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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
CG WS 77-022
June 3, 1977
1.4af
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EKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
'urrent Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant
eats of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently' includes material, coordinated with or prepared by the
of . Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eco-
Ic,.Resarch, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
rttifk -Intelligence, the Office of Weapons intelligence,
SECRET
CONTENTS
1 Europe
USSR; Portugal
2 Africa
Angola; Rhodesia
4 Asia
Pakistan; Bangladesh
4 Middle East
Israel; Lebanon
6 Nigeria: Still Seeking Stability
8 Uganda: Trouble Mounting for Amin
9 Japan: Geothermal Energy Resources
10 China: The Importance of Western Technology
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly,
LL
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USSR 2
NEW CONSTITUTION
Plans for replacing the "Stalin con-
stitution" in the USSR with a "Brezhnev
constitution" are going forward swiftly. It
seems increasingly likely that political
issues raised by the draft of the new con-
stitution in some way precipitated the
abrupt, unceremonious ouster of Presi-
dent Podgorny from the Politburo at the
Central Committee meeting on May 24.
There is no firm evidence as to the issues
involved in or the political ramifications
of Podgorny's departure.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
met on May 27 to hear General Secretary
Brezhnev's report on the draft of the new
constitution. In his speech, Brezhnev im-
plied that the dangers that formerly
demanded rigid control mechanisms had
lessened. Relaxing controlls, however, has
become a highly controversial issue in the
leadership because of the review con-
ference on European security and coop-
eration that will open on June 15 in
Belgrade.
The session approved the draft "in the
main" and decreed that it be published for
public discussion on June 4. The draft will
be given final approval at a special session
of the USSR Supreme Soviet scheduled
for October, when the Soviets celebrate
the 60th anniversary of the October
Revolution.
The Tass announcement of the
Presidium meeting did not mention
whether Podgorny attended, although he
is president of that body. His absence
would suggest that he is no longer acting
as president. Formal action on his
removal may not come until the Supreme
Soviet session opens on June 16.
Some officials in Moscow have recently
portrayed Podgorny as being increasingly
out of step with the rest of the top leaders.
A Central Committee employee, for ex-
ample, said that for the past year Podgor-
ny was uncooperative, even an obstruc-
tionist. In leadership meetings he report-
edly frequently challenged the consen-
sus. There have been other signs that
Podgorny disagreed with some aspects of
Brezhnev's detente policies and other
matters
4 4
The USSR appears likely to have a
record winter grain crop this year. This
harvest-which normally accounts for
about 30 percent of total Soviet grain
production-will be well above the
previous record of 63.5 million metric
tons, and possibly could reach 70 million
tons.
The Soviet consumer still faces serious
Grain producing
area
USSR: Major Grain Growing Regions ?_ ,, East Siberia
meat shortages stemming from the poor
1975 harvest. Meat production in the state
sector improved in March and April, but
a substantial lag exists between increased
output and improved retail supplies
because of the generally inefficient dis-
tribution system.
The record grain prospects are in large
part due to this year's expanded harvest
area-up about 16 percent over last year.
Winter grains were sown last fall on 38.5
million hectares-the largest area since 25X1
1968, and I million hectares greater than
last year. Winter losses are believed to be
smaller than usual this year. Unusually
wet growing conditions throughout much
of the European USSR, however, have led
to weed infestation and plant diseases
that may limit yields somewhat.
Spring grain output is still in doubt.
Sowing was delayed in some regions, and
this may lower crop yields. In addition,
inadequate subsoil moisture in both the
southern Urals and parts of Kazakhstan
rtaI's ----
Caucasu
Winter and Spring
Grain
Cnnlre Volga
)Black-Eai$i r
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GRAIN PROSPECTS
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means yields in these areas will be depen-
dent on rainfall from now through July.
As a result of the favorable outlook for
this year's grain crop and the record
harvest in 1976, the Soviets have made no
new grain purchases since last December.
After good harvest years, the USSR
usuaay waits until the summer to enter
the international market. A Soviet grain
delegation, in Washington in late May for
biannual consultations under the
long-term grain agreement, would say
only that the USSR would buy the re-
quir~;d 6-million-ton minimum for
delivery during the second year of the
agreement-October 1977 through
September 1978. The Soviets showed a
gene?al interest in soybeans but noted the
price was too high.
Portugal's two major opposition parties
issued a joint communique on May 25
harshly criticizing the government. The
criticism was probably intended to make
use of growing public dissatisfaction with
the limited accomplishments of Prime
Minister Soares' minority Socialist gov-
ernment to press the Socialists into con-
sulting the two parties on government
programs. It does not appear to be the
beginning of a campaign to bring down
the government in parliament.
In their communique, the centrist
Social Democratic Party and the conser-
vative Social Democratic Center com-
plained that Portugal can no longer
tolerate the Socialists' "vague policies"
and that minority rule by the Socialists
cannot last much longer. The opposition
part. es have supported the Socialists fre-
quently but are impatient with the
government's refusal to consult them on
policy matters.
The two parties want to mute their own
differences, attempt to force the Socialists
to join with them, and isolate the Com-
munists. They invited the Socialists to at-
tend the meeting that produced the com-
munique, but the Socialists, who have
avoided alliances with parties to the right
or the left in order to maintain unity
within their own ranks, declined.
Social Democratic Center leader
Freitas do Amaral said that the Socialists
might face an early election if they refuse
to change their ways. The opposition,
however, has not directly challenged the
government by calling for a vote of no
confidence. The Socialists control 40 per-
cent of the legislature and could probably
survive with the support of the Com-
munists, who hold 15 percent of the seats.
The opposition parties' determination
to challenge the Socialists will be clearer
when pending legislation on labor,
agrarian reform, and the economy comes
to a vote. The government proposals are
generally moderate and are badly needed.
The Communists are unlikely to support
them.
If the Social Democrats and the Social
Democratic Center withhold their sup-
port, President Eanes may be forced to
call for the formation of a new govern-
ment. Eanes, the key to stability in Por-
tugal, has recently been playing a more
active role in the government. The opposi-
tion parties would prefer a nonpartisan
government under es' strong residen-
tial leadership
The abortive coup last week against
President Neto reflects rising discontent
in Angola over deteriorating economic
and social conditions, corruption, and
political repression. Factions in the ruling
party are considering further moves
against Neto.
