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I'd
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
13 October 1972
No. 0391/72
Copy N2 49
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WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
Office of Current intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
equently includes material coordinated with or prepared
he Office of Economic Research, the-Office of Strategic
and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
zpics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
. published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
WARNING
1 Egypt-USSR: Back to Acrimony
1 The Philippines: Suspended Animation
3 International Oil Developments
4 Indochina
8 Favorable Fall Fair Forecast
9 Korea: Frustration in Pyongyang
9 Burma: On Edge
7.0 Japan: An Eye on the Polls
e WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information
ecting the national security of the United States, within
neaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its con
oor receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by
CONTENTS (13 October 1972)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
38 The Yemens: Aden Loses an Island
19 Uganda-Tanzania: Uneasy Truce
Soviet Harvest Problems Persist
Yugoslavia: Still More Trials
EC: Nine for the Summit
Norway: A Mini-Coalition
Sweden: All Smoke and No Fire
Portugal: Tightening Up
17 Sudan: Cairo Men Get the Ax
;?iJ Argentina: Peron's Initiative
'2 Chile: Allende Afloat
Ecuador: Petroleum Problems
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
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WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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. lEgyptian complaints against the Soviet
Union have been renewed despite Prime Minister
Sidqi's scheduled arrival in Moscow on 16 Octo-
ber. A Beirut weekly published an interview on 5
October in which President Sadat is quoted as
saying that he brought the Soviet military pres-
ence in Egypt to an end because the Soviets
would not fight and had become "a burden to
us." Sadat said the decision was intended to let
the Kremlin know that Soviet strategy in the
Middle East could not be fulfilled at Egyptian
expense.-.a3
,_ tCairo's public recriminations before Sidqi's
arrival in Moscow may be a signal to the Soviets
that the problems that led to the ouster of their
military mission have not been resolved. Cairo
may also intend its comments as a warning to Iraq
and Syria of the dangers involved in too close a
relationship with the Soviets.
garding a possible Egyptian-Soviet summit when
he speculated that under certain circumstances
such a meeting might be "considered use-
;The Soviets, playing it cool, have not re-
sponded to the new Egyptian criticisms and it
appears that both are interested in some sort of
reconciliation. The process could be difficult, and
it will not be helped by the latest flurry of press
attacks. Quddus' remarks about inadequate Soviet
arms could indicate that the Egyptians intend to
renew their requests for more sophisticated mil-
itary hardware during the Sidqi talks in Moscow.
If so, this is likely to add another point of con-
tention to the reconciliation process. Quddus
seemed to warn against too much optimism re-
'Following this presidential blast, the editor
of the Egyptian newspaper, Akhbar al-Yawm,
whose criticism in late August and early Septem-
ber riled the Soviets, renewed his attacks on
Moscow last weekend. The editor Ihsan Abd al-
Quddus, resurrected charges that the Soviets had
failed to supply Egypt with necessary arms.
"Weapons that are not sufficient for a state to
fight the war that has been imposed upon it are
mere pieces of jewelry," he said. j
(The Philippine population continues to show
little sign of overt opposition to President Marcos'
martial law declaration. The political arrests and
stringent press censorship have not really im-
pinged on the daily affairs of the average citizen.
The long-suffering man in the street in Manila and
elsewhere has, in fact, been gratified by improved
conditions of law and order. He remains skeptical,
however, and is waiting to see whether Marcos
will indeed carry out the "New Society" reforms
he has promised.
~I I Most of the reforms announced by Marcos-
land reform, a streamlined bureaucracy,
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enforcement of gun control-are much needed
and highly popular. Thus far, however, he has
made mainly token gestures toward implementing
them, and it is by no means certain that he is
willing or able to challenge directly the funda-
mental economic and political interest groups
that are responsible for much of the injustice in
Philippine society. I
iLand reform, for instance, has existed in one
form or another since 1963, but it has not been
vigorously put into effect.
'.Marcos' actions since declaring martial law
indicate that at this point he remains more con-
cerned about his political future than the coun-
try's economic problems. He is pushing the Con-
stitutional Convention to finish its business so
that the new document will be ready for ratifi-
cation by a popular referendum; no date has been
Even assuming Marcos encounters relatively
smooth sailing, the imposition of martial law has
permanently changed the Philippine political
equation. Marcos apparently now sees himself as
long-term strong man-whether as president,
prime minister, or commander in chief-and in
the future he will always be tempted to fall back
on martial law again whenever his political
control seems threatened. At the same time.
Marcos' challengers-both within and outside the
Filipino establishment-may be pushed to the
conclusion that conspiracy and violence are the
only means to achieve power. Communists and
other extremists have long been advocating this
line, and their credibility has now been en-
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INTERNATIONAL OIL DEVELOPMENTS
jThe new look in the international oil busi-
ness moved a step forward last week with a tenta-
tive agreement that provides for participation by
the Arab Persian Gulf members of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Western
oil company operations within those states. Saudi
oil minister Yamani negotiated the pact on behalf
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi and
Qatar, but the final agreement will not be signed
until the five governments have ratified it_.J
LUnder the tentative agreement, participation
reportedly will begin at 25 percent, increasing
gradually to 51 percent by 1983. Compensation
to the companies probably will be considerably
above net book value-a compromise between the
two earlier positions. However, it will be substan-
tially less than the full value of assets, including
estimated oil reserves that the companies wanted.
The companies will market a large part of the
governments' share, at least in the first few years./
f fi'.> (Yamani believes that the Iraqis may balk at
the tentative agreement, presumably because of
the compensation arrangements. The nationalized
Iraq Petroleum Company and Baghdad had hoped
the participation agreement would provide an
;l opening for the settlement of their dispute, and
an Iraqi rejection of the pact would complicate
the matter. The company, trying to avoid a show-
down while ratification is pending, recently
announced that the moratorium on legal action
against purchasers of the nationalized crude oil
will remain in effect through December.
i iLibya has jumped in with its own version of
participation by demanding 50-percent ownership
in the Bunker-Hunt Oil Company. Bunker-Hunt,
once in partnership with British Petroleum in
Libya, was given until 19 October to respond.
The demand, which follows Tripoli's recent agree-
lment with the Italian state oil company for fifty-
rfifty partnership, probably will be made, in turn,
on the other companies in Libya. Bunker-Hunt is
clearly a logical choice for Libya to begin its
participation discussions. The company is small
and, in effect, is already a working partner with a
Libyan national company, successor to British
Petroleum: Bunker-Hunt has no written agree-
ment and little say in operations. All the com-
panies including Bunker-Hunt probably will adopt
a unified stand in resisting the Libyan demands,
even at the risk of complete nationalization, to
avoid jeopardizing the tentative participation
agreement with the Gulf states. In any showdown
with Tripoli, the larger companies, with big opera-
tions in the Persian Gulf, probably will provide oil
to the smaller companies, like Bunker-Hunt,
which have little or no -production outside
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5bUNbT
INDOCHINA
WAR ON SAIGON'S DOORSTEP
The Communists launched a series of hit-
and-run attacks north of Saigon late last week.
They are part of an ex ected October
point," designe
to put pressure on the South Vietnamese
government and the US prior to the November
elections. Government defense forces have
clashed repeatedly with small Communist main
force units around the town of Phu Cuong and at
points along Route 13, less than 20 miles from
the South Vietnamese capital. The Communists
have been able to hold several hamlets briefly and
have intermittently cut Route 13 north and south
of Phu Cuong. 11
Much of the enemy fighting so far has been
carried out by sappers and appears intended to
mask the movement of additional main-force in-
fantry units and supplies closer to Saigon `fEle-
~ments of two regiments of the North Vietnamese
7th Division have been ordered to infiltrate popu-
lated areas in southern Binh Duong Province, but
generally to avoid contact with government regu-
_nlars for the time being.")$apper elements have
moved into the south of the province. Most of the
enemy troops are currently west and south of Phu
Cuong along the Saigon River corridor, a tradi-
tional approach route into the Saigon area.
