THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM 1 JANUARY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: April 13, 1999
• Content Type: IM

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TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Effectiveness
of the Rolling Thunder Program
in North Vietnam
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
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Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The Rolling Thunder Attack in January-September 1966 . . 5
A. Scale of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. Aircraft Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. Cost Effectiveness of Operations Against North
Vietnam in 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II. Target Systems Attacked in January-September 1966 . . . 11
A. Fixed Targets . . . . . . . . . . .
1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Electric Power Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Petroleum Storage Targets . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Lines of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . 17
(1) Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
(2) Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
(3) Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B. Targets of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance
Missions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C. Laos Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
III. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program in 1966 . . . 25
A. Physical Damage . . . . . . .
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B. Casualties in 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties
2. Estimated Casualties from Strikes
Against Fixed Targets
3. Estimated Casualties from Armed
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . .
C. North Vietnamese Countermeasures . . . . . . . . 29
1. Repair and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
a. Organization and Manpower . . . . . . . 31
b. Protective Construction . . . . . . . . . 31
c. Dispersal of Population and Industry . . . 32
d. Other Civil Defense Measures . . . . . . 32
e. Alerts . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 33
D. North Vietnamese Political Reactions . . . . . . . 34
E. Soviet and Chinese Communist Assistance . . . . . 35
1. Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
IV. General Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program . . 47
A. Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B. Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 48
C. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
D. Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
E. Manpower Developments in North Vietnam . . . . . 59
F. Third Country Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1. Soviet and Eastern European Attitudes . . . . . 61
2. Communist China's Attitude . . . . . . . . 62
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Tables
1. Attack Sorties by US/GVN Forces in Southeast Asia,
During 1.965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . 6
2. Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia,
January-August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Losses by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, During
1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strikes on Major
Fixed-Target Systems: 1965 and January-September
1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strike Sorties on
Major Fixed-Target Systems: 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. North Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted
Bridges, 1965 and January-September 1966 18
7. North Vietnam: Estimated Total Length of Time
Railroad Lines were Interdicted for Through Rail
Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . 19
8. Railroad Bridges Destroyed or Damaged, by Line,
1965 Through 30 September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Reported Losses of Transport Equipment Due to
Bombing in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered
to North Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . .
11. Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered
to North Vietnam, January-June 1966 . . . . . . . . 40
12. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam,
1955-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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13. Credits and Grants Extended to North Vietnam by
Communist Countries, January 1965 - October 1966 . 43
14. North Vietnam: Estimated Transport Performance,
1964, 1965, and Projected 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15. North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory as of the End
of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966 . . . . . . . . . 55
16. North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory as of the End
of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966 . . . . . . . . . 56
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THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
IN NORTH VIETNAM*
1 JANUARY-30 SEPTEMBER 1966
The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been
accelerated sharply in 1966, compared with operations in 1965. The
59, 000 attack sorties flown in the first nine months of 1966 against targets
in North Vietnam were about 2. 3 times the 1965 effort; the 90, 000 tons
of ordnance dropped was 2. 6 times the ordnance delivered on targets in
1965. The 1966 air operations have also been carried out more efficiently
than the 1965 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has
increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been some 58 percent of
the 1965 rate.
In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the cost effec-
tiveness of the air campaign diminished in 1966. The direct operating
cost of inflicting a dollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam has in-
creased by about 28 percent --from an estimated $6.80 in 1965 to about
$8. 70 in 1966. The major determinants of this decrease in cost effective-
ness have been the far greater proportion of attack sorties accounted for
by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed
targets) and the geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic
targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam, principally Military
Region IV.
By the end of 1965, a growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets out-
side of sanctuary areas, as well as other ope rational restrictions virtually
forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance. This
trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against major petro-
leum storage installations, whichbegan late inJune 1966. Strike sorties
against JCS fixed-target systems dropped from more than 30 percent of
* This memorandum was produced by CIA.
It was prepared by the
Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of
National Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions repre-
sent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 3 November
1966.
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the total sorties flown in 1965 to less than 3 percent in 1966. Armed re-
connaissance sorties increased by over 230 percent, from about 17, 300
sorties in 1965 to 57, 300 in 1966. Almost two-thirds of these -- 37, 000
sorties -- were directed at the southernmost areas of North Vietnam,
the Panhandle section south of Vinh.
The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted
interdiction of the infiltration network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties
flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs increased from
11, 000 sorties in 1965 to about 38, 000 during the first nine months of
1966. Ninety-five percent of the attack sorties flown in Laos in 1966
were on armed reconnaissance missions.
The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder
attacks are:
(1) About 20 percent, or 70, 000, of the total
military forces are engaged directly in defensive
programs and countermeasures against the Rolling
Thunder program. About 220, 000 full-time and
100, 000 part-time workers have been diverted to
repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs
in North Vietnam and Laos. In 1965 and 1966, from
25, 000 to 35, 000 persons are tentatively estimated
to. have been casualties of air attacks in the North.
(2) Physical damage to economic and mili-
tary targets has also increased. This damage
amounted to $65 million in 1965 and an additional
$95 million in the first nine months of 1966. Of the
latter total, over 70 percent represented damage
to economic targets.
Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues
to increase its support to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling
Thunder program has not been able to prevent about a threefold increase
in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966. The external logistic sup-
port needed to maintain the expanded VC/NVA force in South Vietnam has
been adequate. In particular, despite the neutralization of the major
petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies have con-
tinued to be imported in needed amounts.
Taking a broader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder
program the North Vietnamese capability to support the war efforthas
improved.
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(1) The capacity of the transportation sys-
tem, at least as it affects the ability to handle the
flow of men and military supplies to South Vietnam,
has been increased,
(2) The sizable manpower drain has peaked,
unless there is a sharp increase in estimated VC/
NVA manpower losses in South Vietnam or a radical
change in the nature of the air campaign against
North Vietnam. In 1965 and 1966, North Vietnam
had to mobilize 80 percent of its physically fit males
as they reached draft age. Subject to the assump-
tions just delineated, this levy could be as low as
50 percent of the 1967 class,
(3) Aid from the USSR and Communist China
received in 1965 and 1966 has amounted, in esti-
mated value, to about five times the total damage
caused by Rolling Thunder attacks.
The fact that a large share of the imports now flowing into North
Vietnam is not military aid but machinery and equipment seems particu-
larly significant. On the one hand, it reflects a willingness of the major
Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war -related indus-
trial facilities, probably encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial
sector of the North Vietnamese economyhas been largely off-limits to air
attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves of skilled
manpower, electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are
available on a significant scale for conversion to a war-supporting role.
While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support military opera-
tions in the short run, it does postpone Hanoi' s long-run plans for the
development of heavy industry.
Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination
of Hanoi to continue the war. We see no signs that the air attack has
shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and Chinese
aid to bolster its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term, at least,
will apparently take no positive step toward a negotiated settlement. In
any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be insistent on a
cessation of the bombings as a prerequisite for negotiations. Analysis
of popular attitudes in North Vietnam indicates a continued firmness in
support of the regime's policies. Although the long-term effects of the
war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence
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that it has yet reached a point sufficient to deter Hanoi's leaders from
their present policies.
Finally, the course of the air campaign in 1966 has had no signifi-
cant effect on the attitudes of third countries. From the resumption of
the bombings in January 1966 to the escalation represented by the bomb-
ing of the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been,
predictably, relatively constant. The unyielding attitude of the North
Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing pause, has had -a
somewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escala-
tion against POL storage facilities produced a reaction more restrained
and less critical than had been anticipated. Among Communist third
countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries would prefer a
negotiated settlement because they regard a continuation of the war as
potentially dangerous to themselves and in any case as posing an awkward
dilemma for.themwithinthe Communist world. The Chinese Communists,
however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps
leading toward a negotiated settlement.
Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing,
the Rolling Thunder program has certain intangible aspects such as enemy
morale and determination which are much more difficult to assess. The
Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism
and the target of a concerted Communist diplomatic and propaganda cam-
paign. In one sense, this must serve to stiffen Hanoi' s back; at the same
time, the program has become one way Hanoi probably measures US
determination - -though the extent of US commitment on the ground con-
veys this determination far more persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling
Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and in this
way may exert a certain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other
hand, if Rolling Thunder were to be terminated at this point without con-
cessions, the United States wou d. be deprived of one form of leverage
against Hanoi which it now has.
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I. The Rolling Thunder Attack in January-September 1966
A. Scale of Operations
During the first nine months of 1966, US/GVN forces flew
nearly 59, 500 attack sorties against North Vietnam. * Of this total, the
United States flew 58, 700 sorties and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)
the remaining 800. The combined effort represents an increase of
approximately 130 percent over the nearly 26, 000 attack sorties flown
against North Vietnam in all of 1965. As shown in Table 1, the air
attack on North Vietnam in 1966 represents a larger share of the total
attack in Southeast Asia than it did in 1965. The number of attack
sorties flown in South Vietnam, on the other hand, represents a smaller
share of the total number of attack sorties in Southeast Asia in 1966 than
it did in 1965.
Attack sorties specifically flown as initial strikes or restrikes
on fixed targets from the target list of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have
become very rare. In 1965, such sorties accounted for nearly 30 per-
cent of all attack sorties flown against North Vietnam, and armed re-
connaissance sorties accounted for approximately 70 percent. In 1966
the share of fixed target attack sorties not involving any armed recon-
naissance had shrunk to 0. 6 percent, with armed reconnaissance sorties
accounting for 99. 4 percent. This change was a continuation of a trend
already under way in the latter months of 1965, when, in comparison
with previous levels, fixed target sorties declined both absolutely and
as a share of the total attack on North Vietnam. The decline undoubtedly
reflects the diminishing number of new fixed targets available for attack,
broadened authorization for armed reconnaissance, and, at least in part,
a change in definitions used. Restrikes on JCS fixed targets were also
carried out by armed reconnaissance sorties. Including these restrikes
on armed reconnaissance, about 1, 600 sorties, or somewhat less than
3 percent of the total number of attack sorties on North Vietnam., were
directed against JCS targets.
During the first nine months of 1966, approximately 90, 000 tons
of ordnance were delivered on North Vietnam, or about 2. 6 times the
Attack sorties include: strike, flak suppression, armed reconnais-
sance, and air interdiction,
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Attack Sorties by US/GVN Forces in Southeast Asia
During 1965 and January-September 1966
1965
January
-September 1966
Area
Force
Number
of Sorties
-
Numbe
Percent of Sort
r
ies Percent
North Vietnam
25,890
20 59,49
4
28
Us
25,276
58,69
6
VNAF
614
79
8
South Vietnam
96,549
72 121,38
8
55
US
73,412
97,29
9
VNAF
23,137
24,08
9
Laos
US
10,819
8 38,29
1
17
All areas of
operation
133,258
100 219,17
3
100
US
109,507
194,28
6
VNAF
23,751
24,88
7
tonnage delivered in 1965. The amounts delivered on North Vietnam
during the early months of the year were much smaller than in the
later months. The total for the three-month period January-March
was only 12, 795 tons, whereas 16, 342 tons were delivered in July and
17, 333 tons in August. The amount delivered in August was equal to
approximately 50 percent of the total delivered on North Vietnam in
1965.
The total ordnance tonnage delivered by air in Southeast Asia,
however, has remained fairly constant throughout the year. It was a
little over 38, 000 tons in January and had increased to over 44, 000 by
August. As indicated in Table 2, during the early months of the year,
when the tonnage delivered on North Vietnam was small, the tonnage
delivered on Laos was relatively large. In the spring and summer the
tonnages delivered on Laos decreased as the tonnages delivered on
North Vietnam increased. Deliveries on targets in South Vietnam have
remained relatively constant.