In the coup attempt, dissidents loyal to
former interior minister Nito Alves at-
tacked the presidential palace and army
headquarters and freed Alves and another
dissident leader, former armed forces
chief Jose van Dunem, from prison. They
also seized control of Radio Luanda for
several hours and proclaimed the installa-
tion of a "revolutionary dictatorship of
the exploited classes."
According to press reports, more than
100 people were killed as government
troops put down the rebellion, and hun-
dreds more have been arrested. The
government announced that the dissidents
killed the finance minister, four other
members of the central committee of the
ruling Popular Movement, and a senior
official of the internal security forces.
Alves and van Dunem, who were jailed
after Neto dropped them from the central
committee last month, apparently es-
caped.
There are some indications that Cuban
troops participated in the recapture of the
radio station and in patrolling the city
afterward. There is no firm evidence,
however, of either Cuban or Soviet in-
volvement.
Alves' faction has been critical of
Neto's go-slow approach toward convert-
ing Angola into a radical socialist state
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ever since early 1976, when the Popular
Movement gained control of Angola.
Alves also contends that blacks are un-
derrepresented at the upper levels of the
regime, an attitude that has won substan-
tial support among black radicals in the
army and unemployed blacks in the slums
of Luanda.
The Alves faction may now seek allies
among other dissidents in the military and
the party
representatives have approached
members of the Active Revolt, a more
moderate dissident group within the
Popular Movement whose supporters are
among the better-educated members of
the party.
The Active Revolt has been gaining
strength in recent months, and many
believe it is the only workable alternative
to the Neto government. The Active
Revolt may have disseminated anti-Neto
pamphlets that appeared in Luanda in
April.
Members of the Active Revolt charge
that corruption has become a way of life
among top party leaders, including Neto,
and that the government is torturing
political prisoners. They hope to open an
exterior branch to publicize these con-
ditions and seek support from moderate
African states such as Senegal and Ivory
Insurgent Gains 2 4 -2-7
The Neto government is also under
severe strain in the south from the in-
surgent National Union forces of Jonas
Savimbi. Recent reports indicate that the
guerrillas have succeeded) in their strategy
of isolating population centers and disrup-
ting the movement of food supplies.
claims that the guerrillas now control all
of Angola south of the Benguela railroad
except for the major cities. the
insurgents are well armed and well dis-
ciplined and that they enjoy the support of
the local population.
The guerrillas have damaged all major
bridges on the Benguela railroad and
sabotaged major sections of track. They
also cut important roads;
most towns
in the south are accessible only by air.
The morale of government troops is
low, and they have not launched a major
campaign against the insurgents since
mid-April. The Cubans stationed in the
south appear to garrison themselves in the
cities and rarely venture out on patrol for
fear of ambush. The lack of Cuban sup-
port has angered government troops, and
incidents between Angolans and Cuban
soldiers are reportedly on the increase.
RHODESIA 2
The major Rhodesia military incur-
sion into Mozambique last weekend was
launched shortly after a US-UK team
finished talks in Salisbury on a Rhodesian
settlement and went on to Mozambique.
In authorizing the attack, Prime Minister
Smith may have been seeking to show
Rhodesia's determination to carry the war
to the insurgents and a willingness to back
tough negotiating positions with strong
military action.
Several hundred black and white
Rhodesian troops, with air support,
reportedly participated in the incursion.
The attackers overran four Rhodesian
guerrilla bases in western Mozambique
and seized the town of Mapai, some 75
kilometers from the border. According to
the Rhodesian military commander,
General Walls, a guerrilla camp outside
Mapai was a key supply base for the
guerrillas.
The Rhodesians say the attacking force
seized a large quantity of military equip-
ment and killed at least 32 guerrillas while
suffering no casualties itself. The at-
tackers expected to encounter more in-
surgents, but the guerrillas apparently
scattered into the countryside. The
Rhodesian force began withdrawing from
Mozambique toward the end of the week.
The raid was the third major Rhodesian
strike into Mozambique since last Au-
gust, and it may have been the largest. The
guerrillas based in Mozambique are af- 25X1
filiated with the Zimbabwe African 25X1
National Union, the most militant and
militarily the strongest of the Rhodesian
guerrilla groups. General Walls said the
strike was launched after Rhodesian in-
telligence received new reports on a
buildup by the guerrillas in Mozambique.
Earlier last month, Smith threatened to
make pre-emptive strikes against
guerrillas based in Zambia. These guerril-
las are loyal to Joshua Nkomo's Zim-
babwe African People's Union, which is
loosely allied with ZANU in the Patri-
otic Front alliance. F_
SALT SB U BY
RHODESIA
desia'F
r MOZ I1QU@
tta
8 M pai
I MIN;,
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0, q i ni A-
PAKISTAN 2,' -3 3
Prime Minister Bhutto and his political
opponents have agreed to resume
negotiations- on June 3 in an effort to
resolve Pakistan's political crisis. Neither
side appears willing to make significant
concessions.
The decision to hold new talks followed
a week of consultations among opposition
leaders in response to a Saudi Arabian in-
itiative. Other Arabs, including members
of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
also have participated in the effort to
resolve Bhutto's differences with his op-
ponents. The opposition may have agreed
to negotiate in the hope that pressure
from the Arabs would make Bhutto more
conciliatory, but it is doubtful that the
Arabs will try to force the Prime Minister
to make concessions.
Both sides apparently have agreed to a
new National Assembly election, but ma-
jor differences remain over timing and
other specifics. The opposition wants an
immediate election, while Bhutto wants as
much time as possible to rebuild his
political position. Last week, a member of
his cabinet said no election could be held
before March.
The opposition leaders have also
demanded that Bhutto resign before an
election; they argue that if Bhutto still
controls the government, a new election
would be as fraudulent as the one held in
March. Bhutto, for his part, has no inten-
tion of stepping down. Some of the op-
posit on leaders may be willing to modify
their demands, but they are well aware
that their colleagues would reject any
proposal that leaves Bhutto in office. One
opposition leader already has publicly
denounced talks as a ruse to buy time for
the Prime Minister.