Gains in the Northern Provinces
=South Vietnamese regulars in Quang Ngai
Province have recaptured Landing Zone Dragon
and have cleared portions of Route 1 that con-
nect the province's five battered district capitals
along the coast. In neighboring Quang Tin Prov-
ince government forces have moved back into
Tien Phuoc district capital, which had been held
by the Communists for nearly a month. Farther
north, in Quang Tri Province, South Vietnamese
Marines captured a district capital just north of
Quang Tri City in a limited offensive operation
last weekend.
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LThere has been some enemy resistance to
South Vietnamese operations in this region, but
the Communists appear to be primarily concerned
with stockpiling supplies and regrouping their
forces. j
Security Slippage During Offensive
!The government's pacification statistics indi-
cate that local security declined significantly in
both urban and rural areas during the first five
months of the Communist offensive.,The statis-
tics are from the government's Hamlet Evaluation
System, an admittedly imprecise measuring tool,
but one that provides a general picture of pacifi-
cation trends; '.In March, just before the offensive
was launched, the vast majority of the 6.5 million
urban residents in South Vietnam were listed as
living under full or partial government control. By
August, the statistics show, the Communists had
greater access to almost half a million of these
people. Those affected live mostly in the suburbs
around such cities as Hue, Da Nang and Qui Nhon
and do not include some 42,000 people in district
towns such as Loc Ninh and Dong Ha that have
come under Communist control.'
ij f. In the countryside, the deterioration of se-
curity has been more pronounced. In March, the
Hamlet Evaluation System listed some 11.5 mil-
lion rural residents as under full or partial govern-
ment control; by August the figure had dropped
almost a million. Concurrently, the number of
people living under full or partial Communist
control more than doubled to over 1.7 million.
Close to two million rural and urban resi-
dents now either live in less secure conditions or
are under greater Communist control than they
--were in March of this year. The effect on the
government's pacification program will be severe,
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especially since several hundred key pacification
officials have been killed, captured or forced to
move. In Binh Dinh Province where the fighting
has been very heavy, no village governments are
currently operating in the northern three districts
and only 36 of the remaining 55 elsewhere in the
province are functioning. This disruption of local
leadership, together with the increased Com-
munist presence, will make the government's job
of rebuilding its position in the countryside long
and arduous. '.
The North Vietnamese this week launched a
major ground attack in North Laos against Vang
Pao's only task force on the Plaine des Jarres.
Preliminary reports on 12 October indicated that
most forward units of the 2,700-man government
Thn1
Heap
Ban Nis
gIaa r Communist at plc N.
Government-held location
Communist-held location
Page 6
force on the southern tip of the Plaine were
retreating after they had been hit with a large-
scale ground assault supported by tanks and artil-
lery.
The three other regular task forces operating
near the Plaine are making little progress. Ele-
ments of one task force trying to move back
toward the Plaine from the west have been unable
to push through Communist blocking positions.
Irregular units from the government's isolated
stronghold at Rolaam I ong managed to move into
positions overlooking Route 71, a major Com-
munist supply route north of the Plaine, but most
of them quickly withdrew when they came under
Communist attack.'
The Communists carried out an air strike
against Bouam Long itself on 9 October, the first
Communist air attack in north Laos in four years.
The brief bombing and strafing attack did not
cause any suhstantial damage or casualties- -
While the conflict in the north drags on,
government and tao Communist representatives
in Vientiane have been moving ahead with ar-
rangements to receive a Pathet Lao negotiating
delegation that is scheduled to arrive in the Lao
capital on 14 October', The delegation will be
headed by Phoune Sipraseuth, a high-ranking Lao
Communist leader- He was also Sorphanouvong's
representative in September 1970 when an earlier
effort was made to get talks started;, Chief govern-
ment negotiator Pheng Phongsavan and Lao Com-
munist representative Soth Phetrasy recently an-
nounced that they have agreed on such matters as
housing for the Communist delegation and a site
for the talks in Vientiane.
;'Cambodians had little to cheer about as the
Khmer Republic began its third year on 9
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October. In a dramatic prelude to the anniversary,
Vietnamese Communist sappers on 7 October
carried out a destructive raid in Phnom Penh's
northern quarter. The attack, which was the first
significant Communist ground action in the
capital area since early May, resulted in consider-
able damage to one of Phnom Penh's two major
bridges and in the loss of several Cambodian
Army armored personnel carriers. Government se-
curity troops claimed they killed most of the
estimated 100-man sapper force. Nonetheless, the
ease with which the Communists struck raised
fresh public concern over the government's mili-
tary capabilities. I
)The Cambodian Army also continued to fare
poorly against the Communists on battlefields in
the countryside. In Takeo Province, attacks by
Vietnamese and Khmer Communist troops dis-
rupted government operations aimed at clearing a
portion of Route 2 and forced the Cambodians to
withdraw from their few remaining outposts on
the highway between Takeo and the South Viet-
nam border. The Communists probably are trying
to expand their logistic corridor that runs through
this area into the South Vietnamese delta.'
In the northwest, government units in Kom-
pong Chhnang Province made no real progress in
their efforts to reopen a short stretch of Route 5
between Kompong Chhnang City and the town of
Oudong. Even if the Communists should be
driven away from the highway, however, several
damaged bridges will have to be repaired before
regular truck convoys can move rice from Bat-
tambang Province to Phnom PenhlfSince these
repairs probably cannot be completed until early
next month, the government will have to con-
tinue to rely on uncertain deliveries of imported
rice to maintain Phnom Penh's reserves. A
Preparing a New Government
L In addition to trying to cope with mounting
military and economic problems, Lon Nol has had
no little difficulty in forming a "government of
national union"-which he reportedly hopes to
unveil as soon as possible. The President's efforts
-)to enlist the services of such prominent opposi-
-)tionists as Republican Party chief Sirik Matak and
Democratic Party head In Tam have been com-
plicated by some key members of his own Socio-
Republican Party, who are reluctant to share any
power or authority with rival political groups. As
things now stand, if any Republicans or Demo-
crats do enter the government, they probably will 25X1
be given relatively minor portfolios in what will
be a reshuffled cabinet rather than a more ef-
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FAVORABLE FALL FAIR FORECAST
d j,,
The month-long fall session of the semi-
annual Canton Trade Fair opens on 15 October
and is expected to match or surpass the spring fair
when a record of over $1 billion in contracts were
signed. The Chinese economy has been per-
forming well-industrial production is running
roughly 10 percent higher than in 1972-and
interest in trade with China is growing. Chinese
export contracts could surpass the $700-$800
million level of the spring fair.
The Canton Fair has been reverting to its
role of being primarily an export fair, and no
large increase in Chinese import contracts is
anticipated over the spring total of $300-$400
million. Negotiations in Peking and purchasing
missions abroad are assuming a greater role in
Chinese purchases.
Attendance may exceed the record 8,000
traders who came this spring, as China continues
to expand its economic relations with non-
Communist countries. Japanese businessmen will
again be the largest contingent and may improve
on the $200 million in contracts signed in the
spring. More representatives from the less-
developed countries are expected, and purchases
should rise. A number of these countries will
order goods under Chinese aid agreements to be
sold at home to finance local costs of Chinese aid
projects.
The US contingent at this fair will probably
exceed the group of about 30 that attended the
spring fair. Some 15 US businesses are known to
Inspecting machine display
have received invitations. As with the spring fair,
these are mostly small firms and trading com-
panies primarily interested in imports. This
spring, US importers purchased about $5 million
in Chinese goods, mostly foodstuffs, fireworks,
carpets and drugs. Since these firms are now more
familiar with Chinese trade procedures and with
the demand in the US for Chinese goods they are
likely to buy more. Higher import tariffs for
Chinese goods and labeling requirements by the
Food and Drug Administration for foodstuffs,
however, may discourage some traders. No major
Chinese purchases of US goods are expected at
the fair although three major US export firms will
be represented. RCA and Western Union will
probably discuss future Chinese purchases of
communications equipment and the textile
division of Monsanto will explore the market for
its products in China.
