CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT CYPRUS: A STATUS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 27, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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CYPRUS: A STATUS REPORT
A tense quiet prevails on Cyprus two and one
half years after the eruption of hostilities which
resulted in the separation of the Greek and Turkish.
communities. A permanent solution still is not in
sight. The Greek Cypriots have firm control, and
President and Archbishop Makarios retains his posi-
tion of dominance in the struggle. He is presently
having difficulties with the government of Greece,
however, over control of the Cyprus national guard.
In the past few months the position of the gov-
ernment of Turkey has hardened. A recent aide-memoire
to the US and UK reflects Ankara's resolve to improve
conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and in-
sists on the continued presence of the UN peace force
on the island. The condition of the Turkish Cypriots
is decidedly less favorable than that of the rela-
tively prosperous Greek community, but probably less
severe than the Turkish note claims.
The economy has held up relatively well during
the trouble, but will be seriously affected if a
political accommodation is not found within the next
few years. The UN force is performing its peacekeep-
ing mission well, and a failure to renew its mandate
--expiring next month--would probably be followed
by a resumption of hostilities.
Wide Divergence of Views
The lack of political move-
ment on the Cyprus issue is
largely due to the wide divergence
between the positions of the
Turkish Government and the gov-
ernments of Cyprus and Greece.
Progress has also been blocked
during the past year by a weak
government in Greece, a new gov-
ernment in Turkey burdened with
domestic problems, a pro - Greek
Cypriot UN resolution last Decem-
ber calling for Cyprus' right of
sovereignty and freedom from out-
side interference, and the joint
Greek-Cypriot rededication in
early February to Cyprus' even-
tual enosis (union) with Greece.
The last development brought
a hardening of Turkey's public
Stand. There is no'evidence that
the Turks are willing to give in
on any of the points on which
1.;hey have long insisted: no uni-
:Lateral annexation by Greece,
the continued existence of two
communities, no domination of
one community by the other, and
the participation of both commu-
nities in the administration of
the island.
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Turkey expressed its frustra-
tion over Cyprus in its 19 April
aide-memoire to the US and the
UK. Ankara strongly stated its
view that the Turkish Cypriot
community could not endure indefi-
nitely the Greek Cypriot pressures
and harassments and what Ankara
called the resulting "economic
plight" of the Cypriot Turks.
Ankara went on to say that it had
decided to ensure the removal of
all the restrictions "within the
shortest possible time." The
Turks correctly assessed the ap-
parent strategy of President Ma-
karios, who is using a so-called
"peace offensive" to allow "time"
to erode the position of the
Turkish Cypriots and eventually
give him unilateral control. It
also pointed out the important
role played by the United Nations
Peace Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
and threatened to send Turkish
troops to the island if the force
should be removed.
Ankara's claims of deplorable
living conditions in the Turkish
Cypriot community were probably
calculated to spark US, UK, and
UN interest in getting the prob-
lem off dead center and, although
well taken, are probably exag-
gerated. However, the allegations
do raise questions as to the
actual conditions obtaining for
both communities on the island.
Greek Cypriot Domination
Much to the chagrin of all
the other parties to the dispute,
including the Greek Government,
President Makarios dominates all
aspects of the struggle, both
domestic and international. His
firm hold on the island is shown
by his extreme popularity with
the Greek Cypriot community,
which comprises about four fifths
of the island's population of
around 600,000. His most signif-
icant, but as yet ineffective,
opponent is General George Grivas,
the legendary hero of the Cypriot
struggle against the British be-
tween 1955 and 1959 and now the
commander of Cyprus' armed forces.
Makarios has all but directed
Greece's Cyprus policy since De-
cember 1963. His struggle with
Grivas over the control of the
island's military affairs recently
added a look of crisis to Greece's,
already disarrayed political
scene. His tactics have frus-
trated the Turks and Turkish Cyp-
riots, who have been unable to
stem the steady, creeping expan-
sion of Greek Cypriot control
over almost all aspects of life
on the island.
