WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC UNDER PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008900030003-1
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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ecre
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Special Report
The Dominican Republic Under President Joaquin Balaguer
Secret
N! 12
9 July 1971
No. 0738/71B
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Unless President Balaguer can liberalize the political atmosphere, achieve a
degree of real social reform, and maintain a high rate of economic growth, his
presidency may prove a sterile interlude rather than a step forward in the political
and economic development of the country.
Support for the Balaguer government by the military and the conservative
business and financial community appears fairly secure, strengthening, at least for
the short-term, prospects for political stability and moderate economic growth.
These prospects may be menaced, however, if the US Congress passes proposed
legislation cutting Dominican sugar shipments to the United States by about 25
percent from the 1970 figure.
The weak, disunited, and badly led extreme left is capable of sporadic incidents
of violence, even including the murder of the President, but it could not subse-
quently take over the government or even assume a significant political role. The
probable consequence of a successful leftist attempt on the life of the President
would be massive reprisals against the extreme left by the military and the formation
of a repressive government controlled by the military.
Former President Juan Bosch has re-established his control over the Dominican
Revolutionary Party and appears to be preparing it to take advantage of political
developments. He fears random violence on the part of leftist extremists because he
believes that a military take-over would follow and would postpone indefinitely his
hopes for a reform government.
In Balaguer's second term, which began in August 1970 and ends in 1974,
pressures for government action to improve the lot of the majority will be more
insistent. The people will be less willing to subordinate all activity to the preserva-
tion of political stability. Increasing authoritarian government, the use of counterter-
ror against the left and the extreme left, uncertainty as to whether the President will
try for a third term, and too little social reform have diminished the credits Balaguer
amassed during his first term and will probably continue to do so. The President is
probably skillful enough to head off any serious threat to his government from these
causes, but he is too circumscribed by political necessity and his own philosophy to
find new ways to attack the almost insurmountable problems that afflict the
country.
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Flawed as it is, the government of President
Joaquin Balaguer is one of the less melancholy
moments in the Dominican Republic's long, un-
happy history. Between the murder of the
dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1961 and
Balaguer's inauguration in 1966, there were eight
governments, three coups d'etat, a civil war and a
foreign military intervention.
When Balaguer took office in 1966, virulent
social and political antagonisms-some created,
others intensified by the civil war of 1965-d
divided the country. The state of the economy was
calamitous; gross domestic product had declined
nearly 13 percent in 1965, and between 30-40
percent of the labor force was jobless. Intran-
sigents on both the left and the right resented and
opposed the new government. The support of
conservative military, business, and financial in-
terests had to be maintained if the new govern-
ment was to survive, and the economy had to be
revived without resort to measures that would
alienate this support.
Balaguer's political expertise has enabled
him to keep the opposition off balance while
permitting a fair degree of political liberty. Re-
pressive measures against extremists were resorted
to only infrequently. Through cautious fiscal and
economic policies, and with US aid, the country
has recovered from the economic devastation of
the civil war and has made modest if poorly
coordinated progress in providing public housing,
education, and health facilities. In 1968-70 gross
domestic product rose nearly 18 percent. Unem-
ployment remained high, however, and the
President Balaguer presenting a tenant with title to an
apartment in a public housing project in Santo
Domingo. 10 May 1971.
Saint Martin de Porres Public Housing Project in Santo Domingo, consisting of 31 two- and three-story apartment buildings
and ten shops. The apartments have three bedrooms, a living-dining room, kitchen, bath, utility room, and balcony.
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President Balaguer officiates at the opening of a country
road.
government was unable to create conditions for
long-term political stability and social reforms.
Nevertheless, Balaguer was returned to office in
the relatively peaceful and honest elections of
May 1970 with a 57-percent majority of the vote.
He pledged to complete the programs begun in his
previous administration aimed at improving the
lives of the people, and to create a "government
of national unity."
Outwardly there is little in either personnel
or policies to distinguish the ten-month-old sec-
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and administration from the first. As he had done
in 1966, Balaguer again offered posts in the gov-
ernment to members of opposition parties. No
real "government of national unity" was
achieved, or intended, however. Authority is cen-
tralized in the president's hands, and no member
of the government exerts any real influence on
presidential decisions. Bringing members of the
opposition into the administration did not give
the opposition a voice in government; rather, it
has contributed to the weakening of the ap-
pointees' political parties. The postelection ap-
pointments and reassignments that Balaguer made
in the military appear to have achieved the dual
end of dispersing authority to prevent only one
officer from becoming powerful enough to chal-
lenge the government while retaining the mili-
tary's support.