The US embassy believes that, despite
the present calm in Pakistan, Bhutto still
faces a highly volatile and dangerous
security situation. Major cities are quiet
only because of martial law, curfews, and
an opposition decision to reduce
demonstrations during negotiations. Out-
side the major cities, demonstrations con-
tinue and there have been a few serious
outbreaks of violence, `Dut press cen-
sorship has greatly limited news of the
Z
The President of Bangladesh, General
Ziaur Rahman, won an overwhelming
vote of confidence this week in a referen-
dum on his program and his continuation
in office. Zia, as he is generally known, is
popular with both the people and the
armed forces and has won the support of
some of the country's politicians-partic-
ularly those with strong Muslim leanings.
The turnout in the referendum was
much larger than the 56 percent of the
electorate that voted in Bangladesh's last
national election four years ago. This will
effectively prevent Zia's opponents from
citing voter apathy to disparage the result
of the vote.
Zia was installed as president last
month, although he has been de facto
ruler since a military coup in November
1975. Under his leadership, Bangladesh
has enjoyed greater political stability and
economic security than at any other time
since it gained independence from
Pakistan in 1971. Many Bangladeshis
believe the only alternative to Zia would
be a return to the violence and corruption
that prevailed under past civilian
governments.
Zia's shrewd handling of incipient army
mutinies and his crackdown on govern-
ment corruption and inefficiency have
added to his reputation as a relatively
honest and dedicated leader. His trip to
China last winter and an improvement in
relations with India have also enhanced
his prestige at home. Good rice harvests
and plentiful foreign aid have further
strengthened his support.
Bangladesh has a large Muslim majori-
ty; Zia's recent declaration of intent to
amend the constitution to make Islam one
of the fundamental principles of the state,
while troubling to the Hindu and Chris-
tian minorities, brought public pledges of
support from the Muslim political parties.
He did not, however, have the support of
the secular Awami League, the party that
ruled Bangladesh in the four years follow-
ing independence and that remains the
largest. Zia may now begin building a
political party of his own, or try to take
over one of the existing parties, in
preparation for the national election he
promised for December 1978. Many sup-
porters of the small Muslim parties and
moderates in other parties might defect to
a party led by Zia
The Likud party's prospects for putting
together a broadly based government
appear to have improved following a deci-
sion by the Democratic Movement for
Change to resume negotiations on a coali-
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tion. The decision came after Likud
leader Menachem Begin agreed to
delay-but not cancel-the appointment
of former defense minister Moshe Dayan
as foreign minister.
Democratic Movement chief Yigael
Yadin and other party officials fear that
with the conservative Dayan as foreign
minister, their party would be unable to
exert a significant moderating influence
on Likud's hard-line stance on
Arab-Israeli issues. The Democratic
Movement also had protested that Likud
did not consult it on Dayan's appointment
even though the two parties were discuss-
ing a coalition government. Without the
Democratic Movement, Likud would
have to form a narrow right-wing coali-
tion in which small religious parties would
wield disproportionate influence.
Although Begin still seems determined
to bring Dayan into the cabinet, the
Democratic Movement was apparently
placated when Likud's executive com-
mittee passed a compromise resolution.
The resolution requires Begin to submit
all his cabinet nominations to the com-
mittee after he is formally designated
sometime this month to form a govern-
ment. In effect, the resolution temporarily
freezes the Dayan appointment but
Moshe Dayan
LIPl
preserves Begin's right to nominate
whomever he pleases. Begin later
reassured Yadin that all policies and ap-
pointments would be open for discussion
among members of a prospective coali-
tion.
Leaders of Likud's Liberal faction, who
also protested that they were not con-
sulted about Dayan's nomination, appear
satisfied with the new arrangement, since
all party factions are represented on the
executive committee. This is only a face-
saving device for the Liberals, however;
Begin's Herut faction and other party
groups that support the Dayan appoint-
ment have a majority on the committee.
Begin's health, meanwhile, remains a
major question; he suffered a serious
heart attack during the election cam-
paign. He was released last weekend from
an Israeli hospital, which he had entered
because of fatigue a few days after his par-
ty won the May 17 election. The Herut
faction's Ezer Weizman, who might well
head Likud if Begin were incapacitated,
reportedly holds even more hard-line
views than Begin
LEBANON 45'- q5
The Syrians have recently entertained a
procession of Lebanese and Palestinian
leaders in Damascus in an effort to
promote an agreement on the so-called
Cairo accords that lay down the ground
rules for Palestinian activities in Lebanon.
The negotiations are not going well.
The main obstacle is Lebanese Presi-
dent Sarkis' insistence that the Palestinian
guerrillas give up most of their weapons
and permit Lebanese authorities to
provide security for the refugee camps.
Sarkis believes that if the Palestinians are
disarmed he will have grounds for de-
manding that Christian forces disarm.
He hopes this will enhance his authority
and lay the groundwork for future po-
litical negotiations between the Chris-
tian and Muslim communities.
Palestine Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir Arafat has resisted these
pressures. He fears-with
justification-that disarming the
Palestinians would allow the Syrians to
gain control of the movement and leave
the guerrillas vulnerable to Christian
retaliation.
The Syrians agree with Sarkis but are
reluctant to use force, which would be
strongly resisted by the Palestinians. The
Syrians believe a show of force would also
antagonize Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
which are subsidizing Syrian operations in
Lebanon but do not want Syria to gain
complete control over the PLO. Serious
fighting would also undermine Syrian ef-
forts to project an image of Arab unity
during negotiations with Israel.
In a move that appears to have been
tacitly supported by Sarkis, and perhaps
by the Syrians, Christian leaders
denounced the Cairo accords last
weekend as null and void. This may have
been an effort to try to break the deadlock
by forcing fence sitters-both Lebanese
Muslims and the Saudis and
Kuwaitis-to back a full and immediate
implementation of the accords despite
Arafat's objections. In all likelihood,
Arafat will try to keep his supporters
from yielding to such pressure and string
out negotiations for as long as he can.