On 30 November 1963, Makarios
issued a 13-point proposal sug-
gesting significant amendments
to the Cypriot constitution drawn
up under the London-Zurich agree-
ments in 1959 and under which
Cyprus began its limited inde-
pendence from the UK in August
1960. Makarios stated the pro-
posal was intended to "facilitate
the smooth functioning of the
state and to remove the causes
of intercommunal friction." The
Turkish Cypriots rejected the
proposals out of hand and less
than a month later the fighting
started.
In summary, Makarios wanted
to abolish the veto right of the
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island's Greek Cypriot president
and Turkish Cypriot vice president
and unify other executive author-
ity. He wanted to end the con-
stitutional requirement that is-
sues before the House of Repre-
sentatives could be passed only
if approved by a majority of
both the Greek and Turkish mem-
bers. His plans also called for
alterations to other administra-
tive, municipal,and judicial func-
tions of the government. In
December 1965 the House of Rep-
resentatives with, of course,
only Greek Cypriot members par-
ticipating in the quorum, passed
a law which culminated in the
adoption of all Makarios' original
"13 points," either by statute
or by executive authority.
This process of slicing
away at the Turkish Cypriot con-
stitutional authority, resulting
in a de facto Greek Cypriot ma-
jority rule, has been virtually
unimpeded by the Turkish Cypriots.
Both the Turkish Cypriots and
the Government of Turkey could
only protest these "unconstitu-
tional actions." The refusal
of the Turkish Cypriots to par-
ticipate in the proceedings of
the House of Representatives and
other governmental functions has
merely played into the hands of
the wily archbishop and has lent
credibility to his complaint
about Turkish Cypriot "insurgent"
tactics.
Cypriot rule. However, it has
achieved for Makarios a degree
of control which enables him to
negotiate from strength.
Grivas and Makarios have
long been at odds over the best
way to deal with the Turkish
Cypriots and with the island's
Communists, who represent its
largest and best organized polit-
ical grouping. Grivas has favored
a harder line than Makarios in
handling the Turks and has often
threatened to "drive them into
the sea." He also feels that
Makarios' acceptance of Commu-
nist support betrays the eventual
goal of enosis, since the party
could never genuinely support
union with anti-Communist Greece.
The most recent manifesta-
tion of the Makarios-Grivas dis-
pute concerns the general's fu-
ture in Cyprus and has involved
the embattled government of Pre-
mier Stephanopoulos in Greece.
During talks with the Greek Gov-
ernment in early February, Ma-
karios apparently was led to
believe that the government of
Cyprus would be given increased
authority in the determination
of the island's defense policies
generally and at least partial'
control of the national guard,
the island's principal defense
force.
Makarios' "peace offensive"
has not achieved his ultimate
objective of loosening the hold
of the Turkish leadership to the
point where the Turkish Cypriot
rank and file would accept Greek
However, Grivas, upon re-
turning from talks in Athens in
late February, publicly stated
that he took his orders only
from Athens. To Makarios this
was clear evidence that the
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government of Greece had reneged
on its agreement. Essentially,
Makarios would like to appoint a
Greek general of his own choice
as commander of the Cypriot-manned
national guard with the approval of
the GreekNational Defense General
Staff and thereby relegate Grivas
to the position of "coordinator"
of military affairs with command
authority over the national guard
only during a state of war.
In early March an attempt by
Makarios to supplant Grivas was
rebuked by the Greek Government.
The effort eventually caused the
resignation on 11 April of Greek
Foreign Minister Tsirimokos, who
supported Makarios. Greek re-
fusal to grant Makarios' request
is probably based on the desire
of many Greek politicians to use
Grivas as a means of keeping
Makarios in line. Makarios
bitterly resents this kind of
Greek control, however, and he
will probably continue his efforts
to get rid of Grivas.
The Turkish Cypriot "Plight"
In its aide-memoire, Turkey
emphasized that steps must be
taken to improve the deplorable
conditions in the Turkish Cypriot
community. The failure to "nor-
malize" the situation and a con-
tinuation of Greek Cypriot pres-
sure are "tantamount to a new
fait accompli based on the time
element to which the Turkish Gov-
ernment will not resign itself."
