Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730120-4
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RESTRICTED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FvREI N DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730120-4
Bros cast
TNI\ DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORNA LION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NIANING OF LU-IONA\N ACT NO
Y. S. C. I I AND II. AS ANENDID. ITS TNAMINIISION ON THE REVELATION
OF III CONTENT/ IN ANT MANNER TO AM YNAY'NON1210 PINION IS Pilo.
NIVITSD ST LAW. REPRODUCTION 01 TNIY FORM IS FN0"1111 so.
TO QA LIBRARY
DAT DIST. 020September
OF PAGES
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
iI
INTRODUCTIUN: To date, Radio Moscow's overt recognition of the President's announcement
has been limited entirely to that contained in the official TASS eta ement which has been
broadcast o?r-er more than 40 different transmieaions.* The TASS stat went has also gone the
round of :5oroiet-controlled radios; but only minimal comment has appeed. Monitored
Yugonlavbroadcasts have not yet mentioned either the President's announcement or the TASS
statement. Other radios outside the Soviet sphere, however, have ben full of news and
speculation--most of it following closely that appearing in'the American press.
7Ir?m~
QOV?n,?A_rQYM 1.T 13 r~r1t!!, r
~ _ Comment from the Eastern European Satellites is extremely
limitel. While Prague and Warsaw report that meetings in those cit.ea greeted the TASS
statement with tremendous cheers and enthusiasm, a talk by Czeehoslo kia's Minister of
Education Nejedly scores past British and American refusal to accept all Soviet proposals
for international control: Referring' to',the current "excitement and alarm" in thr' Reatern
i
,world, he charges that because the bomb "has ceased to be the exclusive property of'the U.$.
and could be turned against her" the British and Americans are now ccntending.that they
A " A
always stood for atomic control. 'IT-he effrontery of roactInnarSur_ A?nfot be srr
ss
p
e
s
a
ent t
s
d
o
llege
--a ~? ???
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press a on Congress GO 1nC ease credits for armaments.
The ll
;zg{jpt-'controed German radio, as usual, is loss reticent. One commentator quotes a
19 6
t
t
t b
v
"
s
a
emen
y Moloto
to the effect that
it should not be forgotjten that once the atomic
bo
b h
d
m
as appeare
on one al.de there will be atomic bombs and some ot~er things, too, on ?tha
other side." Citing Vishinsky'e U.N. demand for prohibition of the ~+,tomic weapon, he notes
that it came at the ver
n-oment
h
T
m
'
"
y
w
en
ru
an
s announcement
brought ,ach a welcome soberinal
up with it." This "sobering up," he suggests, may have produced an 'latmoephere in New York
and the variuuscPnitals favorable to the peace front." Other broadcasts also point to the!,
peace." Among reactions Of Comimini iota in the Western worms, Nonni and Togliatti are reported
to have
reet
d th
e
t
"
"
g
e
e annul c
men
as
peace news.
But the French Can miot m1iANITE charge * Mos
'
tt
t
ti
cow
s con en
ary-a
en
on to the subject of atomic energy is 1itod entirely to
Viahin ky's proposal fo U.N. prohibition of the bomb and to-alleged Anglo-American
differences over atomic 7development. On Sunday, one eommenta.tor a aldthat "the great
of the past week was the opening of the fourth U.N. General Aseemb ',session."
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WHERE
PUBLISHED
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PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
Foreign Cquntriee
FOREIGN RADIO REACTIONS TO' THE PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT ABOUT AN ATCMIC EXPLOSION IN THE USSR
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
HOW
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730120-4
RESTRICTED
that while pit is an "admission' of the failure of the American policy of using the' !atom! bomb
for blackmail," the President's announcement "is evidently a cleverly planned campaign'to
uvvwtup a ni
COMMENT FROM THE NON-SOVIET WOR_D: Reactions of radios in the non-Sovilet world 'run the
gamut of rumors and speculation. Relative to most of the major issues, however, 1they are
Do theISoviets have the bomb itself? There is practically unanimous agreement that
they do. Most comment islbased on this assumption, stated either) explicitly or
No aurprie It is pointed out repeatedly that eventual Soviet poession of thellbcmb
was expected and that U.S. -Western policy was posited on this expe;tation. LittleI!
alarm is shown, but there', is great seriousness.
Balance of atomic n wer: There are many statements pointing to co tinued U.S.
superiority. Development of the first bomb is contrasted with the industrial' potential
needed to produce itJ on a', mass scale. Little attention is paid to the presumed over-
estimation of the time required for Soviet development of the boffin
Need for control: ol: There is complete unanimity on the urgency of adequate co Droll
Comment is divided, however, on Soviet willingness to accede to such control, Continued
Soviet refusal to permit {nspection is predicted. But there are also exprer%ed hopes
that the USSR may be more amenable to negotiations now that they are on a more equal
footing.
War or -peace: Generally, two alternatives are presented. One follows the line of
reasoning summarized immedia'tely above, with suggestions that the atomic weapon may be
outlawed just as was poison gas. On the other hand, there is speculation that with the
bomb in Soviet possession the world situation may become more tens? and infl' ble,
with an armaments rare followed by atomic war and humanity's destr?etion.
Recommended Western nolicv: There is virtual agreement that current policy should be
pursued' and implemented. More American aid is recommended. There are few suggestions
of appeasement. (The Damascus radio, however, reports that a "government source" in.
Iran has "declared that Iran must smooth her relations with her northern neighbors
because! when the sparks of war fl" Iran will surely be the loser .")I Greater I efforts to
achieve control are urged;', but in the meantime and if these fail, he U.S. and West'
should work to maintain atomic supremacy.
How didll the Soviets do it?'~ Repeated references are made to Sovietutilizati on of German
scientists who are g _ven the major credit. The TASS implication t2~at the USSR hat had
the bomb since 1947 is discredited in the few comments on the subject.
How slit discovered? Rife speculation refers to intelligence wok, seismograph
records, and instruments for measuring atmospheric radioactivity. ~
Timiur of the anno~'mc e;Ment: Significance is seen in the coincidence of the announcement
with the General Assembly meetings. There is speculation on the p9ssibility of
intended pressure on Congressfor more military credits and more rapid implementation
of the NO. And some comments conclude that the announcement was made as soon' asl''`
knowledge of the explosion!was reliably established.
e
Predict
d results: Les& U.S. secrecy about atomic developments an ;closer Western
r
i
A 70
m
-gr
cooperat
on.
i up A
erican air force.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730120-4