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Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia
January-August 1966
Month N
or
th Vietna
m Laos
South Vietnam
Total
January
273
13,918
23,869
38,060
February
4,780
10,878
21,783
37,441
March
7,742
8,983
24,093
40,818
April
9,037
9,287
18,921
37,245
May
7,556
7,126
18,080
32,762
June
10,963
4,519
19,025
34,507
July
16,342
2,358
23,182
41,882
August
17,333
1,435
25,590
44,358
Total
74,026
58,504
174,543
307,073
During the first nine months of 1966 the average ordnance load
per attack sortie against North Vietnam was a little more than 1. 5 tons
per sortie -- a slight increase over the 1.4 tons per sortie averaged in
1965. In July 1966 the average load was 1. 9 tons, approximately the
same as the average load per bomber sortie flown by US Air Forces
against Germany in World War II. In August 1966 the average load per
attack sortie flown against North Vietnam was 1. 6 tons.
A total of 228 planes, including support as well as attack air-
craft, were lost during the nine-month period January-September 1966.
All were US aircraft. The ratio of total losses to attack sorties was
about 0. 38 percent in 1966, compared with a ratio of approximately 0.65
percent in 1965. This is equal to an average loss of a little more than
3. 8 aircraft per 1, 000 attack sorties in 1966, compared with a loss of
6. 5 aircraft per 1, 000 attack sorties in 1965. Losses, by model, of
fixed-wing aircraft in 1965 and 1966 are compared in Table 3. Losses
as a percent of total sorties flown by models of aircraft most used
either remained the same or declined.
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Losses by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft
During 1965 and January-September 1966
Losses in Losse
s in
March-December 1965 January-September 1966
Aircraft
As Percent of A
s Percent of
Model Nu
mber Sorties Flown Number S
orties Flown
F-105
54 o.6 96
0.6
A-4
29 0.3 35
0.2
F-4
19 0.3 25
0.1
A-1
26 0.7 17
0.1
F-8
15 0.4 12
0.4
RF-101
6 2.1 11
0.5
A-6
3 0.6 7
0.6
RF-8
6 1.7 6
1.4
F-104
0 0 5
0.3
RF-4
0 0 4
0.2
F-100
5 1.2 1
0.3
RA-3
0 0 1
0.9
RA-5
3 2.3 1
0.1
C-130
0 0 1
0.2
RB-66
0 0 1
Insig.
EB-66
0 0 1
Insig.
RC-130
0 0 1
4.0
EF-l0
0 0 1
0.1
RC-47
0 0 1
11.1
EA-1
1 0.1 0
0
B-57
1 0.7 1
0.2
D. Cost Effectiveness of Operations Against North Vietnam
The value of the aircraft lost on sorties against North Vietnam
in 1966 may be estimated at about $480 million, on the basis of average
costs for production models of the types of aircraft lost. A preliminary
estimate of the sortie overhead costs for the attack sorties and for the
accompanying support sorties is about $200 million. If the ordnance
mix in 1966 was about the same as in 1965, the cost of the ordnance de-
livered by sorties against North Vietnam in 1966 may have been in the
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neighborhood of $150 million. On this basis, the direct operating cost
(excluding manpower losses) of the aerial attack on North Vietnam dur-
ing the first nine months of 1966 may be estimated at about $830 mil-
lion, as follows:
Aircraft losses
480
Sortie overhead costs
200
Ordnance costs
150
Total
830
A preliminary estimate of the damage done to North Vietnam by the
aerial attack is about $95 million. Thus the cost of one dollar's worth
of damage to the DRV may be estimated at roughly $8. 70. This is an
increase of about 28 percent above the estimated cost of $6.80 per
dollar's worth of damage in 1965. The increase in cost per unit of
damage has been caused by loss of planes of more expensive models,
by the increased sortie overhead costs resulting from flying a larger
number of sorties, and by the fact that many of the most attractive
targets were destroyed in 1965.
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II. Target Systems Attacked in January-September 1966
A. Fixed Targets
1. General
The Rolling Thunder attacks during January-September 1966
continued trends that were well defined by the last quarter of 1965. The
growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets which were eligible for attack by
-the criteria of Rolling Thunder forced a continually increasing emphasis
on armed reconnaissance missions and a consequent decline in the number
of fixed target strikes. Although 125 fixed targets were struck in 1965,
most of the 1966 counterpart effort was in restrikes of these targets. Only
25 new fixed targets were struck in the first nine months of 1966 (see
Table 4). Attack sorties flown against JCS fixed target systems dropped
dramatically in 1966, compared with 1965. In 1965, about 30 percent of
total attack sorties were flown specifically as fixed-target sorties. In 1966,
including both fixed-target sorties and restrikes of fixed targets on armed
reconnaissance sorties, only somewhat less than 3 percent of total attack
sorties were directed against JCS fixed targets. (See Table 5. ) Nevertheless,
the effectiveness of fixed-target strike attacks, measured in terms of damage
costs, more than doubled. Damage directly attributable to airstrikes on
fixed targets rose from $5, 000 per sortie in 1965 to $11, 000 per sortie in
1966. The principal cause of this rise undoubtedly is the concentration of
the attack effort on high cost target systems such as powerplants, bridges,
and POL storage areas. Strikes on these three target systems accounted
for over 60 percent of the fixed target program thus far in 1966, whereas
they comprised only 24 percent of the effort in 1965. Other factors, such
as the reduction in average strike size, may have contributed to the rise in
fixed-target strike effectiveness, but it is apparent that target selection is
the key element.
Strikes on military installations included in the JCS fixed-
target system accounted for only 40 percent of the total fixed-target strike
sorties in 1966. The major portion of this program consisted of restrikes
on targets already hit in 1965, and, in general, these attacks produced
damage of lower economic cost than those directed against industrial tar-
gets,
2. Electric Power Targets
Despite the destruction of about one-third of North Vietnam's
electric power industry by US airstrikes, the loss is not yet large enough
to have an important impact on the economy. The effectiveness of the
strikes has been reduced by carrying out strikes against targets of small
economic significance.
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Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strikes
on Major Fixed-Target Systems:
1965 and. January-September 1966
Number of Targets Struck
JCS Fixed. Target System
Number
Targeted.
Struck
1965
Restruck
Jan-Sept 1966 J
New S
an-Se
trikes
pt 1966
Barracks/supply depots/
ammunition depots
106
64
46
11
POL storage
13
4
4
7
Powerplants
20
6
6
1
Manufacturing and
explosives plants
1
1
0
0
Airfields
11
4
3
0
Bridges 61 44 42 6
Radar and communications
installations 5 2 0 0
Total 217 125 101 25
US airstrikes against North Vietnamese powerplants have
resulted in the neutralization of an estimated 59, 000 kilowatts (kw), or
32 percent, of a total installed generating capacity of 187, 000 kw. The
total cost of damage inflicted is estimated to be $11. 5 million. During
1965 there was a total of 21 strikes and restrikes against six Vietnamese
powerplants. The cost of damage inflicted is estimated to be about
$6. 3 million, and the total capacity put out of service amounted to
47, 000 kw, of which 24, 000 kw was put back into service by March 1966.
During 1966 there was a total of 12 strikes and restrikes against five
powerplants. The cost of damage in 1966 is estimated to be about
$5. 2 million, and the amount of capacity neutralized was about 12, 000 kw,
plus another 24, 000 kw of capacity destroyed that probably would have
gone into service during 1966. The following tabulation presents details
of the air strikes during 1966:
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Estimated. Cost
Date of Damage
Powerplant of Air Strikes Million US $) Capacity Out of Service
Uong Bi 18 Apr 66 Negl.
28 Apr 66 Negl.
11 Aug 66 4.4
14 Aug 66 Negl.
17 Aug 66 Negl.
24,000 kw. Put back in
service July 1966.
No known additional
damage.
24,000 kw put back in
service was again neu-
tralized; 24,000 kw
being installed was also
neutralized.
Thai Nguyen Between 6-8 Jul 66 0.8
12,000 kw out of 24,000
kw put out of service.
Prior to 19 Jul 66 Negl. Probably not out of
service more than a
few days.
22 Sep 66 N.A. Restoration under way
23 Sep 66 N.A. but estimated. not to
23 Sep 66 N.A.. have operated since
summer 1965-
23 Oct 66 N.A. Restoration under way
26 Oct 66 N.A. but estimated. not to
have operated. since
summer 1965.
During 1966, most of the strikes (7 out of 12) took place in
the northern part of the country, while the majority of the strikes (17 out
of 21) during 1965 occurred in the south. Two single strikes against the
Thai Nguyen and Viet Tri powerplants and five restrikes against the
Uong Bi powerplant all were in the north. The remaining missions were
accounted for by five restrikes against the Ben Thuy and Thanh Hoa
powerplants in the south, both of which were initially put out of operation
in the summer of 1965.
The 11 August 1966 strike against the Uong Bi powerplant
rates as the most effective single strike against a North Vietnamese
powerplant, severely damaging and putting out of service 24, 000 kw that
had been in service and another 24, 000 kw that was almost ready for
operation. Total cost of damage resulting from this strike alone was
about $4. 4 million. Loss of the plant denies North Vietnam the use of its
largest and most efficient powerplant for at least one year.
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Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strike Sorties
on Major Fixed.-Target Systems:
1965 and. January-September 1966
Ordnance in Tons
JCS Fixed-Target System
1965
Jan-Sept 1966
Total
Barracks/supply depots/
ammunition depots
Sorties
4,291
272
4,563
Ordnance
7,299
337
7,636
Sorties
128
4oo
528
Ordnance
120
48o
600
Powerplants
Sorties
229
50
279
Ordnance
370
47
+17
Manufacturing and.
explosives plants
Sorties
28
N. A..
28
Ordnance
90
N.A.
90
Sorties
421
91
512
Ordnance
330
85
415
Bridges
Sorties
1,713
565
2,278
Ordnance
3,198
856
4,054
Radar and. Communications
installations
Sorties
15
N.A..
15
Ordnance
20
N. A..
20
Naval bases, railroad.
yards, and. ports
Sorties
1,875
222
2,097
Ordnance
1,373
327
1,700
Total
Sorties
8,700
1,600
10,300
Ordnance
12,800
2,132
l4,932
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Airstrikes against powerplants during 1966 generally
appear to be more effective than in 1965. In terms of capacity put out
of operation, each strike averaged some 2, 240 kw in 1965 compared
with only 1, 000 kw in 1966. In value terms, the cost of damage averaged
about $300, 000 for each strike in 1965 and $430, 000 in 1966. However,
if the strikes for both years are weighed in terms of long-range effective-
ness, the above comparisons are misleading. Accounting of the damage
to the Uong Bi powerplant makes a significant difference. If all the
capacity put out of operation at Uong Bi is counted in 1966, including the
amount being installed which was destroyed, then average capacity put
out of operation per strike in 1965 amounts to 1, 095 kw, as against 5, 000
kw per strike in 1966. The comparison in value terms would not change.
3. Petroleum Storage Targets
US airstrikes against JCS-designated petroleum storage
target systems have destroyed almost 80 percent of the pre-strike
capacity of 129, 110 tons. Almost three-fourths of this destruction was
achieved during 1966 when 59 air strikes were flown against petroleum
storage targets, compared with only 9 strikes in 1965. The following
tabulation summarizes the air campaign against petroleum storage tar-
gets during 1965:
Capacity 1965_._.