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Nigeria's military government is suffering from a decline
in its popularity and from factionalism within the ruling coun-
cil. The regime seems commjtted to a return to civilian rule in
1979 /
Nigeria is still far from stable 16
months after the coup attempt in which
the nation's dynamic head of state-
General Murtala Muhammed-was assas-
sinated. Although the military regime
of Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo
has tried to project an image of a
rela6vely stable and popular government,
it is badly factionalized, uncertain
of its support, and very unsure of its
grip on power,
Ir recent months, disenchantment with
the Obasanjo regime has been mounting
both within the army and among civilians.
Obasanjo and his colleagues on the ruling
Sup?eme Military Council have serious
domestic challenges to surmount if they
are :o remain in office and proceed with
their announced intention of handing over
power to an elected civilian government in
1974.
T'iere is a strong feeling in Nigeria that
the military has proved itself unfit to
govern. Obasanjo has not demonstrated
the drive and decisiveness of his
predecessor. The regime has postponed
domestic programs because of its preoc-
cupation with maintaining an ethnic
balance of power, ferreting out suspected
dissidents, and retaining the loyalty of the
army.
P-olonged inaction has bred suspicion
and uncertainty among the population at
large. Some are comparing the regime's
performance with the drift and corruption
of the last years of General Gowon, who
was overthrown in July 1975 in the coup
that brought Muhammed to power.
Nigeria: Still Seeking Stability
Students and the Nigerian press are
calling for the replacement of state
military governors, charging them with
being entrenched, venal builders of fief-
doms in the fashion of the Gowon era.
The government seems to recognize
that something must be done. In March,
more civilians were brought into the
cabinet in a shuffle that ousted some
allegedly corrupt military officers. Also,
the military has announced that the army
will sell its luxury cars in line with the
more austere image the military is trying
to project.
A Divided Regime
Rivalry between two groups within the
ruling 23-member military council is in-
creasingly evident.
The ascendant clique is composed of
young officers with a decided xenophobic,
chauvinistic bias. The leader is armed
forces Chief of Staff Shehu Yar'Adua, the
regime's second-ranking officer-if not its
real leader. Although a northern Hausa
tribesman like the late Muhammed, he is
not fully trusted by the generally conser-
vative north, which has usually dominated
Nigerian political life.
The other group is a loose and shifting
alliance of pragmatic nationalists led by
Head of State Obasanjo and a number of
other senior officers who attempt to exert
a moderating influence. The young
militants, however, have found that by
raising internal security concerns and fan-
ning suspicion of foreigners and foreign
influence, they can intimidate their more
moderate colleagues.
Obasanjo is a southerner and the first
member of the Yoruba tribe to be head of
state. He is beholden to powerful northern
ethnic interests who agreed to his succes-
sion for the sake of national unity. At first
a reluctant head of state, he has warmed
to the job and is displaying much greater
confidence. If Obasanjo should fall-he
probably has a less than even chance of
staying in power through the end of the
year-his most logical successor is
Yar'Adua, providing the chief of staff
wins the acceptance of the north and key
elements of the divided army.
The Army
Over the past five months, there have
been scattered reports of army dissatisfac-
tion with the Obasanjo regime and
numerous rumors of impending coups.
The military council and many well-
informed civilians apparently believe
there are widespread conspiracies afoot.
Two council members, who are also
division commanders, attribute the grow-
ing disaffection in the army partly to the
government's failure to replace state
military governors-which would open up
these lucrative posts to other of-
ficers-and to the top command's failure
to respond to requests by disgruntled of-
ficers for transfers of assignments. Rein-
forced security patrols and nighttime
roadblocks are again very much in
evidence in Lagos.
The military council is most concerned
about the attitude of middle-grade of-
ficers. There are indications that some
majors and lieutenant colonels are dis-
satisfied with their share of lucrative ad-
ministrative posts and may not be as com-
mitted to restoring civilian rule as are
their superiors.
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In one recent effort to head off poten-
tial trouble, the regime held a mandatory
seminar for all majors concerning their
"military responsibilities." Army Chief of
Staff Danjuma and the army's four divi-
sion commanders reportedly visit field
units frequently and put out the word that
anyone starting. trouble will be executed.
Disgruntled "middle belters"-mem-
bers of the many small tribes of the coun-
try's central region, who make up nearly
a third of the army's strength-also
concern the regime, which since the
July 1975 coup has been dominated
by the large and powerful tribes
of northern and southern Nigeria. The
"middle belters" resent losing the
influence they had during the Gowon
regime, when they served as brokers
between the northern and southern fac-
tions in the army and occupied all senior
army posts.
Minority tribesmen were heavily in-
volved in the unsuccessful coup of
February 1976 and bore the brunt of the
executions that followed the attempt. As a
precautionary measure, the regime has
dispersed "middle belters" to units far
from Lagos.
Many officers and enlisted men are up-
set over plans to demobilize part of the
oversized army, which grew during the
1967-1970 civil war from about 10,000
men to some 250,000. The leadership's in-
tention to cut the army by 100,000 men
was an important factor behind the coup
attempt in February 1976.
Although little has been said in public
since then about these plans, Danjuma ap-
parently still has hopes for substantial
cuts, perhaps as many as 60,000 spaced
over the next two years. In March, he an-
nounced that 5,000 veterans recalled to
duty during the civil war had been
demobilized and that 10,000 disabled
soldiers still on the army rolls were to
follow.
Living Conditions
The government's failure to do more to
improve living conditions for the general
public is a source of considerable frustra-
tion, grumbling, and potential unrest.
Inflation is running at 30 to 40 percent an-
nually. The current five-year development
plan, scheduled for completion in 1980,
and other ambitious schemes are lagging
badly. The government is hard pressed to
keep providing essential services, public
utilities, and housing for Nigeria's es-
timated 80 million people, a population
that is increasing at a rate of about 3 per-
cent a year.
Workers, faced with the continuation of
a year-old wage freeze, are restive, and a
wave of crippling wildcat strikes and other
manifestations of labor unrest are a dis-
tinct possibility.
