WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 28, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Center
Western Europe
Review
OSD review complete. RIF w/secondary referral to DOE
for PRD/FRD
State Department
review completed
Secret
RP WER 79-013
28 March 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
28 March 1979
CONTENTS
Italy: Berlinguer and His Peers . . 1 25X1
When the 15th Communist Party Congress meets
this week, Berlinguer will be reelected
party leader, but he will not be the un-
questioned leader that he was in 1975 and
1976.
Attitudes expressed at the local party con-
gresses indicate that the local parties in-
tend to play an active role at the national
congress to begin on 30 March. 25X1
West Germany - Brazil: Strengthening Bonn's Latin
14
Connection . . . . . . . . . . . .
West German Chancellor Schmidt is certain to
make a determined effort to improve Bonn's
political and commercial relations with
Brazil during his visit to Brasilia next
week.
Turkey: New Decree on Straits Transit
Turkey has issued troublesome new regulations
h
governing the passage of foreign wars
through Turkish territorial waters.
. 18 25X1
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Italy: Berlinguer and His Peers
In the spring of 1975 Enrico Berlinguer emerged
from the 14th Congress of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) as its undisputed leader. Berlinguer had been
elected Secretary General three years before, after a
three-year interim in which--as deputy to the ailing
Secretary General Luigi Longo--he was de facto leader
of the party. The slight, uncommunicative Sardinian
aristocrat had long been recognized as the logical suc-
cessor to Togliatti and Longo. His preeminence, however,
stemmed in part from the self-disqualification of older
more charismatic rival leaders. Longo chose Berlinguer
to succeed him not only because he was able, but also
because he was--in party terms--a man of the middle.
When the 15th PCI Congress meets this week, Ber-
linguer will be reelected party leader. He will, how-
ever, be less the unquestioned leader than he was in
1975 and 1976. The local and parliamentary elections
of those years saw the PCI enlarge its vote from 27 to
34 percent. With those victories, Berlinguer's prestige
and popularity in the party and the country at large
soared; polls suggested he was the most trusted politi-
cian in Italy. A good deal of Berlinguer's popularity
and prestige has since been consumed in the difficult
maneuvering since August 1976, when the PCI began to
support the Andreotti government. But he remains a man
of the middle; though he may be contested in the top
councils of his party, those who doubt his policies and
his tactics come together as momentary coalitions of
nay-sayers, and the sum of their disagreements with
Berlinguer does not add up to a coherent alternative
policy.
The Alliance Problem
Historically, the most divisive single issue for
the PCI has been the problem of which allies the party
must have to come to power. During the 1960s disagree-
ment on this topic was symbolized by two groups--the
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followers of Giorgio Amendola and of Pietro Ingrao. The
first supported the idea of a laic alliance, recreating
the ties with the Socialists that had existed until the
mid-1950s; the second argued that priority should be
given to arrangements with the left wing of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (DC), in the ultimate hope of
splitting it off from the more conservative wing. Both
strategies included the lay and clerical forces as po-
tential allies, and the argument was over questions of
emphasis and priority. During the 1960s neither strat-
egy seemed very promising: the Socialists moved farther
away from the PCI in the center-left experiment, while
the Christian Democratic Party sustained its basic
strength and obstinately showed no tendency to split
All currents of opinion in the PCI recognized that
greater party strength was a precondition for effective
alliances. The parliamentary election of 1972 gave the
PCI 27 percent of the vote, but also left the Christian
Democrats with the option of forming a center-right
coalition. The coalition lasted only a year and was
followed by another shaky center-left government that
also fell after about a year. Even though the Christian
Democrats were having trouble holding a majority together,
they still showed no inclination to turn to the communist
Party.