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'' (North Korea has adopted a tougher propa-
ganda line on North-South negotiations, probably
because of its dissatisfaction with the recent
round of Red Cross talks and its defeat on the
Korean question in the UN)jEchoing comments
by Kim II-sung in a recent interview, Pyongyang
now claims that the South is refusing to imple-
ment the agreement to achieve national unifica-
?,;7 tion contained in the joint communique on 4
July. T;
/ lGovernment anxiety over possible terrorist
communique. Seoul is determined to preserve its
present policies despite the North Korean pres-
sure. This determination was underscored by Pres-
ident Pak Chong-hui in his 1 October Army Day25X1
address. He stressed that the nation must con-
tinue to build its military and moral stren th to
deal with the North Korean Communists.
activity by rebels supporting exiled prime minis-
ter U Nu has led to large-scale arrests of suspected
U Nu sympathizers. Up to 1,200 may now be
under detention. Foremost among them is ex-
Brigadier Aung Gyi, once a colleague of Prime
Minister Ne Win but out of favor for nearly a
decade because of opposition to Burma's socialist
course.)
,1() ZThe current jitters were touched off by the
arrest in Rangoon last week of an infiltrator who
described a program of armed terrorism in the
capital to be carried out by saboteurs trained in
the exiles' bases in ThailandfA subsequent an-
s' ' nouncement over the rebel radio that this would
North Korean spokesmen at home and begin on 10 October added to the government's
abroad are alleging that Seoul's military prepared- case of nerves. Until recently, the threat posed by
7ness exercises, its continued reliance on the UN i?' U Nu's resistance movement along the Thai
and US military presence, and the existence of I border has been discounted, with some justifica-
anti-Communist laws and emergency legislationA tion, by Rangoon. The government has been dis-
are in direct violation of the agreement. Like the turbed by deeper rebel penetrations which may
Kim interview, the recent propaganda stops short be aimed at exploiting the unrest caused by
of threatening to break off the negotiations. Its
threatening tone, nonetheless, points up Pyong-
yang's frustration with the talks and lays the
groundwork for blaming Seoul for anything that
goes wrong in the future.]
Burma's rice shortage.]
I % ,The government probably feared that those
arrested would become focal points for open
popular resistance-something which has so far
been prevented by tight security controls. The
extreme overreaction on the part of the govern-
ment could be due in part to Ne Win's depression
following the sudden death of his wife on 1
October. The prime minister, prone to paranoic
behavior under the best of circumstances, may
now become even more erratic, adding to the
?,; 1 Pyongyang will probably raise these charges'
at this week's initial meeting of the co-chairmen
of the high-level Coordinating Committee, but the
~tharges will have little impact on Seoul. The
South Koreans are confident of their ability to /1
deal with the North and are likely to counter with .;-
allegations of their own that Pyongyang's invec-
tiveis a violation of the spirit of the joint/
atmosphere of instability in Rangoon.
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c{$ JDespite Prime Minister Tanaka's repeated
assurances that general elections will not be called
until 1973, the government's decision to schedule
an extraordinary session of the Diet paves the
way for elections this year. The Diet, which will
convene on 27 October to review the Honolulu
and Peking summits and to pass a supplementary
budget, could be dissolved in early November,
allowing the vote to be scheduled as early as the
first week in December.\
?Stimulated by the influential press, an
e ection mood has seized the country and in-
creasing numbers of ruling Liberal Democratic
Dietmen believe that the election will take place
soon. Tanaka's close advisers are engaged in
detailed planning for the election, and last week
Komeito party officials reportedly moved their
campaign apparatus into full gear. The Socialists
and Communists have been preparing since last
July..?
By calling elections this year, the ruling,
party would be trying to capitalize upon the
"Tanaka boom." The prime minister is receiving
unprecedented support in the national polls, but
as the glow of the Sino-Japanese summit begins to
dim, media and public attention will begin to
focus on domestic affairs, and the Tanaka ad-
ministration is more vulnerable to charges that it
has failed to deliver on promises of reform at
home. Postponement until next year could have
one advantage for the government, the opposition
parties with limited war chests will probably have
spent their campaign resources by early 1973.
;.Whatever Tanaka decides on timing elec-
tions, the Liberal Democrats may well lose up-
wards of 20 Diet seats, restoring to the Socialists
part of the massive losses they suffered in the last
election in December 1969. Nonetheless, the rul-
ing party will retain a comfortable majority in the
Lower House. It would still be a vote of con-
fidence and should strengthen Tanaka's hand in
implementing controversial trade adjustment and
environmental cleanup programs.
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SOVIET HARVEST PROBLEMS PERSIST
The grain harvest is still behind schedule,
Deteriorating weather conditions jeopardize its
completion. According to the Soviet press, as of 2
October only 91 percent of the crop had been
threshed compared with 98 percent in an average
year. One week later, all grain had been threshed
in North Kazakhstan, leaving about 13 million
tons to be harvested, primarily in the Urals and
Siberia. Rain has complicated the harvest and
overtaxed grain drying facilities in some areas.
Since 5 October snow and sleet have fallen in
parts of Siberia, threatening to halt harvest opera-
tions there. Although most of the unharvested
crop could be salvaged in the spring, it probably
would not be fit for human consumption. [,
)Declining prospects in the New Lands fol-
`lowing the drought in European Russia probably
prompted the recent public admissions by Soviet
officials that the harvest would be poor. They
now say this year's grain crop will be no more
than 160-167 million tons compared with the 181
million tons harvested in 1971. We estimate that
gross grain production will be 160 million tons,
but that net usable grain-gross output less mois-
ture and waste-will be only 128 million tons-20
million tons below last year.
:The leadership is attempting to convince the
Soviet consumer that all steps are being taken to
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
ensure an adequate supply of food this winter.
Hinting at the huge foreign grain purchases-
about 28 million tons for delivery by mid-1973-
an agricultural official said, "Additional measures
have been taken to satisfy the nation's normal
grain requirements." The Soviets are also reported
to be buying an unprecedented one million tons
of potatoes from Poland. The Soviet potato crop
was another victim of the drought.
[The food supply situation in Moscow
appears to have improved after a spate of reports
in August of food shortages and high prices on
Moscow's open markets. Provincial towns in the
drou ht areas may still be having supply prob-
lems.
YUGOSLAVIA: STILL MORE TRIALS
{.Croatian courts last week convicted nine
former student leaders and put three intellectuals
in the dock on charges of masterminding the
attempted take-over of Croat political institutions
in 1971.
/Three of the student leaders received prison
sentences of three to four years, while six lesser
figures drew sentences ranging from six months to
three years. Because most of them were charged
with crimes carrying a maximum penalty of 15
years, the sentences were relatively light The
students' supporters, however, can find little to
-cheer about. The courts, aware that the student
leaders will be eligible for reduced sentences
pending good behavior, took the added precau-
tion of forbidding them to address public rallies
or the news media during the entire term of their
sentence.
With the student leaders out of the way, the
trials rolled on to the opening of the case against
three Croat intellectuals who were active in the
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Matica Hrvatska (Mother Croatia) cultural soci-
ety. These trials will produce a series of inflated
charges, ponderous and sensation-seeking testi-
mony from prosecution witnesses, flat denials by
the accused, and, presumably, ultimate convic-
tion),One new wrinkle might be an attempt to
revive charges that the intellectuals conspired
with emigres and through them with Western
intelligence. Recent terrorist acts by Croat
emigres have created an atmosphere conducive to
such charges..]
!.Once the Matica Hrvatska leaders have been
dealt with, the regime in Zagreb will have dis-
posed of most of the prominent Croatia-firsters.
The decision to exempt Croatian party leaders,
already purged, from trial seems to be holding
firm, and the party next will address matters such
as the upcoming third party conference. In view
of the aura of depression in the republic, how-
ever, party leader Milka Planinc will proceed
cautiously,
CMany in Belgrade will be glad to see the end
of the political trials in Zagreb. They have caused
adverse publicity in the West, produced unwel-
[The most specific outcome will be the crea-
tion of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund,
which would be an integral part of any future
economic and monetary union of the nine. The
fund has been a main objective of the French, but
in order to get it, they had to compromise. The
West Germans have been able to limit the fund,
for the time being at least, to the provision of
short-term credits to alleviate temporary financial
difficulties. Bonn also successfully insisted that
any movement toward monetary union include
steps toward economic policy coordination,
especially against inflation. High-level meetings in
preparation for the summit have shown, however,
that anti-inflation policies will be difficult to
devise on a community basis.