Ankara demanded suppression
of Makarios' list of the so-called
"strategic items" which are barred
to the Turkish Cypriots and called
for the removal of all other
economic restrictions. The Turks
also demanded the right to dis-
tribute freely relief items from
Turkey and insisted on the cessa-
tion of roadblocks and other
harassments to allow freedom of
movement for the Turkish Cypriot
population.
Most of the Turkish Cypriots
lead a difficult existence, and
it must be especially frustrating
for those who see the Greek Cyp-
riots enjoying a relatively nor-mal, prosperous life.
The Turkish Cypriots living
under the most difficult condi-
tions are the approximately
20,000 "refugees" displaced by
the fighting. Most of these
live in the Turkish quarter of
Nicosia and in villages along the
Nicosia-Kyrenia road. There are
probably another 20,000 who de-
pend on relief supplies and
funds. Most of the assistance
comes from Turkey, which is re-
portedly sending aid at a current
rate of $11.2 million a year.
Most of the refugees have
been resettled in "adequate"
housing, except possibly 1,500
now living in tents. The major-
ity of the latter live in the
Kokinna-Limnitis-Paphos areas
where the living conditions are
truly miserable. Nevertheless,
the International Red Cross says
that the Turkish Cypriots are
not in poor enough condition
to be classified as refugees
by Red Cross standards.
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The government has a housing
reconstruction program to repair
the damage done during the fight-
ing, but it has begun only in
one area near Nicosia and the
progress is exceedingly and prob-
ably deliberately slow. Most of
the improvements are due to the
efforts of the Turkish Cypriots
themselves. In those cases where
houses have been repaired by the
government, most of the owners
are afraid to defy their leaders'
orders and leave the enclaves to
return to their homes.
The Turkish charge in Nic-
osia told a British Embassy of-
ficial that nearly all of the
refugees are better off now than
when they left their home vil-
lages, and a Turkish Foreign
Ministry official stated after a
recent trip to the island that
the Turkish Cypriots suffer more
from psychological problems than
from economic privation. In
short, the situation is diffi-
cult, but much of the suffering
results from fear of an uncertain
future.
The Greek Cypriot authori-
ties have officially offered no
significant concession to meet
the Turkish demand for lifting
the ban on the supply of "stra-
tegic items" to the Turkish Cyp-
riots. However, smuggling and
black market operations supply
the Turkish community with some
of the banned items--such as cer-
tain petroleum products, cement,
lumber, and other building ma-
terials. Purchases of gasoline,
fertilizer, seed, agricultural
spare parts, and other consumer
goods are complicated largely by
the Turkish community's own
bureaucratic problems and limited
purchasing power. There is no
food problem.
Greek Cypriot authorities
have countenanced a slow increase
in the freedom of movement of
the Turkish Cypriots since 1964,
but the number of unnecessary
roadblocks and other harassments,
which have recently been ex-
tended to include Turkish Em-
bassy personnel, remains high.
However, the Turkish/Cypriot
leadership closely controls the
movement of its own people and
also does not allow the Greeks
to travel uncontrolled in the
Turkish Cypriot enclaves.
In general, most reports
indicate that the majority of
Turkish Cypriots are not too
badly persecuted, despite An-
kara's statements to the con-
trary. Conditions are unlikely
to become markedly better so
long as the two communities on
the island remain in what has
become a suspended civil war.
In addition, the Turkish Cypriots
themselves follow a policy of
enforced separation which would
seem to rule out much progress
toward the "normalization" de-
manded by Ankara. They have
thus achieved a desired de facto
partition which would be lost if
they again begin to participate
in the affairs of government and
in a program of reciprocal free-
dom of movement.
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The Economy
The over-all economy of the
island had held up well during
the disengagement. However,
the political strains have caused
distortions in the usual economic
patterns. Both local and for-
eign capital has been reluctant
to venture into long-term in-
vestment, and development plans
have been cut back because of
military necessity. Much of the
Turkish Cypriot population has,
of course, become economically
inactive and dependent upon ex-
ternal aid.