Civilian Politics
The civilian elite awaits its promised
return to power in 1979 with impatience
and fear that the military will renege, as
Gowon did in 1974, on its program to
restore civilian rule. If the regime slows its
timetable for a return to civilian rule,
serious friction could erupt between
civilians and the military.
The regime seems genuinely committed
to handing over power. The Nigerian
press has interpreted the March cabinet
shuffle, which gave civilians a majority of
slots, as a demonstration of the military's
intent to involve more civilians in
decision-making.
A ban on politics is not scheduled to be
formally lifted until sometime after the
Head of State Obasanjo
country's new draft constitution is ap-
proved by a constituent assembly to be
convened this October. The assembly will
have six months to complete its work, and
it could prove to be a stormy exercise.
Most of the assembly delegates are to
be chosen by local government councilors,
who were elected last November and
December as part of a reform of local
government institutions. These nonpar-
tisan elections, the first since the military
took power in January 1966, proceeded
smoothly for the most part. There were
scattered complaints of election
irregularities, but no reports of
widespread fraud.
An election commission has been ap-
pointed. It is charged with organizing and
monitoring state and national elections,
the last two stages of the military's five-
point program to return Nigeria to
civilian rule. It will also register political
parties and delineate election constituen-
cies.
The commission and its members can
expect to come under intense pressure as
the times for ending the ban on politics
and for holding state and national elec-
tions draw closer. The political fortunes of
many would-be politicians will depend on
the commission's decisions. F
c/~ 5
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The turmoil in Uganda has worsened in recent months,
and plotting against President Amin has increased. The most
serious threat comes from groups in or close to the armed
.forces.
Uganda: Trouble Mounting for Amin
25X1 ponents. A combination of luck. Conditions in Uganda have grown even
During Ugandan President Idi Amin's shrewdness, and terror has enabled him to more chaotic in recent months. Most
six years in power, he has managed to stay cope with the results of his misrule. There Ugandan civilians, who play minor roles
barely one step ahead of his growing are signs, however, that Amin's problems in what remains of the country's modern
numt.er of internal and external op- may soon catch up with him. sector, will probably continue to suffer in
silence. Support for Amin among more
influential people, however-especially in
the military-may finally be deteriorating
more rapidly than it can be repaired.
Dissident groups pose the most im-
mediate problem for Amin. Their number
and their plotting against him have in-
creased markedly in recent months.
Some conspirators, especially those in
exile with limited contacts inside Uganda,
appear to have little chance of influencing
events. The exiled leaders may hope at
best to establish their credentials for par-
ticipation in a post-Amin government.
A more pressing threat to Amin comes
from groups in or close to the military.
These dissidents seem to have the most
external support, especially from
neighboring Tanzania and Kenya, which
have long been nervous about .Amin.
Plotters with influence in the military also
are probably the ones most capable of
penetrating Amin's pervasive security ap-
paratus and neutralizing or winning over
key units still considered loyal to the
President.
Signs of military unrest and disloyalty,
in fact, appear to have increased over the
last several months. The unruly military
has been a persistent feature of Amin's
regime. His latest purges of tribal op-
ponents, triggered by a number of
assassination attempts on him this year,
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appear to have exacerbated the situation.
Insubordination, desertions, and low
morale have increased in part from uncer-
tainty as to who is next on Amin's list.
Several senior commanders are reported-
ly fearful that the armed forces are dis-
integrating as a result of the purges and
defections.
In recent weeks, Amin and his senior
military colleagues have been especially
active in exhorting troops to maintain dis-
cipline and avoid tribal and religious fric-
tion. Amin has also attempted to preoc-
cupy the military with alerts, charges of
subversion, threats of invasion from Tan-
zania, and publicity about support for
Zaire against its Katangan invaders.
Amin has stepped up recruitment of
fellow southern Sudanese tribesmen into
his special security and marine units.
These units are responsible for much of
the recent government-sanctioned
violence. The intensified recruitment may
be largely an effort by Amin to offset ris-
ing disenchantment elsewhere in the ar-
my, but it also suggests that disloyalty
may even have begun to affect these key
units.
Other signs also point to a precarious
domestic situation. In an effort to stem
the rising number of robberies, assaults,
and murders in Kampala, Amin imposed
tight security measures in April and in-
itiated a roundup of arms and jobless
civilians. He also gave a stern warning to
students.
As a result of the turmoil, more Ugan-
dans are fleeing the country, and some
cabinet ministers have defected in the last
month or so. Already limited day-to-day
government operations have all but
ceased in some sectors. Medical services
are in very short supply; public transporta-
tion has been curtailed by a fuel shortage.
Japan is developing its substantial geothermal energy
resources and has become the world's leading exporter of
geothermal technology.
The overthrow or death of Amin would
probably not bring a quick end to the
chaos. Uganda's traditionally deep ethnic,
regional, and religious divisions have been
aggravated during Amin's rule. His fellow
Muslims and Sudanese tribesmen, who
have enjoyed a privileged position, are es-
pecially despised.
The immediate post-Amin period is
likely to be marked by the settling of old
scores, the sorting out of new loyalties and
alliances, and efforts by various tribal
groups to safeguard their interests.
The various exile groups, which for the
most part do not coordinate their ac-
tivities and lack notable personalities, are
unlikely to play a major role in the im-
mediate post-Amin period. Another
military regime with some civilian par-
ticipation might bring some stability to
the country, but probably only after more
Japan: Geothermal Energy Resources
Japan has an extensive program to
develop the technology and construct the
power plants needed to use its geothermal
energy resources to help overcome its
dependence on imported fuels. The
Japanese hope to obtain nearly an eighth
of their electric power from geothermal
facilities by the end of the century.
Development of geothermal power has
also enabled Japan to become the leading
exporter of technology in this field, par-
ticularly to developing countries.
Japan has experimented with
generating geothermal power for some
time, and completed its first practical
geothermal power plant in 1966
Operating geothermal plants now have a
total capacity of 53 megawatts; three
facilities of 50 megawatts each are under
construction. All use natural geothermal
steam. By 1985, the Japanese hope to
have 2,100 megawatts of operational
power capacity using natural geothermal
steam.