Number
N
ame Beginning
End,
of Strikes
Phu
Van
84o
0
1
Vin
h
8,000
1,180
5
Nam
Dinh
11,020
0
2
Ph
u Qui
7,560
0
1
27,420 1,180 9
Destruction of JCS petroleum storage targets during the first nine
months of 1966 was as follows:
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Capacity a/
Number
28 June 25 October of Strikes
Phu Van b/ 0 0 0
Haiphong 40,620 4,330 3
Hanoi 30,620 0 1
Vinh 1,180 1,180 12
Nguyen Khe 7,500 6,680 10
Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) b/ 9,910 9,910 0
Bac Giang 2,260 1,560 4
Nam Dinh J 0 0 0
Do Son 2,860 1,430 14
Viet Tri 1,4oo 40 8
Phu Qui b/ 0 0 0
Duong Nham 4,130 0 7
Can Thon (Kep) b/ 1,210 1,210 0
101,690 26,340 59
a. Tons of average petroleum.
b. Not struck to date in 1966.
The effects of neutralizing most of the major petroleum
storage facilities have been largely offset by the development of an
elaborate system of resupply and dispersed storage sites. The North
Vietnamese have been able to maintain petroleum imports at almost
normal levels by a combination of movement of petroleum overland
from China, the lightering of 10, 000-ton Soviet tankers, and, more
recently, the use of small 4, 000-ton Soviet tankers delivering pe-
troleum from the Soviet Far East.
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Difficulties in distributing petroleum internally have been
noted, but they do not appear to be sufficient to cause other than highly
local transportation difficulties or to interfere with the logistic resupply
of the Communist forces in South Vietnam.
4. Lines of Communications
a. North Vietnam
The rail lines, highways, and waterways of North Viet-
nam were, hit continually from January through September 1966, with
emphasis primarily on the same areas that were struck in 1965. Of the
355 bridges confirmed by aerial photography to have been struck since
the start of bombing, about 140 were targets struck for the first time
In 1966. All lines of communications (LOC's) were hit with greater
intensity during 1966, but the only new LOC's taken under attack were
the roads developed as alternates to routes bombed in 1965.
Airstrikes against JCS-targeted bridges, like strikes
against all bridges in North Vietnam, have been concentrated in the
southern part of the country. The number of strikes against highway
bridges on the JCS target list decreased during 1966, whereas strikes
against JCS bridges on the rail lines increased as shown in Table 6.
(1) Railroads
In spite of the increase in airstrikes against the
rail lines in 1966, there has been no significant increase in the total
length of time the rail lines have been interdicted for through rail
service during the year as shown in Table 7. Aerial photography con-
firmed that a total of 82 railroad and combination rail/highway bridges
were damaged or destroyed on all rail lines in North Vietnam since the
start of the bombing. This figure represents 28 percent of all rail
bridges in the country, half of which were destroyed or damaged from
January through September 1966. Table 8 shows a comparison of data
by individual line. The Hanoi. - Dong Dang and Hanoi - Haiphong lines,
the two most important lines for the movement of both imports and
domestic goods, have been interdicted for a total of only about two
months and one month, respectively, during 1966. The average
volume of traffic moved on these two lines could easily have been equal
to that moved in 1965 because the lines are normally used below maxi-
mum capacity, thus traffic backlogged during periods of interdiction
could have been moved while the lines were open. Two additional
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bridges were struck on the Dong Dang line during 1966 bringing the total
on this line to four bridges, all located approximately midway between
Hanoi and the China border. No additional bridges were struck on the
Haiphong line.
North Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted Bridges
1965 and January-September 1966
Number of JCS
Targeted Bridges Struck
Number of Strikes
Type and. Location
1965
Jan-Sep 1966
1965
Jan-
Sep 1966
Railroad. and. railroad.
highway
16
16
67
966
Hanoi - Dong Dang line
3
3
6
14
Hanoi - Lao Cai line
1
2
7
9
Hanoi - Haiphong line
2
1
5
5
Hanoi - south J
10
10
49
68
Highway
31
16
Y7
37
21? to 23?
12
7
28
12
19? to 21?
3
1
5
1
17? to 190
16
8
44
24
Total
47
32
144
lal
a. Including restrikes against JCS bridges.
b. Including JCS bridges initially struck in 1965.
c. Including the Hanoi-Vinh line and. the makeshift line south of
Vinh.
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North Vietnam:
Estimated Total Length of Time Railroad. Lines were Interdicted.
for Through Rail Service
1965 and. January-September 1966
1L65
Jan-SeE 1966
_
Hanoi - Dong Dang
1 month
2 months
Hanoi - Haiphong
1 week
1 month
Hanoi - Lao Cai
5 months
5 months
Hanoi - Vinh
9 months
8 months
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen
Negl.
Negl.
Railroad. Bridges Destroyed or Damaged., by Line
1965 Through 30 September 1966
Total Percent Dest
Percent
royed/Damaged.
Bridges Destroyed/Damaged. i
n 1965 and
Railroad Line on Line in 1965 1966
Through Sep 30
Hanoi - Lao Cai 139
Hanoi - Dong Dang 53 4
8
Hanoi - Haiphong 10 20
20
Hanoi - Dong Hoi 85 32
69
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen 7
Total 944
Average 14
28
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The Hanoi - Lao Cai line has been interdicted for
through service for almost 60 percent of 1966, compared with about
40 percent of 1965. The Hanoi - Vinh line has been disrupted for through
rail service almost continually since it was first struck in April 1965,
except during the cessation of bombing in January 1966. Four of the
major bridges destroyed on this line during 1965 have bypass bridges in
place and shuttling operations under way. At least 32 additional railroad
and combination bridges have been struck on this line in 1966.
(2) Highways
The most significant hindrance to highway traffic
has resulted from strikes against routes in the southern part of North
Vietnam. Strikes against the central and northern parts of the country
have resulted in only minor disruptions of truck service. Route IA, run-
ning along the coast to the DMZ, has been subjected to the most bombing,
but apparently also continues to be the most heavily used road in the south.
Other north-south routes, such as routes 15 and 101, have been used pri-
marily as supplements or as alternates when portions of route lA were
interdicted. Aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage
of about 100 additional highway bridges, primarily in the south, in 1966,
for a total of 273 highway bridges struck since the start of the bombing.
In addition, roadbeds have been cratered at chokepoints, and alternate
routes have been bombed. The southernmost motorable road crossing
into Laos west of Dong Hoi, completed in April, also has been heavily
bombed. The significantly higher level of reported destruction and
damage of trucks in the south during 1966, shown in Table 9, has added
greatly to the problem of moving supplies south. In spite of these heavy
losses, there have been no indications of serious shortages of supplies
resulting from either the loss of trucks or of lowered road capacities.
(3) Waterways
The most significant change in the movement of
supplies to the south thus far in 1966 has been the increased emphasis
on the use of inland and coastal waterways. Airstrikes against the
waterways followed the same pattern during 1966 as in 1965, with
attacks primarily against watercraft, port areas, and other cargo-
handling facilities. No significant damage to the water LOC's has re-
sulted from the numerous strikes against the ports and transshipment
facilities in southern North Vietnam. Dredging of waterways, an annual
project for the North Vietnamese, probably increased during 1966 in the
south. Airstrikes against watercraft probably have been more important
in hindering water shipments than strikes against facilities. The number
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of watercraft reported destroyed and damaged in 1966 increased nearly
five-fold over 1965. The number of watercraft used in the southern
area apparently has not decreased, however.
Reported. Losses of Transport Equipment Due to Bombing in North Vietnam a/
1965 and January-September 1966
1965
Jan-Sep 1966
Destroyed.
Damaged
Destroyed.
Damaged.
Vessels
460
750
2, 700
4,350
Trucks b
320
480
1,600
1, 500
Railroad freight cars c/
230
590
1,060
870
Locomotives
6
6
a. These data are basically those from pilot reports but adjusted down-
ward. to eliminate some duplication. Data probably include some exagger-
ation.
b. Additional trucks were destroyed and. damaged in Laos, resulting in
effective losses of about 1,000 trucks from the inventory.
c. Including small makeshift railroad. cars used. on the line south of
Hanoi. This type of car is not included. in the inventory of mainline
freight cars.
Air operations against lines of communications have
been concentrated in the north-central and Panhandle areas of Communist-
held Laos. The roads and river crossings in the Panhandle were hardest
hit in 1966, with about 70 percent of the sorties flown in this region.
Strikes have been carried out against bridges, fords, ferries, and choke-
points. Some 38, 000 sorties, primarily armed reconnaissance, were
flown against LOC's and fixed targets located in the north central area
and the Panhandle during the first nine months of 1966. Air attacks
were heaviest during the dry season, when an average of about
1, 300 sorties were flown per week. The level of sorties dropped to an
average of about 150 per week during the rainy season, which started
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in June. Pilots reported the following damage to LOC's in Laos for the
period from 1 April through 30 September 1966:
Region Bridges Road Cuts Fords and Ferries
North Central (Barrel Roll) 13 99
Panhandle (Steel Tiger/
Tiger Hound) 173 1,07.1
Aerial photography) Ihas confirmed that seven bridges
in the north-central region and 57 bridges in the Panhandle, most of
which are on fordable streams, were heavily damaged or destroyed. It
is estimated that about 1, 000 trucks have been destroyed on roads in the
Panhandle since the start of bombing in southern Laos.
B. Targets of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance Missions)
A total of 57, 300 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown in the
first nine months of 1966, compared with 17, 300 sorties in 1965. This
increase of about 230 percent reflects not only the scarcity of authorized
fixed targets but also the increasing concern with infiltration of men and
supplies into South Vietnam. The latter concern is apparent in the fact
that almost two-thirds of the armed reconnaissance sorties were
directed against targets in the southernmost areas of North Vietnam,
the Panhandle section south of Vinh.
The rise in damage effectiveness for armed reconnaissance
sorties -- from $600 per sortie in 1965 to $900 per sortie in 1966 --. is
principally attributable to the concentration of attack on transportation
facilities south of Vinh and their systematic destruction. There are,
however, two other factors that contribute to the rise in damage per
sortie, neither of which is a truly sound comparable indicator of mis-
sion effectiveness. The first of these is the inclusion of damage in-
flicted on naval craft -- a figure unavailable and thus excluded from
the assessment of strikes made in 1965. The second is represented
by the downing of North Vietnamese interceptor aircraft by Rolling
Thunder missions. The cost of these aircraft and the number downed
is not related to the number of Rolling Thunder sorties flown, and the
disproportionate rise in dollar replacement cost to North Vietnam
should therefore be taken into account when measuring effectiveness of
the Rolling Thunder program.
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C. Laos Air Operations
Approximately 38, 000 attack sorties were flown under the
Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs against the north-central and
Panhandle areas of Communist-held Laos during the first nine months
of 1966. This air effort shows a marked increase over nearly
11, 000 attack sorties flown in similar missions during 1965. Of the
attack sorties flown over Laos during January-September of this year,
95 percent were on armed reconnaissance missions. About 70 percent
of the attack missions struck targets of opportunity within the Steel
Tiger area of operations; the other 30 percent performed similar tasks
within the Barrel Roll area.
The intensity of the current air war over Laos is varied to
meet fluctuations in weather and the level of enemy truck traffic and
infiltration. During 1966, monthly attack sorties over Laos ranged
from 8, 000 in January (dry season) to 800 in August (wet season). Air-
strikes were heavily directed against trucks, bridges, fords, ferries,
and road chokepoints. It is estimated that during 1966, air attacks in
Laos have inflicted at least $5 million damage against the Communist
forces. The bulk of this damage, primarily accounted for by truck and
bridge destruction, was inflicted in the Steel Tiger area of operation.