(Any immediate strengthening of the EC
institutions will likely be confined to a few minor
changes. France and Germany have agreed not to
raise the question of major institutional reforms,
and the British are saying they need experience in
the present bodies before suggesting changes. A
political secretariat is unlikely to be discussed at
all. France has demanded it be located in Paris;
the others insisted on Brussels;)
come praise from the Soviets, and inspired a {Although the Dutch consider it a matter of
feeble effort by the Czechoslovaks to identify the "national interest" that the European Parliament
trials of Dubcek supporters with those in Croatia. be both strengthened and directly elected through
In Belgrade, as elsewhere, it is realized that the universal suffrage, these issues are likely to be
trials have not dulled the Croats' inbred sense of remanded again for further study. The UK, Italy,
being dominated by the Serbs. and Denmark will argue strongly for effective EC
1 'The six present and three prospective mem-
bers of the European Communities will hold their
first summit meeting in Paris on 19-20 October.
The meeting will affirm the already-agreed steps
toward European economic and monetary union
and will attempt to emphasize European integra-
tion after the setback in the Norwegian EC refer-
endum and the French threats to postpone the
summit.
would increase the EC's jurisdiction, but it will
take time to draw up meaningful programs.]
EC relations with the rest of the world will
receive low priority at the summit. It is doubtful
that the nine will establish mechanisms for con-
sulting with the US beyond those that already
exist. The summit may declare an intention to
maintain favorable relations with the less devel-
oped countries by improving the EC's generalized
preference system and increasing development
aid. The summit will probably reaffirm an EC
intention to participate constructively in the com-
es `I prehensive trade negotiations on industrial and
agricultural trade scheduled for 1973.1
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The meeting will be important in the na-
tional context. Chancellor Brandt will be seeking
to improve his European image before the West
German elections on 19 November. President
Pompidou can only hope that the accomplish-
ments of the summit will counter his govern-
ment's poor performance in the EC enlargement
referendum last April and the failure of France to
have its way on the political secretariat issue. The
summit will, of course, provide a ceremonial
welcome to Ireland, Denmark, and the UK, which
become EC members on 1 January 1973, sig-
nifying a political success for the governments in
all three countries.
i. r The selection last week of Christian People's
Party chairman Lars Korvald to form a 21/2-party
mini-coalition was the bare minimum Oslo could
put together after the EC referendum brought
down the previous government. The coalition, if
realized, would have only 39 of the 150 seats in
parliament, making it extremely difficult to
govern until new elections next September. i
)The coalition would bring together the
Center and Christian People's parties and the five
Liberal Party members who opposed EC entry in
parliament. The Center Party, with 20 seats,
would be the senior partner. The selection of
Korvald to head the coalition probably was a sop
to get his party to join the government. The
Christian People's Party is conservative at home
and supports Norway's participation in NATO
and the UN.
The addition of the large Conservative Party
would have given such a government a majority in
parliament, but such a coalition does not seem
possible at this time. Conservative Party chairman
Kare Willoch, whose party supported EC member-
ship, has reiterated his position that only those
parties which opposed EC entry should partic-
ipate in the government which now has to nego-
tiate an alternative free trade agreement. Former
prime minister Bratteli has also blocked the par-
ticipation of his Labor Party by vowing, before
the referendum, not to participate in any coa-
lition if Norway failed to enter the market. i
i IA farmer and teacher, Korvald, 56, has been
chairman of his party since 1967. He is a rather
colorless politician and has been mainly con-
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G~ Social Democrats, meeting in Stockholm last
week, staged one of their most uneventful gather-
ings in recent history. Despite the participation of
Madam Binh in the opening ceremonies and the
plethora of pro-Hanoi sentiment J,, the rumored
'
.concessions to the party
s left wing failed to
materialize. The party leaders skillfully deflected
demands for immediate recognition of East Ger-
many, North Korea, and the Viet Cong. The left-
ists did manage to carry the day on resolutions
for defense cutbacks and an increase in foreign
aid. Prime Minister Palme displayed firm control
of the party by his careful management of the
congress. 3
rr: . J The party expressed serious concern over
incursions by the Center Party into Social Demo-
cratic constituencies. Several Social Democratic
officials, including Finance Minister Strang and
labor organization chairman Geijer, criticized the
[Center Party's conservatism and spoke in dismay
of the disappearance of inter-party cooperation.
Center Party chairman Thorbjorn Falldin, who
could head a non-Socialist coalition if the three
opposition parties were to win the election next
year, was the obvious target of such criticism. The
popular Falldin poses a serious challenge to
Palme, and the Social Democrats are trying to put
down the competition,,Jhey did not improve
-their position by much, since the congress failed
to come up with specific suggestions to relieve
voter anxieties over high taxes, rising prices, and
the soft job market,issues that promise to dom-
inate the election campaign.
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?The new decree law strengthening the
Portuguese political police, now known as the
Directorate General of Security, will help the
government deal with current problems and re-
flects increased concern about terrorist groups.
The new law condones certain current police
practices and confirms the directorate general's
responsibilities in security matters. Some of this
had been played down since Prime Minister
Caetano reorganized the security police in 1969.`,.
' The new law raises the authorized strength
of the political police by 13 percent and increases
salaries. It also exempts them from the most
important of the penal code reforms that became
effective on 1 October, the same day the new law
was issued. In those overseas territories where
"grave subversive acts" are occurring, complete
exemption is given. In Portugal itself, it is released
from reform provisions such as the mandatory
presence of a defense lawyer during interrogation
of a suspect and the preparation of pre-trial fact-
finding dossiers by a judge rather than the police.
The law also sanctions the current practice of
issuing arrest warrants and authorizes active and
retired "higher functionaries" of the service to
carry arms without a license.
;These increased police powers represent an
intent to deal more aggressively with several small
but active terrorists groups whose sporadic at-
tacks over the past two years have embarrassed
the government. Last month, a communications
station near Lisbon was bombed. In July, another
bombing heavily damaged 13 new troop transport
vehicles in Lisbon. The "revolutionary brigades,"
reportedly associated with a dissident Communist
group in Algiers, claimed responsibility for these
acts and for several acts of sabotage last year.
,Another terrorist organization, Armed Revolu-
tionary Action, is reportedly linked to the
orthodox Portuguese Communist Party. These
terrorists have been setting off explosives since
the fall of 1970. Both organizations aim to
demonstrate opposition to the Caetano govern-
ment, to the war in the African provinces, and to
Portugal's link to NATO.';
The limitations on civil rights imposed by
_1 1. the new law and the failure of the penal reform to
cover political offenses swings Caetano further to
the right. His earlier efforts to bring in new blood
to modernize the government have been reversed.
The undersecretary of state for planning, whose
liberal reform proposals alarmed the far right, was
pushed out in November 1971. Last August,
Caetano removed from his cabinet the two chief
economic reformers whose modernizing efforts
threatened the monopolies of powerful regime
backers. The government has also threatened to
ban a number of the opposition-oriented coopera-
tives that have used their status as economic or-
ganizations to criticize the regime. Pre-publication
censorship of the press has been extended indefi-
nitely, although the press law passed last year had
provided for its abolition. The organic law for the
overseas provinces promulgated in May granted
less autonomy than critics of the overseas rela-
tionship had wished; Caetano insisted on main-
taining Lisbon's control.