Achieving political stability was the Presi-
dent's primary concern in his first term. Since
re-election Balaguer has shown greater interest in
long-range economic planning. In early 1970 a
National Development Plan for 1970-74 was pub-
lished, which the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) finds ex-
tremely optimistic. The bank agrees with the
plan's projected structure of economic growth
but finds the expected pace of advance in each
sector more rapid than can be realistically antici-
pated. The I BRD study predates the presentation
of legislation in the US Congress that would re-
duce Dominican sugar shipments by about 25
percent from the 1970 figure.
The proposed legislation cutting Dominican
sugar shipments poses an unexpected threat to
economic growth and to political stability. The
Dominican press has been filled with articles pro-
testing the "injustice" of the proposed legislation
and describing its damaging effect on the Domini-
can economy. Critics who object to Balaguer's
close ties to the United States have seized the
opportunity to criticize him. Juan Bosch, leader
of the strongest opposition party, the Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD), has publicly stated
that only a tough, nationalistic attitude will im-
press Washington. The political and psychological
effect of a cut cannot be estimated; some of the
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r:L ,vaC/OvA1.
in a loss of prestige for Balaguer and a deteriora-
tion of public confidence in his leadership.
The government's ini.reasingly uncom-
promising attitude toward the left and Balaguer's
subtler seduction of opposition political parties to
prevent political unrest are potential hazards both
for his administration and for the future stability
of the country.
reaction undoubtedly exaggerates its probable ef-
fects. Concretely, however, the US Embassy esti-
mates that roughly 25,000 sugar workers would
lose their jobs, and the already weak balance-of-
payments position would be further damaged
should the quota be reduced as proposed. Bal-
ance-of-payments equilibrium was achieved in
1970 because of large sugar exports to the US
market and substantial net inflows of capital, but
rapidly rising imports in 1971 are expected to
cause a substantial deficit despite the continued
inflow of private and official capital. The reduc-
tion in sugar shipments under the US quota may
be restored or the difference made up by special
allocations and other measures. Nonetheless,
Dominican disenchantment with the US because
of the proposed cut is likely to be reflected also
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Although a variety of political parties sprang
into existence after the death of Trujillo, only
Bosch's PRD and Balaguer's Reform Party (PR)
have real importance. The PRD did not partici-
pate in the 1970 elections, and the other opposi-
tion parties made embarrassingly poor showings.
Balaguer's offers of posts in he government to
opposition party members were for the most part
gratefully accepted. The parties, never very
strong, have since drifted toward virtual extinc-
tion.
The concept of a loyal opposition is foreign
to the Dominican experience, and nonpartisan
cooperation for the good of the nation has never
been attractive to practitioners of what has been
called "the politics of annihilation." Balaguer's
discouragement of opposition activity to protect
his administration is understandable in the Do-
minican context. Such a policy, however, if con-
tinued indefinitely, endangers future political de-
velopment and the administration itself to some
extent. Government is increasingly centralized in
the President's hands. The interests of much of
the population are unrepresented. Most political
parties are spurned by the majority of the
youth-about half the population of the Domini-
can Republic is under the age of 20-and those
who want to act look to the revolutionary left for
inspiration. Political institutions to safeguard the
public interest from the effects of political con-
flict are not being built: perhaps, as Bosch has
come to believe, they cannot be built in the
current Dominican context. There is also the
hazard that, because there are no legitimate
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channels through which to discharge their politi- the future. Two incidents in particular may have
cal energies, the politically concerned and ambi- cost the government more in confidence than the
tious will turn to conspiracy to realize their objec- short-term gain in tranquility was worth.
tives.
