THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES ON INTELLIGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00612R000200020005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 15, 1972
• Content Type: PAPER

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The Problem
1. A subject of considerable concern and discussion within
the Agency for the past two years has been the probable impact of
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam on the community's
intellJ.gence collection and analysis capabilities. Numerous efforts
have been made to encourage our military colleagues to focus on
this critical problem area early in the game so that orderly and
systematic steps would be in train to insure that priority intelli-
gence needs would be met as the inevitable drawdown progressed.
The matter has been the subject of extensive debate and soul
searchLig on the intelligence side, both here and in the field
by military and civilian alike, but without satisfactory resolu-
tion with the drawdow?n of t'-eater assets proceeding at a merry
pace dictated by politically instructed logisticians. attempts,
over time, to determine the exact degree of degradation of intel-
ligence activities have gone for naught since the pace and mag-
nitude of withdrawal has been known only to the operational side
of the military house.
The Need for Intelligence Continues
2. As the U.S. presence in Vietnam has d:w;indled, she goal ittir
tnd quantity o U.S. intelligence has, oer orc , do Le 1 or ~- d
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`' and, on its current course, will inevitably continue to do so.
There has been, however, no matching reduction in the type and
volume of information our top level customers expect the intelli-
gence community to be- able to provide. This is eminently clear
from the types of questions asked and the papers requested by the
White House on a whole host of significant subjects pertaining to
the Indochina War. The latter, thus, are heading for a rude shock,
if we do not give clear warning that further degradations are
coming. The collectors -- not the asset trimmers -- will almost
certainly be the ones blamed for.it even though the White House
has already been alerted to these problems. Its concern has been
reflected in General HaiZ_and Messrs. Odeen and Stearman's queries
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to our Chief of Station, Vietnam. in April. and acrai.n ;n .7111of
this year on the impact of U.S. withdrawal on intelligence.
Views from Near and Far
Headquarters Concern--
3. In February 1972, Headquarters conveyed its concern to
Vietnam Station that the quality of U.S. intelligence on Vietnam
would, in some cases, deteriorate as U.S. presence was reduced.
It was emphasized that there were no complaints regarding clan-
destine reporting, either from unilateral or liaison sources
or other facets of the Station's collection and.reporting activities,
which, indeed, had retained its high quality. Headquarters analysts,
ho:wwever, were already feeling the pinch of the reduced flow of the
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types of intelligence which had in the past come to headquarters
through American channels other than the Agency. The Station
was asked to provide its views on the scope of the problem and
any recommendations it believed appropriate on various points
raised on collection in Vietnam. The situation in the country-
side, ARVN military operations and effectiveness, the Viet Cong
Infrastructure and enemy logistics activities were cited as ex-
amples of the types of subjects on which information had been
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available from U.S. military sources, i.e. advisors, captured
documents (CDEC) and materiel (CNEC) and prisoners and ralliers
(CMIC), who swill no longer be in-country.
The View of Some Military--
4. Despite the white House's seemingly unquenchable thirst
,"N' for high quality intelligence on Indochina, the parochial question
frequently raised by the military has been to what extent intelli-
gence of the scope and quality of that collected in the past is
necessary in the face of reduced U.a.S. commitments in Vietnam and
the apparent intent to reduce the U.S. role in that part of the
world. The military's view has consistently been that once U.S.
forces are no longer involved in Vietnam, there is little need
for intelligence in depth on that area. This attitude was clearly
evident during the discussions in February pertaining to the
revision of SIGINT reporting requirements and the resulting fact-
finding trip through Southeast Asia this !arch. This thinking !,as
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not been limited only to the military as other parts of the
intelligence community have also espoused this reasoning.
Vietnam Station's View--
5. The headquarters and field discussions and table traffic
generated by the February exchange and during and after the March
trip, however, led Vietnam Station to state its view (quite point-
ed?igt that "the trouble with any number of recent planning papers
is that they tend to assume that the end of U.S. ground combat
operations in South Vietnam can be equated with the end of U.S.
interest in the survival of an independent non-communist South
Vietnam-- As the current offensive once again shows, as long
as the North Vietnamese can move from sanctuary positions, air 25X1
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