THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH ARABIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500010003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 28, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH ARABIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH ARABIA
28 May 1964
The recent British campaign to put down the
Egyptian-aided tribal rebellion in the Radfan area
of the South Arabian Federation has focused atten-
tion on a border that has never been wholly defined
and on problems of dissidence and sovereignty which
for centuries have plagued whoever has held Aden and
its surrounding hinterland. The largest natural
port between Suez and the Persian Gulf, Aden has
always played a major roLe in the trade of the south-
west corner of the Arabian Peninsula, and its his-
tory has been intimately bound up with that of Yemen
proper. Indeed, in traditional Arab usage, the
term "al-Yemen" has been understood to include the
area that now comprises the South Arabian Federation,
and Yemenis and Arab nationalists often refer to
this territory as the "occupied Yemeni south." Cairo,
despite only Lukewarm support from the Yemeni repub-
lican regime, now appears determined to endthat"occupa-
tion." London seems equally determined to hang on
because Aden's strategic importance--both militarily
and economically--is all the more pronounced in view
of the loss of British influence elsewhere in the
Middle East.
History of Foreign Control
The tribesmen of the Brit-
ish-protected Federation are
Shafiis--Sunni (orthodox) Mus-
lims who are indistinguishable
from their counterparts in the
southern and western lowlands
of Yemen proper, an area known
as the Tihama. These tribesmen
of the Aden hinterland have been
virtually independent for Long
periods, and their relationship
to the tribes of the Tihama and
the Yemeni highlands to the
north and east has varied greatly
over the years. The Zaidi Imams
who traditionally ruled Yemen
occupied the Aden hinterland
for a time during the 17th cen-
tury and have claimed sovereignty
over the area ever since, even
though this claim was usually
unenforceable. The Turks, dur-
ing the periods when they con-
trolled Yemen, also asserted a
claim to Aden and the surround-
ing country.
In 1839, at the time the
British seized the port, the
area was close to anarchy and
control from the north was non-
existent. The British may at
first have been primarily in-
terested in trade, but as the
importance of Aden as a bunker-
ing station and as a major link
on the route to India became
apparent, they gradually extended
their influence into the hinter-
land, first through some 90
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SAUDI 1:10BIA
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YEMEN
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SOUTH ARABIA
States Adhering to the Federation
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treaties of commerce with local
sheikhs and petty rulers, and
then through a number of formal
treaties of protection with the
leaders of tribal confederations
throughout the area. Eventually
some 23 "autonomous Arab states"
under the protection of the UK
were established. These were
divided for administrative rea-
sons into areas known as the
Eastern and Western Aden Protec-
torate.
The Shafiis, who are trad-
ers, farmers, and nomads, had
long resented the domination of
the warlike Zaidis, who are Shia
Muslims. The Shafii tribesmen
therefore welcomed the British
treaties, which in effect were
a guarantee of independence, as
actual British interference in
2
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tribal affairs was minimal. How-
ever, the Zaidi Imams and the
Turks, while acquiescing in a
situation which they could not
correct, at no time abandoned
their claims to residual sover-
eignty over the area.
With the British exercis-
ing only the lightest control
over the hinterland, tribal dis-
putes were endemic, and at the
turn of the century, troubles
along the de facto boundary aris-
ing from this cause led the
Turks, who then controlled Yemen,
to propose border demarcation.
A frontier commission was set up,
and between 1902 and 1904 the
frontier was demarcated from the
Red Sea to Qataba, north of Aden.
Farther to the east, where the
border traverses impassable
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mountains and featureless des-
ert, both sides agreed on
"blue" and "violet" lines drawn
on maps in lieu of actual de-
marcation. This arrangement was
ratified in 1914, but the ad-
vent of World War I rendered
it largely meaningless almost
at once. Turkish troops ad-
vanced to within sight of Aden
in 1915 and occupied consider-
able portions of the British-
protected area throughout the
war.
Yemen Versus the UK
Following the departure of
the Turks in 1918, Zaidi Imam
Yahya, who was in effective con-
trol of Yemen proper, refused to
recognize the British-Turkish
frontier demarcation and vigor-
ously asserted his claim to the
whole of the "Yemeni south."
Zaidi incursions into the pro-
tectorate took place on several
occasions in the 1920s, and two
British attempts to negotiate a
treaty with Yahya proved fruit-
less. In 1934, however, a treaty
recognizing the status quo as it
then existed was finally signed.
While no new demarcation on the
ground was attempted, the agreed
de facto frontier differed little
from that of 1904.
Interpretation of the treaty
by the two sides differed sharply,
however. The British believed
that they had gained Yemeni rec-
ognition of a permanent frontier
and of their arrangments with the
tribal leaders within the pro-
tectorate. Yahya, on the other
hand, felt the British had rec-
ognized residual Yemeni sover-
eignty over the south and had
agreed not to disturb the tribal
pattern then existing within the
area.
