WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Secret
14 September 1973
No. 0387/73
Copy N? 4 3
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7??:_ b'vRi.~LY St1trMARY, issued every Frittay mcrr-~ng by
tf?e t3ftic? of Lurrertt Ir-teliitlenee, regx~rts and anafyze=_ irtrnif-
ic.~ni ~~ieu?loprrents of the week thrc,ugh noo='r o?ibvrrr4t#a?v-
tt frequently includes rr+aterial coorcinated with ~r txepared
b.,~ the Gif+ce crf EL;~nU+rr+! Research, the Off:ce pp ;ttat~r+
Re~.Parch, and the Directorate of Science aril T~:t+r+o#ogv.
T~,pies requiring more camprehensi~e treatment ~ya~~i there-
'rsre pUbsi,hed separately as Special Reports are Isst_;9 in the
cc~f,tena.
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classifi~ad irrf~r~tatic)n
affecting She nations! recur+ty at t}:e Ursiteo State. within
the mear3ing tat Tftie lEl. sections !93 and J94;-~~# `tte US
Code, as amended. Its Eransmission or reveiatian of its c+Gn-
tents to or receipt by an unauthorized person :s prt3hit2ited by
law.
14 Fedayeen: A Tale of Three Cities
16 Ira4: Kurdistan Smolders
17 Sudan: After the Storm
18 Arab Harmony
19 Arab Apprehensions
20 Uruguay: A Meeting of Minds
21 Bolivia: No Time for Change
'>PECIRL
.SPORT (Published separately)
Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe:
The Crunch
Gommants and gUanes on tha contents of this
pub4lcatian ar~a waloama. That' may ba directed to
!ha editor or iha Weekly Saemmary,~
CQNTEI'~IT'S (14 September 1973)
BAST ASIA
PACIFIC
I Chile
2 The Nonaligned Chorus
4 Mr. Bhutto Comes to Washington
5 Indochina
8 Japan: A Big Spender
Less Jamming
France: Trouble with Immigrants
Norway: Losers All Around
UK: Toss-up
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
IfEMFSPHERE
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JCI~KC I
Chile
THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE
CI~J cT s eu. ec~
The military junta that overturned the -
lende government gives every evidence of being
efficient and determined, but faces many diffi-
culties in getting the country on its feet again.
Moving in tkie early hours of 11 Septerber,
the armed farces took swift control of cornmu-
nications, media, the judiciary, public adminis-
tration, transportation, and most government
enterprises. A nearly nonstop series of public
announcements revealed careful planning, but as
resistance dragged out in Santiago, the forces
shifted from reassurance to retaliation. Troops
needed for the job of re-establishing economic
order, particularly the distribution of s::arce
supplies, were instead brought into Santiago to
reinforce the military effort to root out resisters.
Allende's defiant stand until his death in the
burning presidential palace and the resistan~.:e of
heavily armed leftists holed up in government
buildings and industrial areas of the capital caused
many casualties. The bloodshed will slow the
work of reconciliation in a nation that was bit-
terly divided over the Allende administration,. The
junta is highlighting, however, the key role of
leftist extremists and Cubans in the armed hold-
outs and the Soviet origin of the heavy weapons
in their hands.
The junta is composed of the heads of the
three military services and the national police. All
are experienced and respected senior officers who
only recently took command. The new President,
army General Augusto Pinochet, is a nationalist
like most of his colleagues, but he has had good
relations with US representatives. All but two of
the 15 cabinet members named on 12 September
are military officers, a choice recommended by
the junta's civilian advisers. Many of the new
ministers are trained administrators, probably
chosen more to reorganize the chaotic and cor-
rupt bureaucracy than to provide expertise in
their fields of responsibility.
The military government is keeping its dis-
tance from the major opposition parties, and
those civilian advisers identified with it thus far
are conservative business and professional leaders.
Congress, where Allende's opponents had a ma-
jority, has been "dissolved" indefinitely. While
the Christian Democrats have announced they
wil! not accept government posts, they and the
more conservative National Party leaders have
come out in support of the new government.
Preliminary reports of the junta's plans for po-
litical reform include a new constitution and con-
gre~>sional elections. These reforms may not be
realized for a long time since the restoration of
puk~lic and economic order will be given top
priority.
International reaction to the coup has been
vehement and widespread. Most governments that
opk~osed Allende are silent. Several countries,
including West Germany, Sweden, and Denmark
have expressed regret over the ouster of an
elected government. Venezuela and Mexico, and
perhaps others, are joining Cuba in three days of
official mourning. Leftist groups staged protest
demonstrations in a number of capitals and, like
Per~an in Argentina, most of them accused the US
of complicity in Allende's downfall. The Soviet
Central Committee issued a sharply worded state-
ment denouncing "reactionary forces," and other
Communist governments followed suit.