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SUDAN: CAIRO MEN GET THE AX
J LThe most important aspect of the cabinet '/ iNumayri had already purged a number of
changes in Khartoum this week is the ouster of r, ministers and lesser officials who favor close ties
the remaining ministers known for their pro- with Cairo to demonstrate his displeasure with
E
gyptian sympathies. They have been in obvious;':what he views as Egyptian meddling. The new
trouble for some time as Sudan-Egypt relations
have deteriorated over the past year. The im-
mediate cause for their removal was the sharp
attack in the Egyptian press late last month
against Sudan's interception of Libyan troop
transports en route to Uganda. Relations were
moving toward an open break when Egypt re-
quested Sudan to withdraw its units stationed
along the Suez Canal. At the week's end, how-
ever, a final break had still been avoided.']
government is ostensibly intended to set the stage
for the convening on 12 October of a constituent
assembly, the first since Numayri came to power
in May 1969. The whole process is to lead to the
drafting of a constitution next yearly 'ln the cabi-
net reshuffle, Numayri retained the prime minis-
ter's post and the defense ministry. The key port25X1
folios of foreign affairs, interior, and economy are
held b carr -ovens from the previous cabi-
net.
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THE YEMENS: ADEN LOSES AN ISLAND
:.Relations between the two Yemens reached
a new low following the seizure of Aden's
Kamaran Island on 6 October by Adeni dissidents
of the National Unity Front.}The dissidents, who
had the approval, and probably the support, of
the Sana government, encountered little resist-
ance and captured about 20 Adeni soldiers.
,,, Kamaran is more than 150 miles from Yemen
(Aden), and lies only one and one-half miles off
the coast of Yemen (Sana). It is sparsely popu-
lated, mostly by fishermen. It was occupied by
the British in 1915 and administered by them
from Aden until late 1967 when Yemen (Aden)
became independent and succeeded to that
responsibility. I
Aden has charged that the take-over was the
work of the army of Yemen (Sana) and has
threatened to use force if Kamaran is not restored
to Aden's control.Up to now, the Aden govern-
ment has generally chosen to soft-pedal Sana's
role in the activities of Adeni dissidents, pre-
ferring to place the blame on "mercenaries and
reactionaries backed by imperialist powers." An
attempt by Aden to recover Kamaran using mili-
tary means seems out of the question, but Aden
YEMEN
may retaliate by occupying a portion of Sana's
territory. `
The border between the two Yemens saw
further fighting during the week between dissi-
dents, who are showing surprising persistence, and
the Adeni Army. On 11 October Aden charged
that attacks with armor and artillery had been
resumed by the Yemen (Sana) Army in the Ad
Dhali region-about 65 miles from the city of
'Aden.\,There is no confirmation of participation
by Sana regulars in this fighting, and it may
reflect continuing activity by National Unity
Front dissidents known to be in the area. Pressure
for action against Aden is building in Sana,
according to the US Embassy there. New dissi-
dent incursions are considered likely and, in addi-
tion, there are reports that large numbers of
Yemen (Sana) tribesmen are moving toward the
border.
~? `) ' Meanwhile, a five-member contingent from
the Arab League is now attempting to get the two
Yemens to ease the fighting which began in mid-
September. The mediators do not appear to have
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Aden ch 5'-
Ad ohali new attacks
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UGANDA-TANZANIA: UNEASY TRUCE
The peace agreement signed by the two ', ?Nyerere is unlikely to expel his friend Milton
countries last week in Mogadiscio has eased ) Obote, Uganda's ex-president, and his followers
tensions a bit, but sharp differences remain and ;-(-"from Tanzania, from which they launched their
_,,hostilities could easily recurzj,_Under the auspices abortive effort to overthrow Amin. There was no
of Somalia and the Organization of African reference to Obote in the Mogadiscio agreement,
Unity, Uganda and Tanzania agreed to cease all .\butj[Ugandan President Amin has repeatedly said
military and propaganda activities directed against that there will be "no peace" between the two
each other and to withdraw all troops six miles countries as long as Obote and his supporters
from the border. Each of the two countries also remain in Tanzania. J
agreed to refrain from harboring or allowing
"subversive forces" to operate against the other
and to release any nationals or property of the
other side:?
d : Uganda and Tanzania have welcomed the
truce,, but it could easily be broken by new flare-
ups:j )The mutual withdrawal of troops is to be
observed by Somali officials, but their presence
will be only temporary. The pledge to stop pro-
viding refuge to "subversive, forces" could be the
major stumbling block. ,) Tanzanian President
Any real resolution of the dispute between
Uganda and Tanzania probably awaits a meeting
between Amin and Nyerere. Nyerere, however,
refuses to recognize Amin's government or to
meet with the general. Amin, for his part, has
agreed to such a meeting, but he continues to rail
against Nyerere and Tanzania, most recently with
charges that Tanzania and other countries are
planning to invade Uganda next month.
[Underscoring the fragility of the Mogadiscio
agreement, Somali President Siad made quick
trips to Kampala and Dar es Salaam immediately
after the agreement was signed. Siad probably was
urging Amin and Nyerere to move quickly to
implement the agreement. He may have tried to
soften Nyerere's stand on the Amin regime and to
set up a meeting between the two, possibly at
celebrations in Mogadiscio on 21 October
marking the third anniversary of the Somali coup.
Nyerere has accepted an invitation, but he prob-
ably will back out if Amin agrees to attend. 1,
.Meanwhile, repression of real or imagined
opposition elements in Uganda continues. Several
important Baganda tribesmen have been killed,
detained, or have "disappeared." Acholi and
Lango made up most of the guerrilla force that
invaded Uganda last month, and many of their
tribesmen have been murdered by army troops.
The army itself is badly riven by tribal frictions,
and discipline is uncertain. Some departing Asians
are being robbed, beaten, or killed, and police
have started to pick up university students. Secu-
rity forces have avoided incidents with white resi-
dents during the past few weeks, but with Amin's
announcement of a new invasion threat and the
could quickly change for the worse.
uneasy atmosphere in Kampala, the situation
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Malagasy Republic
FIVE MORE YEARS
'General Ramanantsoa's government received
over 90 percent of the vote in the referendum on
8 October. The vote gives his government a five-
year mandate and abolishes the office of presi-
dent held by Philibert Tsiranana. Tsiranana had
been only a figurehead since last May when stu-
dent and labor demonstrators forced him to turn
real power over to Ramanantsoa.'
In the campaign leading up to the referen-
dum the government took the line that an affirm-
ative vote was a vote against Tsiranana, who is
very unpopular.: Ramanantsoa, nevertheless, has
won considerable acceptance throughout the
island and would probably have received a strong
vote of confidence even if Tsiranana had not been
an issue. The general has worked diligently to
prevent conflict between Madagascar's major
tribal groups, has tried to end corruption and
improve government administration, has begun to
move Malagasy citizens into positions held by
French advisers, and is endeavoring to give his
country a less French and more nationalist
orientation in foreign policy.)
Many problems remain not the least of
which is the country's sagging economy.
Ramanantsoa has not yet offered a precise eco-
nomic program. The general is committed to
changing the country's political institutions; to do
this, he will have to bargain for support among
the island's diverse interest groups. Many of the
major political figures who supported
Ramanantsoa in the referendum will probably
differ with the government over the pace and
direction of political and economic reform.
Ramanantsoa must also contend with the
students and workers who brought him to power.
The government has not yet responded to de-
mands made by students and workers at a na-
tional congress in September. Many of these
demands are too radical for the government to
accept, and Ramanantsoa's strong showing in the
referendum should strengthen his hand in re-
sisting them.
ARGENTINA: PERON'S INITIATIVE
The Peronists and the military leaders have
laid the foundation for serious negotiations on
the coming elections and the government that will
follow. Former dictator Juan Peron has offered a
10-point "reconstruction plan" that has elicited a
favorable response from the Lanusse government-
Peron's personal representative has stated that if
an agreement can be reached, Peron will return to
Argentina to sign it.
Several points in the Peronist document deal
with issues on which there is already agreement or
only a minor difference of opinion between the
Peronists and the government. The points of
agreement include the strengthening of national
sovereignty, changes in economic and social
policy, and lifting of the state of siege. The plan
also includes many controversial issues, but even
the points on which there is strong difference are
couched in conciliatory terms.
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25X1
President Lanusse has publicly characterized
PERON'S TEN POINTS
1. Immediate severance of all international
ties that limit national sovereignty.
2. Urgent modification of economic/social
policy.