Against this background, in late 1973 Berlinguer
pondered the future alliance policy of the PCI, with
the bloody collapse of the Allende experiment in Chile
as his immediate stimulus. The result was Berlinguer's
famous "historic compromise." Berlinguer's proposal was
an effort to cope with the shortcomings of both of the
PCI's old theories of alliance--Amendola's call for an
alliance with the Socialists, which could hope for the
barest of majorities at best, and Ingrao's idea of fo-
menting a split in the Christian Democratic Party. In
Berlinguer's conception, the Communists had to pay almost
as much attention to the forces positioned to the right
of these groups. If an implacable conservative bloc
with the implicit support of the officer corps and the
security forces refused to come to terms with a govern-
ment of the left, that government could not succeed--
and might be overthrown by violence. Consequently,
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Berlinguer concluded that the PCI must accept a compro-
mise not only with the leftwing forces in the Christian
Democratic Party, but with the party as a whole, hoping
in the future to bring the rightwing forces under con-
trol.
The events of 1974-76 made the "historic compromise"
seem an increasingly realistic policy. In 1974, veteran
Christian Democratic leader Amintore Fanfani failed to
make the national referendum on legalized divorce a
rallying ground for a shift to the right; the gains
scored by the PCI in 1975 and 1976 were the largest
scored by any party since 1948. By 1976, although the
DC was still not ready to accept the historic compromise
with its implication of permanent PCI presence in the
government, it seemed to have concluded that the country
could not be run without PCI cooperation and support.
The Primacy of Tactics
The formation in August 1976 of the Andreotti gov-
ernment--whose life depended initially on PCI abstention
in Parliament and later on direct PCI support--opened
a new period. The PCI goal was now to enlarge its open-
ing; ultimately the party hoped to get its own cabinet
ministers and have a direct and unquestioned share of
power. In this process, PCI maneuvering has been coun-
tered by three different forces, two of which may have
been unexpected:
-- Resistance to PCI advances by conservative
Christian Democrats on the grounds of
ideology and aversion to sharing power.
-- Resistance by portions of the Christian
Democratic left and the Socialist Party,
both fearing that in a permanent alliance
they would end as the puppets or dupes of
the Communists.
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-- Resistance by the CISL and the UIL, the
labor unions controlled by leftwing
Christian Democrats and by the Social-
ists, to counsels of wage restraint
and austerity advanced by the largely
PCI-controlled union, the CGIL. Here
again, the non-Communist unions are mo-
tivated by fears of PCI/CGIL hegemony.
As a result, PCI progress since August 1976 toward
full participation in power has not only been relatively
slow, but has been accompanied by a series of small set-
backs that called into question the plausibility of PCI
participation: the Andreotti government, which fell in
January, was unable to carry out a clear economic program;
the unions have not been willing to accept much wage re-
straint; PCI-led urban and regional governments installed
after the 1975 election, lacking fiscal powers and central
support, have been disappointing. And the Christian Demo-
cratic left, particularly after the murder of Aldo Moro,
has shown no sign of rallying to the PCI, while the So-
cialist Party, under the new leadership of Bettino Craxi,
has been actively hostile to it.
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The PCI's Next Choices
The PCI has for years been picturing itself as a
partito di governo, a responsible party whose presence
at the center of affairs is necessary if Italy is to be
well governed. While in theory it is perfectly possible
for the PCI to continue this stance if it goes into op-
position after the national election expected in June,
the operation would in practice be very difficult--
because it would be hard to control. The unions, which
have been restive under a policy of austerity, would
certainly pose greater demands; the rank and file and
middle-level functionaries would be happy to be freed
from the need to support the Christian Democrats; and
in all this Berlinguer would risk losing many middle-
class and intellectual voters attracted to the party in
recent years. So, although Berlinguer is clearly willing
to go into opposition if the Christian Democrats refuse
him a larger governing role, he is probably very reluc-
tant to take the step, not so much because the move would
be called a defeat for him--though it would be--but be-
cause the next phase would be even more difficult to
manage than the present one.
Because Berlinguer is the PCI's quintessential man-
of-the-middle, his continued predominance in the PCI
may be necessary for the continuation of a carefully
balanced, flexible, and controlled party strategy. Ber-
linguer's failure would release all sorts of contradic-
tory thrusts--increased hostility to the Soviets on the
part of some, but also labor intransigence, and radical
posturing of all sorts. This prospect may in itself
be enough to discourage overt rivalry among leaders who
have always worked together very well. An ad hoc coali-
tion of nay-sayers can easily break up, and there is no
particular reason to think that party leaders--or the
rank and file--prefer someone like Chiaromonte to Ber-
linguer.
