A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS UNDER NSC 10/5

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300030020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 5, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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PSB D-31
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August S, 1952
A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FORA NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM
WE
N S
MIER,
1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psychological
content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other peoples. An
attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy covering every
intention and action having psychological impact in this sense would
encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This would be an
effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formulate a national
psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the national policy
it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects of manageable
proportions. When we ask, ttWhat can usefully be said about ways and
means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and influence?u
we have selected one such aspect and have stated it in such a way that
we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not.attempt to deal
with the problems involved in the distribution of resources between cold
10perations and preparations in support of overt war*
a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power,
including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Com-
munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U. S. and
Soviet capabilities and the risk of.wars contribute to the retraction
and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer
constitute a threat to U. S. security.
In accordance with Presidential Directive of 1 April 1951s which
establishes the PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation,
as guidance to the departments and agencies represented for psychological
operations of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and
programs, and which defines psychological operations as including all
act_vities under NSC S9/1 and 10/2.
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b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the
peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and
will to resist Soviet domination.
c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and
guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable ex-
tent consistent with 1-a above . ...1t
5. The general objective of psychological operations in the cold
war can be nabsumed under the general heading of contributing to the
"retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence" whether by
operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Communist orbit or
by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by strengthening the
free world.
6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4, paragraph 20,
is to "endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of
war." This national strategy calls for efforts to "encourage and pro-
mote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from
the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries .. . .;
to eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influ-
ence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow ...; (and) to
create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize
the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present con-
cepts ..."
7. In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be expected
to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union, which is
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to say., the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods which it has
nirsued ever since its accession to power, within as well as outside the
Party. Recognition of this - particularly public recognition - is neces-
sary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. The over-
throw of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be the
only certain means of forcing such changes* one is excluded, and the
other so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeasi-
ble.
$. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which
outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold
war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee the time when
we gill have the capabilities, and (b), because without adequate capabili-
ties the risks involved are clearly disproportionate to the probabilities
of success. The time required to develop the necessary capabilities is
so great that the nature of an acceptable solution cannot be determined
with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide. As our capabilities in-
crease,, flexibility and opportunism in the light of events appear present-
ly more desirable than commitment to too specific a goal.
9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for assisting
revolution and continue to reappraise the situation. This will require
both the development of further capabilities for the exploitation of
existing techniques and a major program for the development of new techni-
ques and approaches. It is possible that the cumulative effect of re-
traction of Soviet power and influence, together with future events and
the inherent problems with which the Soviet government and the Bolshevik
Party are faced may eventually bring about sufficient change in their
aims and methods to provide an acceptable solution. Efforts to deve
our capabilities and to bring about such a retraction as opposed to a
program for a definitive solution may be regarded as the interim strata c
concept for a national psychological program.
10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our national strategy
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a. Effectivenesss The importance of the effects which success-
ful operations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influence and
power or in strengthening the free world against the exertion of Soviet
influence m d power must be appreciable and must warrant the effort, cost
and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be proportion-
al to anticipated effectiveness.
b. Feasibilitys Our capabilities in terms of trained man.
? ^ ~ rw r.r.r~..
power or material,, and local or international support, must be adequate
to give reasonable promise of success to the operation in the face of
such capabilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.
c. Acceptable risk: The degree to which the undertaking or
successful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to provoke
military reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limited as
to be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategy.
d. Flexibility: Operations should be of a type which lend
themselves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to
exploit such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may become
possible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operation.
12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process to
bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which should
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continue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incapable
of producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value in
supporting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. Omis-
sion from the following discussion of many existing projects, does not
imply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the approved
projects should continue as presently conceived and planned, insofar as
they meet the above criteria.
25X1 C
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b. Detachment of Albania.
Because of Albania's unique geographical position, its de-
tachment from the Soviet orbit may be feasible. The principal adv*ntage
gained would be its psychological effects both in subjugated countries
and in areas under intense Soviet pressure, although there would also
be useful additional by-products of a military nature, especially as re-
gards the position of Yugoslavia and Greece. It would be a demonstra-
tion that a continuing Soviet advance is not inevitable and that a re-
traction of Soviet power is practically possible. A preliminary estimate
indicates that detachment could be accomplished by Albanian personnel
25X,,ed without the overt participation of Western military forces.
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CIA should prepare a detailed priority plan of proposed
action, with estimates of expected results.
CIA and the State Department, Each agency should make concrete correla-
ted proposals within the foregoing framework*
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. It is recommended that the progressive retraction of Soviet
power and influence in accordance with our capabilities and subject to
the limitation of acceptable risk be accepted as the interim strategic
concept for a national psychological program with particular reference
to cold war operations under NSC 10/5.
2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies place great-
est emphasis on the three broad fields of activity identified in para-
graph 13 above,
3. It is reoommended that the responsible agencies give priority
within those broad fields to determining the detailed practicability and
desirability of proceeding along the lines indicated under each category
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described in-paragraph Ili, above, It is further recommended that where
such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria will be met, the indi-
cated actions be given priority in both national and agency programs
proportionate to their probable effectiveness.
5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic concept be
kept under continuous review, and revised in the light of future develop.
ments at least annually and also as additional categories of action
appear to meet the specified criteria*
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