Other sources of geothermal heat, such
as thermal waters, volcanic rock, and
magma, which is molten rock, will sub-
sequently be exploited. A 10-megawatt
test unit using thermal waters is planned
for 1980 and a 50-megawatt plant for
1990. A 100-megawatt facility exploiting
volcanic or dry hot-rock technology is
planned for operation by 1995.
Altogether, the Japanese expect to have
approximately 48,000 megawatts of
geothermal power capacity by the end of
the century. Recent surveys have iden-
tified over 10,000 sites in Japan where
geothermal power production may be
possible. One source estimates that Japan
has 10 percent of the earth's readily
accessible geothermal potential.
The requisite technology is available to
build the more than 40 natural steam
power plants of 50 megawatts each that
Japan will need to achieve its 1985 goals
for geothermal generating capacity.
Further increases in geothermal power
production in Japan will include new
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technology to exploit lower temperature
water and dry heat sources such as hot-
rock and magma deposits. The Japanese
and others are studying these systems, and
the Soviets recently announced that they
will undertake a volcanic power project on
Kamchatka.
None of the new systems being studied
has yet been used anywhere to generate
elect-ic power on a commercial scale. Ex-
ploitation of geothermal sources other
than steam is unlikely to contribute great-
ly tc helping Japan meet its ambitious
geothermal power goals for the year 2000.
He Japanese geothermal power
development effort was formally organ-
ized in 1974 as part of Project Sunshine
under the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry. In 1976, the government
allocated $15.4 million to Project
Sunshine to study alternative energy
sources; roughly a third of this appropria-
tion was designated for research in
geothermal power. In contrast, nuclear
development received a $326-million ap-
prop-iation. Between now and the year
2000. Japan plans to spend a total of some
$300 million for geothermal power
development, about 27 percent of the
Project Sunshine budget for the period.
Geothermal sources are expected to
contribute about 1.5 percent of Japan's
electricity supply by 1985 and possibly 12
percent by the year 2000. By comparison,
installed nuclear capacity in 2000 is con-
servatively expected to constitute about a
quarter of Japan's electricity supply but
could, conceivably, furnish as much as
half of electricity output.
Despite a somewhat belated exploita-
tion of its geothermal resources, Japan
has rapidly become the world's leading
exporter of geothermal power technology.
Imports of industrial plants are increasingly important to
the development of China's economy, despite the misgivings of
som,z Chinese leaders about overdependence on foreign credit
and imports and the country's ability to absorb sophisticated
technology.
Geothermal research funded under
Project Sunshine is enabling Japan to
stay in the forefront of developments
in the geothermal power field.
The Japanese, moreover, are par-
ticipating in all phases of international
geothermal development. Japanese firms
are involved in projects all over the world;
their participation runs the gamut from
design, development, and production of
equipment to assistance in planning, con-
struction, and operation of completed
facilities.
China: The Importance of Western Technology
25X1
The purchase abroad of complete in-
dustrial plants is the most effective
method for China to acquire modern in-
dus:rial technology. In the third major
wave of foreign purchases, China is now
buying Western plants on an un-
precedented scale. The first buying wave
in the 1950s focused on plants from the
USSR and Eastern Europe; the second,
between the collapse of the Great Leap
Forward in 1960 and the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966 to 1969), included moderate
purchases from the West.
In the current wave, the biggest sellers
are Japan, Western Europe, and the US.
Between 1972 and 1976, China signed
contracts in the West for about 140 plants
worth $2.7 billion. Japan and Western
Europe together got more than 90 percent
of this business.
Japan's leading role as a plant supplier
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reflects its competitive advantages in the
Chinese market, including low transpor-
tation costs, considerable experience in
dealing with the Chinese, favorable finan-
cing, and relatively low-cost, advanced
technology. The Japanese are selling
several petrochemical plants, mainly for
the new complex at Chin-shan-wei near
Shanghai, and steel mills and electric
power plants.
France, China's second largest supplier,
has landed the largest single contract-a
$300-million petrochemical complex of 16
plants to be built in Manchuria.
The West Germans have re-entered the
complete plant stakes on a large scale for
the first time since some of their
technicians were imprisoned in the 1960s;
their sales to date include several chemical
plants and two large steel mills.
In late 1975, the UK agreed to sell jet
engine manufacturing equipment and
related technology worth $200 million.
Most of the $217 million in direct sales
by US firms reflects contracts for eight
ammonia plants.
Types of Plants
Of the $2.7 billion spent by the Chinese
on modern industrial plants since 1972,
nearly 90 percent has gone to the
petrochemical, fertilizer, steel, and elec-
tric power industries. Most of the
petrochemical plants will be built in four
industrial complexes in widely separated
parts of the country. Almost all the steel
facilities are being erected at the Wuhan
steel center in Hupeh Province.
When these industrial plants are com-
pleted in the next year or two, they will:
? Greatly increase the output of
synthetic fiber for clothing, thus free-
ing land now used to produce cotton
for food production.
? Double China's annual nitrogen
fertilizer production to about 7 million
tons of nutrient.
? Add more than 3 million tons to
the current capacity of 18 million to 19
million tons of finished steel.
? Add 1,700 megawatts to China's
estimated 34,000 megawatts of electric
generating capacity, and boost output
in the industrial areas of the northeast.
? Enable Peking to hold down or
reduce major commodity imports such
as fertilizer, steel, textile fibers, and
possibly grain.
Technology Transfer
One of the greatest benefits of the com-
plete plant import program has been the
training that Chinese technicians and
engineers receive in the operation and
maintenance of modern equipment. Some
of the imported plants embody the world's
highest technology; the ammonia-urea
complexes are among the world's largest
and most advanced, and other
petrochemical plants will use some of the
newest and most sophisticated processing
equipment available.
Chinese technicians are being exposed
to many Western technicians and new
methods of production for the first time
since the mid-1960s. Not since the
withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 have so
many foreign technicians been allowed in
the country. An estimated 3,000 Western
engineers have arrived in China over the
past three years, and many have gone to
areas not visited by foreigners for a
decade or more.