The period of relative calm
that followed this treaty ended
with the close of World War II
and particularly after the as-
sassination of Yahya and the
accession of his strong-minded
son, Imam Ahmad, in 1948. Until
this time the British aim in the
protectorate had been merely to
keep the territory free of for-
eign interference, and, for this,
little direct control was needed.
As British influence and power
in the Middle Fast shrank after
the war, and as Arab nationalism,
already a major force in the more
sophisticated Arab lands to the
north, made inroads among the
growing proletariat in Aden port,
the military base and refining
facilities there grew at once
more important and more precar-
ious in British eyes.
London's response to this
problem was first to establish
greater control over the pro-
tectorate and then to suggest
that Aden, then a crown colony,
join the various sheikhdoms
and sultanates of the protector-
ate in a federation which might
be given independence at some
undefined future date. This
suggestion, however, raised a
whole set of new problems. Adeni
merchants and traders felt that
the colony's wealth would be
squandered in an attempt to de-
velop the backward hinterland.
Arab nationalists in Aden saw
the federation as a device to
perpetuate British control.
Tribal leaders viewed the plan
as a scheme enhancing British
control from Aden over the
largely unadministered protec-
torate.
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Imam Ahmad was infuriated
by the whole idea. He was al-
ready convinced that Yemeni
emigrds and dissidents residing
in Aden had a hand in the as-
sassination of his father; and
indeed numerous Yemeni nationals
had been plotting serious changes
in the Yemeni regime for some
time. From Ahmad's point of
view, moreover, the federation
plan carried the unacceptable
implication of absolute British
sovereignty over the area. His
policy, instituted at the first
sign the British planned greater
control over the protectorate
and well before the federation
idea was made public in 1954,
was to supply arms and money to
dissident subtribes resentful
of the authority of the British
and of the few powerful tribal
chiefs through whom they worked.
Despite an abortive attempt
to arrange a modus vivendi in
London in 1950, Ahmad persist-
ently strove to keep the hinter-
land of the protectorate in
turmoil and to a large degree,
succeeded. His efforts were
aided after 1954 by the revolu-
tionary regime in Cairo, to whom
he turned for aid in a departure
from Yemen's traditional policy
of isolation. Egyptian arms
crossed the border from Yemen
into the protectorate, and
Cairo's Voice of the Arabs--
whose appeal, however, Was pri-
marily to the urban Arab na-
tionalists in Aden--frequently
called for resistance to the
British.
By 1955, when Ahmad had
to devote himself to internal
matters following an attempted
coup in Yemen, conditions in
much of the more remote areas
of the protectorate bordered
on anarchy. With the rise of
anti-British feeling in the
Middle East following the Suez
crisis, Ahmad again interested
himself in the "southern" prob-
lem. He concluded an arms deal
with the USSR, and by 1957 auto-
matic weapons were used for the
first time by the dissidents
in the protectorate.
Formation of the Federation
Meanwhile, despite prob-
lems compounded both by Arab
nationalism and tribal dissi-
dence, the dwindling British
position elsewhere in the Mid-
dle East caused London to assign
ever greater priority to main-
taining its position in Aden.
A War Office white paper in 1960
called the base at Aden vital
to British defenses, and Iraqi
Premier Qasim's claim to Kuwait
the following year dramatized
the base's role in the protec-
tion of British interests in
the Persian Gulf. As Ahmad be-
came increasingly involved in
maintaining firm control within
Yemen proper, the British grad-
ually re-established control of
the anarchistic hinterland of
the protectorate, although areas
such as Radfan and the Lower
Yafai Sultanate remained pockets
of chronic dissidence.
In 1959, the federation
idea, which had been allowed to
lie dormant, was revived, and
six states of the Western Pro-
tectorate formed the nucleus
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of the present federation.
Other states joined in due
course, and at the time of the
Yemeni revolution in 1962--
wilich followed on the heels of
Imam Ahmad's death and overthrew
his successor, Imam Badr--there
were 11 states within the fed-
eration.
Resistance to the federa-
tion idea in Aden itself remained
strong, however. The merchant
class continued to argue against
any move that would give a large
measure of political control to
the backward sultanates, while
the Arab nationalists increased
their agitation against the Brit-
ish presence itself. Nationalist
sentiment is centered in the
large and powerful Aden trade
union confederation and in its
political arm, the People's
Socialist Party (PSP), headed
by Abdullah Asnag. This group-
ing has been financed and to
some extent guided from Cairo,
thereby raising British appre-
hensions as to the course it
would follow should it come to
power--a strong possibility in
any open election. Political
problems in Aden are further
complicated by the large colony
of emigre Yemeni nationals, who
the PSP claims should be en-
franchised in any future elec-
tion.