The leadership to be elected at the party con-
gress will probably--according to press accounts--
include a deputy secretary general, perhaps Chiaromonte,
flanked by a Berlinguer lieutenant like Paolo Bufalini
as a coequal. The presumptive result of this arrange-
ment could be a PCI with a more nearly collective
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leadership than it had ever had. Such a leadership
might eventually change course, but the prospect is far
from certain and it is not clear how such a leadership
would get around the compelling logic of Berlinguer's
"historic compromise" strategy. And it is even less
clear how Italy would fare if the PCI chose--or
drifted--to a course of all-out opposition to the
government.
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Italian Communist Local Parma Congresses
During the past two months, the Italian Communists
have held a number of local party congresses to prepare
for the national congress scheduled to begin on 30 March.
The attitudes expressed in the congresses make it clear
that the local parties intend to play an active role in
defining the Communist Party's identity and future
strategy.
Ideological questions apparently did not spark the
heated debate many observers expected in the local con-
gresses; the draft theses--which will constitute the
basis of discussions at the national level--were all ap-
proved with few difficulties. Only in Tuscany--a long-
time Communist stronghold--were the theses subjected to
much criticism. The Tuscan delegates objected to the
party's call for the preservation of a private sector
in the Italian economy and unsuccessfully fought the
leadership's efforts to reduce the importance of "Lenin-
ism" in Italian Communism. In Naples, on the other hand,
Communist politicians seemed willing to consider doctrinal
changes that would remove Marxism-Leninism from its cen-
tral position, reducing it to one of several ideological
traditions contributing to the party's identity. These
delegates did insist, however, that the national congress
reaffirm the party's working class character and its com-
mitment to socialism.
Local opinions on international affairs were a mix-
ture of "orthodox" and "autonomous" positions. The con-
gresses were virtually unanimous in their condemnations
of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, their admiration for
the "moderate" Soviet response, and their criticism of
the new, "shadowy" relationship between China and the
United States. In the northeast--Veneto (Venice) and
Friuli-Venezia Giulia--local party delegates did, how-
ever, acknowledge that the Soviet model was inapplicable
in Western Europe, and that there the "third way"--or
Eurocommunism--was the only method to establish socialism.
In Tuscany, the Congress, with little dissent, even a -
proved continued Italian participation in NATO.
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Local party concerns clearly centered on domestic
politics. Communists in Lombardy, Campania, Liguria,
Tuscany, and Veneto all heartily endorsed Secretary Gen-
eral Berlinguer's decision to withdraw support from the
Andreotti government. All the delegates appeared con-
vinced that cooperating with the government had cost the
party support. The Genoese party was particularly con-
cerned about the failure of Communist labor and youth
organizations to attract and retain more new recruits. 25X1
Local parties also applauded the national leader-
ship's uncompromising demand to be included in any new
government. And they seemed to relish the prospect of a
return to opposition if their demand was not met. Many
delegates seemed to believe that an opposition role was
necessary to reinvigorate the party and restore its revo-
lutionary image. In Trieste, a national committee member
suggested that, ideally, the party should adopt a "flex-
ible strategy" that would allow it to react more deftly
to changing circumstances. Other party leaders called
for the maintenance of good relations with the Socialists
in case a renewal of a "leftist alternative" policy be-
comes necessary or desirable. 25X1
Although there was little direct criticism of Ber-
linguer and his "historic compromise" strategy--coopera-
tion with non-Communist forces in governing Italy--local
leaders were clearly dissatisfied with the results thus
far achieved by this policy. In Naples, the final con-
gress document went so far as to declare that the problems
of the south had actually become more serious, despite
increased cooperation between Communists and Christian
Democrats there.
Accordingly, the congresses revealed bitter anti-
Christian Democratic sentiment among local Communists.
In localities such as Naples city and the Ligurian prov-
inces, Communist administrations blamed their short-
comings on years of Christian Democratic misrule and on
the Christian Democrats' obstructionist posture as an
opposition party. Consequently, local party leaders
seized on the opportunity to shift from the defensive to
the offensive by attacking the Christian Democrats and
blaming their anti-Communist prejudices for the collapse
of the national government. Local Communist leaders seem
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Communist Leader Berlinguer Addresses Party Faithful
" I
This photograph is from L'Exress, September 1975.