In February there was a general strike in San
The Extreme Left and the Government Francisco de Macoris to force the transfer of the
local police chief. There is some evidence that the
During his first administration, Balaguer PRD and members of extreme left political
took relatively restrained action against the leftist groups were involved. On 24 February, Balaguer
extremists in the country, but his attitude has delivered a major television address in which he
become increasingly harsh and uncompromising. accused Bosch and the PRD, as well as others, of
At present the extreme left consists of some seven trying to destroy constitutional government
or eight small, weak, disunited and poorly led through "psychological terror" and of trying to
parties and groups capable of hit-and-run inci- impose Communism on the Dominican Republic.
dents of terrorism, even including murdering the He warned that the government would use un-
President. The assassination of the President by a democratic measures if necessary to preserve or-
member or members of the left would, however, der.
almost certainly provoke an immediate reaction
from the security forces that would cripple the The speech was believed by some to be a
extremists for some time. The probability is high carefully calculated maneuver to polarize the
that a military government would be formed, and country politically and to confront the people
the revolutionary left's prospects for coming to with a contrived political choice between consti-
power would become even dimmer than they are tutional government and Communism. It was an
now. unmistakable warning that the government would
not tolerate political agitation that disturbed
The revolutionary left is divided between domestic tranquility.
those who demand immediate resort to violence
to promote revolution and those who prefer to lie Three months later La Banda, a police-
low, build strength, and await more favorable sponsored, anti-Communist terrorist group, pro-
circumstances. The Marxist-Leninist Dominican voked outraged public reaction and widespread
Popular Movement (MPD) shows the greatest po-
tential and consequently has been hardest hit by
government security forces. Its already battered '
leadership was further damaged by the accidental
death last May in Brussels of Maximiliano Gomez
Horacio, secretary general of the MPD and a
gifted leader. To date there is little evidence that
the left is making much progress in its efforts to
achieve unity of policy or action, or that it is
attracting the kind of support it would need to
playa political role.
The newly authoritarian note in the govern- The boys in La Banda
ment and the use of almost open counterterror
against disturbers of the political peace have
raised public apprehension about the course of criticism in the press as a result of its activities.
the Balaguer government and its implications for These included the invasion of private homes,
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WIl
NOTHING EVER CHANGES FOR ML,,
7~~',u,r w7i
schools, and at least one church in search of
"subversives" as well as open participation with
the police in a raid on the headquarters of an
important labor union. La Banda and the govern-
ment publicly disclaimed any relationship, and
the chief of the National Police, who had coun-
tenanced the formation of La Banda, pledged that
the government would not tolerate terrorism
from any quarter. The assumption that La Banda
had only suspended operations very temporarily
was confirmed in June by reports of new forays
by the group.
In the past, President Balaguer has escaped
being held personally responsible for particularly
outrageous incidents of antiterrorist police action.
After his speech in February and the emergence
of La Banda, however, the fiction of presidential
ignorance or innocence has become difficult for
the government to maintain.
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Former President Juan Bosch has re-estab-
lished his control over the Dominican Revolu-
i
it
d
b
ng
e rea
y
tionary Party (PRD) and appears to
to take advantage of any propitious political de-
He has adamantly re-
used to allow the PHD to cooperate with the 25X1
revolutionary left, particularly the MPD, because
he believes that extremist violence would only
cause a military take-over and the installation of a
repressive government. Bosch approves of limited
collaboration with the Dominican Communist
Party (PCD) because the PCD's present policy of
nonviolence coincides with his own thinking.
Since returning in 1970 from self-imposed exile,
Bosch has concentrated on reorganizing the party
to rid it of leftist extremists and to bring it more
closely under his personal control. He has also
attracted the annoyed notice of the government
by his rather effective efforts to gain labor sup-
port and to organize a single labor confederation.
There have also been reorganizations in the PRD
youth group, and the PRD is the most powerful
organization at the politically volatile Autono-
mous University of Santo Domingo.
Bosch has made no bones about his disil-
lusionment with representative democracy, in-
cluding elections, but he has been less explicit
about what kind of government he envisions. The
promised explanation of how his "dictatorship
with popular support" would work has not been
forthcoming. It appears that he proposes a gov-
ernment brought to power through election or
coup by a broad-based mass movement led by the
PRD. The aim of such an administration would be
to remain in power long enough to restore "na-
tional sovereignty and identity" and to effect
basic reforms that could not be easily reversed.
Such a government would be a strong one and
would not hesitate to use coercion to achieve its
goals. The current Peruvian regime is cited by
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Bosch as an example of the kind of government
he has in mind.
The PRD is likely to be of continuing impor-
tance with or without Bosch. It is not a one-man
party in the classic Dominican sense and probably
would survive as a significant political force even
without Bosch because of its large membership,
organization, and a distinctive if vague political
ideology. Bosch, like Balaguer, does not enjoy
sharing power, however, and his control of the
party has dimmed the chances of younger party
leaders. It was speculated that Jose Pena Gomez,
former secretary general of the party who ran the
PRD while Bosch was out of the country, re-
signed his post and went abroad late last year
because Bosch allowed him too little scope. Pena
Gomez' sympathy toward the MPD was probably
a source of disagreement between the two men.