Nevertheless, when the
Yemeni revolution in September
1962 placed a strongly Egyptian-
oriented government--the Sallal
regime--on the northern border
of the federation, the British
tried both to strengthen the
federation itself and to dilute
the political weight of the Adeni
Arab nationalists by pressing
for rapid Adeni accession to
the federation. This was accom-
plished in May 1963; there are
now 14 members of the federation
--virtually the entire former
Western Protectorate.
Aden vs. the Yemeni Revolution
Although the Yemeni rev-
olution had the effect of creat-
ing a government to the north
that could appeal both to the
Arab nationalists in Aden and
to the dissident tribesmen in
the hinterland, the border area
remained relatively quiet dur-
ing the first year the Sallal
government was in power. Egyp-
tian and Yemeni republican at-
tention was centered in the
north and east of Yemen, where
the Zaidi royalists led by Badr
and aided by Saudi Arabia were
concentrated. In addition, the
growing Egyptian presence in
Yemen dissipated much of the
initial enthusiasm for the re-
publican regime among Adenis
and tribesmen alike. Firing
across the border and minor
incursions were frequent, but
there were no major incidents.
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When the agreement negoti-
ated by US Ambassador Bunker
calling for Saudi and Egyptian
disengagement came into effect
in June of 1963, however, the
situation began to change. Arms
traffic to the royalists from
Saudi Arabia virtually ceased,
and arms began to flow north
into the royalist-held areas
of Yemen from Baihan, on the
eastern fringe of the federa-
tion. Western advisers, includ-
ing a number of British nationals,
have been observed with the
royalist forces. Air surveil-
lance of the border area by both
the British and the Egyptians
increased.
The British motivation in
allowing aid to reach the royal-
ists through federation terri-
tory grew in part out of Lon-
don's desire to prevent the
Yemeni republicans and Egyptians
from consolidating their hold
on Yemen proper, but an addi-
tional factor has been increas-
ing evidence of Egyptian-in-
spired attempts at sabotage and
subversion within the federation.
The most dramatic of these ef-
forts was the attempt to blow
up High Commissioner Trevaskis
at Aden airport last December.
Trevaskis was himself the au-
thor of the federation idea
and a strong-minded advocate
of a "get tough" policy toward
Cairo. He immediately cracked
down on the PSP in Aden and
pressed London for a stronger
stand along the Yemeni border.
A further British considera-
tion is the need to demonstrate
to the tribal chiefs of the fed-
eration the viability of the
British guarantee through a
policy of retaliation for incur-
sions into federation territory
from Yemen. The March air attack
on the Yemeni fort at Harib was
a gesture of this nature, while
the present Radfan campaign is
an attempt to dramatize the
British determination to curb
dissidence before the revolt
spreads to much larger areas of
the federation.
Outlook
There is little question
that the Egyptians will attempt
to broaden the revolt around
and if ?ossible inside Aden.
owing the Harib
rai , e full weight of the
Egyptian propaganda apparatus
was turned against the British
position in the federation.
Since the Radian operation, the
Egyptians in Yemen have begun
large-scale recruiting of tribes-
men from the border area for
training in Yemen and for even-
tual infiltration and guerrilla
operations within the federation.
Sabotage in Aden itself is also
almost certain to increase.
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Nasir appears determined
to color his activities in Yem-
en with an anti-British, anti-
colonialist hue. In this way he
no doubt hopes to make Saudi
Crown Prince Faysal's continued
tacit support for the royalist
cause politically embarrassing.
Faysal, however, is likely to
view the anti-British campaign
as a sign of Nasir's weakness.
The Yemeni republicans
are not entirely happy at the
turn this campaign has taken.
They continue to maintain the
old Zaidi claims to sovereignty
over the south, but have indi-
cated that they do not wish to
press those claims at this time.
The newly reconstituted Yemeni
Government has suggested to the
US ambassador in Yemen that some
sort of modus vivendi with the
British can be reached, and the
British in turn have surfaced
the idea of a mutual pull-back
of troops along the border and
of UN supervision of the area.
However, such an accommodation
is unlikely, given Egypt's capac-
ity for independently causing
trouble within the federation
and the strong anti-Nasir po-
litical pressures that the Egyp-
tian anti-British propaganda
campaign has generated in the
UK.
Nasir apparently has no
desire for a direct military
confrontation with the British.
He nevertheless is likely to
step up his efforts at sabotage
and subversion within the fed-
eration, in hopes that this
kind of pressure will even-
tually enable him to "win" or
at least extricate himself from
Yemen.
The British, however, are
convinced by recent events that
Nasir intends to drive them from
a base they feel they cannot af-
ford to lose. As long as this
feeling is running strongly,
they will, through their aid to
the royalists, continue to see
to it that Nasir cannot end his
war in Yemen on terms he would
find politically acceptable.
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