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III.. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program in 1966
A. Physical Damage
Attack sorties flown by the Rolling Thunder program increased
approximately 130 percent during the first nine months of 1966, com-
pared with all of 1965, but the value of physical damage increased by
only about 45 percent. A comparison of total measurable damage to
economic and military target systems for 1965 and January-September
1966 is as follows:
Million US
January-September
1965
1966
Economic targets
34.8
67.2
Military targets
30.4
28.0
Total
65.2
95.2
Damage to military targets, which accounted for 47 percent
of the total damage in 1965, accounted for less than 30 percent in
1966. By far the greatest share of damage to military targets was
inflicted on aircraft and naval craft, which accounted for 90 percent
of the total military damage in 1966. No estimates of damage to
naval craft are available for 1965; damage to aircraft in that year
accounted for only 10 percent of total damage to military targets.
The major changes in damages inflicted on economic target
systems in 1966 as compared with 1965 were the sharp increases in
the destruction or damage sustained by transport equipment and the
indirect losses of exports and agricultural crops which are attribut-
able to the bombings. Losses in transport equipment jumped from
US $6 million in 1965 to $24. 5 million in 1966. Indirect losses of
agricultural crops and export earnings almost tripled -- from $9. 2
million in 1965 to $25.4 million in 1966.
The air attack in 1966 shows some general correlation be-
tween the increase in attack sorties and the level of physical damage.
Thus, the months of July, August, and September accounted for
almost one-half -- 47 percent -- of the total damage sustained by
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economic targets. During the same period the air attack accounted for
almost 58 percent of the sorties flown to date in 1966. Military damage
has remained at relatively low levels during 1966 except during the last
four months, when increasing losses of aircraft and naval craft have
been sustained. The cumulative effects, by economic sector, of the
Rolling Thunder program are discussed in Part IV of this memorandum.
The overall effect has been to inflict increasing damage to the transpor-
tation system and to cause extensive distribution problems, most notably
in petroleum distribution. The airstrikes have continued to depress
economic growth and to cause the abandonment of some plans for eco-
nomic development. Nevertheless, essential economic activities con-
tinue; most transportation routes remain open. The level of damage
has not been sufficient to cause any sector of the economy to collapse.
Nor has popular support of the war been significantly diminished.
Hanoi's support of its military activities in South Vietnamhas been made
more costly and burdensome but has not been reduced below the levels
required to continue military operations at the levels maintained
throughout most of 1966.
All estimates of casualties from bombing North Vietnam are
subject to an unknown and conceivably large margin of error because
of the questionable validity of the assumptions and estimates used in
the calculations. Information emanating from Hanoi is of little value
in estimating casualties, with propaganda pronouncements continuing
to be directed to the large but usually unspecified numbers of casual-
ties inflicted from the bombing of schools and hospitals. The few
numerical reports of civilian casualties produced by Hanoi have been
notable for the relatively insignificant quantities shown. By all yard-
sti cks of measurement, however, we conclude that casualties from
US/GVN bombing attacks are not a major effect of the air war, in the
sense that this number is probably relatively small. Our estimate of
16, 000 to 21, 000 casualties for the first nine months of 1966 is con-
sidered to be preliminary.
1. North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties
There have been no official North Vietnamese estimates
of total casualties since September 1965, when Egyptian journalists
were reportedly told that 40, 000 North Vietnamese had already been
killed and 35, 000 wounded. This claim is unsupported and far too
high. A letter in May 1966 from the Hanoi Red Cross to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva specifically cited
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only 239 civilian casualties inflicted since 31 January 1966, although
implying many more. Despite the claims concerning school children,
the Education Ministry admitted in October 1966 to the death of only
300 students and 30 teachers since the inception of the bombing in
August 1964. Hanoi, of course, must balance the propaganda benefits
of claiming heavy casualties against the adverse effect on popular
morale.
2. Estimated Casualties from Strikes Against Fixed Targets
A recent comprehensive study of civilian casualties in 90
JCS-targeted areas, both urban and rural, carried out by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), based on photography and demographic sta-
tistics for the targeted areas, indicated that a minimum of some 500
civilian casualties were inflicted by some 525 strikes. The minimum
estimate, equating to about one civilian casualty per strike, presumes
adequate warning for the personnel in the targeted areas. If the per-
sonnel received no warning, casualties could be as high as ten times
the minimum estimate, the DIA study concluded. For the purposes of
our current estimate, the method derived from the Nam Dinh case study
was used for urban areas. The conclusion of the Nam Dinh analysis was
that casualties ranged from 1 per 12, 000 of population to 1 per 18, 000 of
population. For rural areas a minimum ratio of 0. 7 casualties per strike
(and a maximum of 7. 0 casualties per strike) was implied by the DIA
study. For the purpose of estimating casualties against fixed targets in
rural areas, the mean of 3. 8 casualties per strike has been used in our
current estimate.
The application of the Nam Dinh example to 1966 strikes
against JCS targets in urban areas yields a total estimate of 200 civilian
casualties. If it is assumed that the rural population near JCS fixed
targets has less access to sophisticated air raid warning systems and
that therefore casualties per average strike are more likely to be close
to the 3. 8 average between the minimum (0. 7) and maximum (7. 0) sug-
gested by the DIA photographic study, total civilian casualties from the
218 airstrikes against fixed targets in rural. areas in the first nine months
of 1966 probably amounted to about 800. The combined nine month 1966
total estimate is that civilian casualties from attacks against JCS fixed
targets in 1966 to date have not exceeded 1, 000.
Military casualties in fixed target areas in the first nine
months of 1966 are estimated to have been negligible,
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our first
casualty study indicated that an average of 1. 3 civilian casualties
occurred per armed reconnaissance mission, each mission including
an average of 5 aircraft. Each sortie thus produced an average of
about 0. 25 casualty. Comparative analysis of weapons effectiveness
and civilian population density supplied by DIA for our first casualty
study resulted in a ratio of 0. 17 casualties per sortie. In January-
September 1966 there were a total of some 57, 000 armed reconnaissance
attack sorties (excluding those against fixed targets), yielding an esti-
mate of some 10, 000 to 15, 000 total civilian casualties from armed
reconnaissance in the first nine months of 1966, compared with some
4, 000 in 1965.
One casualty is normally assigned by DIA for each truck
or watercraft damaged or destroyed and 0. 01 casualty for each rail-
road car or locomotive damaged or destroyed. Since some 10, 000
motor trucks and watercraft have been reported damaged or destroyed
during the first nine months of 1966, casualties of 10, 000 are indicated.
It is estimated, however, that at least half of these vehicles are
operated by civilians whose casualties as a consequence of armed re-
connaissance have already been estimated above. The total derived
from this method has therefore been reduced to 5, 000 and is regarded
to comprise only military personnel. Estimates for the first nine
months of 1966 are as follows:
Casualties
Attacks against fixed
targets 1,000
Armed reconnaissance 10,000 to 15,000
Subtotal 11,000 to 16,000
Military
Attacks against fixed
targets Negl.
Armed reconnaissance 5,000
Subtotal 5,000
Total (half killed,
half wounded) 16,000 to 21,000
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Repair and Reconstruction
The intense effort by the North Vietnamese to keep LOC's
open and to maintain an acceptable level of output from its limited in-
dustrial capacity has improved their ability to counter the effects of
'US/GVN air strikes in 1966. Indeed, the capacity of the transport net-
work has been increased by their efforts, Rapid repair and expansion
of the road network together with the transfer of traffic from railroads
to roads and waterways have been the major determinants of North
Vietnamese success.
The roads in North Vietnam, primarily south of Hanoi,
have been kept open almost continuously since the start of the bombing .
by the extensive use of bypasses to destroyed highway bridges and the
construction of new alternative routes. Although the air attack in 1966
concentrated on neutralizing these new projects, the system of counter-
measures inaugurated in 1965 has been successful in diminishing the
effect of bombings. We estimate that 400 miles of short bypasses and
an additional 300 miles of alternative routes were constructed in 1965,
with the larger projects completed by September 1966. To complete
this work, a system of workcamps was organized. The North Viet-
namese used these work camps to anticipate airstrikes on LOC's by
pre-positioning labor and materials for repairs to damaged bridges
or cratered roads and railbeds. Speed and simplicity of repair have
been the main features of the maintenance program which uses large
amounts of highly mobile labor and local building materials to insure
the required flexibility. Rather than repair highway bridges, the
North Vietnamese have chosen to build multiple stream crossings
such as fords, ferries, and culverts at any one point. The prolifera-
tion of stream crossings has greatly improved their ability to main-
tain through traffic,
Aerial photography in 1966 has revealed a new bridging
technique based on the use of steel cables and removable bridge deck-
ing to further reduce vulnerability to air attack. Thirty-eight of these
cable bridges have been seen on major routes in North Vietnam to date.
Comparative day and night photography of one cable bridge showed that
the bridge decking is in place at night for traffic and removed at dawn,
leaving only the steel cables exposed to air attack, The North Viet-
namese have also expended greater effort in 1966 in camouflaging exist-
ing bridges and building alternate dummy bridges with rope and netting.
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Although rail traffic has been maintained almost contin-
uously in 1966 on their main lines from China and Haiphong port to
Hanoi, the North Vietnamese have not been able to repair rail bridges
rapidly or provide as many multiple stream crossings as they have
done on the highways. This has resulted in some lowering of capacity
on rail lines relative to other means of transport. Comparisons of
rates of repair reveal that the Dong Dang line from China and the line
from Haiphong have been kept open more than the other lines. Chinese
railway engineering units stationed on the Dong Dang line have appar-
ently been instrumental in keeping this line open for a greater time.
Bypass bridges have been built and original rail bridges repaired to
operable condition. A new standard-gauge rail line which runs west
from Kep to Thai Nguyen is almost complete, while an additional rail
has been installed on the meter-gauge line northeast from Kep to the
China border. This work provides the North Vietnamese with a standard-
gauge line from China and avoids the need to transload goods at Dong
Dang on the China border. Bypass railroad bridges have been seen
under construction next to bridges in the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong
which have not been bombed.
An analysis of North Vietnamese repair practices reveals
that they have chosen to resort to temporary bridges and bypasses rather
than attempt to provide more permanent replacement spans. The esti-
mated cost for permanent replacement of all damaged bridges to date
totals $16. 2 million, up about $6 million since 1 January 1966. Since
other types of bypasses were used more often to replace damaged
highway bridges, the North Vietnamese have spent only $2. 5 million
to date to repair some bridges to operable condition and to provide
bypasses to the remainder. This implies an actual North Vietnamese
expenditure on repairs and bypasses amounting to only 14 percent of
the cost of permanent repairs. In addition we estimate it would cost
another $1. 1 million to temporarily replace the present inventory of
unrepaired bridges. The total labor input required to complete tem-
por ary repairs to all bridges to date is estimated to be 153, 000 man-
days. By comparison, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese have
expended 62, 000 man-days on bridge repairs to date, or only 40 per-
cent of what all temporary repairs would require.
The North Vietnamese civil defense system has been
characterized. by increased precautions to minimize casualties and
damage during 1966. A new dispersal of the urban population was
ordered this year, and shelter systems have been improved and mul-
tiplied.