28 March 1979
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eager for an electoral test, not only to regain this tac-
tical advantage but also to divert attention away from
their own blemished administrative records.
Perhaps the most significant organizational problem
discussed by the local party congresses was verticismo--
a lack of consultation between the leadership and the
masses. Some delegates called for a greater degree of
local autonomy and a decentralization of some aspects of
the party apparatus in order to increase rank-and-file
participation in decisionmaking at higher levels. The
party in Naples, for example, suggested the creation of
zonal committees, designed to bypass the provincial struc-
ture and give the municipal party direct access to the
regional hierarchy; this proposal is expected to be ap-
proved by the national leadership.
Conclusion
The tenor of discussions at the local congresses
suggests that most Communists are in the mood for intro-
spection and criticism. On questions of ideology and
international affairs, local leaders appeared open to
some innovation, provided a way is found to blend new
approaches with traditional values and attitudes.
Local Communist leaders seem less sure of themselves
on domestic political questions. On the one hand, they
do not reject the "historic compromise" strategy and pose
no workable alternatives to it. On the other hand, they
are anxious to reestablish the dynamic image the party
had before joining the parliamentary majority. But beyond
a desire to return to the opposition, local Communists
are ambivalent about the party's future strategy and re-
fuse to discard any options. In any event, they are
clearly sending a signal to the party leadership that it
must take rank-and-file opinion into account when develop-
ing policy--a fact which may become more apparent during
and after the forthcoming national congress.
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West German - Brazil: Strengthening Bonn's Latin
Connection
West German Chancellor Schmidt is certain to make
a determined effort to improve Bonn's political and com-
mercial relations with Brazil during his visit to Bra-
silia next week. Schmidt's visit is the first by a
foreign head of state since the inauguration of the new
Figueiredo administration and underscores Brazilian ef-
forts during the past few years to diversify its foreign
contacts by developing ties with Western Europe. The
Chancellor will make a strong pitch for the completion
of the West German - Brazilian nuclear accord, but it
seems clear that the Brazilians will press for modifica-
tion of the package. No major new bilateral agreements
are likely to result from the visit, although both gov-
ernments are certain to go out of their way to underline
the already extensive current ties.
West German
Chancellor Schmidt
This photograph is from Liaison.
**This photograph is from Franz Furst.
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Brazil's New President,
Joao Baptista Figueiredo
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Schmidt is scheduled to visit Brazil 3-7 April on a
trip that ostensibly is to reciprocate former Brazilian
President Geisel's visit to Bonn in March 1978.* In the
past the relationship between Bonn and Brasilia has been
far more important to the Brazilians than to the West
Germans, and West Germany has done little more than polit-
ically necessary to maintain its commercial credibility.
Last March the West Germans were quick to rebuff Brazilian
efforts to get Bonn certification of a "special relation-
ship" during Geisel's trip. Because the West German
economic and political stake in Brazil and in Latin
America is growing, however, Bonn may be more willing to
accommodate Brazilian interests and risk a higher profile.
The nuclear accord, initially envisaged as the symbol
of Brazil's regional polder status and the salvation of
West Germany's nuclear power industry, has become a source
of irritation for both parties. Brazilian critics in re-
cent months have repeatedly attacked the agreement on
scientific and economic grounds. They contend that the
technology involved does nothing to advance Brazilian
knowledge. Some Brazilian officials are even skeptical
of West Germany's intention to fulfill all of its commit-
ments under the accord, particularly the promise to trans-
fer technology.
%The Chancellor will also make short stops in Peru to visit the
West German Ambassador (a close friend) and the Dominican Republic.
The latter stop was added as a "democratic" balance to mollify cri-
tics of his visit to "military-run" countries--Brazil and Peru.
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Economic Ties
As further inducement, Schmidt may be prepared to
make some trade-related concessions to enhance the al-
ready extensive economic ties between the two countries.
Brazil is West Germany's most important trading partner
in the developing world, while West Germany is the
second largest foreign investor in Brazil. Although
West German private firms bemoan the discriminatory
nature of Brazilian import and investment policies, they
need little encouragement to stay in the Brazilian market.