The failure to come to a
political accommodation within
the next few years to allow a
normal economic expansion could
have more serious effects on the
economy. By 1970 it is expected
that the UK will be spending only
about half its 1965 expenditure
of about $46,4 million.-.The US-
owned Cyprus Mines Corporation,
whose copper exports have pro-
vided about half the country's
foreign exchange in the last
decade, will have practically
depleted its ore reserves by
1972. Tourism is a good poten-
tial source of foreign exchange,
but a clear-cut political settle-
ment will be necessary for its
proper development.
Military Forces on the Island
One of the "ultimatums" con-
tained in the Turkish aide-
memoire was that the UNFICYP
must remain on the island to
help maintain the truce that
has existed since September 1964
and to oversee implementation
of the Turkish demands. The Turks
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threatened that if UNFICYP should
be withdrawn before an agreed
settlement, they would fill the
vacuum by matching the approxi-
mately 8,500 "illegal" Greek
forces now on the island with
Turkish troops.
The UN force is presently
made up of military units from
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, Ireland, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, and police units
from Australia, Austria, Den-
mark, New Zealand, and Sweden.
The generally peaceful conditions
prevailing since the fall of
1964 have allowed reductions of
approximately 2,000 men to a
present level of around 4,500
through cuts in administrative
personnel and in manned outposts
and checkpoints.
The UNFICYP's present man-
date extends until 26 June and
seems likely to be renewed for
at least another three months,
but reluctance of the UN members
to furnish the funds and troops
without some positive movement
toward settlement will make fu-
ture extension problematical.
Most observers agree that
a force of at least 4,500 men
is necessary to prevent a resump-
tion of hostilities. A token
observer force would probably
.prove to be ineffective as long
as the hostile elements remain
in their current almost head-to-
head proximity.
In addition to the approxi-
mately 30,000 Greek Cypriot na-
tional guardsmen and irregulars,
there are about 8,500 Greek troops
on the island, not including the
950-man contingent authorized
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by the London-Zurich agreements.
As many as 2,000 of the Greek
mainland forces may be integrated
into the national guard as com-
manders, instructors, and tech-
nicians. Others are in separate
Hellenic Army units. The national
guard is probably poorly trained
and disciplined. In addition to
far outnumbering the Turkish Cyp-
riot forces, the Greeks have the
advantage of tank and artillery
support.
Offensively, the Greeks could
probably overrun the Turkish en-
claves within 48 hours, but this
would draw immediate military in-
tervention from the Turkish main-
land. The Greek Cypriot defensive
capability would depend some-
25X1 what on the nature of the attack,
but the defensive forces would
probably make any invasion a
costly operation.
There are an estimated
10,000-15,000 Turkish Cypriot
fighters and an undetermined
number, perhaps,1,000,gf regular
Turkish Army personnel on the
island, not including the 650-
man authorized contingent. Many
of the fighters are students who
had been enrolled in schools in
England and Turkey before the
hostilities started and later
returned to the island to join
in the struggle. A group of
about 400 of these students from
the besieged enclave of Kokinna
were allowed to return to their
studies in Turkey early this
year.
Outnumbered about 3 to 1
and badly outgunned, the Turkish
Cypriots have little offensive
capability without outside assist-
ance. Defensively, they prob-
ably could hold out indefinitely
in some areas, but most of their
enclaves would be completely
sealed off in a matter of hours.
In addition to the approxi-
mately 1,000 troops serving in
the UN force, the British have
about 4,000 ground troops and
6,000 air force personnel quar-
tered in the British sovereign
areas under the London-Zurich
agreements.
There seems little chance
for a solution ih the near future.
Greek-Turkish bilateral talks
are now scheduled to begin in
early dune, but the possibility
of real progress appears slim.
In recent weeks, both in
their aide-memoire and through
their display of military pre-
paredness on their southern coast,
the Turks have shown a new deter-
mination to improve the lot of
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the Turkish Cypriots and preserve
what they regard as their rights
in the dispute. The weak gov-
ernment of Greece's Premier Steph-
anopoulos seems in no position
to make substantial concessions.
It is unlikely that the
Turks will soon intervene mili-
tarily without some new Greek
Cypriot provocation. However,
Turkey is worried by Makarios'
tactic of allowing time to erode
the Turkish Cypriot morale. If
the archbishop fails to make 25X1
some move to meet Turkish demands,
the two sides may again be placed
on a collision course.
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