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a, Organization and Manpower
Controlled nationally by a Directorate in the Ministry
of Defense, Vietnamese civil defense at the province and town level
remains a civilian rather than military type of organization. Peoples
"air defense work committees" are established in districts, towns,
wards, enterprises, and on state farms, These committees are headed
by Party or administrative officials, and their subordinate civil defense
units are manned by local residents and employees. Steps have been
taken to divide medical assets more equitably, undoubtedly because of
urban evacuation and the air raids, which occur principally in areas
outside Hanoi and Haiphong. In April 1966 the North Vietnamese
claimed they had substantially increased the number of medical workers
and dispersed medical installations to the countryside. Thus "92 per-
cent of the villages now have medical stations, "
Because civilian volunteers (perhaps 150, 000) are
used almost exclusively to perform civil defense duties and because
each household is responsible for providing its own shelter, no severe
manpower drain seems to have been imposed by civil defense work,
that old shelters were refurbished and large numbers of new shelters
prepared during 1966. Most progress was reported during the June-
September period, and this was probably in compliance with a general
order. Shelters of various types are quickly available in Hanoi, and
many of the foxholes along the streets have been lined with sections of
concrete sewer pipe. According to the North Vietnamese press, some
55, 000 shelters were built in Haiphong during one ten-day period. In
Vinh, it is claimed that every family has its own shelter, and that
there are also 150 kilometers of communication trenches, 8, 000 other
shelter spaces, and special shelters for machines, documents, and
state property. The Vinh Linh area claims 1, 000 kilometers of
trenches and tunnels, or nearly 15 meters per capita.., Other provinces
report in a similar manner -- thousands of shelters and many kilo-
meters of trenches built.
published statements agree
Protective measures for industrial equipment are
said to have been taken in Hanoi plants -- probably in the form of
blast walls between machines, similar to those built in Japan during
World War II,
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C. Dispersal of Population and Industry
Although the precise degree of urban population dis-
persed and resettled outside cities is not known, about a 50-percent
evacuation seems to have been accomplished,, Efforts prior to 1966
may have resulted in about a one-third evacuation of Hanoi. There has
been a tendency for evacuees to return to the city, and a letdown in
civil defense interest in early 1966 may have had a permissive effect
in this regard. A new dispersal order reportedly was issued about
1 July. Recent newspaper accounts have stated that as much as 75
percent of Hanoi's population may now have been evacuated. However,
difficulties in persuading people to relocate has been confirmed, and
in August a city official told a newsman the city was about 50 percent
evacuated but that the effort was continuing,
The population of Haiphong was partially dispersed,
largely this year, after near-by bombings. According to French
press reports, over half the people have left; schools are closed and
1tnot an idle hand remains. "
Some dispersal of industry is still reported. How-
ever, sample photography of plants has failed to bear out anything
more than slightly decreased activity at bona fide industrial installa-
tions in Hanoi and Haiphong. It is probable that some small industry
and shops have been moved out of urban areas. For example, a North
Vietnamese newspaper stated on 1 September, "Over one hundred
handicraft cooperatives in Haiphong have been carrying out the evacua-
tion policy seriously. " The North Vietnamese concede that the move-
ment of many industries is not possible because of lack of electricity
outside cities.
Dispersal, camouflage, and personnel shelters for
construction workers are used to reduce damage at road camps,
The North Vietnamese use camouflage, movement
by night with reduced lighting, and dispersal to reduce transport vul-
nerability. Business, marketing, and the movement of people and
goods is frequently restricted to evening and early morning hours.
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The movement of goods offloaded at Haiphong takes place under the
cover of darkness. At times, poor weather, hampering air opera-
tions, has been reported as a factor inducing some shops to keep
open during daylight hours.
In addition to the general effort to resettle perma-
nently residents not directly engaged in production or antiaircraft
defense, a noticeable portion of the population
during the day and returns at night.,
of Hanoi disperses
as recently as mid-October -- an appreciable increase at night and on
weekends in the size of the capital's population, The daily exodus serves
not only to reduce the concentration of people in daylight hours but also
to provide manpower for industry and agriculture in outlying areas.
The influx of people into the city at night has been attributed to a lack of
accommodations in the nearby countryside as well as to the opportunity
to shop and conduct business in the evening and early morning hours
when markets are open.
e. Alerts
the North
Vietnamese population usually takes shelter in a disciplined manner
during air alerts, which are signaled by sirens, whistles, or other
audible means. This, of course, means a disruption of industrial
and transport operation, and some personal hardship in areas fre-
quently approached or overflown by aircraft. While such lost produc-
tion and hardships are not readily measurable, they seem cumulative
in effect and may have particular consequences in some critical
areas, such as ports,
dock work ceased completely during air alerts
when workers took shelter, Ithe alerts "greatly dis-
rupted" dock work and that one ship was damaged while docking during
an alert.
It thus appears that a population disciplined in taking
shelter may be vulnerable in the production sense to frequent harassing
overflights or to approaches of aircraft toward transportation and in-
dustrial centers,
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D. North Vietnamese Political Reactions
After enduring 18 months of air attack, the North Vietnamese
appear as determined as ever to continue the war. There has been no
indication that the bombing program has shaken the confidence of the
Hanoi leadership in their ultimate victory. Communist leaders who
have talked with the North Vietnamese recently have been greatly im-
pressed with their firmness. A Polish government official recently
told a US newsman that Ho Chi Minh's first words to any Communist
visitor are always, "We are winning. "
There is no sign that any faction of the North Vietnamese
leadership is out of step with Ho on the advisability of continuing the
conflict, even though the airstrikes have caused the postponement of
some of Hanoi's long-cherished program of heavy industry development.
At the 12th Central Committee Plenum held some time in 1965, accord-
ing to a captured document, a decision was made to put the program for
the development of heavy industry on the shelf for the duration. Since
that time the leadership has appeared to be in complete agreement that
the war is the number-one order of business.
One effect of the Rolling Thunder program has been to rein-
force certain North Vietnamese attitudes which existed prior to the
airstrikes. For example, Hanoi has long been anxious to secure the
closest possible Sino-Soviet cooperation in support of the Vietnam
war. This has been one reason for the neutral position taken by the
North Vietnamese in the Sino-Soviet dispute and for Hanoi's opposition
to open hostility between the two powers.
The Rolling Thunder program has also resulted in Hanoi's
increased emphasis on the necessity of a halt in US air attacks be-
fore there can be a negotiated settlement of the war. The current
North Vietnamese position is that the United States must not expect
or demand any quid pro quo in return for a cessation of the bombings.
The available evidence indicates that the people of North
Vietnam still firmly support the policies of the Hanoi government.
The regime has managed to maintain the swell of patriotism which
was engendered by the first US airstrikes and has capitalized on
a spirit of national resistance against the "US aggressors" to spur
the people on to greater sacrifices on behalf of the war in South
Vietnam.
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Evidence on the feelings of the North Vietnamese toward the
war in the south prior to February 1965 was scanty. The available
information suggested that the northerners were interested in seeing
the insurgents win, but that they did not relish the prospect of having
to risk their own economic standing, let alone their lives, on behalf
of the southern struggle. Since the bombings of North Vietnam began,
however, there appears to be more enthusiasm for supporting the war
in the south.
There are at present, however, no discernible political pressures from
within North Vietnam sufficient to cause the Hanoi leaders to alter their
decision to continue the war effort.
E. Soviet and Chinese Communist Assistance
1. Military Aid
During the first half of 1966, Soviet and Chinese :military
aid deliveries to Hanoi are believed to have been at an annual rate
slightly above the 1965 level of $250 million (see Tables 10 and 11).
These data include the Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) program,
the bulk of which (20 of 24 firing battalions) was, provided during 1965.
Non- SAM- related assistance in 1966 (estimated at $218 million) is
about 50 percent higher than the total non-SAM military aid in 1965
($144 million).
The USSR accounted for 80 to 85 percent of the military
assistance provided by the two major Communist countries, USSR
and Communist China, during 1965 and the first half of 1966. Thirty-
six MIG's (11 of which were MIG 21's) and nearly 1, 200 antiaircraft
guns were delivered by the USSR in 1965 and 24 MIG's and about 425
guns during the first half of 1966. In addition, as many as 1, 500
Soviet military technicians may have been engaged in training North
Vietnamese military personnel in the use of SAM's and aircraft.
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Chinese Communist military deliveries during 1966 have
been at a rate nearly double those in 1965. Aid has consisted primarily
of small arms, ammunition, and trucks. The Chinese also delivered
eight MIG- 15/ 17 fighters and about $5 million worth of radar equipment
in 1965, as well as four small naval craft in the first half of 1966. In
addition to the delivery of military equipment, there are between
25, 000 and 45, 000 Chinese logistic support troops in North Vietnam
working on the construction and repair of transportation facilities. An
unknown number of Chinese military personnel also are employed in
training North Vietnamese to operate and maintain equipment provided
by the Chinese.
All developments foreshadow substantially increased aid to
Hanoi from other Communist countries in late 1966 and 1967, a trend
already confirmed by the volume and composition of North Vietnamese
imports in 1966 to date. The frequent signings of aid pacts and the
stress in the announcements on the support for the war effort indicate
a growing emphasis on materials and services needed to continue the
war. An unconfirmed report from Poland on the recent Warsaw Pact
meeting stated that the Pact countries had signed pledges of $1 billion
in goods and cash to support Hanoi in the war effort. The Soviet Union
would supply $800 million of this aid.
It is estimated that deliveries of economic aid in 1965 were
$150 million, two to three times the average annual level in 1955-64.
This sharp rise has been continued in 1966, and, as in 1965, the USSR
is the major contributor. In the last nine months, deliveries of eco-
nomic aid totaled about $200 million, and an unusually large number of
After an apparent hiatus of two years, Communist eco-
nomic assistance to Hanoi was revived in February 1965 when Premier
Kosygin visited Hanoi. As the war expanded, numerous new extensions
of economic aid were made in mid-1965, but these additions are believed
to have been small. Since then, the tempo of aid agreement signings
has increased sharply (see Tables 12 and 13).
In 1966, Moscow reported an agreement in May to pro-
vide technical assistance, one in September for $2 million in "free
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charge commodities" (possibly consumer goods and medicines), and
one in October of additional grants for economic development and in-
creased military aid. China announced additional aid for agriculture
in July and a nonrefundable economic and technical agreement in
August. In September and October 1966, North Korea and all the
Eastern European Communist countries except Yugoslavia signed new
aid agreements with North Vietnam. In addition, gifts of money and
medicines from workers and other organizations in Communist coun-
tries have been announced at a value of $5 million to $10 million.
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Table 10
Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quar25X1y
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
250.0
217.2
32.8
Surface-to-air missile
firing battalions
20
106.0
20
106.0
0
0
56
16.1
48
15.1
8
1.0
I1-28 light jet bomber
8
2.8
8
2.8
o
0
MIG-21 jet fighter
11
8.8
11
8.8
o
0
MIG-15/17 jet fighter
33
4.2
25
3.2
8
1.0
MU-6 helicopter
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ma-1 helicopter
4
0.3
4
0.3
0
0
Other aircraft
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0_5
20
0.5
0
PT-76 amphibious tank
5
0.3
BTR-40 armed personnel
carrier
10
0.1
10
0.1
0
0
SU-76 assault gun
5
0.1
5
0.1
0
0
Artillery
1,184
30.1
1,184
30.1
0
0
100-mm AAA
64
3.2
64
3.2
0 0
85-mm A.AA.