3. Program for national reconstruction under
the national economic and social council.
4. Precise definition of the future participa-
tion of the armed forces in national planning
and reconstruction.
5. Re-examination of the constitutional
amendments controlling "institutiona-
lization."
6. All decisions on amnesties, abrogations,
extraordinary laws to be the responsibility of
the future government.
7. Designation of a senior military officer as
minister of interior.
8. Formation of a commission to ensure the
impartiality of the public media.
9. Lifting of the state of siege and liberty for
all political prisoners.
10. Consultation and agreement with all po-
litical forces regarding the establishment of
the electoral law and convocation of elec-
tions.
the 10-point plan as a " ositive contribution to
reaching a solution."
The pla in Lanusse's view, re lects
Peron's effort to reach an accord with the govern-
ment and avoid losing control of the Peronist
movement, which would result if he tried to re-
main aloof from the elections. j
There are some points in Peron's plan that
are clearly not negotiable from the government's
point of view, such as the demand that all "polit-
ical prisoners" should be released and that the law
barring Peron's candidacy because he was not in
the country on 25 August should be abrogated.
Even so, Lanusse will probably try to be as forth-
coming as he can; ;The resignation of Finance
Minister Licciardo could be one indication of a
willingness to cooperate. The Peronist plan called
for a loosening of controls on wages and credit
and a tightening of controls on foreign business.
The acceptance of Licciardo's resignation could
mean that Lanusse is ready to move in this di-
rection.
/The willingness of the Peronists and the gov-
ernment to open a dialogue is encouraging, but it
is unlikely that an accord will be easily reached.
The military and the Peronists have been unable
to reconcile their differences in the 17 years since
Peron was overthrown, and there are deep dif-
ferenc and lon -held suspicions to be over-
come.
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CHILE: ALLENDE AFLOAT
+..
As the Allende government moves from one
difficulty to another, it manages to retrieve
enough chestnuts from the fires to stay viable. It
manages to keep its opponents off base and to
grasp the important levers of economic control
more firmly in its own hands. The two chief
assets in this process are Allende's own ability to
feel his way through the Chilean political
labyrinth and the Communist Party's steady con-
solidation of its role as the key party in the
government.
The Kennecott attachment of payment for a
shipment of Chilean copper to France has serious
implications for a country in deep economic dis-
tress, but Allende's opposition has no choice but
to rally behind him on this nationalistic issue.
Indeed, he frequently finds the means to blunt
the opposition's campaign to demonstrate that his
coalition is governing Chile badly. Allende blurred
even the official admission this week that this
year the inflation rate had soared to 99.8 percent
by 1 October. He told the Chileans that they
must solve the country's difficulties by their own
hard work and self-denial and then raised wages
to equal the price increases. While the response to
his urging is unlikely to be noticeable and opposi-
tion demonstrations continue to be impressive, a
majority of Chileans still seem to consider Al-
lende no worse than many of his predecessors.
At the same time, the President is drawing
the armed forces into stronger identification with
his administration. He announced on 7 October
that the service commanders have developed a
plan to integrate the military more fully into the
country's economic development programs. In
fact, he has cultivated the armed forces so as-
siduously that one magazine calls them Chile's
pampered children.
Allende's task is wearing and he often be-
trays strain and impatience. His satisfaction in his
office is, however, a strong restorative. Such ex-
periences as receiving Angela Davis as well as the
Joliot-Curie medal at the World Peace Conference
in Santiago and playing the underdog in the
Kennecott and other widely publicized issues
seem to offset his failures and keep him going.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party daily ac-
curately gauges the situation and seldom misses
an opening. Party leaders keep their perspective
and are wary of setting off a reaction by ap-
pearing to have too much power. They see to it
that their government responsibilities are for the
most part efficiently handled and that political
resentment of the party inside and outside the
coalition is kept to reasonable proportions. The
party knows that it is Allende's most reliable 25X1
political support and takes particular satisfaction
in his ability to keep the military from co-
operating to unseat the government.
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vestors. The petroleum issue is a highly charged
),-one, and the foreign companies have been ex-
' tremely cautious in setting out their negotiating
positions so as to keep charges of economic
imperialism to a minimum.;
Several of the major oil companies currently LThe government has placed high-perhaps
engaged in exploiting Ecuador's Oriente oil fields unrealistic-hopes on the revenues from the ex-
are so disillusioned over the prospects for locating port of crude oil and will be hard pressed to
`and developing large reserves and for gaining -justify a significant drop in production or ex-
profitable concession terms that they are thinking pectations. Already, national newspapers have
,r- of pulling out of the country. If they do, it will begun cautiously criticizing the government for
have a major impact on the military regime.] ..) pursuing an unwise policy toward foreign in-
In September, AMOCO relinquished the
rights to one of its concessions and will probably
do the same with the other. The company has
drilled two wells so far and both have been dry.
The Anglo consortium has decided in effect to
i suspend drilling after the completion of its eighth
well; only one of its first seven brought up a
significant amount of oil.."
.Of the remaining 24 foreign companies, only
Texaco-Gulf has thus far agreed to pay the re-
cently announced higher rental rates. Texaco-Gulf
is the largest single investor in Ecuador, having
invested over $300 million so far, including $154
million for the construction of a trans-Andean
pipeline; it is the only company that has actually
shipped crude oil out of the country. Texaco-Gulf
began shipping crude oil on 15 August and ship-
ments have now reached 200,000 barrels per day;
this figure should reach 250,000 by the end of
the year. According to the present contract,
Texaco-Gulf will keep 25 percent of the profits
and give the government 75 percent.
,Current negotiations between the oil com-
panies and the government stem from the govern-
ment's decision last June to apply retroactively
the highly restrictive Hydrocarbons Law of
October 1971 to existing contracts. The com-
panies view this unilateral move as unfair, and in
some cases, as precluding profitable operations.
Protests have been futile, but the government
may have to reconsider if more companies
suspend operations as a result of unfavorable ex-
ploratory drilling._'j
Texaco-Gulf
Keeping at It
Many of the foreign investors have reached
the point where they must make critical decisions
on further investments. Their deliberations have
been complicated by the injection of higher rental
rates and the possibility that recoverable oil re-
serves are significantly lower than the six billion
barrels previously estimated. Texaco-Gulf has
already invested so heavily that refusing to pay
the higher rates and relinquishing its concessions
would be economically unjustifiable. For the
other companies, it is a question of continuing to
operate in a high risk environment or cutting their 25X1
losses by getting out now. Their decisions will be
a major factor in determining the military gov-
ernment's direction and longevity.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Yugoslavia: The Politics of Succession
Secret
N2 49
13 October 1972
No. 0391/72A
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Yugoslavia:
The Politics I
Succession
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The succession in Yugoslavia will not be
easy. The problems of a developing nation bal-
anced between East and West and plagued with
ethnic hatreds will compound the difficulties
when President Tito passes from the scene. With
an eye toward helping his countrymen surmount
these obstacles, Tito has created a system of col-
lective leadership in both the party and state. A
hybrid mixture of Western liberalism and Com-
munism, this system is anathema to the Soviets,
an enigma to the West, and not really understood
by all the Yugoslavs.
In fleshing out Tito's blueprint for gov-
erning, Yugoslavia has suffered challenges and set-
backs, notably the bout with Croatian nation-
alism last year. With each challenge to date the
system seems to have matured and gained resili-
ence. In the background stands the military
officer corps, which considers itself the guardian
of the unity of Yugoslavia. The armed forces have
repeatedly expressed a willingness to step in
should the federation's existence be endangered
and will be ready to do so in the succession
period.
As a result of years of carefully planned
personnel shifts, a large number of well-trained
leaders with broad experience are available when
Tito leaves. In spite of personality conflicts,
animosities, and disagreements, most of them
recognize that their home republics and provinces
have no future outside the federation. On bal-
ance, they probably can be expected, even after
Tito's steadying hand is removed, to pull together
and prove that Yugoslavia is not just the impos-
sible dream of an aging dictator.
Tito and His System
Tito has sought to build a nation-state where
only a facade existed before and to ensure that
the Yugoslavia he has built continues after him.
