legation in Vienna on
31 March by 2,000 Austrian Communists was a carefully p
action which was fully supported by the Soviet occupation
authorities. Central police orders were circumvented by a local
police official retained in office by the Russians despite his
previous dismissal by the Ministry of Interior. Soviet officials
police
authorized the
telephonesents
who could have
to the Soviet
during the demonstration,
Western officials are disturbed by the Austrian Government?s
failure to maintain adequate liaison with the Western elements
during the episode and have warned the Austrians that there
must be closer cooperation if the Ministry of Interior is to
retain control over police in the Soviet occupation zones.
ive
These officials hope that this recent example of effective
""hand-in-glove"" Soviet-Communist collaboration -m p
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anticipated diplomatic inquiries over the violation of extra-
territorial rights ? will
necessity for more effective use of police A( Factual
data from, U Vienna 3150, 1 Apr 52; R S Vienna 31699
Dutch Communist Party plans cover for members in government
t
service o As a result~c~~~t~~- Dut~F__G?vernment ? s ban -againshave
mmunist employees in the civil services Communist groups n of taken precautions to digU1ThetUnionfofiDutech GovertheirnmentmembPersonnelers
in government employment,
a section of the Communist-controlled labor federation, has
instructed its members to join the Socialist Party if their Com?
overnment officials,
t
o g
munist affiliations are known
The Dutch Communist Party has reportedly sent each of its
that
a government
members who is also
thempa~tyesarosterr"atahisg
his name has been removed
request" -a thus providing "proof" that he has severed all connection with the party. Meanwhile the party has organized
stine but irpet tact between it
e
a committee to plan clan
bers
,
25X1 and its ,vernment-em to ed mem
Comment- Last Decembe~lzation~heforndCivilvservantsetoended
its l .t of "'forbidden orgy
include the Communist Party, the Communist-controlled labor
federation, and other Communist-front organizations. eens
no indication, however, that the government tplans to too implement
this measure, which was fully supported by
political parties,
Communist strength in the Dutch Government is confinedam
almost entirely to the lower echelons in Rotterdam,
and Zaandamo
18? American Embassy warns against demanding rigid List II
export limits froammbwedeno The, ericannAmbassador in tockholm
reports thaq t eden w?-ur "undoubtedly"'
establish definite List II quotfrnaaxportsatowthe Sovietel" "ing
Orbit, but he feels that an approach An inflexible quota system
would achieve much the same thing,
would decrease the ability of the Swedes, t1 rive2)ard bargains
with Orbit countries, (S Stockholm Apr
10
4 Apr 52
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Comment: Last June the Foreign Office agreed informally
to keep to a minimum Swedish exports of List I goods to the
Orbit, but no commitment was sought by the United States at
that time on List II items. Sweden's "alliance-free" foreign
policy has precluded its taking any formal action on East-West
trade matters,
LATIN AMERICA
19. Vice President of Argentina dies: Dr. Hortensio Quijano,
Vice resident ?f Argentina and Vice President-elect for another
six-year term to begin on 4 June 1952, died on 3 April after a
long illness, (R FBIS9 Radio Buenos Aires, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: No new election for vice president will be held.
The press nt pro tempore of the Senate, Rear Admiral Teisaire,
will become acting vice presidents Teisaire will hold this
post at least until the new Congress convenes next May, when
the Senate may reelect him or select another president pro
tempore, who would then become acting vice president. Should
the president die or resign, the acting vice president would
take over his functions only until special elections for president
and vice president were called.
Quijano's death will not significantly affect the admin-
istration's policies, since he was politically inactive and
Teisaire is chairman of the Peronista Party.
20. Russia breaking relations with Cuba: The Russian Charge
d1Affaires has addressed a'maaote to the Cuban Minister of State
stating that Russia is breaking relations with Cuba as the result
of a recent incident involving the mistreatment of two Russian
couriers, The note was delivered personally to the Cuban
Undersecretary of State,
Cuba's reply9 refuting the Russian version of the courier
incident and acknowledging notification of the breaking of
relations, is being delivered personally to the Russian Legation
by the Assistant Chief of Protocol. (R Havana 702, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: Although Cuba has maintained relations with
Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, there have been no Cuban
diplomatic missions in those countries, Russia has maintained
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a legation in Havana; the Polish and Czech missions accredited
have been resident in Mexico City. it is presumed that Russia,
realizing the additional handicaps under which it would have'
to operate under the new Batista regime, has decided to it h-
draw its legation tactfully rather than have it forcibly closed
at a later date,
21, Czechoslovakia requests permission to establish a corn-
mere ial o fice in Panaa: T e Czec oslovar Minister to enezuela
as as e t e Panamanian Foreign Minister for permission to
establish a commercial office. He assured the Foreign Minister
that the office would not be headed by a Communist and that it
would deal only with commercial affairs.
According to Ambassador Wiley, the Foreign Minister believes
that he disposed of the question by replying that Panama would
want a similar office in Prague. (C Panama 856, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: A Czechoslovak commercial firm, Kotva, was
.stab is ed in Panama in 1948; it was used as a contact point
by emissaries of the Czechoslovak Government passing through
Panama. However, no connection between this establishment and
the Panamanian Communists was noted at any time. Kotva was
being closed out in late 1951 and was reportedly to be replaced
by another Czechoslovak agency,
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS,, TITLE 189 USC9 SECSG 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Chinese Nationalists threaten to oppose
government is considering opposing the dissolution of the
Allied Council for Japan when the San Francisco peace treaty
comes into force.
Allied ounce or apan,. represen a ive of t e inese
mbassy in Washington has informed American officials that his
The Chinese official pointed out that the peace treaty
negotiations between Japan and China have reached a stalemate,
and his government believes that it will have "little leverage"
to apply to Japan after the multilateral treaty becomes effec-
tive. (S S/S to Taipei 721, 1 Apr 52)
Comment,. The Chinese Nationalists are unlikely to take
this et~xr measure, and they have undoubtedly advanced this
suggestion to reinforce their recent requests for United States
intervention in the Sino-Japanese treaty talks.
Taipei is well aware that its proposed action would be
favorable to the USSR, which is officially represented in Japan
only through membership in the Allied Council.
again request US intervention in
as again as e t e ni States to use its influence over the
Sino-Japanese treaty talks-, The Chinese a ions ist overnment
Japanese Government to force a reconsideration of its views on
the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty. In a conversation with
the American Charge at Taipei, Chinese Foreign Office officials
pointed out that the principal point of disagreement is refusal
by Japan to acknowledge China's right to the benefits granted
the signatories of the San Francisco treaty, which is essential
to maintenance of the Chinese Government's position of equality
with the other Allies.
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The American Charge commented that should China be forced
to yield on this point, the resulting official and public re-
sentment, directed against the United States as well as Japan,
would impair the effectiveness of the American military and
economic aid program in Formosa, as well as create many ob-
stacles to Sino-Japanese cooperation, (S S/S Taipei 1264;
S S/S Taipei 1257, 2 Apr 52)
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