The Brazilians are anxious to keep West German capital
and technology flowing and would be amenable to additional
joint manufacturing-trade ventures with West German firms.
Bonn has already indicated a willingness to intensify the
transfer of technology to Brazil in minicomputers and
telecommunications modernization projects. A joint West
German - Brazilian commission on scientific and technical
cooperation meets regularly, while a joint commission on
trade and economics was set up last October.
The Brazilians may hope to get the West Germans to
act as an active intermediary on their behalf with the
EC. Brazilian media have already interpreted the Schmidt
visit as a continuation of the "European option" policy
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begun by Geisel and former Foreign Minister (now Ambas-
sador to the United States) Silveria. Brasilia can argue
that such intercession by Bonn is a natural follow-on to
a joint pledge to improve cooperation between the lesser
developed and developed countries made last year during
Geisel's visit to West Germany. The Brazilians may also
wave the prospect of assured raw materials supplies to
resource-poor West Germany. This would be well-received
by the West Germans in their continuing efforts to diver
sify foreign sources of key industrial raw materials.
Schmidt's visit seems certain to accelerate politi-
cal and economic ties between the two countries, but no
major new deals appear in the offing. Neither West
Germany nor Brazil are in a position to chart new direc-
tions for a relationship that, despite being remarkably
friendly, remains essentially one of economics. The
Chancellor is under heavy pressure from West German nu-
clear interests to save the accord. At the same time,
however, Schmidt must contend with many in his own So-
cial Democratic Party who take a dim view of Brazil's
record on political liberalization. Figueiredo's crack-
down on labor union activity last weekend in Sao Paulo
is certain to reinforce this view. Figueiredo obviously
will want to come off well in projecting Brazilian na-
tional interests and to show that his one-month-old ad-
ministration is firmly in charge. Moreover, Brazilian
critics will be watching closely to see just how well
the new President handles the West German connection.
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Turkey: New Decree on Straits Transit
Turkey has issued troublesome new regulations govern-
ing the passage of foreign warships through Turkish
territorial waters--including the Bosporus and Dardanelles,
which are controlled by provisions of the Montreux Con-
vention. Ankara appears to have expanded upon some of
the provisions of the Convention and Turkish law to come
up with several new stipulations that are contrary to
international practice or in. violation of US laws.
Some of the more important provisions of the new
decree are:
-- Nuclear warships must now request permission to
pass through Turkish territorial waters instead
of simply giving notification.
-- The limitations on nuclear-powered warships also
apply to ships carrying "nuclear material."
It is not clear from the language of the decree
whether this also applies to nuclear weapons.
If so, the Turkish controls are unacceptable
to the US Navy.
-- A 10-day instead of a three-day notification of
a delay in passage is now required. This
feature will reduce Soviet flexibility to re-
inforce its surface fleet in the Mediterranean
with ships from the Black Sea. Until now,
Moscow has been able to send small groups of
warships with only a minimum delay through a
system of "contingency declarations."
-- Foreign warships must submit to the jurisdiction
of Turkish courts and are liable for various
damages beyond the fault of the ship or its
crew.
28 March 1979
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-- Prohibitions on the use of certain equipment
such as radios and sonars, which are necessary
to the safe navigation of the ship.
-- Prohibitions against pollution, including dis-
charge of sewage and trash while in transit.
The impact of the new decree cannot yet be measured.
To date only the Greek press has protested. In addition
to frequent transits by Soviet warships, straits are used
by US destroyers making a one-week cruise through the
Black Sea on a once-per-quarter basis to demonstrate the
principle of freedom of the seas. French, Italian, and
British warships have also made recent visits to Black
Sea ports. It remains to be seen whether any of the
other signatories of the 1936 Montreux Convention--France,
the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the USSR, Japan,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia--will protest the decree
or call for an abrogation of the Convention. Turkey has
been quite fastidious in the past in its enforcement.
The new decree is likely to be brought up at the
Law of the Sea Conference that opened 19 March in Geneva.
None of the signatories to the Montreux Convention are
expected to call for its nullification, mainly out of
fear that it would be replaced by an agreement more
detrimental to their interests.
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