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Algerian Foreign Minister lioutel7ika .addresses ~yreliminaru mectino
~3dat alld ~oi2JnedlenC Castro during sess~ian
Qadhafi departs meeting hall
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~' ~t(.;F~t 1
The Nonaligned Chorus
~/u ~he Fourth Summit Conference of Non-
aligned Nations broke up this week in a cloud of
cliches. As before, it served largely as a forum for
airing the resentments and grievances of thE: poor
and weak countries against the rich and strong.
The final resolutions were largely a repeat of
those issuing from earlier gatherings; US p~~licies
in the Middle East and Indochina were roundly
condemned, along with colonialism and apartheid
Lj, ~fhe US nevertheless came off reasonably
well; most speakers attacked a nameless im~~erial-
ism and colonialism. The Soviets lost some
ground; most speakers lumped the USSR with the
US as a rich, powerful, and menacing state. A
heavy-handed effort by Moscow on the eve of the
conference to avert that association backfired.
The letter from E3rezhnev did not win friends>, and
Fidel Castro's espousal of the Soviet position was
badly overdone. The Chinese remained quiet and
unobtrusive, while their views on big-power
aJC" hegemony gained ground. Libyan President
Qadhafi directed a broad appeal to the partici-
pants to break relations with Israel and pr-orrrised
Libyan assistance for any country that did so. He
did, however, manage to introduce a rare note of
candor into the proceedingsr
,?i ~Nith representatives of more than 70 coun-
tries in attendance, including 52 heads of state or
government, the Algiers meeting was the largest
of the four summits held since 1961. Prince
Sihanouk's delegation and one from the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-
nam were seated as full members?
jj~~, The Middle East resolution was somewhat
watered dawn from the extreme language advo-
cated by Borne Arab delegates. It nevertheless
demanded immediate, unconditional Israeli with-
drawal from the occupied Arab territories, con-
demned the US-and unnamed other powers--for
giving support to Israel, and called on the non-
aligned states to work on measures for a full
boycott of Israel. Only Cuba, trying to recoup,
actually did anything: Havana broke relations
with Tel Aviv.
'~ Cln addition, the assembled leaders:
? supported the peaceful reunification of
Korea before its admission to the UN and the
~Nithdrawal of all foreign troops;
? backed independence for Puerto Rico
ably
will continue for at least another month. The
government seems to be using a "carrot-and-
stick" approach to the Kurds. While trying to
intimidate them through various types of harass-
ment, the government is also offering the Kurds a
place in the national front government, an offer
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apparent reference to dissident exiles-and other
scapegoats. He failed to address himself to any of
the key problems facing the country and his
regime. These include:
? inflation and shortage of consumer
goods-issues that were exploited by his
enemies during the disturbances;
? labor unrest and how to deal with
strikes;
? student grievances against the educa-
25X1 tional system.
(~'~ President Sadat's latest go at summitry-his
four h in three weeks-brought Jordan`s King
Page t8
Husayn and Syria's President Asad to Cairo this
week. Billed as an effort to reconcile Jordan's
long-standing differences with its sister "con-
~~frontation" states~he meeting resulted in the
normalization of Egypt's relations with Jordan
and the prospect of an early restoration of Syrian-
Jordanian ties.
(p ? The communique issued at the summit's
conclusion indicates by its terse wording that all
~' differences have not been resolved7~Major prob-
(~ lems remain, centering an the restoration of the
fedayeen to Jordan and the re-establishment of
the so-called "eastern front" against Israel.
+~.~ Husayn is not willing to agree to mare than a
token commitment to either proposition, and
Sadat-whose experience with the Libyan merger
project has reinforced his caution-wilt probably
not press the point
(,pCf ~adat is taking other steps to expand Egypt's
international support and to forge a greater de-
gree of inter-Arab cooperation. Iran's foreign min-
ister was in Cairo early this week, and the Arab
League is meeting there now. Discussion will
center on Arab strategy at the UN General As-
sembly, which opens next week?