The postwar record of accomplishments is impres-
sive. Tito, in addition to defying Stalin, parlayed
ambiguous terms such as "self-management" and
"nonalignment" into political concepts that
worked, for a while at least.
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A crafty and gregarious self-made man, Tito
possesses rare political talents and skills. He is
dogmatic and can be arrogant, but Tito has keen
instinct for sensing danger, knows when self-
control is needed and, no less important, how to
neutralize his opposition. Most significant for
Yugoslavia's future, however, is his masterful
ability to employ the skills of those around him.
Critics of the aging leader and his system
argue that Yugoslavia is just a castle in the air that
will be there only so long as he is around. Recog-
nizing the problems that lie ahead, Tito has con-
scientiously sought to lay a solid foundation for
his nation's future. He has created collective
executive bodies in both the party and govern-
ment in which genuine debate and give-and-take
have become part of the decision-making process.
Aware that collective governing bodies are only as
good as the men who occupy them, Tito has
instituted a system of rotating all major party and
government assignments at two- to three-year
intervals. This accomplishes two things: it pre-
vents a potential political rival from emerging to
challenge Tito's power and authority, and it
brings the nation's most talented leaders to
Belgrade from the republics and provinces for the
benefit of the federation.
The net result is that Yugoslavia has a reser-
voir of well-trained men prepared to take over
and operate the system Tito passes to them. Most
of these men are equally adroit in handling party
and state affairs. Many have held diplomatic posts
in the East and West.
The Party
The real crunch in the succession period will,
of course, come in the party. It is the party that
will determine how power is divided up and
exercised after Tito. In 1969, Tito created a party
executive bureau, designed to bring together in
Belgrade the best talent available from the center
and from each republic and province. It was also
designed to give an equal voice to Yugoslavia's
various ethnic groups at the highest decision-
making level.
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Executive and Legislative Branches of Yugoslavia
Chamber of Nationalities
(140 members)
Social-Political Chamber
(120 members)
Social Welfare and Health Chamber
(120 members)
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEC)
The Cabinet
PREMIER
Education and Culture Chamber
(120 members)
Economic Chamber
(120 members)
553668 l g-72
pecial Report
VICE PREMIER
VICE PREMIER
SECRETARY
Federal Secretaries for:
(1) Economy
(2) Labor and Social Policies
(3) Finance
(4) Foreign Trade
(5) Foreign Affairs
(6) National Defense
(7) Judicial and General Administration
(8) Agriculture
(9) Internal Affairs
(10) Transportation and
Communications
(28 members in all)
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In three turbulent years, the executive
bureau has undergone extensive reorganization.
Today, it is the collective body responsible for
taking much of the party work off Tito's
shoulders; eventually, it is expected to provide
the Yugoslav leadership in the succession period.
Today, the bureau is made up of eight men,
one from each of the six republics and one from
each of the two autonomous provinces. The
average age of its members is 50.6 years; four of
them are lawyers or economists, one is a teacher,
one a veterinarian, one a philosopher and one has
a background in political science. They bring
together a wide range of experience and expertise.
Fadil Hodza, for example, is a specialist in Alba-
nian affairs. He is trusted and well liked by the
vast majority of Yugoslavia's nearly one million
Albanians. Kiro Gligorov is the official spokesman
for the nation's complicated economic reform.
On present form the person most likely to
take up Tito's party mantle is the young and
energetic Stane Dolanc. A Slovenian, Dolanc has
both organizational and ideological competence.
He is one of the original executive bureau mem-
bers and has gained Tito's confidence not only
through hard work and devotion to the party, but
also through his ability to tailor party action
quickly to Tito's wishes. On numerous occasions
Dolanc has spoken for Tito. Last December, for
example, Dolanc went on nationwide TV to
explain the actions taken against the Croatian
leadership. He remained in the forefront through-
out the turbulence of December and January,
translating Tito's words into action. Dolanc's
critics call him a hatchet man. Friends respond
that he genuinely believes in the need for a strong
party capable of holding Yugoslavia together. He
does not, as some critics imply, advocate a return
to Soviet-style centralist rule. Like many of his
fellow Slovenes, Dolanc is greatly concerned that
the centrifugal forces of regionalism endanger the
federation.
Edvard Kardelj, the party's intellectual is not
likely to succeed Tito, but will wield considerable
influence on the next party chief. He is the last of
Tito's close, wartime colleagues to remain in
prominence. Kardelj is the father of the nation's
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peculiar form of socialism, the guiding light
behind Belgrade's nonaligned posture, and the
chief architect of Yugoslavia's current decentral-
izing constitutional reforms.
Two years ago Tito astonished the faithful in
Zagreb with a call for a collective presidency.
Speaking with candor, Tito said the time was ripe
to prepare for the succession.
"There should be a collective president in
Yugoslavia which bears full responsibility for
what is happening," he said. "This is the only
solution to preserve our unity."
Presidium
52 Members
Executive Bureau
8 Members
Under Tito's new scheme, others should
begin to lift the burden of leadership from him,
teamwork and cooperation would be the rule,
Yugoslavia's diverse nationalities would be equal,
no one group would dominate another. In this
manner Tito set in motion a radical reform
designed to qive all the republics and provinces a
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sense of equal participation in the highest levels
of government.
Tito's collective presidency is modeled after
the Swiss. Twenty-three men make up the col-
lective presidency-himself, three representatives
from each of the country's six republics, and two
from each of the two autonomous provinces.
Each member of the presidency is charged with
representing his local interests and, in addition,
helps run the government.
With the creation of the collective presi-
dency, the position of vice president was estab-
lished. The post is significant because the incum-
bent automatically becomes caretaker president
1971-72
Krste Crvenkovski, a Macedonian
1972-73
Rato Dugonjic, a
Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina
1973-74
A
Slovene
1974-75
A
Serb
1975-76
A
Croat
1976-77
A
Montenegrin
1977-78
A
Vojvodinian
The rotation will start over in 1978 and an Albanian will not hold down
the post until 1985. Presumably, once Tito is gone the titular post of
president will rotate in a similar fashion.
when Tito departs. The vice presidency rotates
annually among the presidency's members ac-
cording to a predetermined pattern. First to be
vice president was a Macedonian, Krste Crvenkov-
ski, who served from August 1971 to August
1972. He is well educated, aggressive, and intel-
ligent, and, during his tour as vice president,
clearly established himself as one who will play a
key role in the succession period. Were Tito to die
this year, the caretaker president would be the
current vice president, Rato Dugonjic, a Serb
from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Dugonjic has experi-
ence in internal and foreign affairs as well as in
youth work, an area of prime concern for the
regime.
Another feature of Tito's new system of
governance, Yugoslav leaders are expected to
substitute persuasion for coercion and to be
practical instead of pedantic. They must be
articulate, playing to their audiences and main-
taining a good public image. Ideology must not
stand in the way of getting the job done. They
must be politicians more akin to those in the West
than in the East.
Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac, Finance
Minister Janko Smole and Vice Premier Anton
Vratusa are examples of the new breed. They will
play important roles in running Yugoslavia after
Tito. The first two are exceptions to the rotation
policy and are serving their second consecutive
terms in office. They have gained respect both at
home and abroad.
Of the three, the most ambitious is Vratusa.
An outspoken supporter of Yugoslavia's self-
managing socialism and nonaligned foreign policy,
the sheer force of his personality assures him a
role in the post-Tito politicking. Smole, a former
deputy director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, is well known
and liked in international financial circles. His
arrogance in dealing with fellow Yugoslavs, how-
ever, could prove his undoing in the politics of
succession. Tepavac is probably the most liberal
of the three. His sometimes unorthodox ideas are
reinforced at home by his actress wife Renata.
She is a far cry from the Mrs. Khrushchev stereo-
type of a Communist leader's wife. This beauty is
a theater buff and has lent her name and talents
to Belgrade's avant garde theater, Atelje 212. Her
poise and charm have been a major asset to
Tepavac on his way up.