250
10.0
250
10.0
0 0
57-mm AAA
350
12.2
350
12.2
0 0
37-mm AAA
500
4.5
500
4.5
o 0
Other artillery
20
0.2
20
0.2
0 0
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Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965
(Continued)
Total
USSR
Communist China
25X1
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Radar
81
12.7
41
7.8
4o
4.9
Trucks and vehicles
2,000
10.0
1,000
5.0
1,000
5.0
Small arms and infantry
weapons
0
13.2
0
6.6
0
6.6
Ammunition
0
61.4
0
46.1
0
15.3
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Table 11
Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966
Surface-to-air missile
battalions
I1-28 light jet bomber
MIG-21 jet fighter
MIG-1517 jet fighter
Mi-6 helicopter
Mi-1 helicopter
Other aircraft
Naval craft
Shanghai-class PTF
Armor
PT-76 amphibious tank
BTR-40 armored personnel
carrier
SU-76 assault gun
Artillery
100-mm AAA
85-mm AAA
57-mm AAA
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quar25X1y Value
(Units) (Million US $) (Units) (Million US $) (Units) (Million US $)
130.0
lOl.4 28.6
4 21.2 4 21.2 0 0
40 31.3 40 31.3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
14 11.2 14 11.2 0 0
10 1.3 10 1.3 0 0
6 12.0 6 12.0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
10 6.8 10 6.8 0 0
4 3.6 0 0 4 3.6
4 3.6 0 0 4 3.6
20 0.5 20 0.5 0 0
5 0.3 5 0.3 0 0
10 0.1 10 0.1 0 0
5 0.1 5 0.1 0 0
457 7.8 457 7.8 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
75 3.0 75 3.0 0 0
50 1.8 50 1.8 0 o
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Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966
(Continued)
Artillery (Continued)
37-mm AAA
Other artillery
25X1
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
(Units) (Million US $) Units (Million US $) (Units) (Million US $)
300 2.7 300 2.7 0 0
32 0.3 32 0.3 0 0
Radar
0
0
0
0
0
0
Trucks and vehicles
1,000
0
500
2.5
500
2.5
Small arms and infantry
weapons
0
29.6
0
14.8
0
14.8
Ammunition
31.0
23.3
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Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam a/
1955-64
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963-64
1955-64
Communist China
200
J
100
157
L/
J
457
USSR
100
8
12
21
25
200
4
N.A.
369
Eastern Europe
50
8
7
~/
2
Negl.
62
h
130
Total
350
16
19
21
128
200
223
N.A.
956
a. This is the minimum of economic aid extended by the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Communist
China. In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by Albania, Mongolia,
and North Korea. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.
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Credits and Grants Extended to North Vietnam by Communist Countries
January 1965 - October 1966
Description
USSR Feb 1965 N. A. Grant: Six fishing boats and an unspecified amount
of hospital and medical equipment.
The agreement also united credits extended in
1960-62, extended the repayment period to a later
date, and wiped out interest.
Jul 1965 N.A. For the development of the national economy and
strengthening the defensive potential. Provides
supplementary assistance in addition to that being
given under previously concluded agreements. Of
the economic credits, 30 percent will go to power
stations and transmission lines and 15 percent for
the creation of state farms, irrigation, and other
agricultural needs.
Dec 1965
N.A.
Provides supplementary grant aid for 1966, supple-
mentary technical aid, a credit to cover balance
of 1965 clearing account, and deferred payments
during 1966 on earlier extended credits.
Jan 1966
N.A.
Provides supplementary aid for the development of
the economy and the strengthening of defense.
May 1966
N.A.
Technical assistance.
Jul 1966
N.A,
Scientific cooperation for joint research and
study.
Sep 1966
$2 million
"Free charge commodities" (possibly consumer goods
and medicines).
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Credits and Grants Extended to North Vietnam by Communist Countries
January 1965 - October 1966
(Continued)
Country Date Amount
Description
USSR (Con- Oct 1966 N.A. Signed agreement for grants to aid economic de-
tinued) velopment and increase military aid potential.
(Signed agreement for additional credits and com-
mercial trade at same time.)
Bulgaria Jun 1965 N.A. For the rendering of material aid.
Jan 1966 N.A. For the purchase of equipment and rendering of
technical aid in the construction of complex
projects which will contribute to development
of economy.
Sep 1966
N.A.
"Nonrefundable economic and technical assistance."
(Commercial agreement for 1967 also signed.)
Czechoslovakia
Jan 1966
N.A.
A credit for economic aid.
Jul 1966
N.A.
Scientific cooperation pact signed.
Sep 1966
N.A.
Economic, technical, and military aid agreement
signed.
East Germany
Jun 1965
N.A.
Economic aid.
Jan 1966
N.A.
To provide further assistance.
Oct 1966
N.A.
Agreement signed on granting of economic aid and a
long-term credit for goods deliveries and services
for 1967-70. Vocational and advanced training of
North Vietnamese citizens included.
Hungary
Jun 1965
$5.5 mil-
lion
Economic aid. Long-term credit.
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Table 13
(Continued)
Country
Date
Amount
Description
Hungary (Con-
Dec 1965
N.A.
Provides for a further long-term and interest-free
tinued)
loan and economic aid of a different nature; also
postpones the repayment of earlier loans.
Aug 1966
N.A.
Scientific cooperation agreement.
Sep 1966
N.A.
"Long-term, no interest loan" and an agreement on
technical training.
Poland
Jun 1965
N.A.
Economic assistance.
Jan 1966
N.A.
A credit.
Oct 1966
N.A.
Economic assistance granted. (Agreement on mutual
trade exchange and payments for 1967 signed at
same time.)
Rumania
may 1965
N.A.
Economic aid.
Jan 1966
N.A.
A credit. Also deferred the repayment of certain
credits previously extended.
Sep 1966
N.A.
Nonreimbursable aid and commercial exchanges.
China
Aug 1966
N.A.
"Nonrefundable aid." Both economic and technical.
Oct 1966
N.A.
Health cooperation agreement.
Albania
Apr 1966
N.A.
Goods provided free of charge.
Oct 1966
N.A.
"Nonrefundable economic aid."
North Korea
Sep 1966
N.A.
Nonrefund aid.
Mongolia
Oct 1966
N.A.
"Nonrefund material aid in 1966 and 1967." Also
agreement was signed for goods exchange and pay-
an
ments for 1967.
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IV. General Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
A. Agriculture
During the past 18 months the production of paddy rice in North
Vietnam -- the main agricultural crop in that country -- was about 200, 000
tons below the average. While this is only 3 percent below the average for
the 18-month period, all of this shortfall occurred during the past six
months. Such a shortfall amounts to about $17 million worth of rice on
the international market. In addition, the production of subsidiary crops -
manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, and green beans -- was probably below
normal during the 1965/66 winter/ spring season. There is insufficient
information, however, on which to estimate the shortfall of these crops,
which are important food substitutes for the preferred rice.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the bombing attacks
contributed to the shortfall of agricultural production. Undoubtedly, poor
weather in the last half of 1965 and in the first half of 1966 contributed to
the poor performance of agriculture. Although there is little evidence that
air attacks directly damaged significant amounts of agricultural crops,
the indirect disruptive effects of the bombing on agricultural production
were considerable. Agriculture in North Vietnam has usually experienced
difficulties -- partly because of the chronically undependable weather and
partly as a result of management problems associated with the socializa-
tion of agriculture into agricultural cooperatives. The war has brought
such additional problems as manpower shortages -- particularly skilled
manpower -- disruption of normal farming and fishing schedules, and the
interruption of electrically powered irrigation systems and the production
and distribution of chemical fertilizers. The North Vietnamese have
attempted to lessen the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks by im-
porting increased amounts of chemical fertilizers and substantial numbers
of diesel generators to power the irrigation systems. These measures
have not been completely successful.
The agricultural shortfall, the disruptive effects of the bombing
attacks on the transportation of food to deficit areas, and the increased
requirements for the war; have contributed to food shortages -- particu-
larly in rural areas, However, food supplies in the larger cities such
as Hanoi have been maintained at adequate levels, and there have been no
indications of critical shortages anywhere. The continuation of the bomb-
ing attacks will continue to exacerbate the tight food situation in North
Vietnam., However, the self-sufficient nature of the agricultural economy
and the availability of food imports -- particularly from Communist
China -- suggest that food supplies are not likely to become critical.
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B. Industry
The North Vietnamese industrial sector has not been drastically
altered since the start of the Rolling Thunder program in 1965. Some
changes have been made in plant production and industrial development
because of the war situation, but the regime seems to have been suc-
cessful in keeping the disruption to a minimum.
The decision to postpone the beginning of the second five-year
plan (1966-70) and the substitution of the two-year plan (1966-67) were
the result of war pressures on the North Vietnamese economy including
the step-up in US bombing. An examination of regime statements since
early 1965 on its economic plans suggests that the regime has increased
the tempo of some of the programs already begun under the first five-
year plan -- dispersal of industry, enlargement and mechanization of
agricultural cooperatives, and evacuation of civilians to rural areas.
In addition, the decision was taken to postpone heavy industry expansion,
with the exception of the machine building and electric powerplants, and
to shift emphasis to the increased development of light and local industry.
On the surface the decision to postpone heavy industrial expansion appears
to have ominous economic overtones for the continued economic develop-
ment of the country, but the regime has merely postponed part of its heavy
industrial expansion; it has not abandoned it.
North Vietnam has published almost no aggregate industrial pro-
duction data for 1965 and 1966; fragmentary information available indi-
cates that present industrial production is at or above the 1964 level of
industrial output. No data on heavy industrial production have been pub-
lished, but in 1965 the central state-run light industry increased its
output by 4. 6 percent over 1964, while the output of local industry and
handicraft increased by 7. 7 percent in 1965. Despite these small in-
creases in industrial output, the regime in August 1966 noted that the
"US imperialists have created difficulties for the economy in general
and light industry in particular. " No information on 1966 output quotas
for individual plants or industries is available, but nearly all the reports
on individual plants in the popular press are consistent in claiming that
the plants are producing at or above their 1965 level despite varying
problems.
Evidence of the postponement of heavy industrial development
is provided by the recent departure of the Soviet specialists working
on the Thac Ba hydroelectric powerplant, which was nearly two years
away from completion. No reason was given for their departure.
After an examination of the scanty evidence available on industrial
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expansion in 1965-66 and future plans for expansion, however, the
abandonment of the Thac Ba project appears to be almost unique.
Recent reports more
strongly reinforce the thesis that the North Vietnamese have not entirely
abandoned their program for heavy industrial expansion. During
October, Hanoi sent representatives to Poland and Comminist China to
examine methods and techniques for installing rolled steel capacity and
making other improvements in iron and steel production. These reports
imply that the regime still intends to complete the Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Plant-- North Vietnam's only iron and steel complex.
US bombing has created some difficulties in the North Viet-
namese industrial sector. However, some of the problems such as poor
management and administration in individual plants and the shortage of
skilled labor existed before the bombing began. The bombing of the
electric powerplants does not appear to have seriously affected industrial
output. Power shortages have been observed, particularly in Hanoi, but
the individual plants have been able to cope with the situation by using
mobile generators and by increasing the number of shifts at the plants.
The step-up in the dispersal program, too, caused some
difficulties. Many plants attempted to operate: simultaneously at both
the original location and at the dispersed site. Production was slowed
down by this practice, and transportation and distribution costs increased.
The smooth evacuation of the plant workers was difficult. Some workers
were evacuated to the dispersed site but were still expected to work at the
original site; some workers did not wish to be evacuated and morale
problems were evident. The organization of the evacuation was poorly
handled by the cadres and the trade union leaders responsible for the
movement. There is no hard evidence that industrial production has been
seriously slowed down by the dispersal program. Nevertheless, most of
the dispersed plants are found in the local, light, and handicraft sectors
of industry, which are major components of total industrial output; the
dispersal program in these sectors has probably depressed total industrial
production in the past year.