fe,Cs Also scheduled for next week, or soon
thereafter, is the final adoption of Sadat's new
policy paper, which has been under debate in
Egypt for the past several weeks. The paper calls
for:
? disengagement from superpower in-
terests
? expanded diplomatic and economic ties
to establish a better balance in Egypt's rela-
tions between East and West
? greater inter-Arab collaboration, par-
ticularly on economic matters, to strengthen
Egypt's and the Arabs' position against Is-
~E'~Rt~T
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ARAB APPREHENSIONS
The Arabs are playing up accounts cif US
desert warfare exercises, linking them to Washing-
ton's .current concern over its energy supplies. As
the Arabs are handling the story, it has so stirred
existing suspicions that some Arab leaders are
openly expressing uneasiness about the possibility
of US military intervention in the Middle East
4~' Feature articles about "the largest US desert
battlefield maneuvers in 40 years" appeared in US
newspapers in August. The stories, along with
comments from Arab correspondents in WasFring-
ton, were picked up and embellished in a v~rriety
of Middle Eastern periodicals, which are now
talking of US readiness to ensure its oil require-
ments by force. Several articles claim that un-
identified US Marines had directly linked the
intensification of their desert training to the .situa-
tion in the Middle East
Libyan environment. Others predicted US and
British collusion in a plan for using airborne
troops to seize oil fields:)
(,~Z? ~rab officials, who see themselves reacting
in a war of nerves started by the US, have lent
thE~mselves to the campaign. President Boume-
diene, in his address to the nonaligned confer-
ence, declared that "overt and covert military
threats" by the US are dangerous tools to gain
domination over important economic and stra-
tegic areas. He specifically referred to the possi-
bility of an "imminent invasion" of the Gulf
stales. President Sadat told the conference, "What
the American press writes about, what it calls the
desert war, is intended- to usurp the wealth of
other states."
~ Some Middle East observers believe all this
tal4c about "desert
" h
war
as created a sense of
'~' urgency in the Arabs' search for common ground
(`fhe Beirut Daily Star, a moderate English-~~{ on such sensitive issues as oil pricing and produc-
la~guage newspaper, noted that the maneuvers tiorl limitation. The search, however, still con-
came on the heels of reports that "the US, in fronts the same serious political and economic
order to guarantee its oil supplies, may intervene differences that have so far prevented a united
directly or through. surrogates such as Israel and Arab oil policy. Nevertheless, if mistrust of US
Iran." As usual, more inflammatory rendi-lions intE~ntions grows, Arab oil negotiations will be
appeared in the Libyan press; for example, one ~Sthat much more difficult in the months
paper claimed last week that the exercises were ahead.
carried out under conditions which simulated the
THE DAILY STAR ~sx;
The Leading English Langt.~age Newspaper in the Middle East
BOUT WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1973 1 o Pages
No. 781,6 PL 25
But Deny Mideast Link
U.S. Marines Train for Desert War
ey EDMOND GHAREEB
"The Daily Star" Correspondent
WASHINGTON, Aug, 21 -- Energy requirements, Middles East
tension and geo-political considerations may have been the
motivating factors behind the largest desert battlefield maneuvers
in 40 years held recently by the U.S. Marines in the Mojave
desert,
'"'te maneu~`?rs, which involved several thousand reser~~e
yes, ?~ old ' des hF ~ hP? ?ing ~' v
"I hs.ve been in the marines for 12 years and I have never
been called upon to tight in the desert before. I lust hope it is
agother 12 years before the marines decidetheyhave to be ready
attain,
"The;~e musk be some reason for the longest desert exercise
in 40 years, You can hardly say it took us 40 years to think of it.
The airline hijackings, the skirmishes, the controversy in this
country over the Jews and the Arabs, the Russian influence in
' Ara'- ~rld that migh' ve had ~ ethln~ ~ do w' i
,. .. ~~
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. Jtt~I~C 1
URUGUAY: A MEETING OF MIfUDS
~'~ (President Bordaberry's position vis-a-vis his
military associates was strengthened by his per-
y formance at a recent meeting, which was called to
G~ seek ways to restore vigor to the economy and
confidence in the administration. The President,
who set the tone for the meeting by rolling up his
sleeves and getting down to business, emerged
with increased prestige among the officers
present?
wring the week-long meeting, the President,
his t p civilian advisers, and high military officials
decided to encourage foreign investment; spend
Ga
61
considerable sums on roads, bridges, and port
facilities; and support the development of key
industries. The administration hopes to rally
flagging public enthusiasm by publicizing this
example of civilian-military cooperation and the
actual measures adopted to cure the country's ills.
It was also decided, but not made public, that the
Brazilian-style mini-devaluation of the nation's
currency in relation to the dollar would continue.