Pena Gomez is an able and promising politician
and a valuable asset to the PRD.
The Military
The military seems generally satisfied with
President Balaguer's policies and with its own
role. There is nothing to indicate that political
opposition figures or parties have attracted signifi-
cant military support.
Bosch's statement that the Peruvian Government
most nearly resembles what he envisions for the
Dominican Republic appears to be artful angling
for military attention. Nonetheless, the preva-
lence of tarnished top brass and Balaguer's careful
coddling of this important source of support
could feed discontent among younger officers
who profit less from the President's favor. The
political prospects of former General Elias Wessin
y Wessin were wiped out on 30 June when Presi-
dent Balaguer hauled him before television
cameras and in a nationwide speech accused him
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of conspiring against the government. The former
general was tried and sentenced to exile by a
military tribunal on the following day. There is
little to suggest that a Wessin coup plot could
seriously threaten the government. The President
apparently used the opportunity to show
would-be conspirators the folly of plotting against
his government.
General Neit Nivar Seijas commands the
strongest unit in the Dominican military, but
Balaguer's adroit manipulation of the armed
forces has confined Nivar's military power largely
to his own First Brigade. Nivar's extensive busi-
ness interests and his cultivation of a variety of
political figures probably give him influence out-
side the military that will be useful if he has high
political ambitions.
Nivar's goals are hard to assess. In the past,
he conspired actively on Balaguer's behalf and is
believed to be satisfied with the reward his service
has brought him. He maintains contact with
Bosch, probably at Balaguer's behest, but also
perhaps to maintain a relationship that might
later prove useful. Nivar's career as a plotter and
money-maker make it clear that his primary
loyalty is to himself. It is less clear whether he
wants to be president.
If Balaguer encounters serious opposition,
Nivar might try to assume power himself, but
there is no proof that he has the military, much
less the political, support he would need to get
and keep the presidency. Nivar is the nearest
thing to Trujillo's spiritual heir in the Dominican
Republic, and the upper classes and the business
and financial community who suffered at Tru-
jillo's hands would probably be very unenthus-
iastic about returning to the old order under
Nivar.
The going will be rougher for Balaguer's sec-
ond administration. Economic performance has
been reasonably encouraging, but the resolution
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of the question of Dominican sugar shipments to
the United States will affect economic growth
prospects. The graphic demonstration of the
economy's extreme vulnerability to external in-
fluences and the exhibition-bitter to the nation-
alist spirit-of Dominican dependence on the
United States should intensify criticism of Presi-
dent Balaguer's pro-US attitudes and stimulate
largely unanswerable demands for ways to pro-
mote greater economic independence.
Assuming that an adequate sugar quota is
obtained, the government will probably attempt
more agrarian reform and public works and de-
velopment projects to improve socioeconomic
conditions. Balaguer will extract maximum politi-
cal credit from any improvement. But need, much
less expectation, cannot possibly be met and the
opposition, mainly the PRD, will miss no oppor-
tunity to publicize the government's shortcom-
ings and stimulate popular pressure for more and
faster improvements.
At present the left's intentions are unde-
fined. Its weakness and disunity and the risk of
crippling reprisals by the military should it pro-
voke serious violence or make an attempt on the
President's life should lengthen the odds against
serious extreme leftist adventures. The prospect,
although remote, should not be dismissed en-
tirely, however. The relative strengths of the left
and the military are such that the murder of the
President would probably bring into being the
repressive military government that Bosch fears
and provoke severe reprisals against the extreme
left.
Continuing high unemployment, widespread
poverty, and allied ills, increasing apprehension
LL \ACIUAA1.
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that Balaguer will run for a third term, continuing
decay of opposition parties, and unchecked pro-
liferation of government authoritarianism all are
likely to gnaw away at the government's pop-
ularity. Balaguer's skill will probably prevent any
serious threat to his government from developing
from these causes. Even so, the problems are too
great, resources too small, and the President's
political philosophy too limited to permit him to
convert his presidency from a moderately com-
fortable holding operation to a positive contribu-
tion to the political and economic develo ment
of the Dominican Republic.
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