The first CIA report dealing with the bombing of North Vietnam
released in March 1966, listed 15 major industrial plants, all. of which
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were examined as possible targets. A review of Hanoi press reports
on these plants is helpful in assessing the effect of US bombing on the
North Vietnamese industrial plants. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Complex is claimed to have lost about 1, 000 cadre and workers to the
war effort, but still claimed to have exceeded its planned goal. The
Haiphong Cement Plant reportedly suffered from a shortage of coal, was
harassed by the bombing, and at the end of 1965 was just meeting its
planned production quota. The Nam Binh Textile Plant was dispersed
but announced that it was installing new machinery in August 1966. The
8 March Textile Plant in Hanoi dispersed part of its operations and found
that its transportation costs had increased. The Hanoi Rubber Products
Plant lost workers but claimed to have increased its overall output with
the production of automobile tires up by 50 percent in the first six months
of 1966 as compared with the same period in 1965. The Viet Tri Paper
Mill lost production time because of air raids,it was stated, but it im-
proved the quality of its production. The Viet Tri Chemical Combine
had a difficult year in 1965. Its machinery and equipment were old, part
of it was dispersed, and it lost time because of air raids. Still, the plant
claimed achievement of its production quota and began to produce new pro-
ducts.
In combination these claims add up to admitted labor shortages,
temporary loss of output due to dispersal, and problems in changing
the production mix. They do not, however, reflect serious and prolonged
production problems even if one discounts the general claim of meeting
planned goals.
In general, the machine building industry has suffered from the
same problems as the other industries. One significant observation from
reviewing press reports is the conversion of machine building plants to
production of agricultural machinery which is aimed at alleviating man-
power shortages through increased mechanization of the agricultural
cooperatives.
The determination of the regime to continue to train its youth
both at home and abroad in technical and academic skills further
demonstrates that US bombing has not created severe manpower short-
ages. There is continuing evidence that North Vietnamese students are
being sent to other Communist countries for training. (Around 5, 000 stu-
dents were abroad in 1965 and early 1966, and some reports have sug -
gested that as many as 20, 000 may go abroad for study in the next few
years.) Further, the regime has just recently opened four colleges with
emphasis on technical and engineering skills.
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A Rolling Thunder program could have done great damage to the
modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy. However,
Rolling Thunder target systems chosen did not include the main industrial
facilities. The Hanoi regime, possibly now acting on the assumption that
industrial installations will not be the main targets of attack, continues to
request accelerated deliveries of machinery, goods, and even. industrial
plants from other Communist countries. Perhaps, if Rolling Thunder
had more heavily damaged some of these targets, the North Vietnamese
would have a harder time convincing their Communist' partners to con-
tinue sending industrial aid.
C. Transportation
The transport system of North Vietnam continues to function
adequately. There have been and continue to be periodic delays in the
movement of goods,which produce temporary local shortages. But
transportation is supporting the essential segments of the economy and
is providing the required support for the war in the North and in the
South.
The rudimentary nature and somewhat primitive character of
the system is probably more of an asset than a hindrance in overcoming
the effects of the air war on it. The small, light-weight, antiquated
railroad system is augmented by reasonably modern but low-capacity
motor trucks and a few modern craft on the inland and coastal. water-
ways. But, for the most part,transport is provided by primitive
sampans and junks and animal transport, carts, bicycles, and human
bearers. Traffic.per capita is exceedingly small. Rumania, for
example, a country with substantially the same population and. 50 per-
cent more area, has 20 times the tonnage per capita that is found in
North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam with a small industrial base and a
population with simple wants and needs can exist with a rudimentary
primitive type of transportation system, and the task of impairing
significantly the movement of traffic over it by the use of air power
becomes difficult.
The initial attacks against transportation in the Rolling Thunder
program affected the southern part of the country, which is of relatively
minor importance to the economy. Concentration of the attacks in this
area provided time for the North Vietnamese to obtain advice from the
North Koreans and advice and aid from the Chinese. During this period,
organizations were also established for the repair of damage and for
the marshaling of all forms of transport for the movement of traffic.
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These organizations have been remarkably effective in making the neces-
sary repairs, in providing alternate facilities, and in commandeering all
forms of transport to keep the essential traffic moving. As a consequence,
after 18 months of attack under the Rolling Thunder program, in spite of
the heavy cost in terms of manpower and material, the transportation
system is better able to continue operating while coping with damage and
loss of personnel than it was when the program began.
If the level of attacks achieved during the first nine months
of 1966 is maintained for the remainder of the year, total transport
performance in 1966 will continue to increase as it has in past years
in terms of tons carried, but will decrease slightly in terms of ton-
miles, as it did in 1965 (see Table 14). Rail transportation has been
more affected by the attacks than other forms of transport. Perform-
ance by railroad transport has been reduced both in terms of tons
carried and ton-miles, but rail transportation continues to be the prin-
cipal mode of transport in terms of ton-miles. Increases in tons
carried by other modes have more than compensated for the loss in
rail tons carried.
The reduction in rail traffic has not affected the volume of
imports and exports moved by rail between China and North Vietnam.
The volume of such shipments probably will increase again in 1966
as it had in 1965. Halting of through traffic by destruction of bridges
on the two lines important for the movement of foreign trade -- the
lines from Hanoi to Dong Dang and Haiphong -- has extended over a
relatively small percent of the 18 months.
Destruction of bridges and other facilities on the lines from
Hanoi to Lao Cai and Vinh has been more continuous and thus more
serious for the domestic economy. Especially noteworthy have been
the attacks on the Viet Tri bridge on the Lao Cai line and the Phu
Ly bridge on the Vinh line. These bridges have remained out of
service for fairly long periods of time. Traffic within the modern
industrial sector of the economy -- between Hanoi and the industrial
cities of Lam Thao,Viet Tri,and Narr, Dinh - - has thus been disrupted.
Limited through service has now been restored between these cities,
however, and shuttle service between the breaks and the line is in
use on the remainder of the lines.
The North Vietnamese with the help of Chinese engineers
have expanded and improved the railroad system by the addition of
some dual tracking, a new line, and alternate rail bridges for some
of the bridges on the Hanoi - Dong Dang and Hanoi - Haiphong lines.
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Table 14
North Vietnam: Estimated Transport Performance
1964, 1965, and Projected 1966
1964 1965 1966`x/
Total Performance 20.6 21.7 22.0
Million tons carried 1,200 1,160 1,100
Million ton-miles
International Trade by Rail
Imports (thousand tons carried) 180 350 N.A.
Exports (thousand tons carried) 220 170 N.A.
a.. Projected for the full year, assuming a continua-
tion of performance at the level of the first nine
months.
Dual tracking on the Dong Dang line, which permits both Chinese
standard-gauge and North Vietnamese meter-gauge equipment to be
used, very likely now extends from the Chinese border southas far
as Kep, and some preparations have been made to extend the dual
tracking from Kep to Hanoi. A new standard-gauge line from Kep
to Thai Nguyen may also have been completed, thus providing a more
direct route for shipment of Chinese coal to the iron and steel complex
at Thai Nguyen and an alternative route for rail traffic between Kep and
Hanoi. Another improvement directly related to the war effort is the
extension of a low-cost makeshift rail line south of Vinh toward the
Demilitarized Zone. This line is kept in service with inexpensive
expedients in spite of intensive bombing.
North Vietnam has suffered a high level of destruction of
railroad rolling stock, particularly in 1966, but there is no evidence
of a shortage of locomotives or freight cars. It is estimated that
the inventory of locomotives remains at about the pre-April 1965
number. The North Vietnamese freight car inventory, however,,
has been significantly reduced (see Table 1). The Chinese probably
have made freight cars available to North Vietnam from the meter-.
gauge rolling stock of Yunnan Province and formerly used for the
Chinese transit traffic through North Vietnam. The loss of this
traffic and other traffic such as the transport of apatite after the
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Lao Cai line was interdicted in July of 1965 has reduced the require-
ment for rail transport. Furthermore, Chinese standard-gauge
equipment can be used on the new dual-gauge and standard-gauge lines
in North Vietnam. Much of the reportedly destroyed rolling stock
probably consisted of the makeshift equipment used on the line south
of Hanoi, the type that probably could be built in North Vietnam. Thus
North Vietnam has sustained a high level of destruction of rolling stock
and has continued to operate the railroads at a reasonable level. The
North Vietnamese are nevertheless negotiating with the Chinese to buy
quite large numbers of rolling stock, presumably to avoid using
Chinese equipment within North Vietnam.
North Vietnam is making increasing use of highway and inland
and coastal water transport. Traffic moving over these networks is
more difficult to disrupt than is traffic on the railroad system. High-
way and water transport is also being used to shuttle traffic around
breaks in railroad lines, It is estimated that performance by these
modes increased in 1965 and 1966, both in terms of tons carried and
ton-miles. These increases have been made possible by the consid-
erable expansion and improvement of the road and inland water net-
works and maintenance of the inventory of transport equipment at the
necessary level. New alternate roads have been built and additional
waterways dredged. Alternate highway bridges, for the most part
pontoon or cable types, as well as ferries and fords have been or are
being built. Imports of motor trucks by North Vietnam from Communist
countries far exceeded the destruction of these vehicles by air attack in
1965 and have kept pace with such destruction so far in 1966 (see Table
16). In spite of extensive destruction of watercraft, the number ob-
served in use is constantly increasing. The North Vietnamese can
build many of the small types observed in use, and Communist countries
are providing small modern tugs, dry cargo barges, and tank barges.
The truck route into and through southern Laos is likewise
considerably more capable of supporting infiltration now than it was
18 months ago. The fairweather truckable network has been greatly
extended and provided with many miles of alternate routes. The portion
of the year during which trucks can use the route has been increased
by better road alignment and surfacing. After the heavy rains in the
fall of 1965, truck traffic began to flow south into Laos a month earlier
than it had in 1964. This year, truck traffic into Laos has begun to
move in significant volume a month earlier than it did in 1965.
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North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory
as of the End. of 1964 and. 1965 and. 1 October 1966
Units
Locomotives (totals rounded)
As of the end. of 1964 120
Imports during 1965 4
Domestic production 3
Losses -6
As of the end of 1965 120
Imports during January-September 1966 6
Losses -10 J
As of 1 October 1966 120
Freight cars j/ (totals rounded)
As of the end. of 1964 1,800
Imports during 1965 60
Losses (230 destroyed times 60 percent) -140
As of the end. of 1965 1,700
Imports during 1966 60
Losses (1,060 destroyed. times 60 percent) -64o
As of 1 October 1966 1,100 J
a. Probably includes some makeshift locomotives used. on the rail line
south of Hanoi. It has been assumed., therefore, that the mainline loco-
motive inventory has been maintained. at about the end of 1964 level by
imports.
b. Reported losses of railroad freight cars have included small make-
shift cars used. on the rail line south of Hanoi as well as some exagger-
ations from pilot reports. Thus only 60 percent of those reported. de-
stroyed. and. none of those reported. damaged have been deducted. from the
inventory.
c. These data represent a significant decrease in the inventory during
1966, but this inventory is still sufficient for performance at the
level estimated. The actual number of freight cars in North Vietnam
must be significantly higher than indicated., however. No evidence
exists of a shortage of freight cars in North Vietnam. The number of
freight cars imported. is a minimum figure. Furthermore, Communist China
probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the freight cars needed..
Although no information is available to indicate that Chinese cars from
Yunnan Province are operating in North Vietnam, it is logical that this
province has made meter-gauge stock available to North Vietnam.