(,,~. ~ne man who loomed large at the con-
~rence was General Gregorio Alvarez, chief of
the joint general staff and secretary of the na-
G~ tional security council. Alvarez, who is considered
the leading military intellectual, reportedly
initiated the conference. During the meeting, he
cemented relations with Bordaberry, while Gen-
eral Esteban Cnsti, commander of the important
First Army Division, aright-winger and a man of
action, took a back seat. The prominence of
General Alvarez could signal the emergence of a
strong military faction more interested in ideas
and plans than in force. Although Bordaberry has
enjoyed a good relationship with Cristi, he could
benefit from an equally close link with Alvarez,
who could be a balancing farce to Cristi and his
followers. The President must exercise care, how-
ever, not to show partiality to either since this
could fester a disruptive rivalry'
~~ (Bordaberry has gained a broader base of
support among the military by indicating his
readiness to innovate. He has secured from the
officers a renewed public commitment to act on
the national problems, a commitment they used
months ago to justify their assumption of a larger
role in government. Action must be quick and
specific, however, if the government is to keep
alive the optimism created by the meeting.
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'~ StC;HET
BOLIVIA: NO TIME FOR CHANGE
?~j fter raising public expectations by calling
fort e resignation of his cabinet on 7 Septerraber,
d' President Banzer proceeded to reappoint nearly
~? the same people and to maintain the same polit-
ical balance as before. This lack of meaningful
change suggests that Banzer was convinced that it
is unwise to upset his coalition until after his visit
to the US in October
~~ The right-wing Bolivian Socialist Falange,
eaded by Foreign Minister Mario Gutierrez, has
been too obstreperous for Banzer's taste, o~~enly
attacking its partner in the coalition, the Nation-
alist Revolutionary Movement. Banzer seems to
favor the Falange, but it has only minimal public
support. He needs the Movement, which Naas a
measure of support, to avoid isolating himself.
Banzer took a poll of military officers in the
garrisons, and they seemed willing to abandon the
"corrupt" politicians and rule with an all-military
cabinet. The advice was not taken. Banzer prob-
ably preferred not to install an all-military cabinet
at this time since the action would open him to
charges of being a military dictator-a charge that
has plagued him during visits to other countriesr
7g' ~As a result, the new cabinet is basically the
old one; a few cosmetic changes have been made,
but the new cabinet will not be any better
prepared than the old to find solutions to old and
futcare problems. President Banzer still has hard
decisions to make about the long-range or-
gar~ization of his government.
25X1
25X1
Presidential Palace on Independence Day
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} StC;f-{t I
IIUTERNATIC}NAL MIQNEY
Money Market Developments
b 3~t~C QS~
The dollar was mixed on European money
markets last week. In Tokyo, it remained essen-
tially unchanged as the Bank of Japan continued
to sell dollars in moderate amounts to prevent the
yen from .depreciating.
Sterling continued under strong pressure and
since mid-August has declined almost five percent
relative to the currencies participating in the joint
European float. Contributing factors in the de-
cline were the belief that the E3ritish would pursue
expansionary policies at the expense of increased
inflation, lack of labor support for the govern-
ment's incomes policy, and a growing trade def-
icit.
International Monetary Reform
Agreement on an acceptable draft outline
for monetary reform now seems unlikely in time
for the Nairobi International Monetary Fund
~'~~~~~
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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meetings. The recent meeting of the C-20 Dep-
uties-the body established by the International
Monetary Funct last year to develop proposals for
monetary reform-ended in deadlock. Thty Euro-
peans took a less conciliatory position than at the
July meetings ;end spoke of a hardened US posi-
tion. The same basic issues remain in contention:
the nature of the balance-of-payments adjustment
process and the extent of currency convertibility.
l-he US proposal that changes in the level of
international reserves be relied on to indicate the
need for balance-of-payments adjustment-an idea
tl~at seemed to gain ground earlier this year-was
s~:verely criticized in this negotiating session,
especially by the French. The Europeans are
opposed to subordinating their economic policies
25X1
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Percent Change Since 2 January 1973 in the Value of the US Dollar
Relative to Selected Foreign Currencies
1
,?
^
_5~r^ ~~i^^^~~~~~~ RDITICN nnn.~n ~~~~~~~??
19 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 2'2 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 31 7 12
MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT
554602 9-73
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~++' r
Secret
Secret
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ument Denied
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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Conference on Security crz2d Coo~deration in Europe:
The Crunch
Secret
N?- 4 2
14 September 1973
No. 0387/73A
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~7Cl~r~l~ i
Summary
After six months of preparatory discussions and a brief opening stage last July,
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe gets down to brass tacks on
18 September in Geneva. This stage of the conference is to produce the agreements
that are to be approved by ministers-or at the summit level-in the final stage. The
conference has moved forward thus far by postponing or skirting contentious issues.