Although not in the limelight at present,
Mijalko Todorovic promises to figure prominantly
in the succession period. He has been shuffled off
to the unpromising job of president, but as a
long-time confidant of Tito's, will very likely be
back. He captured headlines four years ago with
his virulent criticism of the Soviets for occupying
Czechoslovakia.
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Yugoslavia's leaders may range from liberal
to conservative, but they are united in a belief
that the nation's future depends on federation.
Nowhere is the federalist feeling stronger than in
the military. The armed forces have long been
faithful supporters of Tito and his policies. The
officer corps has come to view itself as holding a
privileged position in the power structure. They
were confirmed in this belief last December when
Tito sought and obtained
endorsement for his move to put
down Croatian separatism. The Zagreb military
commander was among the first to come out in
support of Tito's actions. No military leader has
been more outspoken in opposition to localism
and support of federalism than Colonel General
Viktor Bubanj, who is clearly going places in the
armed forces. He is well versed in political and
economic affairs, and an aggressive, natural
leader. He has been chief of staff since January
1970. In this capacity he frequently sees Western
cl l omats.
Defense Minister Nikola Ljubicic is another
military figure who will have a voice in what
happens after Tito. He is articulate, and Tito has
used him more than once, both at home and
abroad, to propagate and defend national policies.
Ljubicic is intensely loyal to the federation and
would support the politician he felt best able to
hold Yugoslavia together. A third military figure
whose voice will be heard in the succession period
is Colonel General Ivan Miskovic. He has Tito's
ear, indeed, he was made special adviser to the
President on questions of security in the wake of
the Croatian political upheavals. Miskovic's posi-
tion is strengthened by the fact that his brother
Milan is a member of the state presidency. F_
Some who have met Miskovic describe him as
pro-Soviet. A better description would be that he
is politically conservative and harbors strong
reservations about the value of, and need for,
decentralizing power. His views on running a
Communist state are closer to Moscow's than are
those of his colleagues, but this should not be
over-emphasized.
Economic rivalries, ethnic animosities and
foreign meddling plague Yugoslavia now and will
continue to do so in the succession period.
The path of Yugoslavia's recent history is
paved with economic problems. The widening
gulf between a relatively affluent urban society
on the one hand and an agricultural population
on the other is a constant irritant. The gap be-
tween the relatively well-developed north and 25X1
west and the depressed south and east, is another 25X1
critical problem. This regional disparity is a major
source of rivalry, distrust and envy. It feeds the
nation's ancient and bitter ethnic animosities.
Belgrade has worked hard on overcoming
this problem, but it is still there. The government
now admits its program of channeling investment
funds to backward areas will require a consider-
able gestation period before it produces results.
Regional squabbling will afflict Yugoslavia as long
as these economic disparities exist. The problem
will not be solved in Tito's lifetime and will be a25X1
major concern to those who follow him.
No nation in Europe is more plagued with
deep-rooted ethnic hatreds than is Yugoslavia.
Tito's leadership and the sheer force of his pres-
tige and personality kept the problem at bay
throughout most of the postwar period. Al-
though designed in part to ameliorate these
animosities, the freer political climate accom-
panying Tito's efforts to build for the future has
permitted them to be expressed more openly and
vigorously. As a result, frictions have increased
instead of declined. The latest and most serious
example was the political upheaval in Croatia. It
showed that, after 2/ years in power, Vito had
not managed to build a federation in which con-
stituent ethnic groups put aside regional differ-
ences in the interest of the nation as a whole.
The magnitude of the move against the
Croatian leaders last December left many Yugo-
slavs bewildered and stunned. More than 600
Croats lost their jobs at that time, and many
feared Vito's new system had been endangered by
Tito's own actions. Confusion within party ranks
was heightened by Tnto's vacillating and then by
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his highhanded circumvention of the system he
had built, as well as his failure to lay out clear-cut
party directives.
In the wake of Croatia, Belgrade has moved
against regional chauvinists throughout Yugo-
slavia. This summer witnessed trials not only in
Croatia, but in Serbia and Macedonia as well. The
party executive bureau announced in mid-
September that measures to ensure discipline will
henceforth include sending "teams" to local
republic, provincial, and army party units.
A great deal more needs to be done. Time is
needed to correct past mistakes and to heal the
wounds of the Croatian crisis last year. Time is
one thing Tito does not have. He is 80. There is
no easy or quick solution to the complex problem
of regionalism, and it is not likely to be solved
within the aging leader's remaining years. Tito has
brought to the fore leaders who recognize the
need for a federation of equal nationalities, but
the mammoth task of instilling this idea in the
average Croat or Serb still remains to be done. It
will take all the skill and cunning that can be
mustered to guide Yugoslavia through this wilder-
ness that Tito scarcely penetrated.
Tito's successors will be subjected to
machinations from a number of foreign sources,
principally the USSR. The Soviets have learned to
live with, even grudgingly accept, the Yugoslav
heresy. Moscow hopes that Yugoslavia's march
toward orthodox Soviet-style Communism will be
resumed after the heretic Tito leaves. Moscow
may even anticipate that Tito's hard-pressed heirs
will turn to the Soviet Union for advice and help
in dealing with the serious economic difficulties
and nationality rivalries. The Soviets have at least
temporarily patched up their differences with
Tito and are using this opening to jockey for a
better position in the post-Tito Yugoslavia. In
return for large development credits Moscow re-
cently joined the West in gaining the right to
bypass federal authorities and deal directly with
local enterprises. Over the long run, these foot-
holds may prove very useful in insinuating Mos-
cow's views and positions into Yugoslavia.
Special Report - 7
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Radical, anti-Communist Croatian emigres
have taken heart from Yugoslavia's recent prob-
lems with nationalism and have intensified their
campaign for an independent Croatia through
guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and air piracy.
These actions are part of a pattern of the upsurge
in terrorism that began in 1971 with the murder
of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden, Vladimer
Rolovic, and terrorism will continue into the
succession period. Croatian emigres are based in
Austria, Sweden, Canada, West Germany, the US,
and Australia. Belgrade has made it clear that
failure of these host countries to clamp down on
the emigres will have a negative affect on bilateral
relations. The problem may become an even
greater irritant in the succession period than it is
today because the emi res will see Tito's passing
as a green light.
Josip Broz Tito, described by some as the first and
last Yugoslav.
Tito kicked off the politics of succession by
calling for the creation of a collective presidency
and for a further decentralization of power from
Belgrade to the republics and provinces. One con-
stitutional reform has been passed and a second is
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being debated. Regionalism last winter presented
Tito with his most serious internal threat since
the conclusion of World War 11. It was a dramatic,
if not traumatic, period for the Yugoslavs. From
it, however, a better picture of the succession
emerged.
When Tito goes, collective leadership will be
accepted. Leadership of the government will pass
to the vice president who will become caretaker
head of state. The presidency is then supposed to
rotate on an annual basis along predetermined
lines. In the shakedown period it may well do so.
In the party, the succession is less clear but proba-
bly will be fought out in the executive bureau.
The best bet is that the bureau's secretary will be
Tito's heir.
Tito is banking heavily on the common fear
of foreign meddling, and on the accepted wisdom
that Yugoslavia's constituent republics and
provinces cannot go it alone, to draw the nation's
talented leaders together for the common good.
Yugoslavs often fight bitterly among themselves,
but there is a genuine pride in the nation's post-
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war accomplishments. Nothing unites them as
quickly as the threat of foreign intervention.
Collective executive bodies, troikas and
councils of state have not historically proven
durable. For the short run, however, that is what
appears in store for Yugoslavia. At this time no
politician has the prestige or backing to fill Tito's
shoes. Barring the unexpected, however, the
chances are good that the federation probably
will hold together after Tito's passing, difficult as
that will be, and that Tito's system will function
well enough to keep Belgrade's nonaligned, self-
managing system afloat in the immediate succes-
sion period. The real test will come several years
after Tito is gone. Then, heightened frictions
among the regions or increased foreign meddling
could bring about an informal alliance between
conservative leaders and the military to produce a
more tightly controlled, centralized Communist
state. Then, more than likely, some individual will
emerge to dominate the system.
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