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Table 16
North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory
as of the End of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966
As of the end of 1964 9,000
Imports during 1965 3,L1i13
Airstrikes
Normal retirement
goo
360
5)+0
As of the end of 1965 11,500 J
Imports during January-September 1966 3,200
Losses 3,200 -3,200
Airstrikes in North Vietnam 1,700
Airstrikes in Laos 1,000
Normal retirement 500
As of 1 October 1966 11,500
a. Includes cargo trucks of one-ton or more capacity. Losses from
inventory due to airstrikes were computed using 75 percent of the
number reported destroyed and 25 percent of the number reported
damaged. Normal retirement was computed at the rate of 6 percent per
year.
'b. North Vietnam had at least 3,000 additional vehicles, such as
jeeps, command cars, ambulances, and service vehicles.
Maintenance and expansion of the transport system has been
very costly to North Vietnam in terms of manpower diverted and re-
sources expended, in spite of the use of low-cost expedients wherever
possible. Through September 1966, repair and restoration cost of
damaged or destroyed transport facilities and equipment totaled more
than $50 million, or almost one-third of the measurable direct and
indirect cost of the Rolling Thunder program to North Vietnam, as
follows:
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Repair and Restoration Cost
Category (Million USAl___._
Bridges 12.8
Restoration 16.2
Temporary repair 3.6
Transportation equipment 30.5
Railroad yards and ports 1.0
Total 51.3
The restoration cost it the end of 1965 amounted to only
$17. 2 million. The increase of $34. 1 million during the first nine months
of 1966 is accounted for chiefly by damage and destruction to transport
equipment amounting to $24. 5 million. The cost of restoring and re-
pairing bridges increased by $9. 3 million, while railroad yards and
ports increased by $300, 000.
The sharp increase in the transport equipment category re-
flects the heavy emphasis on armed reconnaissance missions in the
Rolling Thunder program throughout 1966. These equipment losses have
been largely offset by imports from Communist countries. Possibly
a more serious loss to North Vietnam has been the loss of trained
personnel.
The North Vietnamese, with Chinese aid, have gained in ex-
perience and efficiency in expanding routes and making the necessary
repairs. As a consequence the transport system is now considerably
less vulnerable than it was during 1965. The system is performing at
a level. adequate for military and essential economic needs. It can be
expected to operate at this level unless there is a basic change in the
pattern and weight of air attack against transportation in North Vietnam.
D. Foreign Trade
North Vietnam?s foreign trade, since the initiation of Rolling
Thunder, has been marked by two major developments. (1) an increasing
volume of imports from Communist countries (Free World imports have
been largely maintained); and (2) a general reduction in exports. By
the fall of 1966, seaborne imports seemed to have reached a peak set
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by the capacity of ports and their connecting rail distribution facilities,
while known exports continued to decline.
Recent aid agreements signed by other Communist countries
with Hanoi signal the intention to continue a high level of shipments to
North Vietnam. Imports were sharply accelerated in both 1965 and
1966. Goods received from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reached
an estimated value of $180 million in 1965, ,,, nearly 65 percent more than
in 1964. Comparable value data are not available for 1966, but the vol-
ume of seaborne imports from Communist countries in the first nine
months averaged about 50 percent more than the same period in 1965.
Imports of manufactured goods (largely machinery, equipment, and
rolled steel products') comprised a major share of the imports from
Communist countries and accounted for the sharpest increases in volume
of shipments. Imports of fertilizer and petroleum have also increased
significantly.
The value of North Vietnam's exports remained steady within a
range of $100 million to $110 million in both 1964 and 1965. Seaborne
exports of apatite, which had an average :f, o. b. value of nearly $418, 000
a month in the first seven months of 1965, virtually ceased following the
initiation in July 1965 of recurrent interdictions of the rail line connect-
ing the apatite mines at Lao Cai with Haiphong. The major export losses,
however, followed the strikes against coal processing facilities at Cam
Pha in April 1966. Seaborne coal exports in the first quarter of 1966
had an average f. o. b. value of $1. 8 million a month, but have had an
average value of only $0. 6 million a month since April and the trend is
still downward. There have been additional reductions in seaborne
exports of cement, pig iron, and manufactured goods, but the decline
in these exports cannot be directly related to the effects of bombing.
It is also possible, but not probable, that increased volumes of these
commodities have been shipped undetected to Communist China. Con-
tinuation of the present degree of retardation of shipments of coal and
apatite will cause North Vietnam's export earnings in 1966 to be at
least $12 million less than in 1965, approximately half of which is in
Free World hard currency, thereby worsening the already large im-
balance between imports and exports.
.= The estimated distribution of these imports, which include economic
aid, is as follows: from China and the Soviet Union, $75 million each;
and from the Eastern European countries, $30 million.
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E. Manpower Developments in North Vietnam
The Rolling Thunder program, together with other US/GVN
military actions in South Vietnam, has placed a significant strain on
North Vietnam's manpower resources, The allocation of manpower
in response to the air attacks has taxed the ingenuity of North Vietnam's
leadership, has forced the country to make meaningful sacrifices in
terms of disruption to some normal civilian pursuits, and has inflicted
real, costs resulting from disruptions of economic activity, most notably
in agriculture, transportation, and construction. At the same time, the
regime has allocated the bulk of its physically fit youth coming of mili-
tary age to building up its military forces. In spite of these pressures
there are several indications that the quantitative drain on manpower
may have peaked during 1966.
The buildup of North Vietnam's armed forces and the replace-
ment of manpower losses in South Vietnam have required the mobiliza-
tion of at least 170, 000 men since 1 January 1965. This figure may be
larger if a substantial number of troops are being discharged because
of age or illness. At a minimum, total conscription for military ser-
vice probably has approached 80 percent of the number of physically
fit males -- 220, 000 -- reaching the draft age of 18 in 1965-66. There
is, however, a total pool estimated at about 2. 1 million to 2. 3 million
males in the 15 to 49 age group who are physically fit for military
service.
A large measure of the military build-up in North Vietnam is
accounted for by forces committed to defensive programs in reaction
to the Rolling Thunder program. At least 7.0, 000 North Vietnamese
troops, or close to 20 percent of the armed forces, are assigned to
units involved almost exclusively in defensive programs and counter-
measures against the Rolling Thunder program. This estimate in-
cludes those forces assigned to the Air Force, to AAA and SAM units,
and to engineering and transportation units. In addition a large number
of militia are assigned to air defense activities.
The mobilization of civilian labor has exceeded the manpower
needs for the build-up of military forces. By early 1966, North Viet-
nam had to reallocate large amounts of labor to repair or reconstruc-
tion activities and to dispersal and emergency programs directly re-
lated to the Rolling Thunder attack. These programs are believed to
have required the full-time services of 200, 000 workers and the part-
time utilization of another 100, 000. The obligation of some 150, 000
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persons to fulfill civil defense responsibilities has created an additional
part-time diversion of labor.
The size of this commitment of labor is estimated to have re-
mained stable during 1966. Although the weight of air attack has in-
creased, the labor force has gained a great deal of experience in making
quick repairs, using camouflage, and adopting other innovations to
neutralize the effects of air attack. The experience gained in this type
of construction work has enabled the North Vietnamese to develop faster
recuperability from airstrikes. As the expertise and hence the labor
productivity of the North Vietnamese improves, and assuming, the pattern
of air attack does not change, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese
will be able to reduce the size of the repair-of-damage labor force and
still increase its effectiveness. The commitment of labor could be
greater, however, if more of the airstrikes against the logistic target
system were concentrated on the rail and combination rail/highway
bridges on the major LOC's in the northern part of the country.
Two other manpower drains of some significance are the North
Vietnamese assigned to repair and construction activities on the infil-
tration route through Laos, and casualties resulting from the Rolling
Thunder program.
The road repair and construction activities in Laos require
the commitment of some 20, 000 to 25, 000 persons, about three-fourths
of whom are North Vietnamese. Since the pattern of this activity has
not changed appreciably in the last six months, it is estimated that this
commitment has remained stable.
Casualties inflicted in 1966 as a result of the Rolling Thunder
program are tentatively estimated at from 16, 000 to 21, 000. This
would be an increase of 40 to 50 percent over the level estimated for
1965. Casualties are probably about three-fourths civilian (principally
persons engaged in logistic:and transportation activities in direct sup-
port of the war effort) and one-fourth military.
The drain on North Vietnam's manpower resulting from mili-
tary and civilian mobilization and casualties in both North and South
Vietnam has amounted to 400, 000 to 425, 000 persons. This includes
an estimated military mobilization of at least 170, 000 persons and the
full-time assignment of about 220, 000 persons to war-associated tasks
in North Vietnam and Laos, largely a consequence of Rolling Thunder.
This total diversion amounts to about 5 percent of North Vietnam's
civilian labor force.
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The ability of North Vietnam to meet the numerical commit-
ment of manpower resources is apparent. However, there are many
indications that the manpower drain has inflicted strains on the coun-
try. Recent indications of possible war-associated strains on man-
power are reports that additional women have been trained and are
serving in agricultural occupations and in the militia, and that the
regime is trying - - apparently with limited success -- to make greater
use of unskilled wo rkers from the peasant and urban population. The
disappointing fifth-month harvest has probably made it incumbent on
the regime to provide more agricultural manpower in order to achieve
a successful tenth-month harvest. The regime has also been forced
to shelve some plans for industrial expansion,
F. Third Country Attitudes
There has been little significant change in the attitudes of
Free World countries toward the US bombing program during the last
two years, either because of its continuation or escalation. Free
World reaction to the latest escalation of the bombings -- the strikes
against the POL storage facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong area -- pro-
duced the normal leftist and Communist cries of "outrage" in Free
World states; The overall official reaction, however, was more re-
strained and less critical than expected.
The so-called non-aligned, or neutral, nations who have
attempted from time to time to serve as intermediaries in getting
negotiations started have not altered their basic positions during the
past year as a result of the continued US airstrikes. The unyielding
attitude of the North Vietnamese, however, has had a somewhat sober-
ing impact on certain of these neutral nations. In particular, they have
realized that the United States has a valid point in demanding some sign
from Hanoi that it will respond positively to a cessation of the bomb-
ings. This has not produced a swing toward the United States by these
nations, but it .has served somewhat to mitigate North Vietnamese
efforts to convince the neutrals that the United States is solely to blame
for the continuation of the war,
1. Soviet and Eastern European Attitudes
The effectiveness of the US airstrikes in destroying North
Vietnamese military hardware and in disrupting the transportation
system in North Vietnam has caused Hanoi to place increasing demands
on the USSR and the Eastern European countries. In response, these
countries have agreed to provide additional economic and military goods.
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At the same time, however, there is growing apprehen-
sion in the USSR and the Eastern European countries that their own
national interests will be threatened by a continuation of the bombing
raids. On numerous occasions during the past several weeks, Eastern
European diplomats have assured.the United States that their increased
aid to Hanoi is designed to wean the North Vietnamese away from
China and thus improve the chances of getting Hanoi to the negotiating
table.
These diplomats clearly believe that there is no chance
of getting Hanoi to negotiate until the United States ceases its bombing
of North Vietnam. Thus far, however, neither the USSR nor any of
the Eastern European countries has indicated that it can assure the
United States that Hanoi will make a positive move toward negotiations
if US airstrikes cease. The Poles have advised the United States that
they do not intend to carry US overtures for negotiations to Hanoi again
unless they are given some sign that such activity on their part will
be productive.
The Chinese have not altered their position on the war
as a result of the Rolling Thunder program. They remain as deter-
mined as ever to oppose any move toward peace which does not entail
total US capitulation to North Vietnamese demands. Chinese policy
remains even tougher than that of the Vietnamese on what it will take
to get negotiations started. Peking still insists that the United States
must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam before talks can begin.
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 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070034-6
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070034-6