At least 2,500 Chinese technicians,
Workers at Szechuan petrochemical
plant, a Sino-Japanese effort
6aPfl
engineers, and maintenance personnel
have been trained abroad under existing
contracts. The total may exceed 4,000
when all current contracts are completed.
More than 50 technicians have already
been trained in the US to run am-
monia-urea plants, and more are sched-
uled to come. Additional Chinese engi-
neers and technicians have been sent to
the US and other nations to inspect and
approve equipment and machinery before
shipment.
The typical Chinese trainee still cannot
fully handle the equipment and
technology. Even when they receive train-
ing beyond that specified in the contract,
trainees at steel rolling mills have been
unable to operate these sophisticated
plants. Other plant suppliers have
reported that long learning periods will be
necessary before the Chinese can operate
imported plants at full capacity. The
growing pool of foreign-trained personnel
nonetheless will contribute greatly to up-
grading the competence of China's work
force.
Specialized Equipment
China's deficient transportation system
is benefiting considerably from imported
equipment and technology. During the
years 1970 to 1975, the Chinese imported
nearly $1.8 billion worth of transportation
equipment. Motor vehicles and ships ac-
counted for 75 percent of these imports,
and aircraft and railway rolling stock for
the remainder. The Chinese use the im-
ports for prototypes to copy as well as for
modern equipment for current use.
The Chinese have also imported almost
$700 million of specialized equipment for
the construction, mining, and petroleum
industries. They are almost totally depen-
dent on foreign sources for offshore drill-
ing rigs. They also lack the capability to
produce large pieces of machinery such as
120-ton trucks, heavy-duty power shovels,
mechanized coal face equipment, and
heavy dredges.
Importing this type of machinery has
helped China expand open-pit mining,
begin an offshore oil drilling program,
and launch a major port and waterway
improvement effort. US firms have been
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important suppliers of these types of
equipment and are negotiating for ad-
ditional sales.
High-Technology Imports
China must import such advanced
technological equipment as semiconduc-
tors, :elecommunications machines, com-
puters, and electric instruments and
devicI s. Much of the material acquired in
recent years has military as well as
civilian applications, but the Chinese have
circumvented embargos.
China's capability to produce in-
tegra:ed circuits is largely due to its
success in obtaining embargoed equip-
ment and technology. China also is ac-
quiring a considerable amount of em-
bargoed electronic instruments needed for
research in both civilian and defense in-
dustries. Japan has been the primary
supplier of embargoed equipment.
Imported computers and computer
technology have helped to fill some of
China's pressing data processing needs.
At least 100 computers, valued at more
than $50 million, have been imported
from the West in the last decade.
Although the domestic industry handles
an increasing share of such requirements,
foreign computers are required for
Industrial Plants Purchased
Petrochemical ? Metallurgical
Ammonia-Urea ? Electric Power
`3 Other
n
MANCHURIA
A
n
Pekin ?
A*
? tl
China
0 _ K~mmet,rs 500
X1659 5 77 CIA
?
JShanghai
? \Chhin-shan-wei
high-technology applications such as
seismic oil exploration, industrial produc-
tion control, and weather forecasting.
Imports play a vital role in Chinese
telecommunications development. Most
of the hardware devoted to international
telecommunications has come from the
US and Japan.
Military Hardware
The Chinese tacitly admitted the
deficiencies in their aircraft engine in-
dustry when they signed a $200-million
contract in December 1975 with Rolls
Royce for the technology and equipment
to produce the Spey aircraft engine. With
this acquisition, China will be able to
produce turbofan engines to power new
combat aircraft that will probably come
on line in the early 1980s.
The Chinese appear interested in
prototype or design technology for
Western tanks, antitank missiles, satellite
photographic equipment, electronic
countermeasure systems, and antisub-
marine warfare equipment. Chinese of-
ficials have made discreet inquiries in
Western Europe and Japan about the ac-
quisition of production technology for
such equipment, but no major contracts
have apparently been signed.
Prospects
China's imports of machinery and
equipment have slowed since 1974
because of political disruptions, financial
problems, and the difficulty the economy
has had in absorbing modern industrial
technology.
The huge trade deficits incurred during
1973 to 1975 involved a heavier reliance
on foreign credit than the Chinese would
have liked. Even if Peking were to reverse
its custom and accept long-term credit to
finance new purchases, it would take a
year or two before the inflow of
machinery and equipment picked up sub-
stantially because of the lead time re-
quired to fill major orders. Over the
longer term, however, a shift in policy
could bring a very large jump in ad-
vanced-technology imports because Pe-
king would have little difficulty in ob-
taining the Western credits desired.
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The new 200-mile fishing zones being established
throughout the world could reduce the Soviet fish catch by as
much as 25 percent. Japan, the world's largest fishing nation,
faces significant reductions but may fare somewhat better.
USSR-Japan: Impact of 200-Mile Limit
The failure of the UN-sponsored Law
of the Sea conference, after more than
three years of negotiations, to establish a
comprehensive treaty has led to a
proliferation of national 200-mile
maritime fishing zones. Currently, 44
countries have claimed such boundaries,
20 since the beginning of this year. Nearly
all the world's prime fishing grounds are
within such 200-mile zones, and the im-
pact on the USSR. and Japan, the two
leading distant-water fishing nations is
particularly serious.
The proliferation of 200-mile zones
could force a substantial reduction in the
Soviet fish catch. During 1975, the
Soviets caught 9.9 million tons of fish,
roughly 15 percent of the world catch of
some 70 million tons. Official Soviet
statistics indicate that nearly 90 percent of
the catch came from waters not controlled
by the USSR.
Under the restrictions imposed by the
US, Canada, and the EC-all of which es-
tablished 200-mile zones this year-the
total Soviet fish catch could be reduced by
nearly 1.5 million tons. The Soviets may
lose another 500,000 to 1 million tons
from quotas imposed by other countries
that extended their maritime jurisdiction
to 200 miles during the past year. Thus,
the potential Soviet fish loss could
amount to about 25 percent of the total
catch.
Japan, the world's largest fishing nation
with a catch of 10.5 million tons in 1975,
will fare somewhat better than the USSR.