Vigorous East-West clashes are likely to precede any agreements of importance;
the East wants assurances about the "inviolability of frontiers"; the West would like
to see "freer movement"' of people and ideas across national boundaries. The
willingness of the Soviets to make concessions on "freer movement" and of the West
to sweeten the bargain with offers, for instance, of increased economic cooperation,
will say a .great deal about the direction of detente in the 1970x. The conference
could produce only pious rubbish or it could take a small but meaningful step
toward reduced tensions and more stable relations between East and Wesi.
Background
The idea of a security conference in Europe
was first broached by the Soviets in 1954, at the
height of the cold war. Behind the initiative was a
Soviet desire to secure international approval of
European borders as they stood after World War
II and thus give Soviet territorial gains legitimacy;
equally important, the conference would ratify
the division of Germany. The Soviets had in mind
a grandiose diplomatic gathering, something like
the Congress of Vienna, that would define the
structure of European security for decades to
come.
This rather grand design was in the beginning
staunchly opposed by the West. i3y last year,
however, a number of factors--including Brandt's
Ostpolitik and the Berlin and inter-German agree-
ments-had made the idea of a conference more
acceptable. Although the basic Soviet aim was the
same, the West Europeans recognized that a cer-
tain legitimacy had already been given to the
division of Germany in the other agreements.
They also began to think that a conference
might offer real opportunities for the West. It
could perhaps encaurage the countries of Eastern
Special Report
Eurape to move toward a greater degree of in-
dependence in their relations with the Soviet
Union. In addition, the Communist regimes might
be induced to relax their domestic policies which
would lead to greater freedom for the people of
Eastern Eurape. Some economic benefits might
else be derived from the conference. To the
srna{ler nations of Western Europe, a conference
began to seem a way of participating in detente.
Of their larger neigh bars, Bann now viewed the
conference as a tagicaf extension of its Ostpolitik,
while France saw it as an opportunity for exer-
cising independent diplomacy. The EC as a whale
perceived in a conference a chance to concert its
policies toward the East.
Rreparatory Talks, November-June
Preparations for a conference got under way
in Helsinki in late November 1972 and, with
interruptions between the four preparatory
rounds, lasted until early June 1973. Despite de-
bate that at times plumbed the depths of obscu-
rity, there were several useful results. First, pas-
sible agenda topics were grouped into four
"'baskets,"' ar general categories. Agreement was
made possible when the Soviets reluctantly ac-
ceded to the West's desire to put "freer
14 September 1973
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StC,:Kt I
movement" items into a separate basket. With the
agenda items organized in their "baskets," the
delegates decidc;d to produce draft "mandates"
for each of the "baskets" to serve as terms of
reference for the committees in the stage of the
conference that is about to begin. These ?'man-
dates" were haggled over for months, and the
Soviet willingness to discuss substantive issues at
such length in the preparatory talks was another
major concession. Moscow had hoped the prepa-
rations would be general and brief; they ended up
being detailed and lengthy.
The Soviet concessions, however, were for
the most part a r~natter of tactics. The main Soviet
goal in the preparatory stage was, of course, the
convening of the conference itself. A willingness
to give in on procedural points and even to dis-
play some flexibility on matters of substance
seemed to Moscow a cheap enough price to pay
for the conference. The Soviets doubtless hope to
turn these concessions to their later advantage.
They may, for example, argue that, since the
preparations reached such a level of detail and
went on for so long before, the second stage of
the conference -need not go over the same tired
arguments and can be relatively brief.
Finally, the Soviets may have been pushed a
bit by the surprising unity of the non-bloc coun-
tries. This was due in part to the consultations in
Helsinki among rnembers of the EC. The prEo-para-
tory phases were perhaps the first major success
of the EC at political consultation. Even the
French-expected to be the Western prima
donna-played a useful role. The emergence of
reasonable EC positions on a number of issues
attracted support from other Western countries
and from several nonaligned states as well.
~iTAGE I, JULY
The preparatory talks ended in a spirit of
optimism, with rrrany observers feeling that agree-
ment on the "mandates" might indicate that the
resolution of some problems would be easier than
had previously been thought. The conference it-
self was formally held in Helsinki on 3 to 7 July;
this stage showed clearly that no one was really
willing to concede basic positions without a good
deal of intensive bargaining.
Special Report
Foreign Minister Gromyko made the first
s~~eech. He took nearly three times his allotted 20
minutes and left no doubt that the main Soviet
goal was, as it had always been, the preservation
of the territorial status quo in Europe. Europe's
e~:isting borders, he said, are an incontestable
political reality. He also opposed the West's aspi-
rations for the freer movement of people and
ideas, arguing that there could be no changes in
political systems or ideological views. Any in-
cr~~ased contacts would have to develop, he in-
si~,ted, in accordance with the laws, customs, and
tr