During 1975, only about 35 percent of
Japan's total catch was taken within 200
miles of foreign countries. The largest
foreign catch was in US waters, where
slightly more than 1.4 million tons were
taken. Under current US allocations,
Japan will be allowed to take 1.2 million
tons in US waters in 1977, only about 14
percent less than in 1975.
Japan faces a much larger cutback in
Soviet waters, where it harvested about
1.4 million tons in 1975. The Japanese
fishing fleet has been barred from Soviet
waters since April 1, awaiting the out-
come of negotiations on quotas.
Moscow Tries to Cut Losses
The USSR will be able to offset some
of its reduced fish catch by limiting
foreign fishing operations in its own
coastal waters. On March 1, Moscow es-
tablished a 200-mile fishing zone off its
coasts, where foreign fleets took over 2
million tons of fish during 1975. Japan
and South Korea accounted for 1.8
million tons of that amount, part of which
undoubtedly will now be allocated to the
Soviet fleet.
The Soviets have not been in a hurry to
negotiate quotas with some coastal fishing
nations. They started talking with the
Japanese in February and immediately in-
troduced sensitive political issues and con-
flicting territorial claims that effectively
Page 17
put off serious talk about fishing quotas
for four months.
Moscow also stalled with the South
Koreans, maintaining they could not
negotiate a fishing agreement because the
two countries had no diplomatic relations.
During 1975, the South Koreans caught
over 400,000 tons, nearly 20 percent of
their total catch, in Soviet waters. Even if
Moscow should back off from its position,
South Korea's take in Soviet waters
would probably be cut by 50 percent or
more.
Ties with Developing Countries
Another probable Soviet device to cut
losses will be to expand the long-standing
program of joint ventures with fishing
companies in the developing countries.
The USSR now has 18 joint fishing ven-
tures with developing countries, and
another nine are under negotiation.
These ventures are small investments
with high rates of return. Soviet ships,
leased or purchased by the joint company,
are jointly manned and used for training,
research, and fishing. Part of the catch is
delivered to the developing-country
partner for local distribution; the
remainder is frozen and taken home or
sold in Western markets.
The Soviets also have been active in
signing fishing aid agreements with
developing countries. As of December
1976, the USSR had fishing aid
agreements valued at over $200 million
with more than 30 countries. These
agreements involve grants or long-term
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credits to be repaid in reciprocal services.
The USSR often requires concessions
from its partners for the Soviet fishing
fleet, such as the use of repair facilities,
refueling privileges, transfer of crews, and
onshore processing.
The sup cess of these actions is evident
in the rapid increase in the Soviet catch
off the coast of western Africa during the
past 10 years. In 1975, more than 15 per-
cent of the Soviet catch, or 1.5 million
cons, came from west African waters,
compared to less than 3 percent in 1965.
Although several west African states have
declared 200-mile fishing zones and ex-
panded their own fishing operations,
Moscow's continued aid and the creation
of joint ventures will probably allow the
Soviets to expand their catch there in the
future.
Impact on the Soviet Diet
The recuced Soviet catch could affect
the Soviet diet. In 1975, Soviet per capita
consumption of fish was 16.8 kilograms,
which represented about 15 percent of the
animal protein in the Soviet diet. Ac-
cording to the current five-year plan
] 1976-1980), per capita fish consumption
is to increase to almost 21 kilograms in
1980-a goal that will be difficult to
achieve.
Moscow could lessen the impact of the
reduced catch on the Soviet diet, but only
at the expense of badly needed foreign-ex-
change earnings. Soviet fish products are
sold arourd the world; sales have nearly
tripled in volume since 1970 to 500,000
tons. Hard-currency earnings from fish
exports arriounted to roughly $ 100 million
n 1975.
Tokyo's Reactions
Japan has already started adapting to
the new realities of international fishing.
t has established a 12-mile territorial
limit and will implement a 200-mile
fishing zone later this year. It also has
launched a $700-million, seven-year
program to increase yields in Japanese
coastal waters. Tokyo is likely to try to
reduce Soviet fishing in its waters,
although enforcement will be difficult.
The Japanese also have been active in
establishing joint ventures, especially in
the US. Of the more than 50 joint fishing
ventures now operating in the US-most
of which have been established within
the past two years-more than 30 are with
the Japanese. Most of the joint ventures
with the Japanese operate along the
Pacific Coast and in Alaska.
Dietary Impact in Japan
Japan-which relies more heavily on
fish for animal protein than does any
other developed country-is committed to
maintaining its current level of fish con-
sumption. In 1975, consumption of fish
products accounted for more than half the
animal protein in the average Japanese
diet. The share was considerably higher
for low-income families.
Since 1970, domestic consumption of
fish has outpaced the increase in the coun-
try's catch, forcing Tokyo to shift from a
net exporter to a large net importer. Fish
imports exceeded exports by almost $700
million in 1975, with net imports supply-
ing 15 percent of consumption re-
quirements. Part of the increase in the
value of Japanese fish imports can be ex-
plained by the larger imports of more ex-
pensive products, such as shrimp and
herring roe.
Japan can afford to increase its imports
of fish, especially from the US. Last
year, Japan's trade surplus worldwide
was $10 billion, half of which was with
the US.
Fishing Off New Zealand
The USSR and Japan are attempting
to locate new fishing areas to offset possi-
ble losses in their catch. As a result, the
number of Soviet and Japanese fishing
boats in the waters around New
Zealand-where there is only a 12-mile
restriction-has increased greatly in re-
cent months. The Japanese fleet has
grown from 235 to 335; the Soviet fleet
from 15 to 52.
New Zealand had earlier announced
That, in agreement with its Pacific
neighbors, it would not declare a 200-mile
fishing zone until after it had reviewed
progress at the session of the Law of the
Sea conference that began this week at the
UN. New Zealand fishermen were afraid,
however, that foreign fleets would cause
considerable damage to fishing stocks in
the area, and last week Prime Minister
Muldoon announced his intention to in-
troduce a bill to establish a 200-mile zone.
Soviet fishing operations: a small boat (r) unloads its catch into the /ar
Page 18
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Secret
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